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Issues:
1. Whether the misfeasance proceeding brought under section 543 of the Companies Act is within the time limit. 2. Application of section 45-O of the Banking Companies Act to the limitation period. 3. Availability of a further period under section 45-F of the Banking Companies Act. 4. Classification of claims under contractual liability and misfeasance. Analysis: The judgment revolves around the issue of the timeliness of a misfeasance proceeding initiated by the liquidator of a banking company under section 543 of the Companies Act. The winding-up petition was presented in 1949, and the winding-up order was made in 1950, with the liquidator appointed on the same date. The liquidator's argument that the proceeding was initiated through a report in 1953 is dismissed, emphasizing that a report does not constitute an application as required by the law. The actual application initiating the misfeasance proceeding was filed in 1958, which is beyond the five-year limit from the date of the winding-up order or the first appointment of the liquidator, rendering it out of time under section 543(2) of the Companies Act. However, the judgment delves into the application of section 45-O of the Banking Companies Act, which provides a special period for limitation for banking companies under winding-up. The court analyzes the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 45-O, concluding that sub-section (1) does not apply to misfeasance applications. Sub-section (2) clarifies that the limitation period for misfeasance claims is twelve years from the accrual of the claim or five years from the appointment of the liquidator, whichever is longer. Thus, the period of limitation for misfeasance claims in this case is governed by sub-section (2) of section 45-O. Regarding the availability of a further period under section 45-F of the Banking Companies Act, the court dismisses the argument, stating that the provision had been repealed before the application was filed. The judgment distinguishes previous cases and holds that the application cannot benefit from a statute that is no longer in force. Lastly, the judgment classifies the claims into two categories: those based on contractual liability of the directors and those based on misfeasance. Claims under contractual liability are not time-barred due to section 45-O, while misfeasance claims are limited to acts committed within twelve years preceding the application. The liquidator is directed to provide a statement specifying the acts of misfeasance committed after May 21, 1946, and the liable respondents by a specified date.
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