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Jurisdiction to make an order under section 173 of the Companies Act, 1929 before the company is in winding-up status. Analysis: The judgment revolves around the question of whether the court has jurisdiction to make an order under section 173 of the Companies Act, 1929 before the company is actually in the process of winding-up. The judge notes the historical evolution of this provision, tracing it back to the Companies Act of 1862. The essence of the section is to allow the liquidator to review transactions entered into by the company post the commencement of winding-up. The judge highlights the purpose of the section, emphasizing that any transaction entered into during this period should be subject to review by the liquidator once a winding-up order is made. The judge expresses reluctance in adjudicating on incomplete facts and anticipates the role of the liquidator in reviewing such transactions. The judge opines that the section does not empower the court to make conditional orders in the absence of a winding-up order. The judgment references the case of Carden v. Albert Palace Association [1886] to draw a distinction, where the court made an order in an action and winding-up simultaneously due to the presence of all interested parties. However, the judge in the current case concludes that unless there is an ongoing winding-up process, the court lacks the authority to make orders under section 173. The judge asserts that the jurisdiction lies with the liquidator post his appointment in case a winding-up order is made. The judge highlights the uncertainty surrounding the current status of the company, as a potential winding-up is contingent on the outcome of the petition. Ultimately, the judge concludes that without a definitive winding-up process in progress, the court cannot exercise jurisdiction under section 173 of the Companies Act, 1929. In conclusion, the judgment delves into the interpretation and application of section 173 of the Companies Act, 1929 concerning the court's jurisdiction to make orders before the actual commencement of the winding-up process. The judge emphasizes the role of the liquidator in reviewing transactions post a winding-up order and asserts that the court's authority is contingent upon the existence of an ongoing winding-up process. The judgment underscores the limitations of the court in making orders under section 173 in the absence of a definitive winding-up status of the company.
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