|
Advanced Search Options
FEMA - Case Laws
Showing 261 to 280 of 1378 Records
-
2019 (2) TMI 214
Violation of provisions of section 4 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 and Regulation 3 of the Foreign Exchange Management (Realisation, Repatriation and Surrender of Foreign Exchange) Regulations, 2000 - inheritance of foreign exchange - Held that:- There is no dispute that the appellant being a person resident in India has inherited this amount as per the voluntary settlement deed executed by the settlers being person resident outside India - As per settled law, the word inheritance has to be given a wider meaning here. The word inheritance here cannot be limited to mean the asset acquired by a Human being/ natural person upon the death of a natural person because as per section 2(v) of the Act a ‘person resident in India’ includes a legal person. Thus, the property passing upon death of a person being resident outside India to a person resident in India whether the person resident in India is a natural or a legal person.
As per Section 9(e) of the Act also if the foreign exchange has been acquired by way of gift or inheritance then even in that situation the provision of section 4 shall not apply. The reserve bank has not prescribed any limit for holding the foreign exchange in case the foreign exchange has been acquired by gift or inheritance - even if for a moment assuming that the provision of section 6(4) and section 9(d), (e) of the Act are not applicable in the instant case even than the appellant should not be held guilty for contravening the provisions of section 4 of the Act
The appellant should not be considered to have violated the provisions of section 4 of the Act and Regulation 3 of the Foreign Exchange Management (Realisation, Repatriation and Surrender of Foreign Exchange) Regulations, 2000 in view of peculiar facts and circumstances of the present matter - appeal allowed - decided in favor of appellant.
-
2019 (1) TMI 1502
Maintainability of appeal before Special Director (Appeals) - proper appellate authority for deciding the appeals filed after repeal of FERA on 01.06.2000 against the order passed under Section 51 of FERA - contravention of Sections 9 (1) (a), 9(1)(c) and Section 16(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 - imports and exports of certain commodities made with two foreign parties, viz., M/s Fingrain, S.A., Geneva and M/s Continental Grain Export Corporation, New York - whether appeal against the order passed by the Deputy Director of Enforcement (Adjudicating Officer) under Section 51 of FERA read with FEMA would lie only to the Appellate Tribunal under Section 19 of FEMA but not before the Special Director (Appeals) under Section 17 of FERA?
Held that:- Any appeal filed after 01.06.2000 against the order of the Adjudicating Officer passed under Section 51 of FERA in the proceedings initiated under FERA would lie before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 19 of FEMA.
The legislature did not intend to make a distinction between the two appeals for their disposal by two different appellate authorities under FEMA only because one appeal was filed prior to 01.06.2000, therefore, it will lie before the Appellate Tribunal whereas the other appeal which was filed after 01.06.2000 though against the similar order, it will lie before the Special Director (Appeals). In our view, there does not appear to be any justifiable reason to make such distinction for filing of appeals filed against the similar order passed under FERA before two different appellate authorities under FEMA - this intention of the legislature is strengthened when we read Section 49 (5)(b) of FEMA and Section 81(c) of FERA.
So far as Section 49(5)(b) of FEMA is concerned, it specifically provides that the appeals filed under Section 52 (2) of FERA against the order passed under Section 51 of FERA will be decided by the Appellate Tribunal under FEMA - So far as Section 81(c) of FERA, 1973 is concerned, it deals with Repeal and Saving of FERA, 1947. Clause (c) of Section 81 specifically provides that all the appeals filed under Section 23 of FERA, 1947, whether pending on the date of Repeal or/and those filed after the repeal of FERA, 1947, shall be disposed of by the Appellate Board constituted under FERA, 1973.
Since Section 49(5)(b) of FEMA is not identically worded on the pattern of Section 81(c) of FERA, that itself would justify that the legislature intended to provide two appellate authorities in FEMA for filing two types of appeals arising out of a similar order - it is not possible to accept the submission of learned counsel for the respondents(assessees) that by interpretative process this Court can uphold creation of another appellate authority for the disposal of the appeals filed against the order passed under Section 51 of FERA after 01.06.2000 which do not fall under Section 49 (5)(2) of FEMA.
There is no reason as to why the same legislative intent while interpreting the provisions of FERA, 1973 and FEMA, 1999 is applied for deciding the identical question now arising in the case.
The appellate forum for deciding the appeals arising out of the order passed under Section 51 of FERA whether filed prior to 01.06.2000 or filed after 01.06.2000 must be the same, i.e., Appellate Tribunal under FEMA - the appeal filed by respondent Nos. 2 to 4 against the order dated 05.12.2003 passed by Deputy Director of enforcement under Section 51 of FERA will lie and was, therefore, maintainable only before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 19 of FEMA - appeal allowed.
-
2019 (1) TMI 980
Stay of penalty imposed - Contravention and allegations against the appellant u/s 6(3)(d) of FEMA - penalty imposed - delay in settlement of import dues - Held that:- The Appellants have prima facie demonstrated that there have been no violations of the provisions of FEMA, the Rules, Regulations and the Master Circular on Imports. Without prejudice to any of the aforesaid, and assuming without admitting that there was a violation, even then the RBI regularized the same by granting the permissions to settle the dues specifically from “FEMA Angle”. The Appellant has also able demonstrated the factual conditions which led to the delay in settlement of import dues.
The RBI letter expressly states that the permission was issued from foreign exchange angle under FEMA. The limitation of the permission was only in respect of any other applicable laws other than FEMA. The Respondent is admittedly not seeking to impose penalty for alleged violation of any other law. In view of the aforesaid, the contentions of the Respondent especially at Para 16 are unsustainable.
In this regard, the submissions of the Appellants in their Appeals, Stay Applications and the common Synopsis are reiterated.
Prima facie it is of the view that the respondent has no jurisdiction to reinterpret the terms of the agreement between Google Ireland and Google India.
Undue hardship that will be caused to the Appellants if they are made to make a deposit of any part of their respective penalty which is without basis in law and in any event highly disproportionate to the bona fide actions of the Appellants.
In the present case, the RBI has specifically allowed the settlement of dues from FEMA angle
In the light of the prima facie has been made by the appellant and the appellant will suffer hardship if the appellant is asked to deposit the penalty amount. After having through the facts and material placed on record, I am of the opinion that the chances of success of appeal are more than the failure of appeal. Thus, the prayer is allowed. M.P is disposed of. There shall be a stay of operation of the impugned order till the final decision of appeals.
-
2019 (1) TMI 190
Approval of RBI for transfer of technology in excess of USD 1,00,000 - rectification of the advance payment - invocation of provisions of FERA - Held that:- The whole case hinges on the RBI’s approval for the excess amount not being available. From the RBI’s letter dated 18.11.2002, it is apparent that the RBI was seized of the matter and had not rejected their case. It would be in the fitness of things to have consulted the RBI before the impugned order was passed more so because the genesis of the case was an information received from the RBI.
The matter is remanded back to the original authority to get the necessary response/reply from the RBI and pass a fresh speaking order after giving the appellants an opportunity of being heard.
-
2019 (1) TMI 26
Penalty under FEMA - Tribunal jurisdiction allowing waiver of deposit of penalty - Tribunal directed the appellant to deposit a sum of ₹ 12,00,000/-, which would amount to 25% out of the total amount ordered by the adjudicating authority by way of penalty - Held that:- We are of the opinion that the direction already given in this appeal, dated 05.09.2018, would safeguard the interest of the Department, since the appeal itself has been directed to be listed by the Appellate Tribunal on 27.02.2019.
Thus the appeal stands allowed and the order passed by the Tribunal is modified to the effect that the appellant shall pay a sum of ₹ 5,00,000/-, which the appellant has already paid. Consequently, the remaining amount of penalty, levied on the appellant, shall remain stayed till the disposal of the appeal by the Appellate Tribunal.
-
2018 (12) TMI 2001
Order of seizure u/s 37-A of FEMA - Competent Authority's power and the scope of adjudication under Section 37-A - clash between a general provision and a specific provision - HELD THAT:- The powers of the Appellate Tribunal are general in nature and does not have any specific powers. Whereas Section 37-A (4) is a specific provision. In a clash between a general provision and a specific provision, the specific provision would prevail.
The decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Suresh Nanda vs. CBI [2008 (1) TMI 876 - SUPREME COURT] dealt with the issue of a special Act with the specific subject and a general Act. It laid down “where there is a special Act dealing with specific subject, resort should be had to that Act instead of general Act providing for the matter connected with the specific Act.” The golden rule of interpretation of statues stipulates that no law or any part thereof can be so interpreted to make the other part redundant. The appellant’s plea of setting aside the seizure would tantamount to that.
Whether Section 37-A will have retrospective effect or not? - As there are decisions of the Supreme Court and other courts on the issue whether a law can have retrospective effect. In Vatika Township (P) Ltd. [2014 (9) TMI 576 - SUPREME COURT] held Law passed today cannot apply to the events of the past. Retrospective operation should not be given to a statute so as to take away or impair an existing right or create any obligation or impose a new liability.
While seizure is a measure which is taken as an immediate action it does not bestow the power of appropriation until and unless it is confiscated. The law, before Section 37-A came into being did not give any right to the parties to get their property seized and thereafter agitate as provided under Section 37-A(3) and Section 37-A (4) before the concerned authorities but was more draconian in the sense that they were straightaway confiscated. Section 37-A has in fact enlarged the rights of the parties with regard to the properties etc. which has supposedly contravened the provisions of law, in the present case Section 4.
It is nobody’s case that Section 4 did not exist prior to the introduction of Section 37-A and there is no dispute on that. Section 37-A has therefore given more rights to the parties and more channels for them to agitate their case. It has mellowed down the impact of Section 13(2), as presently, there would be a separate procedure involving two different stages of adjudication as stipulated under Section 37-A (3) and 37-A (4). The provisions are beneficial to the parties and has extended their rights further than that was provided in law earlier.
As the adjudication proceedings u/s 37-A (4) are yet to be finalised and the law stipulates that the seizure shall continue till the disposal of the adjudication proceedings and because of the issue of retrospectivity will not remain see no legal ground to interfere with the orders of the Competent Authority at this stage.
In any case, the appellants will have the liberty to file appeal against the adjudication order as and when passed, under Section 19 of FEMA, when it would be open to them to agitate all the issues raised before the adjudicating authority, if they are aggrieved. I, therefore, dismiss the appeal as rejected.
-
2018 (12) TMI 1765
Violation of FEMA - Appellant Company has failed to submit (Bill of entry) documentary evidence for import of goods in respect of the advance remittance through HSBC Bank - penalty imposed on managing director - HELD THAT:- It is admitted by the respondent that the Company has used the foreign exchange for the declared purpose in terms of section 10 (5) by assuming that non-receipt of the goods would mean use of foreign exchange for a wrong purpose. Once the foreign exchange has been used by the Appellant Company for the declared purpose and if said purpose is not achieved it would not lead to the inference of not using the foreign exchange for the purpose for which it was acquired.
Invoking of Regulation 6 of the Foreign Exchange Management (Realisation, Repatriation and Surrender of Foreign Exchange) Regulations, 2000 is without any substance as the same applies to Resident Person, who has acquired or purchased foreign exchange for any purpose mentioned in the declaration to the Authorised Dealer in terms of Section 10 (5) of the Act and does not use it for the said purpose and is enjoined to surrender such foreign exchange or unused portion thereof back to the Authorised Dealer within 60 days. In the Show Cause Notice, the provisions of the law have also been engrafted .
The Counsel for the respondent has referred Section 11 of FEMA contending that the exemption granted by RBI is basically seeking compliance are not otherwise which has no substance as for alleged compliance of filing of Bill of Entry, RBI had granted exemption, hence there was no scope of compliance. Even more, reading of Section 11 FERA, 1999 in the manner is correct. In fact, it is an enabling section empowering RBI to issue directions to the Bankers/Authorised Persons for the purpose of securing compliance of the provisions of FEMA. The said section goes in consonance with the judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of LIC versus Escorts, [1985 (12) TMI 289 - SUPREME COURT] wherein held that Reserve Bank of India is the Custodian General of the foreign exchange of the country and what is permitted/exempted by RBI cannot be questioned, by any person and directions are given by RBI in terms of section 11 of FEMA in consonance with the said law laid down by Hon‟ble Supreme Court.
The respondent admittedly not denied the fact that the vendor was declared bankrupt who has also not issued the 60 days notice to the appellant about it, otherwise the appellant would have approached to recover the amount as of law. Even if the contention of the respondent is accepted, the respondent ED is not able to get any additional/independent evidence against the appellant apart which was already available with RBI.
As asserted by the respondent that inquiries were made with the Company to find out the person incharge and responsible during the relevant period and the Company vide communication dated 14/10/2014 informed that Mr. S. Jain (Head of Finance) was the person incharge during the impugned period, who had already left the Company. The said Mr. S. Jain has not been arraigned in the show cause noticee and instead the Managing Director, who is appointed on 27/08/2015 as Managing Director of the Company, a citizen of South Korea was arraigned in vicarious liability in terms of Section 42 of FEMA. The Form DIRE-12 for appointment of the Appellant No. 2 as Managing Director. The present Managing Director became Managing Director on 27/08/2015 and was not the person in-charge of and responsible to for the conduct of the business of the Company, which was duly informed to the Respondents during the course of investigation but the Respondent chosen to arraign the new Managing Director with vicarious liability. Therefore, the notice and the penalty imposed on the Managing Director is without any valid reason.
Allegations against the Company and the order passed against the Company is liable to be set aside. Once Company is not liable, as aforesaid, there is no scope of imposition of penalty on the Managing Director as the precondition for imposition of penalty in vicarious liability is, if the company is found guilty.
-
2018 (12) TMI 445
Gross violation of the principles of natural justice - Dispensation of the pre-deposit - Penalty imposed - whether principles of natural justice was followed or not? - Held that:- Innumerable opportunities have been given to the appellant for appearing/arguing his case and examining the witness but he failed to avail the same. He either did not appear or on the few occasions where he did appear before the adjudicating authority he took adjournment on some plea or the other. We agree with the learned counsel for the respondents that justice is qua both the parties and we do not find any violation by the adjudicating authority in this regard.
Therefore, do not see any reason to grant them the dispensation of the pre-deposit. They have not pleaded anything either on merits of the case or on hardship even when specifically asked by me. With regard to the judgments quoted by the counsel for the appellant on the principles of natural justice it goes without saying that these principles are the pillars of justice and there is no denying these judgements. However, the facts of the case has to be seen to come at a conclusion whether there is a denial of these principles or not. The discussions and findings in the previous paras show that the principles have been fully followed by the adjudicating authority.
Interests of justice would be served if the appellant is directed to deposit 50 per cent of the total penalty (covering all the four appeals as above) within a period of two months from today.
-
2018 (12) TMI 444
Contravention of FERA underhand foreign exchange - Loose sheets found in the house of the main accused Shri Darshan Singh and the statement of the appellant - Held that:- There is no evidence to that effect on record. In fact, the appellant in his statement before the DRI and which finds a mention in the impugned order has not stated that the alleged Darshan Singh was in any way involved in foreign exchange transactions. The so-called loose sheets recovered from the residence of Shri Darshan Singh does not establish that the appellant had received or given any money in contravention of FERA. There are no statements or any other evidence which has been produced by the adjudicating authority to prove the involvement of the appellant in receipt or making payments of foreign exchange. Holding of Indian currency or dealing with it is not a crime and if there is a violation of any other law like the income tax etc. that would be dealt with by the respective authorities. The appeal is accordingly allowed.
-
2018 (11) TMI 1672
Stay petition - pre-deposit orders - HELD THAT:- With regard to undue hardship he pleaded financial hardship for all. However, the ITR produced by him shows the financial conditions of all as comfortable except for M/s. Queen Forex Pvt. Ltd and M/s. Cheap Cloth Store whose financial status as noticed from their Income Tax Return for the years 2017-18, 2018-19 are not good.
Hence Shri Rajinder Singh Duggal, Shri Vishal Arora and Shri Sunil Gupta are directed to pre-deposit the entire amount as per the impugned order. The pre-deposit with respect to M/s Queen Forex Pvt. Ltd and M/s Cheap Cloth Store is stayed until further order.
All the deposits are to be done within a period of five months from today.
-
2018 (11) TMI 367
FERA violation - cases against a number of exporters for presenting forged copies of shipping bills, GR-I Forms, invoices etc. where no shipment had actually taken place - denial of principle of natural justice - violation confirmed on statement taken during investigation - relying upon statements made under the Customs Act for the purpose of the adjudication proceedings under FEMA - Held that:- Principles of natural justice has been duly followed and the appellant have failed to avail of the opportunities given to him. Moreover, his silence over receipt of the relied upon documents afresh in 2008 after the Tribunal‟s remand order of 16.11.2007 also casts shadow on his intentions except that he appears to be trying to delay the decision. On merits as discussed above, his 3 statements which are voluntarily and the investigations done by the Customs brings out the offence as well as his involvement.
A decided in Vinod M. Chitalia vs. UOI [2012 (5) TMI 157 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] the investigations done under Customs Act, can be used for the purpose of FERA/FEMA also, as the transaction in this case also is the same. The court further held that “in assessing these findings, the Court cannot be oblivious of the fact that clandestine transaction of the nature involved in the present case, are within the peculiar knowledge of persons such as the appellant who are parties to those transactions. The burden which is cast upon the adjudicating authority to establish a violation must be assessed from a robust and common sense perspective. Clandestine violations take place under the cloak of secrecy. To impose a burden of establishing in an adjudication proceeding, every conceivable link of an unlawful transaction would result in a manifest failure of justice and would defeat the underlying purpose of the Act. Appeal dismissed.
-
2018 (11) TMI 310
Application for condonation of delay in filing the appeals - Conversion of petition to an appeal - Held that:- When the petitions came up for consideration, our attention was invited to the decision of the Apex Court in Raj Kumar Shivhare Vs. Asstt. Director, Directorate of Enforcement, (2010 (4) TMI 432 - SUPREME COURT). Therefore, the appropriate remedy to challenge the impugned orders would be an appeal under Section 35 of the FEMA. It is an undisputed position that both these petitions have been filed within a period of 120 days from the date of the impugned order of the Appellate Tribunal as provided under Section 35 of the FEMA.
Mr. Jain, prays that he be allowed to convert this petition into an appeal. Mr. Vyas for the respondent has no objection at this being allowed.
Thu the petitioners are allowed to convert both the petitions into appeals under Section 35 of the FEMA. The petitioners would take the necessary steps including payment of appropriate Court Fees etc. with the Registry to convert both the petitions into appeals on or before 30th November, 2018
-
2018 (11) TMI 188
Contravention of Section 8 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 read with Section 42(1) thereof along with Regulation 9 and 13 of the Foreign Exchange Management (Export of Goods and Services) Regulations, 2000 - Appeal to Appellate Tribunal - Held that:- The Tribunal prescribed a condition of deposit of 20% of the penalty amount as a precondition for hearing the Appeals on merits. Such a pre-condition is imminently fair, just and reasonable. It does not deny the appellant a right of appeal as is now projected before us. It ensures that justice would be done as well. Thus, the right of appeal has not been defeated and frustrated and as is now complained. In fact from 14th July, 2009, we have travelled upto 31st October, 2018. Despite this enormous passage of time, the appellants have not complied with this order and the conditions imposed therein. We were prepared to give further time to the appellant to comply with this order, but their counsel argued that they do not have any money. Given their precarious financial position and undue hardship, we must set aside this condition altogether or reduce the amount to a paltry sum of approximately two lakhs.
Tribunal was ready and willing to hear the restoration application provided a fair stand was taken by the appellants. On such occasions, when the restoration applications of the appellants were placed before the Tribunal, they chose to remain absent. They did not cooperate with the Tribunal. The Tribunal was not obliged to wait for them. Its the appellants who desire another opportunity to have an adjudication on merits. However, their conduct is not consistent and justice cannot be rendered to those who have failed to show their bona fides in the instant case. We find that the bona fides are totally lacking. The Tribunal has indulged the appellants enough and we do not see the discretion exercised by the Tribunal to be arbitrary or capacious enabling us to entertain these Appeals.
-
2018 (10) TMI 1420
Contravention of section 8 read with section 42 of FEMA, 1999 - Penalty imposed - Directorate has no jurisdiction to issue of the offences allegedly committed during the FERA regime after the repealing of FERA after the expiry of sunset clause on 31.5.2002 - Held that:- Admittedly the Company through which exports were made during 95-96 and as the company has become defunct no exports were made thereafter besides the buyers had gone under ground , auction at the Turkey port following change in the quota system etc.( i.e. letters dt.27.4.2010 and 6.12.2010 as replies to the show cause notice. These replies were not at all considered as could be seen from the findings and order of the Adjudication order.
In the present appeal both the parties had made their submissions on 16th May, 2018 and the order was reserved. On the said date, two weeks time was granted to the parties to file their written submissions.
The written argument of the appellant was received however no written submissions has been filed by the respondent. Even after waiting for the considerable period for the written submissions on behalf of the respondent, when the same was not filed, we proceeded to pass the present order on the basis of the written arguments filed by the appellant and the materials available on record.
Once the issue of SCN of the offence completed in FERA regime no SCN can be issued after 1.6.2002 under FEMA,1999 because of the statutory bar under FEMA, 1999.Accordingly, in the light of the above, the appeal is allowed.
The entire proceedings based on the illegally issued SCN (assuming jurisdiction under FEMA, 1999) is null and void ab-initio and therefore the penalty imposed is untenable by the force of law.
-
2018 (10) TMI 1081
Condination of delay as per Section 19 of FEMA - delay in filing appeal - sufficient cause for not filing it within specified period - Held that:- On receipt of the adjudication order, that notwithstanding that efforts were again made by the respondent to serve the copies in person on the appellant, but because of the appellant leaving her residence/premise without any notice could not enable the said service and the postal endorsement is a proof of the same, and that way back in 2009 and 2010, they were pasted on the last known addresses of the appellant.
In spite of that the appellant failed to file any appeal, and suddenly in 2017 she filed the appeals and took the plea that she was in jail and hence the delay, while by their own admission, she was sent to jail only in February, 2017, while the impugned order are of 2008 and 2009. I do not find any cause having being given to explain the delay. Following decision in Esha Bhattacharjee case (2015 (1) TMI 1053 - SUPREME COURT), and in the facts of the case as discussed in previous paras see no reason for condoning the delay. Justice is for both the sides- the appellant and the respondent and such huge delay and thereafter attempts to cover it up would lead to denial of justice to the other side.
No ground to condone the delay running into number of years in all the four appeals. The appellant has not been able to give/prove any sufficient cause to do the same.
-
2018 (10) TMI 1015
Penalty on the co-appellant on the charge of violation of Section 3(b), 3(d) and 3(c) of FEMA - Held that:- It is stated on behalf of the appellants that ED without conducting any independent inquiry has simply on the basis of few documents sent by DRI issued a show cause notice to the appellants for alleged under-valuation of furniture imported from China during the year 2006-07 and thereby alleging violation of the provisions of section 3(b), 3(d) and 3(c) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (“the Act”) read with Section 42(1) of the Act.
The show cause notice relied solely on the DRI case which had been settled and closed by the Settlement Commission in 2009 itself. Initiation of proceedings is incorrect when the issue has already been settled by the Settlement Commission. This is against the statutory mandate laid down under provisions of Section 127J of the Customs Act, 1962 which stipulates that no matter covered by such orders shall be reopened in any proceedings under this Act or under any other law for the time being in force. Appeal allowed.
-
2018 (10) TMI 411
Refund to the Petitioners of principal amount along with interest - non adherence to Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board orders - Held that:- We find that our Court had in Abu Moosa [2015 (1) TMI 977 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] and Prabodh Mehta [2012 (7) TMI 145 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] had occasion in similar facts, directed refund of the amount received by the Respondents along with interest from the date on which the amounts were deposited with the Respondents till repayment.
The Respondents before us refuse to pay interest on the ground that it has not earned any income. Interest is paid as to compensate persons who have been deprived of its amount. Thus in the present facts the Respondents are directed to grant refund aggregating to ₹ 9,50,000/- along with interest thereon @ 6% p.a. from the date of payment / deposit of the Petitioner. The refund should be granted as expeditiously as possible along with interest @ 6% p.a. preferably within a period of 12 weeks from today.
-
2018 (10) TMI 221
Non-supply of documents - proceedings on the basis of a complaint under FEMA - documents sought for, relied upon by the respondent-authorities to initiate proceedings against the petitioner, have not been furnished - Held that:- In the light of statement made by the respondent-authorities in their statement of objections that they are required to provide only relied upon documents and accepting their obligation to provide those documents to the petitioner and also having contended that such documents have already been furnished to the petitioner, this Court desist from going into the merits of the case at this stage, inasmuch as, it may prejudice the rights of either of the parties.
This Courts finds that there is no good ground available to entertain this petition and accordingly, Petitions stand rejected.
-
2018 (10) TMI 39
Jurisdiction of concerned authorities - Held that:- Respondent nos. 2 and 3 are located in Bangalore and there is a possibility that issue has been examined by the concerned authorities having jurisdiction in respect of Banglore. He, nonetheless, states that the averments made in the petition would be considered by respondent no.1 and if any inquiry or investigation is warranted, steps in this regard would be taken by the concerned authorities.
No further orders are required to be passed in this petition, the same is, accordingly, disposed of.
-
2018 (9) TMI 1150
Order passed u/s 37(A)(3) of FEMA, 1999 - Competent Authority (CA) has confirmed the seizure of mutual funds as equivalent to US $ 16,00,000 held outside India by the appellant - whether as per Section 37(A)(4) proviso, the seizure can be set aside which was confirmed by the impugned order dated 18.05.2018? - Appellate Tribunal’s power - Held that:- CA or Adjudicating Authority has the power to deal with this seizure order only, and not review its own order once passed under Section 37(A)(3). Hence, the contention of the appellant that it has the powers to review, is not borne out by this legal provision.
Coming to the Appellate Tribunal’s power, Section 37(A)(5) clearly mentions that any person aggrieved by any order passed by the Competent Authority under Section 37(A)(3) may prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. Hence, the Appellate Tribunal jurisdiction is limited only to the orders passed by the Competent Authority under Section 37(A)(3). He does not have any original jurisdiction to get into any issues which have not been dealt by the original authority or are subsequent developments to the passing of the order by the Competent Authority.
The law is very clear in as much as the Competent Authority has the power only to confirm or otherwise, the seizure done under Section 37(A)(1).
The Appellate Tribunal’s powers are only limited to hearing of appeals against these orders. In any case, the adjudication proceedings will have to be gone through as Section 37(A)(4) clearly lays down that the seizure will continue till the disposal of adjudication proceedings.
Hence, no merits in the application asking for setting aside the seizure on the above grounds. It is therefore disallowed. Reply be filed in the main appeal within four weeks time and rejoinder within four weeks thereafter.
............
|
9911796707
