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Issues Involved:
1. Necessity of obtaining leave from the company court under Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956, for initiating proceedings under Order 8-A, Civil Procedure Code. 2. Interpretation of the term "other legal proceeding" in Section 446(1) of the Companies Act, 1956. 3. Applicability of defensive claims and third-party procedures in the context of company liquidation. Detailed Analysis: 1. Necessity of Obtaining Leave from the Company Court: The primary issue in this case is whether the petitioners need to obtain leave from the company court under Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956, to initiate proceedings under Order 8-A of the Civil Procedure Code. The petitioners argued that no such leave is necessary as Order 8-A proceedings do not amount to initiating new proceedings against the company. However, the court held that the application for initiating proceedings under Order 8-A against a company in liquidation cannot be maintained without the leave of the company court. The court emphasized that the objective of Section 446 is to prevent all litigations against a company in liquidation except with the permission of the company court. 2. Interpretation of "Other Legal Proceeding": The petitioners contended that the term "other legal proceeding" in Section 446(1) should be interpreted to refer only to original proceedings and not to interlocutory applications in a pending suit. The court, however, rejected this narrow interpretation. Citing precedents such as the Federal Court's decision in Governor-General in Council v. Shiromani Sugar Mills, the court clarified that "other legal proceeding" includes execution proceedings and is not confined to original proceedings alone. The court concluded that leave of the company court is required for any proceeding, including interlocutory applications, against a company in liquidation. 3. Applicability of Defensive Claims and Third-Party Procedures: The petitioners argued that since they invoked Order 8-A in defense of the suit filed against them, Section 446 should not apply. They relied on cases like Andhra Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. Anand Bros, where it was held that a defendant does not need leave to set up a cross-claim or set-off in a suit filed by a company in liquidation. However, the court distinguished the present case, noting that the company in liquidation had not initiated the proceedings. The petitioners sought to implead the company to establish its liability or indemnity, which effectively meant enforcing a claim against the company. The court held that defensive proceedings initiated by a defendant require leave from the company court when they seek to enforce a claim against a company in liquidation. The court also addressed the argument that Order 8-A proceedings do not apply to winding-up proceedings, referencing In re A Singer and Company (Hat Manufacturers) Ltd., which held that third-party procedures are not applicable in winding-up proceedings. However, the court emphasized that the substance of the claim should be considered in light of Section 446's objective to prevent a scramble for the company's assets during liquidation. Conclusion: The court upheld the lower court's order rejecting the petitioners' application under Order 8-A, ruling that leave from the company court is necessary for initiating such proceedings against a company in liquidation. The civil revision petition was dismissed, with no costs awarded.
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