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Customs - Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 39920 Records
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2025 (3) TMI 754
Seizure of the gold chain from the Petitioner by the Customs authorities was justified under the Customs Act, 1962 and the Baggage Rules, 2016 - denial of free allowance - eligible passenger in terms of the Notification No. 50/2017-Customs dated 30th June, 2017 (as amended) read with Baggage Rules, 2016 (as amended) - confiscation - redemption fine - penalty - violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- A photograph of the Petitioner wearing the said jewellery has been placed on record. The wedding card of the Petitioner, showing the date of marriage as 21st April, 2024 has also been placed on record. A perusal of the photograph along with the wedding card would itself show that the Petitioner is a bona fide passenger who was travelling to India to attend a wedding ceremony.
It is not in dispute as has been recorded by the adjudicating authority that the Petitioner himself is a UAE resident with a proper resident ID. The gold chain has been valued at Rs. 1,76,488/- - The Petitioner being a non-resident is fully entitled to the benefit provided to an eligible passenger under the Baggage Rules, 2016. The goods constitute personal effects of the Petitioner and could not have been seized in the manner the Custom authorities have.
This Court has now pronounced several orders/judgments, following various judgments of the Supreme Court and this Court, wherein it has been held clearly that if the gold items seized are personal jewellery, the same would not be liable to be confiscated.
Moreover, in the present case, a show cause notice has not been issued to the Petitioner and no personal hearing has been afforded.
Conclusion - i) The impugned order dated 7th November, 2024 passed by the adjudicating authority is accordingly quashed. ii) No penalty or redemption fine shall be collected from the Petitioner. No warehousing charges shall also be liable to be collected from the Petitioner. The charges, if any, already deposited shall be refunded to the Petitioner.
Petition disposed off.
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2025 (3) TMI 753
Seizure of the gold chain from the Petitioner by the Customs authorities was justified under the Customs Act, 1962 and the Baggage Rules, 2016 - denial of free allowance - eligible passenger in terms of the Notification No. 50/2017-Customs dated 30th June, 2017 (as amended) read with Baggage Rules, 2016 (as amended) - confiscation - redemption fine - penalty - violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- A photograph of the Petitioner wearing the said jewellery has been placed on record. The wedding card of the Petitioner, showing the date of marriage as 21st April, 2024 has also been placed on record. A perusal of the photograph along with the wedding card would itself show that the Petitioner is a bona fide passenger who was travelling to India to attend a wedding ceremony.
It is not in dispute as has been recorded by the adjudicating authority that the Petitioner himself is a UAE resident with a proper resident ID. The gold chain has been valued at Rs. 1,76,488/- - The Petitioner being a non-resident is fully entitled to the benefit provided to an eligible passenger under the Baggage Rules, 2016. The goods constitute personal effects of the Petitioner and could not have been seized in the manner the Custom authorities have.
This Court has now pronounced several orders/judgments, following various judgments of the Supreme Court and this Court, wherein it has been held clearly that if the gold items seized are personal jewellery, the same would not be liable to be confiscated.
Moreover, in the present case, a show cause notice has not been issued to the Petitioner and no personal hearing has been afforded.
Conclusion - i) The impugned order dated 7th November, 2024 passed by the adjudicating authority is accordingly quashed. ii) No penalty or redemption fine shall be collected from the Petitioner. No warehousing charges shall also be liable to be collected from the Petitioner. The charges, if any, already deposited shall be refunded to the Petitioner.
Petition disposed off.
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2025 (3) TMI 752
Time limitation for issuance of SCN - SCN was issued beyond the prescribed period of limitation which is three years - HELD THAT:- The Petitioner is a Chartered Accountant who is stated to have assisted the main accused in producing false and fabricated documents in return for receiving 1% of the invoice value. The allegations being serious and factual in nature, this Court in writ jurisdiction would not be able to examine the said factual aspects. Secondly, insofar as the judgment of the Gujarat High Court is concerned, the challenge therein was to the belated issuance of the Show Cause Notice itself and the Show Cause Notices were quashed by the Gujarat High Court at the instance of the actual exporters. In the present case, Petitioner is not the actual exporter but a Chartered Accountant who is providing services to the actual exporter.
Under these circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the Petitioner deserves to be relegated to avail of the appellate remedy. Under Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962, the order is appealable before the Commissioner (Appeals) - the Petitioner may file an appeal in accordance with law challenging the Order-in-Original before the appropriate Appellate Authority.
Conclusion - i) The Petitioner should avail of the appellate remedy under Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962, to challenge the Order-in-Original and raise all objections, including those related to limitation. ii) The Court did not examine the merits of the limitation issue or the procedural fairness of the Order-in-Original.
Petition disposed off.
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2025 (3) TMI 751
Seeking unconditional release of the gold ornaments of the Petitioner detained - issuance of SCN within a prescribed period, usually six months - HELD THAT:- The prescribed period of six months for issuance of a Show Cause Notice has already elapsed. No personal hearing was also granted to the Petitioner and as directed in the above order in the previous writ petition, no order-in-original has been served upon the Petitioner till date. After the passing of an order by the Division Bench in the earlier writ petition, the Customs department had an obligation to ensure that the order-in-original is served or intimated to the Petitioner. There has been no compliance of the direction passed by this Court.
Under such circumstances, the Petitioner cannot be forced to repeatedly approach the Court to even obtain a copy of the order - Accordingly, it is a fit case for directing the release of goods. The detention is, accordingly, quashed. The goods shall be released to the Petitioner. Warehouse charges shall be waived.
Petition disposed off.
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2025 (3) TMI 750
Violation of principles of natural justice - Correctness of setting aside the penalty against the Respondent herein without assigning any reason for the same - HELD THAT:- Since on merits, the Tribunal has given relief to the company of which the respondent is a Director, the question of penalty on the Director would be consequential and in any case, the order is a reasoned order raising no substantial question of law but is based on facts and no perversity has been shown.
The appeal does not raise any substantial question of law and the appeal is dismissed.
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2025 (3) TMI 749
Amendment of Shipping bill from a “Free Shipping Bill” to a “Shipping Bill for Claim for Drawback” in respect of re-export of goods in terms of Section 149 of the Customs Act, 1962 - confiscation - penalty - HELD THAT:- The imported goods were not allowed to be taken outside the customs area and therefore the question of the imported consignments being re-examined once again before the reexport would have been merely a procedural formality as the Customs Department had already subjected the imported consignments of Black Pepper to test and had sent it for laboratory to comply with the provisions of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006.
Since the goods have been reexported back, the procedural irregularities in complying with the requirements of the rules under the Re-export of Imported Goods (Drawback of Customs Duties) Rules, 1995, cannot be pressed against the petitioner as the procedures are handmaids of justice and not mistress of law as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh Vs Aurya Chambers of Commerce [1986 (4) TMI 363 - SUPREME COURT].
Conclusion - Since the goods having been exported without being cleared, the petitioner cannot be denied the substantial benefits that was available to the petitioner.
The respondent is directed to refund the amount within a period of two (2) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order - petition allowed.
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2025 (3) TMI 748
Amnesty scheme - Failure to achieve the export obligation - availment of concessional rate of duty utilising the benefit of the Export Promotion Capital Goods Scheme - HELD THAT:- It is clear from Ext.P1 that the sum of Rs. 50,23,802/- represents the entire amount of duty forgone under the EPCG Scheme. Rs. 13,35,689/- represents the interest payable on the said amount. The learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Customs Department does not dispute this. If that be the case, the failure to achieve the export obligation has been regularised in terms of the scheme. The inability to fulfill export obligation in terms of the Scheme, no doubt, exposed the petitioner to proceedings for recovery of the Customs Duty and for confiscation/imposition of penalty. However, once a Scheme for settling the liability had been introduced and the petitioner had paid Customs Duty forgone together with interest thereon and had obtained an export obligation discharge certificate (which is to be issued in terms of Ext.P2), the default in not achieving the export obligation was regularized by the proper authority namely, the Directorate General of Foreign Trade, Department of Commerce. There is yet another way of understanding the issue.
The only benefit obtained by the petitioner by utilising the benefit of the EPCG Scheme was that he could import goods without paying the full amount of customs duty. In terms of the Amnesty Scheme, the petitioner has to pay the entire amount of duty foregone along with interest up to the date of payment. On payment of the total amount of duty along with interest, it must be deemed that the petitioner has not availed the benefit of the EPCG Scheme. If that were the situation, the liability to achieve export obligation would be discharged, and no penalty/fine could be imposed on the petitioner.
The fine imposed under Section 112 (a) of the Act in lieu of confiscation under Section 111 (o) of the Act cannot be recovered from the petitioner.
Conclusion - i) The petitioner, having regularized the export obligation by paying the duty and interest under the Amnesty Scheme, cannot be subjected to penalties for the same default. ii) The imposition of a penalty under Section 112(a) of the Customs Act is not justified once the export obligation is deemed fulfilled through the Amnesty Scheme.
Petition allowed.
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2025 (3) TMI 747
Revocation of Customs Broker License - forfeiture of security deposit - levy of penalty - violation of Regulation 10(n) of the Customs Broker Licensing Regulations, 2018 - Does the Customs Broker have to satisfy himself that these documents or their copies given by the client were indeed, issued by the concerned government officers or does the Customs Broker have to ensure that the officers had correctly issued these documents? - HELD THAT:- Regulation 10(n) does not place an obligation on the Customs Broker to oversee and ensure the correctness of the actions by Government officers. Therefore, the verification of documents part of the obligation under Regulation 10(n) on the Customs Broker is fully satisfied as long as the Customs Broker satisfies itself that the IEC and the GSTIN were, indeed issued by the concerned officers. This can be done through online verification, comparing with the original documents, etc. and does not require an investigation into the documents by the Customs Broker. Therefore, the appellant was correct in verifying the GSTIN issued by the department on the GST portal. The presumption is that a certificate or registration issued by an officer or purported to be issued by an officer is correctly issued. Section 79 of the Evidence Act, 1872 requires even Courts to presume that every certificate which is purported to be issued by the Government officer to be genuine.
The onus on the Customs Broker cannot, therefore, extend to verifying that the officers had correctly issued the certificate or registration. Of course, if the Customs Broker comes to know that its client has obtained these certificates through fraud or misrepresentation, nothing prevents it from bringing such details to the notice of Customs officers for their consideration and action as they deem fit. However, the Customs Broker cannot sit in judgment over the certificate or registration issued by a Government officer so long as it is valid. In this case, there is no doubt or evidence that the IEC, the GSTIN and other documents were issued by the officers. So, there is no violation as far as the documents are concerned.
There is nothing on record to show that either of these documents were fake or forged. Therefore, they are authentic and reliable and there are no reason to believe that the officers who issued them were not independent and neither has the Customs Broker any reason to believe that they were not independent.
The responsibility of the Customs Broker under Regulation 10(n) does not include keeping a continuous surveillance on the client to ensure that he continues to operate from that address and has not changed his operations. Therefore, once verification of the address is complete as discussed in the above paragraph, if the client moves to a new premises and does not inform the authorities or does not get his documents amended, such act or omission of the client cannot be held against the Customs Broker.
Conclusion - The appellant Customs Broker did not fail in discharging its responsibilities under Regulation 10(n). The impugned order is not correct in concluding that the Customs Broker has violated Regulation 10(n) because the exporter was found to not exist during subsequent verification by the officers.
The impugned order, therefore, cannot be sustained and is set aside - appeal allowed.
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2025 (3) TMI 746
Levy of penalty u/s 112 of the Customs Act, 1962 and a penalty u/s 114AA of the Customs Act - whether the goods that were imported required Wireless Planning and Coordination (WPC) License and whether in the absence of this license, the goods could be confiscated? - existence of proper evidence or not - principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- It is not possible to accept the contention that has been raised in the grounds of appeal that the finding recorded by the Commissioner is without any evidence. The Commissioner has meticulously examined the evidence and has recorded a categorical finding of fact that either WPC Licenses were not produced and the WPC Licenses that were produced were forged. This finding has not been effectively contraverted. Fraud vitiates everything, and therefore, no benefit can accrue to the appellant.
Appeal dismissed.
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2025 (3) TMI 699
Rejection of the petitioner's refund claims by the respondent authority, based on the pendency of an appeal - bone of contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the claim of the petitioner for refund is turned down by the impugned order - HELD THAT:- A Division Bench of this Court in PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VERSUS M/S. GRANULES INDIA LIMITED has held that 'the assessee had been held to be entitled to refund of central value added tax credit of Rs. 3,28,75,733/-. The aforesaid finding is in consonance with law and the same cannot be termed as perverse.' - Thus, as on date, there exists no reason for not following the previous order of the CESTAT.
In the impugned Order-in-Original dated 30.10.2024, the petitioner’s claim was not allowed by taking shelter of pendency of CEA No.26 of 2024, which was, admittedly, dismissed.
It is deemed proper to set aside the impugned Order-in-Original dated 30.10.2024 and restore the matter on the file of respondent No. 1 - petition disposed off.
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2025 (3) TMI 698
Seeking provisional release of seized goods under Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962 - appropriateness of the bank guarantee and bond requirements imposed by the Commissioner of Customs for the provisional release of goods - applicability of Board Circular No. 35/2017-Cus dated 16.08.2017 - HELD THAT:- It is found that exports to be undertaken by the party must not be hinded through the supporting manufacturer i.e. Vasundhra as of now in the view of new authorisation dated 16.04.2024. The bond condition as laid down by the Commissioner will prevail till the time the duty, penalty, interest & redemption fine, etc. are paid by the party as may be adjudicated.
As far as protection of revenue is concerned, it is directed that an undertaking may be taken from the supporting manufacturer to the effect that (a) he has machinery and other infrastructure to process these imported goods (b) he will carry out processing of the remaining seized goods and will hand over the same to the appellant for its exportation. While the bank guarantee condition is quite onerous and deserves to be reduced. The interest of Revenue ad-interim, may need protection.
Conclusion - The impugned order modified by reducing the bank guarantee requirement and allowing the appellant to offer immovable property as security. The provisional release of the goods are released.
Appeal is partly allowed.
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2025 (3) TMI 697
Maintainability of the appeal - whether or not there exists jurisdiction for this Tribunal to decide the matter on merits? - HELD THAT:- Honourable High Court of Delhi has in its decision in Principal Commissioner of C.Ex. Delhi-I v. Space Telelink Ltd, [2017 (3) TMI 1599 - DELHI HIGH COURT] considered the effect of stay of proceedings by the Honourable Supreme Court and has held that 'We are, therefore, of the opinion that the passing of the interim order dated February 21, 1991 by the Delhi High Court staying the operation of the order of the appellate authority dated January 7, 1991 does not have the effect of reviving the appeal which had been dismissed by the appellate authority by its order dated January 7, 1991 and it cannot be said that after February 21, 1991, the said appeal stood revived and was pending before the appellate authority.'
On a plain reading of Section 129A(1) and the applicable first proviso along with its clause (c), to our mind, the legislative intent is emphatically made clear by the language of the statute couched in prohibitive terms, twice over. Moreover, unlike the wordings of Section 130(1), the legislature having consciously omitted the phrase “among other things”, coupled with the doubly emphasised prohibition in the negative, clearly conveys the legislative intent that an order “related to” simpliciter, payment of drawback as provided in Chapter X, and the rules made thereunder, is sufficient to oust the jurisdiction of this Tribunal from entertaining the appeal - if the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) under Section 128A relates to any of the aforesaid aspects, then by virtue of clause (c) to proviso to Section 128A (1), the jurisdiction of this Tribunal stands statutorily excluded and the appeal shall not lie to this Appellate forum.
The concurrent jurisdiction of the Revisionary Authority as well as of this Tribunal to deal with orders relating to drawback, albeit arising from different hierarchical adjudicatory levels, at times, perplexes the party as to the forum before which they are to pursue their remedy, when aspects relating to valuation and classification also get intertwined. Occasionally, while pursuing such remedy before the revisionary authority, it may result in foreclosing the otherwise available appellate remedy before constitutional courts even for some deserving litigants - There is always a presumption in favour of constitutionality of such provisions legislated. Therefore, such litany of travails are not ones that the Tribunal, a creature of statute, can address by usurping a jurisdiction under any misconceived notion of that being its responsibility while functioning as sentinel on the qui vive for rendering justice.
Jurisdictional High Court holding that Section 129A of the Customs Act, 1962 has explicitly stated about the exclusion of Chapter X, and further since the Honourable High Court has also granted its imprimatur to the decision in PREMIUM INTERTRADE PVT. LTD. VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, MUMBAI [2000 (10) TMI 661 - CEGAT, MUMBAI] that the phrase “payment of drawback” used in the proviso to Section 129A would prevent the Appellate Tribunal from dealing with cases involving recovery of drawback, in adherence to such binding precedents, it is held that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is ousted in the present matters and the defect raised by the Registry is in order.
Conclusion - The Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal concerning the recovery of drawback, as it was related to the payment of drawback under Chapter X and the rules made thereunder.
The appeal filed is not maintainable and cannot be entertained and is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
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2025 (3) TMI 696
Classification of imported goods - imported towers - to be classified under Customs Tariff Item (CTI) 7308 or under Customs Tariff Heading (CTH) 8503 - whether the towers are parts of Wind Operated Electricity Generators (WOEG) and thus eligible for specific tariff classification and exemption benefits? - HELD THAT:- The ‘tower' in question, as understood by the Board is clearly a part of the Wind Electric Generator and not a General/Civil Structure as understood by the Commissioner in the impugned order. The Commissioner is clearly in error in misunderstanding that the ‘tower’ in question is not a part of Wind Energy Generator, nor do we see any justification for generalizing the ‘tower' in question. The conclusion drawn is therefore bereft of any merits and hence, the said finding cannot sustain, which was aside.
In one of the cases, viz. CC Chennai Vs Suzlon Towers and Structures Limited, Chennai Bench [2024 (1) TMI 1171 - CESTAT CHENNAI] has even considered the classification of ‘tower flanges’ against rival tariffs vis-à-vis the eligibility for exemption benefit of Notification No.12/2012. The Bench has after a detailed analysis, concluded that the tower flanges are clearly parts of WOEG classifiable under 8503. Further, the other orders of the Benches are on the same line.
Conclusion - The towers imported by the appellant were indeed parts of WOEG and thus should be classified under CTH 8503.
The impugned order set aside - appeal allowed.
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2025 (3) TMI 695
Rate of IGST - lithium-ion batteries - whether the rate of IGST payable on the import of lithium-ion batteries is at 12% as per S. No. 203 of Schedule II to Notification No. 01/2017 – IT (Rate) or at 18% as per S. No. 376AA of Schedule III to Notification No. 01/2017 – IT (Rate), as inserted by Notification No. 19/2018-IT (Rate) dated 26.7.2018, which specifically covered “lithium-ion batteries”? - levy of interest or penalty - HELD THAT:- The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Ors. [1955 (9) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT], stated that a legal enactment must be interpreted in its plain and literal sense, as that is the first principle of interpretation. Again, in Union of India Vs Hansoli Devi [2002 (9) TMI 799 - SUPREME COURT], wherein the Apex Court held that it is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, the court must give effect to the words used in the statute. Besides, in a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said and there is no room for any intendment. In a taxing statute nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied, one can only look fairly at the language used.
It is found that based on the first principle of interpretation, the impugned goods were found covered under a specific heading which conveys only one meaning and were correctly determined to discharge IGST @ 18% as per S. No. 376AA of Schedule III of Notification No. 19/2018-IT (Rate) dated 26.07.2018, during the relevant period, by the Original Authority. Due to a lack of ambiguity in the rate notification and in the light of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Simplex Mills Co. Ltd. [2005 (3) TMI 117 - SUPREME COURT], there is no necessity here, to examine the claim of the goods at S. No. 203 of Schedule II to N/N. 01/2017 – IT (Rate) and muddy the clear water. An aid to interpretation of the terms used in a statute or notification is resorted to only when there is some ambiguity in the words or expression used, which is not so the case here.
No Interest or Penalty is leviable in the absence of machinery provision - HELD THAT:- The Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India, [2022 (10) TMI 212 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT], has examined an identical issue regarding interest. It was held that there is no substantive provision in Section 3 of Customs Tariff Act, 1975 requiring payment of interest and in the absence of specific provisions for levy of interest, same cannot be levied or charged.
It is also noticed that Section 3(12) of the Customs Tariff Act has been substituted, vide Finance (No 2) Act 2024 which was notified on 16th August 2024, specifically including ‘interest’ among others measures - The legislature having now incorporated ‘interest’ into the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, the same can be demanded for non-payment of IGST only after the substitution of the said sub-section as above, from 16.08.2024 and not on the impugned goods which were imported before that date. The appellants prayer hence succeeds on this issue.
Conclusion - i) The demand for IGST on “lithium-ion batteries” @ 18% as per S. No. 376AA of Schedule III to Notification No. 01/2017 – IT (Rate), is upheld. ii) The demand for interest is set aside.
Appeal disposed off.
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2025 (3) TMI 694
Revocation of Customs Broker license - forfeiture of its security deposit - imposition of penalty - violation of Regulations 10(a), 10(d), 10(n) and 10(q) of the CBLR.
Violation of Regulation 10 (a) - HELD THAT:- Regulation 10(a) requires the Customs Broker to obtain an authorisation and to produce it to the Assistant Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner when called for. It is not a task requiring any extraordinary effort since the Customs Broker is usually present on a daily basis or at least visits the custom house frequently because it is his place of work. The existence of the exporter or otherwise is not relevant to Regulation 10(a). The only thing relevant is if the authorisation had been obtained and produced when called for - If an enquiry is being conducted into any consignment and if the Customs Broker is called and if he had obtained an authorisation from the exporter before filing the Shipping Bill, we find no reason for the Customs broker to not produce it. In this case, as per the records, the appellant had not even responded to several summons issued to it. It is only during the personal hearing while passing the impugned order, the appellant stated that it had an authorisation and would be able to produce it. The Commissioner has correctly rejected this submission because Regulation 10(a) not only requires obtaining an authorisation but also producing it before the Assistant Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner when called for.
Violation of Regulation 10 (d) - HELD THAT:- The presumption is that DGFT has not issued benami IECs to non-existent exporters. If DGFT is issuing benami IECs and the Customs ICES system is allowing export on the basis of such benami IECs to exporters who do not exist at all or exist only on paper, the problem is not of the appellant or any other Customs Broker but it is a deep rooted systemic problem where neither DGFT nor Customs checks the existence of the exporter/importer while allowing exports and giving out export benefits. Even a ration card which gives the poor families subsidised rations worth a few thousand rupees is not issued without verifying the existence of the persons and their family size. Likewise, even a passport, which gives one nothing but a right to leave the country and return to it is not issued without police verification- prior to or after the issue - the appellant had not violated Regulation 10(d).
Violation of Regulation 10 (n) - HELD THAT:- Regulation 10(n) requires the Customs Broker to verify correctness of Importer Exporter Code (IEC) number, Goods and Services Tax Identification Number (GSTIN), identity of his client and functioning of his client at the declared address by using reliable, independent, authentic documents, data or information. This responsibility does not extend to physically going to the premises of each of the exporters to ensure that they are functioning at the premises. When a Government officer issues a certificate or registration with an address to an exporter, the Customs Broker cannot be faulted for trusting the certificates so issued.
Regulation 10(n) does not place an obligation on the Customs Broker to oversee and ensure the correctness of the actions by the Government officers. Therefore, the verification of documents part of the obligation under Regulation 10(n) on the Customs Broker is fully satisfied as long as the Customs Broker satisfies itself that the IEC and the GSTIN were, indeed issued by the concerned officers. This can be done through online verification, comparing with the original documents, etc. and does not require an investigation into the documents by the Customs Broker. The presumption is that a certificate or registration issued by an officer or purported to be issued by an officer is correctly issued. Section 79 of the Evidence Act, 1872 requires even Courts to presume that every certificate which is purported to be issued by the Government officer to be genuine.
The GSTIN issued by the officers of CBIC itself shows the address of the client and the authenticity of the GSTIN is not in doubt. In fact, the entire verification report is based on the GSTIN. Further, IECs issued by the DGFT also show the address. There is nothing on record to show that either of these documents were fake or forged. Therefore, they are authentic and reliable and there are no reason to believe that the officers who issued them were not independent and neither has the Customs Broker any reason to believe that they were not independent - the appellant had not violated Regulation 10(n).
Violation of Regulation 10(q) - HELD THAT:- After carefully considering the sequence of events as narrated in the SCN and the impugned order, there are no iota of doubt that the appellant had not cooperated at all with the investigation. The appellant’s submission that it had not received the several summons issued by post and that it had received only one summon delivered by hand to Shri Ajay Dogra but the statement could not be recorded are nothing but lame excuses - the appellant had not cooperated with the investigation and thereby violated regulation 10(q) of CBLR, 2018.
Conclusion - The appellant violated Regulations 10(a) and 10(q) but had not violated Regulations 10(d) and 10(n). Applying the doctrine of proportionality, the ends of justice will meet, if the penalty of Rs. 50,000/- imposed on the appellant is upheld and the revocation of its licence and forfeiture of security deposit are set aside.
The appeal is partly allowed and the impugned order is modified to the extent that the revocation of licence and forfeiture of security deposit of the appellant are set aside but the penalty of Rs. 50,000/- imposed on the appellant is upheld.
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2025 (3) TMI 693
Smuggling of Gold - Town seizure - Confiscation - statements recorded un/s 108 of the Customs Act can be considered as conclusive evidence of smuggling or not - burden to prove - whether impugned order is based on assumption and presumptions? - applicability of Section 113 of the Customs Act - HELD THAT:- No any allegations that seized gold were trying to export from India. Therefore, Section 113 of the Customs Act is not applicable.
It is a case of town seizure, in which Customs Officers intercepted a person Shri Burri Yedukondalu and seized 850.39 grams gold in 10 pieces of irregular shape. The Customs Officer recorded statement of Shri Burri Yedukondalu under Section 108 of the Customs Act in which he stated that “He is working as part time worker in M/s Dattatreya Associates in Durgi, owner is Shri Kapalavai Naga Samba Siva Rao. As per the directions of his Associates in Durgi. His owner is Shri Kapalvai Naga Samba Siva Rao. His owner is paying him Rs. 20,000/- per month excluding travel and food expenses. As per the directions of his owner i.e Shri Kapalavai Naga Samba Siva Rao (owner of M/s Dattatreya Associates in Durgi), on 17.10.2022, he started from Durgi to Nellore along with cash of Rs. 43,50,000/- given by owner and reached Nellore.
Statement recorded under Section 108 of The Customs Act is admissible in evidence but such statement may be scrutinised in facts and circumstances of the case. It cannot be presumed that statement recorded by Customs Officer will be treated as gospel truth. Learned Counsel for the appellants argued that Department prepared a concocted story and witnesses are habitual/pocket witness. He produced a copy of Panchanama dated 20.03.2023 at 19.45 hrs onwards relating to place Prakasam District, Andhra Pradesh in which a witness named Shri Gedela Nageswara Rao with same address. How it is possible a person will be available as a witness in so many places. It creates doubt on panchanama as well as statement as recorded.
Conclusion - Revenue failed to prove reasonable belief that the seized gold is smuggled whereas appellants successfully proved that seized gold was not smuggled but prepared bars after melting old jewellery. Therefore, absolute confiscation as well as imposing penalties are not justified.
Appeal allowed.
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2025 (3) TMI 639
Seeking release of fresh garlic which has been imported by the Petitioner from Afghanistan without any condition of furnishing of a bank guarantee - HELD THAT:- This Court is inclined to grant an opportunity to the Petitioner to clarify the actual position before the Respondent/Department.
Accordingly, let the present writ petition and the documents annexed therein be submitted by the Petitioner to the Commissioner of Customs (Preventive) NCH, New Delhi and let the said official examine all the documents. If there is any document which is missing, the Petitioner shall produce the same and satisfy the said Department with respect to all the other relevant aspects including the actual country of origin and applicability of SAFTA provisions to the impugned consignment.
Considering the perishable nature of the goods seized, the Department shall take a decision by the next date of hearing.
The Petitioner to appear before the Custom Department on 13th March, 2025.
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2025 (3) TMI 638
Dismissal of appeal on the ground of time limitation - sufficient cause for delay or not - appeal passed beyond the period of 90 days prescribed under Section 129D(3) of the Customs Act, 1962 - HELD THAT:- The proviso to Section 129D(3) mandates that the Board may, on sufficient cause being shown extend the said period(the period for passing the review order) by another thirty days and even before this Tribunal the appellant has not evidenced that the appellant has shown sufficient cause to the Board and had obtained the sanction of the Board as mandated in the proviso to Section 129D(3) ibid for preferring the appeal before the Commissioner Appeals beyond the statutorily prescribed period provided in sub-section (3) of Section 129D. Further, the appellant has also not evidenced that in the absence of any such order of the Board providing the extension sought on sufficient cause being shown, the appellant had filed an application seeking condonation of delay of 20 days stating justifiable reasons before the Commissioner Appeals. As can be seen from the grounds of the appeal before this Tribunal reproduced supra, the appeal is only on the grounds that the rejection of the appeal on the ground of limitation by the Lower Appellate Authority would be a loss for the Revenue and the Appellate Authority has not decided the case on merits.
There is no explanation or justification provided for not adhering to the mandate of proviso to Section 129(D)(3) nor any explanation provided for not preferring an application for condonation of delay for filing the review order beyond the period prescribed in Section 129 D(3) before the Commissioner of Appeals in the absence of any sanction obtained/permission accorded by the Board as per proviso to Section 129D(3).
In this case, neither has any evidence been let in that an application showing sufficient cause has been preferred to the Board to extend the period for filing of review order nor has any such order of the Board extending the period for filing of the review order been produced. It has also not been shown that the appellant had preferred any application for condonation of non- filing of the extension order of the Board or seeking condonation of delay of 20 days in passing the review order, in the absence of such sanction/permission of the Board before the learned Appellate Authority. The appellant has no right to any preferential consideration to get its delay or non-compliance of the mandate of law condoned mechanically and without adhering to the mandate of law.
Conclusion - The appellant has no right to any preferential consideration to get its delay or non-compliance of the mandate of law condoned mechanically and without adhering to the mandate of law. In view of our aforesaid discussions, there are no justifiable reason shown to interfere with the impugned Order-in-Appeal of the Commissioner of Customs (Appeals) and the same is upheld.
Appeal dismissed.
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2025 (3) TMI 637
Classification of the imported goods - Synthetic Casting Tapes - to be classified under CTH 9021 or under CTH 30059040 - invocation of extended period of limitation under Section 28(4) of the Customs Act, 1962 - HELD THAT:- The issue involved in the present appeal is no more res-integra. In the case of Johnson & Johnson [1998 (9) TMI 184 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI] it was held that 'the Deltalite Casting Tapes imported by the appellants herein fall for classification under sub--heading 3005.10 of the Customs Tariff Act.'
Extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- There is also no dispute that at least 2 of the orders of other Benches where the classification was decided, were available when the Bills of Entry came to be filed. The appellant had also relied upon on order of Mumbai Bench in C. Natwarlal & Co. [2005 (4) TMI 331 - CESTAT, MUMBAI], reported in the year 2005 and, hence, the appellant cannot plead ignorance of the above orders which were reported much earlier, in the years 1999 & 2000. The larger period has been correctly invoked and hence, the appellant has to suffer the consequence.
Conclusion - i) The goods in question are not in the nature of a device/instrument/appliance and hence cannot be considered as coming within the coverage of Heading 90.21. ii) The larger period has been correctly invoked and hence, the appellant has to suffer the consequence.
There are no merit in the appeal - appeal dismissed.
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2025 (3) TMI 636
Lawful possession of Gold seized - discharge of burden of proof under Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962 or not - HELD THAT:- The learned Commissioner (Appeals) has very clearly established through his impugned order, particularly para 5.9 and 5.10 that the gold which was seized was lawfully possessed by the respondent and the respondent has discharged the burden of proof required under Section 123 of Customs Act, 1962.
The appeal filed by Revenue dismissed.
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