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Showing 181 to 200 of 1429 Records
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2023 (12) TMI 1249
Condonation of delay in filing an appeal before NCLAT - whether the appeal was instituted within limitation? - Maintainability of application under Section 7 of the IBC - HELD THAT:- On the facts of the case, the Court noted that the appeal was barred by limitation as the appellant did not even attempt to secure a certified copy and only relied on the date of uploading the order on the website. Significantly, in the case, there was a pronouncement on the date mentioned on the order and the appellant did not dispute his presence before the NCLT when the order was pronounced in open court.
The date on which the limitation begins to run is intrinsically linked to the date of pronouncement. The question that arises in the facts of the present case, therefore, is when is an order deemed to be pronounced. The National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 [NCLT Rules] provide guidance in this regard. Rule 89(1) of the NCLT Rules indicates that when NCLAT registry publishes its cause list, a distinction is drawn between cases listed for pronouncement of orders and other cases.
In the present case, the cause list for 17 May 2023 placed on record by the appellant indicates that the case was listed for admission and not for pronouncement. Further, on a specific query of the Court, it is not in dispute between counsel for the appellant and the respondent, that no substantive order was passed on 17 May 2023 by the NCLT. In these circumstances, limitation would not begin to run on 17 May 2023 which was the date on which hearings concluded. As no order was passed before 30 May 2023, there was no occasion for the appellant to lodge an application for a certified copy on 17 May 2023. Time for filing an appeal would commence only when the order appealed from was uploaded since prior to that date no order was pronounced.
The period of limitation began to run on 30 May 2023. The 30- day limitation period provided in Section 61(2) of the IBC concluded on 29 June 2023. Though the appeal was filed beyond the period of thirty days, it was within the condonable period of fifteen days - the appeal should be restored to the NCLAT for reconsidering whether the appellant has shown sufficient cause for condoning the delay beyond thirty days.
Appeal disposed off.
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2023 (12) TMI 1248
Maintainability of section 9 application - HELD THAT:- The present appeal is dismissed - It is clarified that the impugned judgment and the dismissal of the present appeal will not be construed as an expression of opinion on whether the petition under Section 9 of the IBC is within time.
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2023 (12) TMI 1247
Submission of claim before COC - HELD THAT:- The pleas and contentions of Kamal Kant Dewan and Bharat Food and Agro Products, as well as the contentions of White Water Hospitality Private Limited, will be examined by the adjudicating authority.
The impugned judgment set aside - appeal allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1246
Dismissal of Section 9 application - pre-existing dispute - HELD THAT:- The email sent by the Corporate Debtor indicate the entire issue raised between the parties, where the Corporate Debtor denied any outstanding amount. Further, the receipt which was claimed by the Corporate Debtor was the receipt of the diamonds received on behalf of the Appellant, which were all before the date when Demand Notice was issued. This indicate that at the time when Demand Notice was issued, there were dispute between the parties.
The Adjudicating Authority has rightly rejected the Section 9 application there being a pre-existing dispute - Appeal dismissed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1245
Seeking condonation of delay of 15 days in filing of the appeal - existence of sufficient reasons for delay or not - HELD THAT:- In the present case, the appeal has been filed on the last date i.e. 15th day i.e. 45th day. The reason given in para 3 of the application for condonation of delay appears to be a halfhearted attempt on the part of the Appellant for condonation the delay of 15 days because it is mentioned therein that the appellant took time for procuring relevant documents and as such the counsel for the Appellant could not receive instructions on time. However, in the additional affidavit, the Appellant has mentioned that it had to obtain several documents which could not be procured in time. However, it is not denied that the appeal was filed on 17.04.2023 and then an application was filed on 08.11.2023 for placing on record the additional documents.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of National Spot Exchange Limited Vs. Anil Kohli [2021 (9) TMI 1156 - SUPREME COURT] held that the delay beyond the period of 15 days cannot be condoned by the Tribunal and even under Article 142 of the Constitution of India which makes the provision very stringent and lays responsibility on the Appellant to be vigilant enough to file the appeal within the prescribed period. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, there are no merit in the application and the same is hereby dismissed - The application for seeking condonation of delay in re-filing has become infructuous and the same is hereby dismissed.
Condonation of delay of 15 days in filing the appeal and for condonation of delay of 162 in refiling the appeal - HELD THAT:- In the present case, the appeal has been filed on the last date i.e. 15th day i.e. 45th day. The reason given in para 3 of the application for condonation of delay appears to be a halfhearted attempt on the part of the Appellant for condonation the delay of 15 days because it is mentioned therein that the appellant took time for procuring relevant documents and as such the counsel for the Appellant could not receive instructions on time - the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of National Spot Exchange Limited Vs. Anil Kohli, [2021 (9) TMI 1156 - SUPREME COURT] held that the delay beyond the period of 15 days cannot be condoned by the Tribunal and even under Article 142 of the Constitution of India which makes the provision very stringent and lays responsibility on the Appellant to be vigilant enough to file the appeal within the prescribed period - there are no merit in the application and the same is hereby dismissed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1244
Arrest of appellant - HELD THAT:- Even during the course of investigation, the appellant was not arrested.
The interim order dated 16th October, 2023 is made absolute on the same terms and conditions - Appeal allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1243
Seeking grant of anticipatory bail - Money Laundering - proceeds of crime - statement recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA, 2002 - HELD THAT:- The co-accused persons Shesh Nath Chauha, Ashok Kumar Singh and Pramod Kumar Singh have been granted anticipatory bail in the present case - The complaint states that the applicant was working as a Junior Engineer; the applicant is aged about 63 years and besides the alleged Scheduled offence, he is not involved in any other case. He has already been granted anticipatory bail in the Scheduled offence and three co-accused persons have been granted anticipatory bail in the present case.
The applicant is also entitled for anticipatory bail in the present case - In the event of arrest/ appearance of applicant-Ashok Kumar Singh before the learned Trial Court in the aforesaid case crime, he shall be released on anticipatory bail on his furnishing personal bond and two solvent sureties, each in the like amount, to the satisfaction of S.H.O./Court concerned on the conditions imposed - bail application allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1242
Levy of service tax - Declared Service - relinquishment charges under section 66E (e) of the Finance Act - charges are in the nature of consideration received towards rendition of the declared service i.e. tolerating of relinquishing access rights - HELD THAT:- It is well settled that the amount paid in the nature of compensation/damages on account of breach or non-performance of contract would not be considered in lieu of any service and, therefore, would not be leviable to service tax.
In view of the decision of the Tribunal in South-Eastern Coalfields Ltd. [2020 (12) TMI 912 - CESTAT NEW DELHI], it has to be held that relinquishment charges are not consideration received towards rendition of a declared service under section 66E (e) of the Finance Act.
It would not be necessary to examine the alternative submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant that in any view of the matter, the relinquishment charges recovered by the appellant are part of the electricity transmission service and, therefore, would be covered under the Negative List under section 66D (k) of the Finance Act.
The order dated 04.03.2021 passed by the Principal Commissioner cannot be sustained and is set aside - Appeal allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1241
Levy of service tax - Declared service or not - Recovery of penalty/liquidated damages recovered from customers and contractors - agreeing to the obligation to recover from an Act or to start an Act or a situation, or to do an Act - HELD THAT:- After considering the various provisions of Indian Contract Act therewith, it has been held that liquidated damages/ compensation for the breach of contract can be awarded to make good the loss or damage which actually arises or which the parties knew when they made the contract, “to be likely to result from the breach”. Hence it cannot be concluded that sum received is synonymous to “tolerating”. It is absolutely wrong to say that in breach of contract one appellant tolerates an Act or a situation, hence, the view taken by the Commissioner (Appeals) that the liquidated damages as have been received by the appellants towards “consideration” for “tolerating the Act” are leviable to service tax under section 66 E(e) of Finance Act is not at all sustainable.
In the fact of both the present appeals, it is found that the facts are almost identical. There appears nothing for us to differ from the above observations in the afore-mentioned final order of the said Tribunal. Respectfully, following those findings it is held that the amount in question cannot be called as consideration towards declared service as defined under Section 66E (e) of the Finance Act. The confirmation of tax demand qua said amount is therefore not sustainable.
Appeal allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1240
Refund claim - refund rejected solely on the ground that the TR6 challan, evincing payment of duty, had not been furnished - HELD THAT:- The issue of documentation prescribed under section 11B of Central Excise Act, 1944 for claiming of refunds came before the Tribunal in MAHARASHTRA STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD VERSUS COMMR. OF C. EX., NAGPUR [2004 (4) TMI 368 - CESTAT, MUMBAI] and it was held therein that The respondent has no case that the appellants have claimed refund of duty unduly or with any oblique purpose. The appellant is a public body and it can have no oblique motives. The orders of the lower authorities are set aside in so far as the refund claims in question are concerned. The claims are allowed.
The issue is the same as that in the dispute of the appellant for similar refund. It would appear that the lower authorities had erred in insisting upon the original document as proof of discharge of duty liability even though available with the central excise authorities - the impugned order is set aside and the application restored to the original authority for fresh determination of the application for sanction in consequence of judicial determination of non-excisability.
The appeal is allowed by way of remand.
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2023 (12) TMI 1239
Levy of Central Excise Duty - inclusion of sales tax concession retained by the assesses in the assessable value or not - extended period of limitation - penalty - HELD THAT:- The issue is no more res integra as the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, JAIPUR-II VERSUS M/S. SUPER SYNOTEX (INDIA) LTD. AND OTHERS [2014 (3) TMI 42 - SUPREME COURT], has held that the sales tax concession retained by the assesses is required to be added in the assessable value for the purpose of levy of Central Excise duty. By relying on the above decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, we hold that the sales tax concession retained by the Appellant is required to be added in the assessable value for the purpose of levy of Central Excise duty.
Since the Appellant has not collected the duty separately from the customers, the amount collected is to be treated as inclusive of duty - the demand for the normal period is to be computed by taking the amount collected as cum-duty.
Penalty - HELD THAT:- The appellant cannot be faulted for not including the same in the assessable value. In the impugned order, the adjudicating authority while agreeing that extended period not invocable in this case, imposed penalty equal to the duty confirmed under Section 11AC of the CEA, 1944 - the adjudicating authority has not given any proper finding for imposing penalty under Section 11AC. Accordingly, the penalty imposed under Section 11AC not tenable.
Extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- In the present case, it is observed that the Adjudicating Authority has failed to show any positive act of suppression on the part of the Appellant. The details of VAT collected and retained by the Appellant are reflected in the audited Profit & Loss account and balance sheet of the impugned periods. Accordingly, by following the above Circular issued by the Board, it is held that extended period not invocable in this case and for the same reason penalty under Section 11AC of the CEA, 1944 also not imposable.
The appeal is disposed by way of remand for calculating the duty, payable for the normal period of limitation, with consequential relief, if any, as per law.
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2023 (12) TMI 1238
Reversal of cenvat credit - used/rejected capital goods on which Cenvat credit has not been taken are cleared as waste and scrap - transaction value as per Rule 3(5A) of the Cenvat Credit Rules - HELD THAT:- On going through the provisions of Rule 3(5) and 3(5A) of the Cenvat Credit Rules. A perusal of these Rules 3(5) and 3(5A) reveal that the expression "the capital goods" available in Rule 3(5A) refers to the capital goods on which Cenvat credit has been taken - Rule 3(5) provides for a situation where such capital goods are removed “as such” from the factory or premises of the provider of output service. Rule 3(5A) deals with a situation when such capital goods are cleared as "waste and scrap". It is apparent that both the provisions of Rules 3(5) and (5A), are concerned with capital goods on which Cenvat credit has been taken.
As the Appellant has not availed any credit on these rejected capital goods cleared as scrap, we hold that the provisions of Rule 3(5) and 3(5A) are not applicable in this case - the demand of duty confirmed in the impugned order is not sustainable. Since, the demand of duty itself is not sustainable, the question of demanding interest or imposing penalty does not arise.
The impugned order set aside - appeal allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1237
CENVAT Credit - inputs or not - wielding electrodes used in their factory premises towards repairs and maintenance activities - HELD THAT:- The Rajasthan High Court in the case of HINDUSTAN ZINC LTD. VERSUS UNION OF INDIA [2008 (7) TMI 55 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT] has held the expression “in the manufacture of goods” should normally encompass entire process carried on by the dealer, of converting raw materials into finished goods, where any particular process, or activity, is so integrally connected with the ultimate production of the goods, but for that process, manufacturing, or processing of the goods would be commercially inexpedient, goods required in that process would, fall within expression “in the manufacturing of goods”.
The Chhattisgarh High Court in the case of CST, Bilaspur Vs. Singhal Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. [2017 (7) TMI 1112 - CHHATTISGARH HIGH COURT] has held Welding Electrodes used in the manufacturing process are considered as inputs.
Since the present issue is squarely covered by the above decisions of the Hon’ble High Court, respectfully following them, the present Appeal is allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1236
Recovery of dues - priority over charges - whether the different departments of the State including Excise and Revenue will have priority over the secured creditors’ debt? - HELD THAT:- It would be evident from the replies filed by the respondents that they have nowhere disputed the lien of the State Bank of India as per Section 26 D noted and entered in the CERSAI (Annexure P-2), dated 06.03.2013, which clearly establishes the fact that the petitioner-Bank is not only a secured creditor but has created the first charge over the property in question as far as back in the year, 2013. Whereas the charge of respondents No. 1 and 2 had been created and reflected in revenue record vide rapat No. 459, dated 09.07.2015 and that of respondent No. 3 only vide Rapat No. 173, dated 05.02.2018.
Once the petitioner is a secured creditor and has moreover created the first charge over the property, then obviously, it has the first right to realise its dues and this question is no longer res integra in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Punjab National Bank Vs. Union of India & Ors. [2022 (2) TMI 1171 - SUPREME COURT].
The legal position has thereafter been reiterated in a recent judgment of this Court in Mankind Life Sciences Private Limited vs. The State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr., [2023 (10) TMI 867 - HIMACHAL PRADESH HIGH COURT], wherein it was held [2022 (2) TMI 1171 - SUPREME COURT].
This Court is left with no other option, but to allow the instant petition by directing respondents to remove the red entry qua the property in question made in the revenue record i.e. Rapat No. 459, dated 09.07.2015 and Rapat No. 173, dated 05.02.2018 forthwith.
The instant petition is allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1235
Dishonour of Cheque - rebuttal of presumption - main reason asserted both for dislodging execution of Ext.P1 and lack of consideration is that the similarity of handwriting in it with that in Ext.X1. PW1 has no case that Ext.P1 was in the handwriting of the petitioner - HELD THAT:- The petitioner did not adduce any evidence. It is true that in order to rebut the presumption in respect of a cheque, the accused can rely on the evidence and materials submitted by the complainant. The only thing is that the accused must be able to substantiate his case by preponderance of probabilities. The case set up by the petitioner during the cross-examination of PWs.1 to 3 and also in his answers to the question put to him under Section 313(1)(b) of the Code is that the cheque was issued as a security in respect of the transactions between himself and the 1st respondent - Lack of signature of PW1 in two pages of Ext.P6 does not assume much importance since its execution is proved by the evidence of PW3 and it is in favour of the 1st respondent. It was after considering the aforesaid evidence in detail the courts below concurrently held that the petitioner failed to rebut the presumption available under Section 139 of the N.I. Act in respect of Ext.P1.
The power of revision under Section 401 of the Code is not wide and exhaustive. The High Court in the exercise of the powers of revision cannot re-appreciate evidence to come to a different conclusion, but its consideration of the evidence is confined to find out the legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. When the findings rendered by the courts below are well supported by evidence on record and cannot be said to be perverse in any way, the High Court is not expected to interfere with the concurrent findings by the courts below while exercising revisional jurisdiction.
This Court is not expected to substitute the concurrent finding of the court below with a different view unless such findings are perverse and against the evidence - the revision lacks merits and liable to be dismissed - the revision petition is dismissed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1234
Penalty u/s.271CA - “assessee in default” for failure to collect tax at source u/s 206C - running bars on contract / licnece basis - empty bottles can be considered as scrap or not? - tax has also been imposed u/s 206CC and Section 206CCA and further interest u/s 206C(7) - HELD THAT:- Under Sub-Section (7) to Section 206C where a person responsible for collecting tax fails to collect it in accordance with Section 206C(1) shall be liable to pay tax to the credit of the Central Government in accordance with the provisions of Sub Section (3).
As per Sub-Section (3) to Section 206C any person collecting any amount under this Section shall pay within the prescribed time the amount so collected to the credit of the Central Government or as the Board directs. Provided that the person collecting tax on or after the 1st day of April, 2005 in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this Section shall, after paying the tax collected to the credit of the Central Government within the prescribed time, prepare such statements for such period as may be prescribed and deliver or cause to be delivered to the prescribed income-tax authority, or the person authorised by such authority, such statement in such form and verified in such manner and setting forth such particulars and within such time as may be prescribed.
As per Sub Section (7) to Section 206C a person responsible for collecting tax failing to pay tax to the credit of the Central Government on or before the date specified, either after collecting the tax or fails to collect tax, shall be liable to pay simple interest at the rate of 1% per month or part thereof on the amount of such tax from the date on which such tax was collectible to the date on which the tax was actually paid or payable and such interest shall be paid before furnishing the quarterly statement for each quarter in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3).
In absence of definition for the expression “mechanical working of materials” in Section 206C the above doctrine of nocitur a sociis can be usefully applied to the facts of the case to resolve the legal conundrum. Court is faced with.
The meaning of the expression “mechanical working of materials” in Section 206C can therefore to be gathered by applying the doctrine of noscitur a sociis from the meaning of the expression “manufacture” in Section 2(29BA).
The definition of the expression “manufacture” in Section 2(29BA) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 is similar to the definition of “manufacture” in Section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Therefore, for a “waste” or a “scrap” to be liable to excise duty under Section 3 of the Central Excise Act, 1944, such “waste” or “scrap” was also to be specified in the 1st Schedule to Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985.
Certain activity may amount to “manufacture” yet not liable to Central Exercise Duty. An activity may resemble to a “manufacturing activity”, yet may not amount to “manufacture”. Only those activity can came within the purview of the expression of “mechanical working of material”.
Only those activity which resemble “manufacturing activity”, but are not a “manufacturing activity” can come within the purview of the expression of “mechanical working of material”. Only such “scrap” arising of such “mechanical working of material” are in contemplation of Section 206C.
Only such “scarp” generated from such “mechanical working of material” which are not “manufacturing activity” but are akin to “manufacturing activity” can be said to be in contemplation of Section 206C.
The expression “mechanical working of material” in Section 206C would apply only to such activity which are akin to “manufacturing activity” but not “manufacturing activity”. Only such “scrap” generated from such activity i.e. either “manufacturing activity” or from “mechanical working of material” can be construed to be in contemplation of Section 206C.
Mere opening, breaking or uncorking of a liquor bottle by mere twisting the seal in a liquor bottle will not amount to generation of “scrap” from “mechanical working of material” for the purpose of explanation to Section 206C.
Activity of opening or uncorking of the bottle is also not by the petitioner. These are independent and autonomous acts of individual consumers who decides to consume liquor purchased from the Tasmac Shops of the petitioner which have a licensed premises (Bar) adjacent to them under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Liquor Retail Vending (in Shops and Bars) Rules, 2003.
No waste or scrap was generated by the petitioner for it to be sold by the petitioner. Scrap, if any, was generated at the licensed premises which was leased by the licensees from the provide owners of the premises.
Left over bottles after consumption are not owned by the petitioner. Neither the petitioner nor the licensee are the owner of the waste bottles. What the respective bar licensees are permitted under the terms of the license under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Liquor Retail Vending (in Shops and Bars) Rules, 2003 is merely to sell food and water and clear the left over bottles more from the point of view of ensuring cleanliness. The bar owners incidentally monetize the left over bottles.
Rule 9(a) of the Tamil Nadu Liquor Retail Vending (In Shops and Bars) Rules, 2003 merely grants privilege to the respective bar owners only to run the bars to sell the eatables and to clear left over empty bottles. Bottles are neither “Scrap” nor a property of either the TASMAC or Bar Licensee.
Ownership over the bottles at best would stand vested with the respective bar owners / licensees who have been licensed. Sale of left over bottles are merely regulated. Mere regulation of such sale would not render the petitioner sale of bottles A mere privilege is conferred on the respective bar owners / licensees to collect the left over bottles and sell them to the breweries and distilleries. There is no scope to conclude sale bottles by the petitioners to the respective bar owners / licensees.
To be a “seller” of used bottle, the petitioner should be the owner of the bottle. Neither the petitioner nor the Bar owners / licensees are the owners of the bottles left behind in the licensed premises (Bar). The petitioner merely decides the upset price and other terms and conditions in the tender process with the approval of the Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise. Merely because used bottles are to be cleared which implies sale by them would not render the petitioner “seller” for the purpose of Section 206C of the Act.
There is neither a “manufacture” nor a generation of “scrap” from ”mechanical working of materials”, the liability under Section 206C of the Income Tax Act, 1961 is not attracted.
Suffice to state that the petitioner is neither the owner of the bottle nor generates scrap as is contemplated under the Income Tax Act, 1961. The activity of opening and uncorking is not a “mechanical working of material”.
Invocation of Section 206 C, 206CC and 206CCA of Income Tax Act, 1961 was wholly misplaced and unwarranted under the circumstances against the petitioner for the alleged failure to collect tax at 1% on 99% of the license fee payable to the Government and 1% retained as agency commission. Therefore, there is no merits in the impugned order. Consequently, the question of paying simple interest under Section 206C(7) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 cannot be countenanced with.
Since Section 206C of the Income Tax Act, 1961 is not applicable, question of imposing liability on the petitioner to furnish the PAN Number of the Bar owners under Section 206CC of the Income Tax Act, 1961 cannot be countenanced with. WP allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1233
Tribunal not dealing with second issue/question - whether the respondent/assessee had a Permanent Establishment (PE) in India? and whether the subject transaction was at Arm’s Length and, if it was so, whether any profit could be attributed to the respondent/assessee?
Tribunal has dealt only with the first issue and concluded that the respondent/assessee neither a fixed place PE nor a dependent agent PE in India. Because the Tribunal reached this conclusion, it observed that the other issue was academic.
HE;D THAT:- As the record discloses that the respondent/assessee had raised an alternative plea concerning the second issue. In our opinion, it would save time and costs if the Tribunal were to render a view with regard to the second issue as well, which is broadly referred to hereinabove.
Therefore, without disturbing the impugned orders passed by the Tribunal, with the consent of counsel for the parties, the above-captioned matters are remitted to the Tribunal for rendering a decision with regard to the second issue.It is made clear that whichever party is aggrieved by the impugned order, as well as the order passed upon remand by the Tribunal, will have liberty to approach the court by way of a statutory appeal.
Since the instant appeal concerned the impugned orders passed by the Tribunal as and when the appellant/revenue files an appeal, the period spanning between the date when the above-captioned appeals were instituted in this court and the date when the Tribunal passes the order post remand, will not be factored in while calculating the period of limitation.
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2023 (12) TMI 1232
Refund of tax - Applications to condone delay in filing the return of income and claim of refund u/s 119(2)(b) rejected - HELD THAT:- Respondent could not have rejected the applications to condone the delay of the petitioners when in case of similarly situated persons, the respondent has ordered to condone the delay after considering the decision in case of Hari Singh and others [2017 (11) TMI 923 - SUPREME COURT] while exercising the jurisdiction u/s 119(2)(b) of the Act, 1961.
Therefore, the impugned orders rejecting the applications to condone the delay are required to be quashed and set aside in each petition with a direction to condone delay u/s 119(2)(b) as per order passed by the respondent in case of similarly situated persons, however, with a rider to direct the AO to issue refund with interest on the amount of refund claim from the date of deposit by the Executive Engineer, Irrigation department till the date of granting of refund.
For passing such direction of issuance of the refund with interest under section 244A, similar reasons as given by this Court in case of Special Civil Application No. 12466/2021 [2023 (12) TMI 1165 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] the words "or the deductor, as the case may be," which is inserted with effect from 01.04.2017 would not be applicable as the petitioners have been permitted to file the refund claim for the AY 2013-2014 after condonation of delay and such delay in claiming the refund cannot be said to be attributable to the petitioners as the petitioners were not made aware about the deduction of tax at source by the deductor in absence of issuance of Form No. 16-A which was mandatorily required as per Rule 31(3) of the Rules.
In view of the foregoing reasons, the petitions succeed and are accordingly allowed. The respondents are directed to pass the order to condone the delay in filing the return for the Assessment Year 2013-2014 and to issue the refund with interest under section 244A of the Act, 1961 from the date of deposit of the amount of TDS till date of payment of refund as per provisions of section 244A of the Act, 1961
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2023 (12) TMI 1231
Recovery proceedings - Validity of Attachment of property - Encumbrance attachment entry - grievance of the petitioner is that the first respondent has attached the properties of the third and fourth respondents towards the income tax dues for the year 2018-19, and even though the mortgage properties were sold, the encumbrance certificate reflected, as if, there is a clog in the title by virtue of the entries made in the Encumbrance Certificate due to attachment order passed by the first respondent. It is under these circumstances, the present writ petition has been filed before this Court.
HELD THAT:- It is quite clear from the materials placed before this Court that the properties, which were attached by the first respondent in the year 2018-19, were already a subject matter of mortgage with the petitioner Bank in the year 2015 itself and it is apparent from the particulars that have been extracted supra. It is now too well settled that the Bank as a secured creditor will have a priority over the dues that are payable to the first respondent.
The Full Bench judgment of this Court in UTI Bank Ltd [2006 (12) TMI 2 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] also took note of the priority of the Bank over the dues as against the crown's debts.
The relief as sought for by the petitioner is granted. There shall be a direction to the second respondent to make necessary footnote and delete the attachment entries made by the first respondent. It is made clear that this order will not stand in the way of the first respondent to recover the income tax dues from the third and fourth respondents, if other properties are available for sale and recovery of dues.
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2023 (12) TMI 1230
LTCG - Deduction towards the ‘Cost of Improvement’ in the Lucknow House u/s 54 - AO observed that the photographs produced by the assessee were vague and insufficient to prove the year of incurrence of expenditure as claimed - HELD THAT:- We find that the AO has categorically accepted that Air conditioning, modular kitchen and kitchen chimney, tube-well and submersible pump are not a part of the building.
AO also accepts the fact that the building was valued as per the CPWD guidelines. Having said so, the AO holds that the expenses relatable to Air conditioning, modular kitchen and kitchen chimney, tube-well and submersible pump are not allowable as cost of improvement. The AO again agrees that the valuation report cannot be completely disregarded and parts of it are based on evidence and is in line with existing CPWD guidelines but has an objection that the photographs produced by the assessee are vague and insufficient to prove the incurrence of expenditure.
AO also held that the photographs do not portray the exact specification of the improvement made. It cannot be said that the house operated, made to live without a modular kitchen. The availability of submersible pump is a finding of fact and not mentioning it in the agreement doesn’t entitle the deduction. All the improvements made necessarily lead to the improvement in the value of the sale. The authorities have blown hot & cold in disallowing the expenditure. The selective reading of the sale agreement and lack of mentioning of pump and modular kitchen cannot necessarily lead to disallowance. AO could not bring anything on record that the statement given by the valuer is wrong on facts or had inconsistencies. Hence, we allow the appeal of the assessee on this ground.
Cost of improvement - Bangalore property - We find that the revenue has not disputed the import of Pneumatic Vacuum Elevator (PVE) however held that it is not essential for the improvement of the house to make it habitable. Whether to have a lift in the house or not is certainly not the purview of the Assessing Officer. Notwithstanding that, we find that the father of the assessee, Brig. V. K. Ghai is 90 years old staying with the assessee which is also a fact on record before the AO. Hence, we hold that the sum of Rs. 12,00,000/- incurred for installation of lift is an allowable item of cost of improvement. The amount of Rs. 1,80,000/- was made with regard to installation of the lift and the other sundry expenses to make the house habitable and hence the amounts are also to be allowed. Hence, we allow the appeal of the assessee on this ground.
Eligibility for deduction u/s 54 though the assessee did not purchase new house property himself rather got it as gift from parents - As find that the ld. CIT(A) had diligently, meticulously & conscientiously, after considering the Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court judgments in the case of ACIT Vs. Suresh Verma [2012 (3) TMI 256 - ITAT DELHI] & CIT Vs. Kamal Wahal [2013 (1) TMI 401 - DELHI HIGH COURT] came to a valid conclusion that the investments have been made by the assessee from his bank account of Rs. 17,65,000/- on 14.08.2014 and Rs. 3,31,82,000/- dated 21.08.2014 for payment to Sh. V. Ravindran, seller of the property and the parents have gone to registration owing to the absence of the assessee in India. It is also a fact that such registered property has also been gifted to the assessee by the parents on 10.06.2015. Hence, we decline to interfere with the order of the ld. CIT(A) invoking rule of purposive construction and object of Section 54F and allowing the deduction u/s 54F on the house registered in the name of the parents of the assessee.
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