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Indian Laws - Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 26744 Records
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2024 (11) TMI 197
Dishonour of Cheque - insufficient funds - challenge to summoning order - scope of interference of this Court under Section 482 of the Code - non-application of mind - whether the learned MM and learned ASJ erred in passing the summoning order and impugned revision order, respectively, against the petitioner? - HELD THAT:- It is observed that after a cheque is returned for insufficient funds in the account, a notice demanding the repayment of the due amount should be issued by the payee to the drawer within a time period of thirty (30) days from the date on which the cheque was returned. Moreover, the provision also provides the drawer with a statutory period of fifteen (15) days to repay the due amount from the date of receipt of the demand notice. However, if the drawer fails to pay the due amount within the said statutory period, then an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act is deemed to have been committed.
Moreover, once the offence is made out under Section 138 of the Act, the concerned Magistrate shall take cognizance of the offence as per Section 142 of the NI Act, only if the complaint is made in writing, by payee or holder in due course of time and within one month from the date on which the cause of action arises.
It is pertinent to unfold the series of events that took place between the respondent no. 2 and the petitioner, wherein the cheque presented by the respondent no. 2 was returned for insufficient funds vide the return memo dated 25th May, 2019. Thereafter, the respondent no. 2, adhering to the statutory requirement of 30 days mentioned under clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 of the NI Act, issued a legal demand notice to the petitioner for the payment of due amount on 21st June, 2019 and the same was received by the petitioner on 24th June, 2019 as per the postal tracking report on record.
It is pertinent to note that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/S. SAKETH INDIA LIMITED AND OTHERS VERSUS M/S. INDIA SECURITIES LIMITED [1999 (3) TMI 591 - SUPREME COURT] observed that the day on which the cause of action arises must be excluded in computing the limitation period for filing of the complaint as per Section 142 (1) (b) of the NI Act.
In the matter at hand, the period of fifteen (15) days for repayment of the due amount expires on 9th July, 2019. Therefore, the cause of action under clause (c) of proviso to Section 138 of the NI Act arises on 10th July, 2019, which is to be excluded while calculating the limitation period of one month as envisaged under Section 142 (1) (b) of the NI Act. Therefore, according to the said provision, the complaint is to be filed on or before 10th August, 2019. However, the respondent no. 2 filed the complaint on 13th August, 2019 - It is the case of the respondent no. 2 that the limitation period of one month for filing the complaint expires on 10th August, 2019, on which the Court was not functioning and therefore, the respondent no. 2 was only able to file the complaint on the next working day i.e., 13th August, 2019.
The NI Act, which categorically lays down extensive substance regarding the dishonor of the cheque, is silent with respect to the expiration of the limitation period on the day the Courts are closed. However, since the same is explicitly dealt by Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the same would be applicable in the instant case as well - given that the limitation period of one month for filing the complaint expires on 10th August, 2019, which is a holiday for the Court concerned, the same may be filed on the day when the Court concerned reopened i.e., 13th August, 2019.
Coming to the issue of non-providence of sufficient reasons for summoning of the petitioner, it is observed that the respondent no. 2 filed pre-summoning evidence by way of an affidavit. It is pertinent to note that as per Section 145 of the Act, the complainant may give its evidence via an affidavit and upon satisfaction of the Court concerned, the same may be treated as an evidence for summoning the accused for any enquiry, trial or proceedings - Upon perusal of the summoning order, it is observed that the learned MM was satisfied with the sufficient causes being shown and accordingly, summons against the petitioner were issued. Therefore, the learned MM was correct in passing the summoning order against the petitioner and the learned ASJ was also right in upholding the said summoning order.
This Court is of the view that the learned MM and the learned ASJ have not committed any error or illegality while passing the respective orders and therefore, this Court does not find any reasons to exercise its powers under Section 482 of the Code as the instant petition is bereft of any merits - Petition dismissed.
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2024 (11) TMI 196
Dishonour of Cheque - challenge to summoning Order - Cheque has not been signed by the petitioner but by a person, who is neither an employee nor a Legal Representative of the petitioner or his Proprietorship Firm - HELD THAT:- Pertinently, the Cheque in question has been dishonoured on the ground of signature being different, which again implies that Bhagawat Daulat Gawali had no authority to sign the Cheque for and on behalf of the petitioner-accused or his Proprietorship Firm. The Cheque does not bear the signatures of the petitioner-accused and therefore, cannot be held liable either for the issuance of Cheque or its consequent dishonour.
The assertion of the respondent No. 2-Complainant that Bhagawat Daulat Gawali had issued the Cheque for and on behalf of the petitioner-accused in discharge of his liability is not tenable under Section 138 of NI Act, 1881. This may be a valid ground for filing a Suit for Recovery but definitely under Section 138 of NI Act, 1881 which is specific and is applicable only to the Drawer and Drawee of the Cheque, no third party can be summoned under Section 138 of NI Act, 1881.
Therefore, the petitioner-accused not being a signatory to the Cheque, cannot be summoned in the Complaint Case under Section 138 of the NI Act, 1881 filed for and on behalf of the respondent No. 2-Complainant.
The Summoning Order dated 01.02.2021 is patently illegal and is hereby set aside - Petition disposed off.
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2024 (11) TMI 195
Dishonour of Cheque - Challenge to Cognizance and Summoning Orders - vicarious liability - Cheques have been signed and issued by the respondent No. 3-Bhagawat Daulat Gawali in his individual capacity which had no connection with the petitioners herein or the alleged business transaction between the petitioner No. 1-Bipin Lal Singh Pagar through its Proprietorship Firm M/s Amax Agro Exports (the petitioner No. 2) and the respondent No. 2-Tiger Logistics (India) Limited.
Whether the Petitioner can be summoned under S.148 NI Act for a dishonoured Cheque that has not been signed by him but by one Bhagawat Daulat Gawali, who is neither an employee nor a Legal Representative of the petitioner or his Proprietorship Firm? - HELD THAT:- Pertinently, the Cheques in question have been dishonoured on the ground of “Account Closed” vide Cheque Return Memo dated 03.09.2020.
Since, the petitioner No. 1-Bipin Lal Singh Pagar is not a signatory to the said two Cheques, he canot not be held liable under Section 138 of NI Act, 1881. The claim of the respondent No. 2-Tiger Logistics (India) Limited that the Cheques had been issued by the respondent No. 3/Bhagawat Daulat Gawali for and on behalf of the petitioners in discharge of their liabilities towards the respondent No. 2-Tiger Logistics (India) Limited, may be a basis for filing the Civil Suit, but these averments for Complaint under Section 138 of NI Act, 1881 are not maintainable against the petitioners.
Therefore, the petitioners not being a signatory to the two Cheques cannot be summoned in the Complaint Case under Section 138 of the NI Act, 1881.
The Summoning Orders both dated 11.01.2021 in the two Complaints, against the petitioners are patently illegal and are hereby set aside, though they may be continued against Bhagawat Daulat Gawali, in accordance with law - Petition allowed.
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2024 (11) TMI 194
Direction to empanel it as an Agency for production of audio visual contents - benefits of exemption/relaxation from deposit of EMD in terms of the letter dated 27th December, 2023 (Annexure-8) issued by the MSME Department - HELD THAT:- This Court finds that the Petitioner being a MSME Unit is entitled for certain exemptions/relaxations as per the letter under Annexure-8 and notification as well as Memorandum under Annexure-10 and 11 respectively. The plea taken by the State of Odisha-Opposite Party Nos.1 & 2 that the case of the Petitioner could not have been considered, as the notification was issued on the date of sitting of the Scrutiny Committee is not sustainable. From the counter affidavit, it appears that the Scrutiny Committee was convened on 27th December, 2023 and subsequently on 28th December, 2023. Admittedly, notification of MSME Department (Annexure-8) was issued on 27th December, 2023. Thus, it could have been considered by the Scrutiny Committee on 28th December, 2023. Further the Petitioner claims that in view of Section 44AD of the Act, it is not required to submit the audit report of the Chattered Accountant. These aspects need fresh consideration by the Scrutiny Committee. Further the Scrutiny Committee failed to take into consideration the instruction and policy decision of the Government under Annexures-10 and 11.
The writ petition is disposed of with a direction that the Scrutiny Committee shall review the case of the Petitioner giving its representative an opportunity of being heard and to produce documents in support of its case. The Petitioner shall be intimated about the date of consideration of its case by the Scrutiny Committee and entire exercise shall be completed as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of three months from the date of production of certified copy of this order before the Director, Department of Information and Public Relations, Government of Odisha, Bhubaneswar-Opposite Party No. 2.
Petition disposed off.
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2024 (11) TMI 113
Recovery of sums payable under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 - whether section 56(2) of the 2003 Act has any application to a demand raised by the appellants on the first respondent for recovery of sums payable under the 1910 Act? - HELD THAT:- In KUSUMAM HOTELS (P) LTD. VERSUS KERALA STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD AND ORS. [2008 (5) TMI 723 - SUPREME COURT], this Court, while examining the issue of retrospective discontinuance of tariff concessions for the tourism industry, held that the liability accruing to the licensee being statutory in nature would continue to survive even after the enforcement of the 2003 Act.
As settled by this Court, section 185(5) of the 2003 Act read with section 6 of the 1897 Act would lead to the inescapable conclusion that the limitation period of two (2) years prescribed for recovery of dues under section 56 of the 2003 Act would apply to liabilities arising under the 2003 Act, and not prior to the enforcement thereof. Thus, the Division Bench manifestly erred in holding that the liability incurred by the first respondent prior to the enforcement of the 2003 Act would still be barred by the provisions of section 56(2) thereof.
Whether the demand, if it be treated as one under the 1910 Act, is sustainable having regard to the long delay? - HELD THAT:- Section 24 did not refer to any period of limitation as in section 56(2) of the 2003 Act. If the licensee were to opt for institution of a suit, it cannot be contended with any degree of conviction that since section 24 does not prescribe a period of limitation or does not refer to the Limitation Act, 1963 a suit can be instituted at any time as per the convenience of the licensee. Electrical energy is a saleable commodity or goods, which we find usually to be sold on credit. That is, the licensee first supplies the energy and a bill is raised by the licensee specifying the date by which the charges are to be paid, whereafter it is the liability of the consumer to pay it. On neglect to pay, the consequences in section 24(1) are attracted.
Although section 24 of the 1910 Act prescribes no period of limitation, it does allow the licensee to discontinue supply of energy upon a consumer neglecting to pay charges that are demanded by raising a bill, irrespective of the fact that a suit for recovery of unpaid charges would be barred if not instituted within three (3) years of the liability accruing. There appears to be no limitation as regards the period within which notice under section 24(1) has to be issued, evincing the intention of the licensee to disconnect supply for nonpayment of claimed dues. However, if in case, despite the consumer not paying the charges demanded and the notice thereunder is not issued within a reasonable period or at any time within which a suit for recovery could be instituted, whether the right of the licensee to claim the unpaid charges would lapse will have to be decided by the court before whom the lis is brought upon consideration of the defence that is raised and the explanation for the delay.
However, since the appellants accepted the order of the learned Single Judge dated 16th July, 2009 and issued a fresh demand for a reduced amount and which has since been recovered by encashing the bank guarantee, no order is made for changing the position flowing from the said order.
The impugned judgment and order of the High Court allowing the intracourt appeal being unsustainable in law has to be and is, accordingly, set aside with the result that the civil appeal stands allowed.
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2024 (11) TMI 112
Prayer by plaintiff for the judgment and decree to be passed in his favour - defendant has failed to apply for leave to defend the Suit within the period prescribed in Order XXXVII Rule 3(5) of the CPC - HELD THAT:- Order XXXVII Rule 3(5) of the CPC provides for the defendant to apply for leave to defend the Suit. It further provides that the leave to defend may be granted to the defendant unconditionally or upon such terms that may appear to be just to the Court. It further provides that leave to defend shall not be refused unless the Court is satisfied that the facts disclosed by the defendant do not indicate that the defendant has a substantial defence to raise or that the defence intended to be put up by the defendant is frivolous and vexatious. It further empowers the Court to direct the deposit of the admitted amount by the defendant, where the Court finds that a part of the amount claimed by the plaintiff is admitted by the defendant to be due from him.
The denial of leave to defend is not the rule but an exception. However, leave to defend may not be granted where the defendant has practically no defence and is unable to give out even a semblance of triable issues. Where the defendant raises triable issues indicating a fair or bona fide or reasonable defence, albeit not a positively good defence, the defendant would still be ordinarily entitled to unconditional leave to defend. Where the defendant raises triable issues, but it remains doubtful if the defendant is raising the same in good faith or there is a doubt about the genuineness of the issues, the Court may impose conditions both as to time or mode of trial, as well as payment into the Court or furnishing of a security by the defendant. Where the defence appears to be plausible but improbable, heightened conditions may be imposed as to the time or mode of trial as also of the payment into the Court or furnishing security or both - Where the defendant admits to a part of the claim of the plaintiff, leave to defend is not to be granted unless the amount so admitted is deposited by the defendant in the Court.
The only defence of the defendants is that the said amount was repayable on an ‘as and when able to’ basis - the defendants in their applications seeking leave to defend have also stated that the amount was repayable to the plaintiff when Mr. Shivinder Mohan Singh would be released from custody. The learned senior counsel for the plaintiff has asserted that the same also happened about one and a half years back.
The Court is, therefore, faced with the defence whereby the defendants admit that they are liable to repay the amount but claim that the said amount has not become repayable as of now and shall become repayable on a future date, which is uncertain and at the sole discretion of the defendants and only when the defendants are able to repay the same.
In the present case, the liability to repay is admitted by the defendants. It is also admitted that they had given the cheques under their own signatures with the amounts filled in to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff has merely inserted a date on the said cheques - the defence raised by the defendants is completely moonshine, frivolous and vexatious and, in fact, the defendants have admitted to their liability owed to the plaintiff.
The applications are hereby dismissed.
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2024 (11) TMI 111
Dishonour of Cheque - vicarious liability for the offence of the company - principal contention raised by the Petitioner is that she is the housewife and has never dealt with the affairs of the Company and that the cheque in question was not signed by her and she was not the authorised signatory of the Company - HELD THAT:- It is well settled that while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C, the High Court must be extremely cautious and slow in quashing a complaint at an initial stage. It is now well settled that the power of quashing should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of rare cases and courts must not embark upon enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the Complaint unless the allegations in the complaint are so patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can reach such a conclusion.
The Apex Court in S.P. Mani & Mohan Dairy v. Snehalatha Elangovan, [2022 (9) TMI 846 - SUPREME COURT], after examining the issue as to who would be held vicariously liable for the offence of the company has held that Section 141 extends such criminal liability in case of a company to every person who at the time of the offence, was in charge of and was responsible for the conduct of the business of the company and such a person is vicariously liable to be held guilty for the offence under Section 138 and punished accordingly. The proviso to Section 141 of the NI Act states that the officer who is being accused of committing an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act as being responsible and in-charge of the company can escape the punishment if he/she proves that the offence was committed without his/her knowledge or that he/she was not responsibly for the affairs of the company.
The Petitioner herein is a Director of the accused Company. In the Master Data, the Petitioner has not been shown as an independent Director or a Non-Executive Director or a Deputy Director, who can be said to be not responsible for the conduct of day-to-day affairs of the company. This Court is of the opinion that when there are only three Directors in the Company, it cannot be said that the Petitioner herein, who is one of the three Directors of the company, is not responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the company.
The contentions raised by the Petitioner is a matter of trial and at this juncture, this Court is not inclined to quash the summoning Order in the absence of any unimpeachable and incontrovertible evidence beyond suspicion and doubt that the Petitioner herein was not responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the accused Company.
Petition dismissed.
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2024 (11) TMI 110
Grant of Anticipatory Bail - financial fraud and conspiracy - offences punishable under Sections 406, 408, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 477A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code - whether the applicants could be forced to supply the documents which are not in existence? - HELD THAT:- The overall facts of the case reveal that it is purely an accounting matter. A detailed investigation has been done. Necessary ledgers of the applicants as well as the complainant have been recovered and assistance of the Chartered Accountant has also been taken. It may be an attempt of the complainant to recover money from this criminal case only. However, criminal law does not provide for recovering money through criminal proceedings. Besides, the complainant has filed cases against the Kawadiya Brothers under Section 138 of the N.I. Act before lodging the report and legally enforceable debt would be a matter of facts and the evidence of the case.
Considering the cooperation extended by the applicants during the interim protection, the Court is of the view that sending the applicants to custodial interrogation would serve no purpose.
As far as the allegations against applicant – Bharat Machhindra Khedkar are concerned, he resigned long back. Whether he committed fraud of such huge money would be determined by appreciating the evidence. The relevant bank account has been recovered. Nothing has remained to be recovered from him. He also cooperated with the Investigating Officer. Whether he was the plant head is also question of fact.
This Court is of the view that custodial interrogation of the applicants is not essential. Hence, they deserve anticipatory bail - bail application allowed.
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2024 (11) TMI 48
Challenge to arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 - grant of stay on the execution of the award conditional on the respondent furnishing a bank guarantee - treatment of governmental versus private entities in arbitration proceedings - HELD THAT:- In the present case, there is an arbitral award to the tune of approximately Rs 21 crores in favour of the appellant. The High Court, while issuing a direction for furnishing of a bank guarantee, dealt with only one of the claims which was awarded by the arbitral tribunal, namely, that which pertained to the refund of the cess under the Building and Other Construction Workers’ Welfare Cess Act 1996. In this regard, the High Court observed that the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner, by its order dated 6 November 2019, held that the Cess Act was not applicable to the appellant which was therefore not required to pay cess under that statute. It noted that the arbitral tribunal had, however, rendered an award in which it directed the respondent to pay the appellant this amount, which had already been paid by the respondent to the appellant.
The High Court granted a stay on the operation of the award subject to the respondent furnishing a bank guarantee for the principal amount awarded to the appellant, i.e. Rs 21,07,66,621. It held that it was not inclined to issue orders in relation to the interest and the costs awarded to the appellant because “the petitioner is not a fly-by operator and is a statutory undertaking.” The law qua arbitration proceedings cannot be any different merely because of the status of the respondent as a statutory undertaking.
The High Court was in error in not even prima facie considering the fact that apart from the issue of cess, there was an arbitral award in favour of the appellant in regard to other claims as well. Further, the High Court ought not to have based its decision on the condition for the grant of stay on the status of the respondent as a statutory authority. The Arbitration Act is a self-contained code – it does not distinguish between governmental and private entities. Hence, the decision of the Court cannot be influenced by the position of the party before it and whether it is a fly-by-night operator - the argument that the High Court was correct in directing the respondent to furnish bank guarantees in relation to the amount awarded because it is a statutory body is rejected.
Under Order XLI Rule 5 of the CPC, the Court has the power to direct full or part deposit and/or the furnishing of security in respect of the decretal amount. Bearing in mind the principles which must guide the Court, we are of the view that the order of the High Court requires modification - The respondent shall deposit an amount quantified at 75% of the decretal amount, inclusive of interest, on or before 30 November 2024 before the High Court - Conditional on the deposit of the aforesaid amount within the period stipulated above, there shall be a stay on the enforcement of the arbitral award.
The impugned judgment of the High Court shall stand modified - Appeal allowed.
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2024 (11) TMI 47
Suit for recovery of money filed by the plaintiff - Rebuttal of presumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act - failure to prove the consideration by producing the account books, bank statement, income tax returns, etc. - failure to consider and appreciate the oral and documentary evidence on record in their proper perspective and based their conclusions on mere surmises and conjectures - burden to prove - HELD THAT:- In this case, both the Courts below have analyzed the evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.3 and they have recorded their finding that the promissory note itself is sufficient to prove the passing of consideration since there is a clear acknowledgement of the receipt of the same. Further, the defendant has not denied the thumb impression or signatures. After the plaintiff has proved the consideration and the execution of the promissory note, then, the burden shifts on the defendant to probabilize his case that the promissory note was not executed in favour of the plaintiff.
The Apex Court in Kundan Lal Rallaaram vs. Custodian Evacuee Property, Bombay [1961 (3) TMI 100 - SUPREME COURT] declared that the Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act lays down a special rule of evidence. It enables the Court to presume that the negotiable instruments or the endorsement was made or endorsed for consideration and the burden of proof of failure of consideration is thrown on the maker of the note or the endorser as the case may be.
A Combined reading of the defendant side witnesses only shows that they have come up with the case that D.W.4-Raj acted like an agent for the plaintiff and through him, D.W.1 to D.W.3 have borrowed loans and promissory note executed by them and later it was misused by the plaintiff - In the absence of any proof establishing the collusion between the plaintiff and the said Raj, and in the absence of any repayment of loan as stated by the defendant in his evidence and pleadings, the evidence adduced on the side of the plaintiff's side, shall be placed on higher pedestal since their evidence is supported by the promissory note-Ex.A1 and consequent legal notice issued which was not replied by the defendant. The defendant had come forward to lodge a complaint only the year 2011 that too, after decree being passed against him.
Both the Courts have not erred in drawing a presumption under Section 118(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act against the defendant. Both the Courts have rightly held that the execution of promissory note itself is sufficient to prove the passing of consideration, hence rightly decreed the suit.
The Judgment and Decree dated 31.10.2012 passed in A.S. No. 62 of 2011 on the file of the III Additional District and Sessions Court, Cuddalore at Virudhachalam confirming the Judgment and Decree dated 29.08.2011 passed in O.S. No. 110 of 2010 on the file of the Sub Court, Neyveli are hereby confirmed - the Second Appeal is dismissed.
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2024 (11) TMI 46
Dishonor of Cheque - Validity of the summoning order and framing of notice under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of the CrPC by the High Court - HELD THAT:- The instant petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the CrPC (now Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023). It has been already settled in a catena of judgments that although the High Court has inherent powers under Section 482 of the CrPC (now Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) while adjudicating a petition, however, the said power has to be exercised sparingly and with caution wherein the High Court must bear in mind that it does not interfere unnecessarily, unless there is some material irregularity or illegality.
Section 138 of the NI Act is a quasi criminal remedy available to a party aggrieved by the dishonor of a cheque, who may initiate such proceedings against the issuer of a cheque - This Court is of the view that summons issued in a complaint case under Section 138 of the NI Act may be quashed if it is prima facie apparent from the complaint that the complainant has not presented even an iota of evidence for filing the said complaint which shows occurrence of an offence.
In the case of HMT Watches Limited v. M.A. Abida, [2015 (5) TMI 280 - SUPREME COURT], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held 'The High Court has erred in law in going into the factual aspects of the matter which were not admitted between the parties. The High Court further erred in observing that Section 138(b) of the NI Act stood uncompiled with, even though Respondent 1 (accused) had admitted that he replied to the notice issued by the complainant. Also, the fact, as to whether the signatory of demand notice was authorised by the complainant company or not, could not have been examined by the High Court in its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure when such plea was controverted by the complainant before it.'
Upon perusal of the aforesaid judgment, it is made out that it has been emphasized time and again by the Hon’be Supreme Court that the High Court while exercising powers under Section 482 CrPC must bear in mind that whenever a proceeding under the NI Act has been challenged under the said provision, it should not express its view on the disputed question of facts to arrive at a conclusion that the offence is not made out as the same would amount to error of law.
As per the settled principle of law, summons can be issued only, when, prima facie, a case is made out on the basis of documents alongwith the complaint, its contents and the evidences filed alongwith the affidavit - This Court is of the view that the Court concerned has taken into consideration the submissions made as well as the contents of the petition, and thereafter, rejected the revision petition by way of passing a detailed and reasoned order, by upholding the summoning order passed by the learned Trial Court.
This Court does not find any material on record which can be stated to be of sterling quality warranting invocation of the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 CrPC at this stage when the learned Trial Court has issued summons and framed notice of charge against the petitioners - this Court deems it imperative to state that in contemporary practice, a complainant in proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act often endures greater procedural hardship than the accused. This stems primarily from the trend wherein every summoning order issued by the Magistrate is challenged on various grounds. Such challenges compel the complainant to defend the validity of the Magistrate’s orders at the preliminary stages of the case.
There is no illegality in the order dated 14th March, 2023 passed by the learned ASJ in CR No. 627/22 and the same is hereby upheld - Petition dismissed.
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2024 (11) TMI 45
Dishonour of Cheque - sustainability of criminal prosecution against adjudicated insolvency - HELD THAT:- The Hon'ble Supreme Court in various judgments, had discussed the issue in detail and had protected only the corporate debtors namely, the company and not the Directors. The individual liability of the Directors of the company which faced bankruptcy proceedings are not immune from prosecution and not protected under Section 32A(1) of IBC Code.
As regarding the individual debtors, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clarified that the insolvency proceedings against the individuals will not protect them from proceedings under Section 138 N.I.Act. Even prior to the enactment of IBC. This Court through Justice M.Karpagavinayagam (as he was then) in Bharath N.Mehtha and another case [1999 (2) TMI 733 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] had considered the consequence of issuing cheques after adjudication as insolvent and had explained the expressions that suit or other legal proceedings found in Section 72 of the Presidency Town Insolvency Act that 'The wordings "any suit or other legal proceedings" would mean the suit or other legal proceedings relating to the property of the insolvent and not with reference to the personal act committed by the accused constituting the offence liable to be proceeded in Criminal Court.'
Thus, finally the Court has held that there is no bar in any of the provisions of insolvency Act or in the Negotiable Instruments Act, restricting the complainant to resort Section 138 of N.I.Act, after adjudication proceedings under Insolvency Act and it is open to the petitioner/accused to establish the fact regarding the alleged enforceable liability and the factum of impossibility to pay in the light of the insolvency before the trial Court.
This Court is not inclined to record any opinion on the facts and leave it open for the petitioner/accused to canvas those points before the trial Court - this Criminal Original Petition is disposed of.
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2024 (11) TMI 44
Dishonour of Cheque - account from which the cheque drawn was frozen and for that reason the subject cheque returned unpaid - offence under Section 138 of NI Act attracted or not - complainant is the Bank which freezed the account due to the default of loan by the account holder - presentation of the cheque for collection and consequential complaint amounts to malicious prosecution or not.
HELD THAT:- The clarification of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/S LAXMI DYECHEM VERSUS STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. [2012 (12) TMI 106 - SUPREME COURT] makes clear that, ‘account block’ or ‘freezed’ are a species. Insufficient fund is one of the two contingencies mentioned in section 138 of the NI Act. If the issuance of cheque without sufficient fund which is the genus, same will give cause of action to prosecute. The test is whether the fund in the account not sufficient or exceed the limit arranged. Account blocked or freezed is species. It is not so material whether the drawer of the cheque aware or not aware of the fact about his account freeze at the time of issuing cheque. If with knowledge that the account is freezed nevertheless he issue the cheque from the account freezed, the intention to cheat is manifestly seen.
From the facts and circumstances of the instant case, obviously on the date of cheque (08/11/2019) fund in the account was not sufficient to honour. Thus, the first contingency to attract section 138 of NI Act gets satisfied. The account being freezed, the petitioner company had a opportunity to pay the cheque amount within 15 days from the date of receipt of the statutory notice. In this case, the petitioner company had disputed the liability and not paid the cheque amount.
Hence, the question whether the Bank which has freezed the account can initiate the complaint for dishonor of the cheque due to account freeze and the dispute regarding liability to discharge enforceable debt, it is necessary to consider the plea of the petitioners regarding the circumstances the subject cheque purportedly given to the complainant Bank.
This Criminal Original Petition stands dismissed.
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2024 (11) TMI 1
Repudiation of insurance claim on the grounds of suppression of material information regarding existing policies with other insurers - burden of proof and the method of discharging that burden of proof to prove an alleged fact - Section 45 of the Insurance Act, 1938 - uberrimae fidei - plea of utmost good faith - HELD THAT:- The repudiation of an insurance claim is largely governed by Section 45 of the Insurance Act, 1938. Section 45 is a special provision of law, which bars the calling in question of an insurance policy beyond expiry of the stipulated period, except in a few circumstances that have to be proved by the insurer.
Since the present case deals with a policy and its repudiation before the 2014 amendment to Section 45 of the Insurance Act, the pre-amendment time period of two years would be applicable to the case. As per the aforesaid language and interpretation of Section 45, the insurer cannot question the policy after the expiry of the time period and if it does, then the burden rests on the insurer to establish materiality of the fact suppressed and the knowledge of the insured about such suppression, so that the repudiation of the claim could be justified by the insurer.
Law demands a higher standard of good faith in matters of insurance contracts which is expressed in the legal maxim uberrimae fidei. The plea of utmost good faith has also been taken by the respondent, for contending that the insured-deceased had a duty to disclose the details of the previous policies, as the same was sought in the application form. However, the insured failed in his duty to correctly answer the question about his previous policies.
The basic test hinges on whether the mind of a prudent insurer would be affected, either in deciding whether to take the risk at all or in fixing the premium, by knowledge of a particular fact if it had been disclosed. Therefore, the fact must be one affecting the risk. If it has no bearing on the risk it need not be disclosed and if it would do no more than cause insurers to make inquiries delaying issue of the insurance, it is not material if the result of the inquiries would have no effect on a prudent insurer - Whether a fact is material will depend on the circumstances, as proved by evidence, of the particular case. It is for the court to rule as a matter of law, whether, a particular fact is capable of being material and to give directions as to the test to be applied.
In the present case, the date of birth declared are different and the date of issuance has not been stated except in respect of one policy. It is also not known from the table to whom the said policies were issued. However, the NCDRC has observed that the appellant-complainant had not alleged in her complaint that no other insurance policy had been taken by the deceased. In the affidavit of the complainant, the fact that insurance policies were taken from other insurers was not denied. The respondent insurance company had given details of the aforesaid policies by way of an affidavit. Therefore, NCDRC concluded that deceased insured had withheld information in respect of several insurance policies which he had taken from other insurers.
There is an essential distinction between burden of proof and onus of proof; burden of proof lies upon a person who has to prove the fact and which never shifts but onus of proof shifts. Such a shifting of onus is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence. For instance, in a suit for possession based on the title, once the plaintiff has been able to create a high degree of probability so as to shift the onus on the defendant, it is for the defendant to discharge his onus and in the absence thereof, the burden of proof lying on the plaintiff shall be held to have been discharged so as to amount to proof of the plaintiff’s title.
The respondent insurance company has produced no documentary evidence whatsoever before the District Forum to prove its allegation that the insured had taken multiple insurance policies from different companies and had suppressed the same. The District Forum had therefore concluded that there was no documentary evidence to show that the deceased-life insured had taken various insurance policies except an averment and on that basis the repudiation was held to be wrong - in the absence of any evidence to prove that the insured-deceased possessed some insurance policies from other insurance companies, the State Commission upheld the decision of the District Forum in setting aside the repudiation of the claim by the respondent.
The impugned order dated 22.07.2019 passed by the NCDRC in Revision Petition No.1268 of 2019 is set aside. The respondent company is directed to make the payment of the insurance claim under both the policies to the appellant, amounting to Rs. 7,50,000/- and Rs. 9,60,000/-, with interest at the rate of 7% per annum from the date of filing the complaint, till the actual realisation.
Appeal allowed.
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2024 (10) TMI 1537
Cheating - Seeking quashing of FIR - Offence under Sections 420/406/506/120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 - According to the Complainant/Respondent No. 2, in the present case, he was induced by the accused to part with a considerable sum of money on, inter alia, the dishonest/false pretext of return (12-15%) besides assuring the repayment of principal amount. - whether the FIR under question can be allowed to be continue or deserves to be quashed in view of the fact that a similar complaint which was filed by the Complainant/Respondent No. 2 was dismissed as withdrawn? - HELD THAT:- The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari vs Govt. of U.P. & Ors., [2013 (11) TMI 1520 - SUPREME COURT], held that the registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C, if the information discloses a commission of cognizable offence.
In the present case, it is not the case of the Petitioners that the learned Magistrate had taken cognizance when the application under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.P.C. was dismissed as withdrawn. It is pertinent to note that no observations were made by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate on the merits of the case - There is no bar under the Cr.P.C. for registration of an FIR while a complaint is pending before the Metropolitan Magistrate. In fact, the Code provides for a procedure to be followed when there is a complaint and a police investigation in respect of the same offence.
In Supinder Singh [1997 (8) TMI 545 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT], the Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court was dealing with a situation where the Provident Fund Inspector had filed a complaint which was withdrawn and, subsequently, filed a second complaint on the same cause of action before learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, which was held to be not maintainable.
Admittedly, Petitioner No. 2 does not dispute his signature and thumb impression on loan agreement as well as the promissory note but takes a stand that the said documents were got signed by Respondent No. 2 which were blank - The stand of Petitioner No. 2, that he had signed the blank promissory note as well as cheques is difficult to comprehend, in view of the fact, that he is an educated business man and well-versed with the functioning of monetary transactions in ordinary course of the business that he was pursuing. Therefore, the said stand cannot be a bonafide claim.
The facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing of FIR under Sections 420/406/506/120B of the IPC registered at P.S. Chittaranjan Park and the consequent chargesheet against Petitioner No. 2 pending before the Court of competent jurisdiction. It is further clarified that since Petitioner No. 1 was not charge-sheeted, therefore, no observation has been made with respect to him.
Petition dismissed.
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2024 (10) TMI 1536
Dishonour of Cheque - discharge of legal liability or not - rebuttal of presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act - corroboration of statements - Jurisdiction and scope of revisional court under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. - HELD THAT:- It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in MALKEET SINGH GILL VERSUS THE STATE OF CHHATTISGARH [2022 (7) TMI 1455 - SUPREME COURT] that the revisional court does not exercise an appellate jurisdiction and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law - The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
The cheque was dishonoured by the bank of the accused on 23.01.2018. The cheque was issued on 21.10.2017 and was to be presented before the drawee bank within three months excluding the date of drawing of the cheque. The cheque was to be presented before the drawee bank on or before 21.01.2018 but it was presented on 23.01.2018 after the lapse of the statutory period of validity of the cheque. Thus, it was rightly dishonoured with an endorsement outdated/state cheque.
In the present case, the learned Trial Court noticed the date of presentation of the cheque before the bank of the complainant but failed to notice that presentation of the cheque before the bank of the complainant was not material and the presentation before the bank of the accused was necessary within three months to confer a cause of action upon the complainant. The learned Trial Court also failed to appreciate the significance of the memo of dishonour, in which the reason for dishonour was mentioned as out dated/state and the fact that such a memo does not confer a cause of action to file complaint under Section 138 of the N.I.Act. The learned Appellate Court failed to notice both these aspects. Hence, the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below are not sustainable.
The present appeal is allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below are ordered to be set aside. The complaint is dismissed not maintainable. The accused is acquitted for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of N.I. Act. The fine/compensation amount be refunded to the petitioner/accused after the expiry the period of appeal - Appeal allowed.
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2024 (10) TMI 1535
Rejection of the petitioner's financial bid due to past unsatisfactory performance and non-deposit of statutory dues - exercise of power under judicial review - challenge to decision-making process by the tendering authority - HELD THAT:- On bare reading of the communication made by the EPF Organization to the petitioner, it is made clear that the petitioner was advised to facilitate the finding of e-nomination by all the employees and also advised to deposit EPF and allied dues to be paid under Section-14B and 7Q of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. Such instructions were issued, as the petitioner had not deposited the statutory dues and was lacking in its responsibility to comply with the statutory requirements. As a consequence thereof, communication was made to the petitioner vide Annexure-1 dated 06.10.2023 assigning reason as to why its bid was not accepted, even though it was L1 bidder in the process of bidding, keeping in view clause-6.10 of the RFP.
It may be noted that in exercise of power of judicial review in respect of contracts entered into on behalf of the State or instrumentality of the State, such as Corporation, the Court prima facie concerns whether there has been any infirmity in the decision making process. In that case, the Court can examine whether the decision making process was reasonable, rationale not arbitrary and not violative of Article-14 of the Constitution of India.
In ERUSIAN EQUIPMENT & CHEMICALS LTD. VERSUS STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ANR. [1974 (11) TMI 89 - SUPREME COURT], the Apex Court held 'When the Government is trading with the public, ‘the democratic form of Government demands equality and absence of arbitrariness and discrimination in such transactions’. The activities of the Government have a public element and, therefore, there should be fairness and equality. The State need not enter into any contract with anyone, but if it does so, it must do so fairly without discrimination and without unfair procedure.'
In RAMANA DAYARAM SHETTY VERSUS INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY OF INDIA [1979 (5) TMI 144 - SUPREME COURT], the Apex Court held 'In contractual sphere as in all other State actions, the State and all its instrumentalities have to conform to Article 14 of the Constitution of which non-arbitrariness is a significant facet. There is no unfettered discretion in public law: A public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good. This imposes the duty to act fairly and to adopt a procedure which is ‘fair play in action’.'
The apex Court also noted that there are inherent limitations in the exercise of power of judicial review in contractual matter. As such, it was observed that the duty to act fairly will vary in extent, depending upon the nature of cases, to which the said principle is sought to be applied. It was further held that the State has the right to refuse the lowest or any other tender, provided it tries to get the best person or the best quotation, and the power to choose is not exercised for any collateral purpose or in infringement of Article 14.
In MASTER MARINE SERVICES PVT. LTD. VERSUS METCALFE & HODGKINSON PVT. LTD. [2005 (4) TMI 579 - SUPREME COURT], the apex Court held that the principles of judicial review would apply to the exercise of contractual powers by Government bodies in order to prevent arbitrariness or favourtism. However, there are inherent limitations in exercise of that power of judicial review.
In AFCONS INFRASTRUCTURE LTD. VERSUS NAGPUR METRO RAIL CORPORATION LTD. & ANR. [2016 (9) TMI 1292 - SUPREME COURT], the apex Court held that the constitutional courts are concerned with the decision making process. A decision if challenged (the decision having been arrived at through a valid process), the constitutional Courts can interfere if the decision is perverse. However, the constitutional Courts are expected to exercise restraint in interfering with the administrative decision and ought not substitute its view for that of the administrative authority.
In view of the law laid down by the apex Court, so far as the power of the Court to interfere with the conditions of tender in exercise of judicial review is concerned, there is no iota of doubt that when there is arbitrariness and unreasonableness in the matter of decision making process by the tendering authority, the Court can interfere. But, here is a case where in adherence to the tender conditions, the tendering authority has exercised its power, more particularly, clause-6.10 which gives power to the tendering authority to reject any or all the bids at any time solely based on the past unsatisfactory performance by the bidders. On the basis of the materials available, the tender committee came to a definite conclusion that past performance of the petitioner was unsatisfactory and, therefore, even if it quoted lowest price, the same cannot be accepted.
Thus, the bid submitted by the petitioner has been rejected on the ground of non-satisfactory performance in the past relying upon two documents, which have been issued by the RTO, Gajapati and RTO, Nuapada and also due to non-compliance of the requirement by depositing statutory dues.
This Court is of the considered view that rejection of the bid of the petitioner, even though lowest one, is well justified in view of clause-6.10 of the RFP. Therefore, there is no error in the decision making process in rejecting the bid of the petitioner so as to warrant interference of this Court in exercise of the power under judicial review - the writ petition merits no consideration and the same is hereby dismissed.
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2024 (10) TMI 1457
Attachment of the properties on default of return of deposits - Prayer for quashing and setting aside the auction process in respect of sale of the subject property - challenge to auction in which the Petitioner itself is declared as successful auction purchaser - alleged suppression of material facts in contravention of section 55 (1) (a) of the Transfer Of Property Act, 1882 - HELD THAT:- The attachment of the properties on default of return of deposits u/s. 4 of the MPID Act starts with a non-obstante clause and it provides that when the Government is satisfied that any Financial Establishment has failed to return the deposit after maturity or on demand by the depositor, or to pay interest or other assured benefit, or to provide the service promised against such deposit, or where the Government has reason to believe that any Financial Establishment is acting in a calculated manner detrimental to the interest of the depositors with an intention to defraud them and if the Government is further satisfied that such financial Establishment is not likely to return the deposits or pay the interest or other benefits assured, the Government may in order to protect the interest of the depositors, issue an order in the Official Gazette attaching the money or other property believed to have been acquired by such Financial Establishment either in its own name or in the name of any other person from out of the deposits collected by such Financial Establishment.
In the present case, Respondent No. 3 is duly constituted Competent Authority and it has exercised power u/s. 5(3) by applying to the designated Court and subject property was attached. The Designated Court u/s. 6 of the MPID Act has passed an order after investigation, to release the subject property from attachment u/s. 7(6) of the MPID Act - It is therefore clear that the subject property was first vested in the Competent Authority by operation of law and thereafter sold through the auction under process of law and the attachment of ED has been lifted by the Designated Court u/s. 7(6) of the MPID Act.
It is therefore clear that the enforcement of right of the ‘secured creditor’ flows from an agreement / instrument / document and ‘secured asset’ means property on which ‘security interest’ is created. Security interest means right, title or interest of any kind upon the property created in favour of the secured creditor including mortgage, charge, hypothecation, assignment or any right, title or interest of any kind on tangible asset retained by the secured creditor etc.
The very basis of the Petitioner’s case seeking refund of the purchase price paid, is that the subject property cannot be utilized by the Petitioner. This argument is based on the alleged non-availability of the title deeds. Once the subject property vested in the Competent Authority and is sold to the Petitioner under due process of law and once the attachment of ED is lifted by the order of designated MPID Court, nothing more is required, for the Petitioner to enjoy the subject property.
Having held that the Petitioner is not entitled to refund of the principal amount (purchase price paid), it is not necessary to labour any further about grant of interest as claimed by the Petitioner or otherwise. For the same reason, even the Petitioner’s prayer for damages / compensation is only stated to be rejected.
There are no merits in the Petition and the same is accordingly dismissed.
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2024 (10) TMI 1456
Levy of deficit stamp duty and penalty - whether in a case where a sale is conducted by a Court or under the aegis of Court (like in the present case), the stamp authorities can embark upon a journey to determine the true market value of the property [sold in an auction conducted by the Court or under the aegis of the Court] and levy stamp duty thereon? - HELD THAT:- The issue raised in the present Petition is squarely covered by a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of SPECTRUM CONSTRUCTIONS AND DEVELOPERS LLP VERSUS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THROUGH JOINT DISTRICT REGISTRAR, COLLECTOR OF STAMPS, RAIGAD [2022 (1) TMI 1469 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] as well as a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ASL Vyapar Pvt Ltd [2022 (11) TMI 1385 - SUPREME COURT].
In the case of Spectrum Constructions also the Petitioner was a successful bidder for purchase of certain immovable property for an amount of Rs. 1,66,57,920/-. This property was purchased by Spectrum Constructions pursuant to a sale conducted by a Committee constituted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court under the Chairmanship of the Hon’ble Mr. Justice R. M. Lodha (former Chief Justice of India), to oversee the disposal of lands held by a company called PACL Ltd. The reserve price fixed for the property was Rs. 83,28,960/- and the bid of the Petitioner was higher than that. The Petitioner also paid full stamp duty on the consideration paid for purchasing the property in question. Thereafter, the Petitioner (i.e. Spectrum Constructions) received a demand notice from the Stamp Authorities for payment of deficit stamp duty and penalty.
As laid down by the Division Bench in Spectrum Constructions, once the bid of the Petitioner was accepted by the Justice Lodha Committee, and the sale was confirmed at a price bid by the Petitioner, and which was above the reserve price, there was no question of the Stamp Authorities determining any other value. That would be taken as the market value.
This issue has now been conclusively settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ASL Vyapar Pvt Ltd. A three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has clearly opined that in a Court auction, often the price obtainable may be slightly less as any bidder has to take care of a scenario where the auction may be challenged which could result in passage of time in obtaining perfection of title, with also the possibility of it being overturned - The logic is that an auction of a property by the Court is possibly one of the most transparent methods by which the property can be sold. Thus, to say that even in a Court monitored auction, the Registering Authority would have a say on what is the market price, would amount to the Registering Authority sitting in appeal over the decision of the Court permitting sale at a particular price.
Petition allowed.
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2024 (10) TMI 1455
Dishonour of Cheque - Insufficient funds - validity of the complaint u/s 138 of the NI Act, 1881, filed through a Power of Attorney - proceedings initiated on the basis of a compromise deed - HELD THAT:- It is relevant to note that this Court can quash complaints under the NI Act at the pre-trial stage in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC if such unimpeachable material is brought forth by the accused persons which indicates that they were not concerned with the issuance of the cheques or that no offence is made out from the admitted facts.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2022 (4) TMI 1434 - SUPREME COURT] had discussed the scope of interference by the High Court against the issuance of process under the NI Act and it was held that 'to non-suit the complainant, at the stage of the summoning order, when the factual controversy is yet to be canvassed and considered by the trial court will not in our opinion be judicious. Based upon a prima facie impression, an element of criminality cannot entirely be ruled out here subject to the determination by the trial Court. Therefore, when the proceedings are at a nascent stage, scuttling of the criminal process is not merited.'
In line with the dictum of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2022 (4) TMI 1434 - SUPREME COURT]], thus, while exercising the power under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash a complaint at the pre-trial stage, it is pertinent for this Court to examine whether the factual defence is of such impeachable nature that the entire allegations made in the complaint is disproved.
From a perusal of the complaint, it transpires that the complaint mentions that the authorized representative is fully competent to file and sign the complaint and is competent to file evidence by way of affidavit, and do all other acts to pursue the case. The complaint also mentions that attorney possessed personal knowledge of the case.
In the present case from a perusal of the complaint and the pre-summoning evidence, it is evident that the same contains an averment that the authorized representative does possess personal knowledge of the alleged transaction. The degree of knowledge or whether the authorized representative even possess any personal knowledge with regard to the alleged transaction as alleged by the petitioner is a subject matter of trial and cannot be looked into at this stage to quash the complaint and framing of notice under Section 251 of the CrPC. Merely because the complaint, or the pre-summoning evidence by way of affidavit does not detail what knowledge or the extent of knowledge possessed by the authorized representative, this Court does not deem it expedient to quash the complaint and notice under Section 251 of the CrPC, especially on the ground of extent of knowledge of the authorized representative - The challenge to the validity of the compromise deed would be decided after the evidence is lead by the parties and cannot be commented upon at this stage and this Court does not deem it apposite to comment or consequently quash the present petition on such ground.
In the present case, while the petitioner has raised questions regarding the incapability of the attorney to file the complaint, or lead pre-summoning evidence on the strength of the Power of Attorney, or the maintainability of the complaint on the basis of a fabricated compromise deed, the same is not impeachable in nature and does not disprove the allegations levelled against the petitioner in the complaint. Such questions can well be determined by the learned MM during the course of trial. The learned MM would arrive at a decision after considering the allegations, and counter allegations raised by the parties, and considering the evidence on record.
This Court finds that the petitioner has, at best, raised questions of fact mixed with law which cannot be examined by this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC since it is expedient that the same be left to be adjudicated at the stage of trial when the parties have led their evidence.
Petition dismissed.
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