|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 121 to 140 of 324 Records
-
2025 (3) TMI 204
Public offer date - Determination of date on which a public announcement of an open offer, in terms of clause (1) to Regulation 20, has been made - It is the case of the appellants that the date on which the public announcement was made would be 18.01.2025 - case of the private respondents that the public offer date must be taken as 03.10.2023 and, therefore, the application filed by the appellants is belated and beyond time.
HELD THAT:- Clause (9) of Regulation 20 states that, upon the public announcement of a competing offer, an acquirer who had made the preceding offer shall be entitled to revise the terms of his open offer provided the revised terms are more favourable to the shareholders of the target company.
The acquirers making the competing offers shall be entitled to make upward revisions of the offer price at any time up to one working day prior to the commencement of the tendering period.
The tendering period, we are informed, has come to an end today, that is, on 07.02.2025. During the course of arguments, it was noted that there have been several attempts to stall the public offer, but without success.
We have noted the said aspect, but at the same time, we have also taken into account the fact that the application filed by the appellants is still pending consideration by the SEBI and has not been disposed of. SEBI would be more concerned about public investors and their rights and interests.
The main question that arises and has to be decided by the SEBI relates to the date of public announcement of the open offer, as contemplated in Regulation 20(1) of the 2011 SEBI Regulations. The second question would be whether or not to grant exemption, if the situation requires it. Third issue relates to the public offer price.
It is pointed out by the private respondents that they deposited a sum of ₹330 crores way back on 26.09.2023 in an escrow account.
Keeping all the aforesaid facts in mind, we are inclined to pass the following order: -
1. The appellant, Digvijay Laxhamsinh Gaekwad (Danny Gaekwad) or their nominee/applicant before SEBI, as suggested by his counsel, shall deposit a sum of ₹600 crores in terms of the 2011 SEBI Regulations, in the form of cash and/or bank guarantee, on or before 12.02.2025. In case the amount is not deposited by the said date, the directions in the present order shall be automatically vacated without further reference to the Court.
2. The public offer, which is to close today, will be continued till 12.02.2025. In case the appellant, Digvijay Laxhamsinh Gaekwad (Danny Gaekwad) or their nominee/applicant before SEBI, deposits ₹600 crores in terms of the 2011 SEBI Regulations, the offer will continue till the end of third day post the date of the order to be passed by SEBI on the application of the appellants.
3. A party aggrieved by the order passed by SEBI would be entitled to take recourse to an appropriate remedy.
Present directions are in the nature of an interim order.
-
2025 (3) TMI 203
Seeking restoration of the suit - Exclusion of period of moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) for filing an application under Order IX Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) for restoration of suits dismissed for non-prosecution - HELD THAT:- The proceedings under the IBC were initiated by the appellant/plaintiff, i.e., the erstwhile Corporate Debtor on 29.01.2018. Thus, there is no merit in the plea that the application under Order IX Rule 9 of the CPC was filed by the same set of counsels, for the simple reason that the moratorium that crept in on filing of the proceedings under the IBC left no legal right or power in the Ex-Directors/Management to continue with the civil suit. The plea by the learned counsel for the respondent that the order dated 14.05.2018 applied moratorium only to suits or legal proceedings instituted against the Corporate Debtor, and not to those initiated by the Corporate Debtor, is only recorded to be rejected.
This Court finds merit in the plea advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff that the period of moratorium, i.e., from 14.05.2018 to 28.11.2019, must be excluded. It is during such period that the two suits were dismissed for non-prosecution on 04.06.2018. The fact that the application was filed on 06.12.2018, despite instructions from the IRP on 05.10.2018, does not carry significant weight, especially considering that the appellant/plaintiff was entangled in the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process, which was eventually successful and resulted in the revival of the company. The said delay, if any, ought to be condoned.
Conclusion - The period of moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC must be excluded when computing the limitation period for filing restoration applications under Order IX Rule 9 of the CPC.
The impugned order set aside - matter is remanded back to the learned Trial Court for further trial of the matter in accordance with law - appeal allowed.
-
2025 (3) TMI 202
Scope of SCN - Appellant was registered under the category of ‘Manpower Recruitment and Supply Agency Services’ but was simultaneously providing certain other services without intimating the Department - difference in figures of amounts reflected in ST-3 Returns vis-à-vis those disclosed in P & L A/c and Balance Sheet - Invocation of Extended period of limitation.
Scope of SCN - HELD THAT:- The SCN nowhere specified the nature of services on which service tax was sought to be recovered. Since the period covered by the SCN was prior to 01.07.2012 and the charge of service tax under Section 66 during that period was only on services defined under various clauses of clause (105) of Section 65, hence the SCN was clearly vague and not sustainable in law. While it is correct that the nature of ‘other services’ were described in the adjudication order, but the SCN being completely silent on the nature of services, the deficiency in SCN cannot be removed by the adjudication order, as SCN is the foundation of the case set up by the revenue and revenue cannot be permitted to travel beyond the scope of SCN, as held in CCE vs. Shital International [2010 (10) TMI 19 - SUPREME COURT].
Invocation of Extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- The demand is barred by limitation having been raised by invoking extended period of limitation. A perusal of the appeal records shows that the demand is worked out on the figures disclosed by the Appellant in its Balance Sheet and Profit & Loss A/c. This Tribunal in catena of cases held that demand based on figures of Balance Sheet, which is a public document, cannot be made by invoking extended period of limitation.
Since the SCN was issued on 20.09.2013, the demand of service tax beyond the period of eighteen months from 20.09.2013 i.e. till 20.03.2012 is in any case barred by limitation. However, since the SCN lacks material particulars for raising the demand, the demand for the period 20.03.2012 to 20.09.2013 cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the demand of service tax of Rs.5,11,989/- along with interest and equal penalty under Section 78 are set-aside.
Conclusion - The demand for service tax and penalties set aside due to limitations in the SCN and the lack of specificity regarding the nature of services.
Appeal allowed.
-
2025 (3) TMI 201
Short payment of service tax - classification of service - preparing the advertising material - advertising service or not - extended period of limitation.
Classification of service - preparing the advertising material - advertising service or not - HELD THAT:- The appellants are engaged only in writing and/or printing banners which were given to them by the clients. They had no role in the design and conceptualization of the advertisement. It has been held in the cases cited above, that mere preparing the advertising material does not come under the ambit of advertising and therefore, the activity undertaken by the appellants cannot be held to be “advertisement agency service”.
Extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- The show cause notice has been issued invoking the extended period. However, no positive act of suppression, mis-statement etc. on the part of the appellants has been brought on record. Further, the show cause notice has been issued on the basis of the data available with the Income Tax Department in the form of TDS details and 26AS statements. Revenue has not conducted any enquiry so as to ascertain what was the service rendered? When it was rendered? To whom it was rendered? What was the consideration received by the appellants? etc. The burden of proving the same was with the Department for alleging non-payment of service tax by the appellants. Such a confirmation of duty cannot be sustained. Extended period cannot be invoked under such circumstances.
Conclusion - i) Mere preparing the advertising material does not come under the ambit of advertising and therefore, the activity undertaken by the appellants cannot be held to be “advertisement agency service”. ii) Extended period cannot be invoked.
Appeal allowed.
-
2025 (3) TMI 200
Refund of the unutilized CENVAT credit - rejection on the grounds that the services rendered by the appellants are Intermediary Services in nature and therefore, cannot be treated as Export of Services - whether the appellants are appellants are intermediaries as far as the services rendered to M/s Air BNB Ireland are concerned? - HELD THAT:- The authorities below have not interpreted the clauses of the agreements and the facts of the case correctly. The terms of the agreements give an unmissable understanding that Only the main service i.e. promotional and marketing services is being provided by the Appellant and there is no auxiliary service is involved; the compensation to the appellant is on cost plus markup basis; appellant is an independent contractor of Airbnb Ireland; there is no agent-principal relationship; appellant may have entered in to subcontracts for the provision of service, agreement will be between subcontractor and the Appellant and the responsibility will be on the Appellant; the Appellant raises bills on Air BNB Ireland and not on their Customers. The appellant has no contract with the customers of Airbnb Ireland. The fact that the appellant has subcontracted does not make them an intermediary as per CBIC Circular dated 20.09.2021.
It was held in M/s Blackrock Services India Pvt Ltd [2022 (8) TMI 874 - CESTAT CHANDIGARH] following the decision in JFE Steel India Pvt Ltd [2020 (3) TMI 1342 - CESTAT CHANDIGARH] that if the case of Revenue is that the activities undertaken by the appellants in present case is not amounting to Export of Service then the proceedings need to be initiated against the appellant for demanding the service tax in respect of the taxable services provided by the appellant. In the present case no such proceedings demanding the Service Tax on these taxable services provided by the appellant have been initiated in terms of Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994. By not initiating any such proceedings Revenue itself has allowed these taxable services provided as Export of Services. Having done so they cannot in a proceeding under Rule 5 for refund of accumulated credit take the contrary stand and deny refund treating the services provided not to be export of services.
Conclusion - The appellant's services were not intermediary in nature and thus qualified as export services. Consequently, the appellant was entitled to the refund of the unutilized CENVAT credit.
Appeal allowed.
-
2025 (3) TMI 199
Non-payment of service tax on taxable service relating to ‘Construction of Commercial or Industrial building and civil structure and ‘Works Contract' - Non-payment of Service tax on construction services provided to IIM, DDA, CEAI, Mr. Manoj Arora and Mr. Anuj Dandone - Short payment of Service tax on construction services provided to Sweta Estates Private Limited, AVA Builders Pvt. Ltd. and Birla EduTech Limited - Non-payment of Service tax on ‘Advances’ and ‘Miscellaneous Income’ shown in balance sheet - Non-payment of Service tax on ‘Freight and Cartage Expenses’ shown in balance sheet.
Non-payment of Service tax on construction services provided to IIM, DDA, CEAI, Mr. Manoj Arora and Mr. Anuj Dandone - HELD THAT:- IIMs are not-for-profit educational bodies and not in the nature of commercial concerns. It is submitted that services in relation to the construction of Noida campus for IIM, Lucknow were carried out for not-for-profit organization and constructed buildings were not primarily used for commerce or industry. Hence, the impugned services are not covered under ‘Commercial or Industrial Construction Service’ or ‘Works Contract Service’ - reliance placed in the decision in the case of Banna Ram Choudhary Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur, [2017 (9) TMI 86 - CESTAT NEW DELHI], wherein it was held that buildings used for educational purpose by recognized educational institutions cannot be categorized as ‘commercial buildings’, and the construction thereof is not leviable to Service tax under ‘commercial or industrial construction service’.
Similarly Delhi Development Authority (DDA) is observed to be a statutory body established under Delhi Development Act, 1957 (DDA Act) with the primary objective to promote and secure the development of Delhi as stated in Section 6 of the DDA Act. It is an autonomous body which reports directly to the Ministry of Urban Development, Government of India. Hence, construction of Indoor Stadium at Siri Fort Sport Complex was for being used by the Government for holding Commonwealth Games and not for generating any profit from the same. It was a non-commercial project, and the construction was undertaken for national interest. Above all, it is submitted that the stadium is a public used for the recreation of the public. Thus, it cannot be said that construction services were used by DDA primarily for commerce or industry.
Further consulting Engineering Association of India Limited (CEAI) is incorporated under Section 25 of the Companies Act, 1956 as a ‘not-for-profit’ company as stated in Preamble of Memorandum of Association (MOA) of CEAI. Clause 5.0 of MOA of CEAI stipulates that “all the income, earnings, movable, immovable properties of the Association shall be solely utilized and applied towards the promotion of its aims and objectives only as set forth in the Memorandum of Association. No profit thereof shall be paid or transferred directly or indirectly by way of dividends, bonus, profits or in any manner whatsoever to the present or past members of the Association who shall have no personal claim on any moveable or immoveable properties of the Association or make any profits whatsoever by virtue of his membership.” - it is clear that CEAI also is a ‘not-for-profit’ organization and not in the nature of commercial concerns. It is submitted that construction services of Secretariat Building for CEAI were carried out for a not-for-profit organization and constructed buildings were not primarily used for commerce or industry. Hence, the impugned services are not covered under ‘Commercial or Industrial Construction Service’ or ‘Works Contract Service’.
All onus is on department to establish that the building was being used for such purposes by which the organization using the same was making profit. We draw our support from the decision in the case of Manisha Projects Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise & S.T., Ghaziabad [2019 (3) TMI 448 - CESTAT ALLAHABAD]. In view of above discussions, it is held that construction services provided to IIM, DDA and CEAI are not taxable under ‘Commercial or Industrial Construction Service’, ‘Construction of Complex Service’ or ‘Works Contract Service’. Thus, the impugned demand is not sustainable.
Construction activities pertaining to private residence of Shri Manish Arora and Shri Anuj Dandone - HELD THAT:- The construction activities pertaining to private residence of Shri Manish Arora and Shri Anuj Dandone were outside the ambit of Service Tax, it is held that the impugned services are not covered under sub-clause (a) to Section 65(25b) and sub-clause (ii)(b) of the Explanation to Section 65(zzzza) of the Act, therefore, not taxable under ‘Commercial or Industrial Construction Service’ or ‘Works Contract Service’ - In the present case, the respondent had undertaken the construction of single residential unit for Shri Manish Arora and Shri Anuj Dandone, which cannot qualify as ‘residential complex’ as defined under Section 65(91a) for the purpose of sub-clause (a) of Section 65(30a) and sub-clause (ii) (c) of the Explanation to Section 65(zzzza) of the Act. Thus, impugned services are not covered under ‘Construction of Complex Service’ or ‘Works Contract Service’.
Construction services provided to Sweta Estates Private Limited, AVA Builders Pvt. Ltd. and Birla Edutech Limited - HELD THAT:- The issue is no longer res integra as the value of free of cost material is not includible in the value of gross amount charged for payment of service tax. The value of free of cost material supplied by M/s. Sweta Estates Private Limited (service recipient) to the Respondent (service provider) was not required to be included in the assessable value for determination of service tax liability as it does not form part of the value charged by the service provider for rendering the services. The value of free of cost material is neither an amount ‘charged’ by the service provider, nor a ‘consideration’ paid by the service recipient.
Service tax demand on ‘advances’ and ‘miscellaneous income’ shown in the balance sheet is with respect to the advances received during relevant period includes the amount is respect of the construction services provided to IIM, DDA, CEAI, Shri manish Arora and Shri Anuj Dandone - HELD THAT:- Said advances were also not liable to service tax. Also the amount declared as ‘miscellaneous income’ in the balance sheet during 2009-10 to 2011-12 was not pertaining to any taxable services. The said amount pertained to the unclaimed amount by the creditors and security deposits received by the respondent. The said facts are not in dispute in the present appeal. Thus, the impugned demand of service tax on ‘miscellaneous income’ is not sustainable.
Service tax demand on ‘freight and cartage expenses’ that amount shown as ‘Freight and Cartage Expenses’ - HELD THAT:- The amount shown as a ‘cartage’ is related to payments made to the supplier of the goods which included the transportation cost. Transportation and pumping charges are in respect of pumping of ready-mix concrete (RMC) material for construction activity. The aforesaid expenses also include expenses towards insurance and car policy and site expenses (payment made to cab supplier). The said amount/expenses/charges were not paid by the respondent directly to the transporter for transportation of any goods. Thus, the said activity cannot be covered under GTA Services, hence, no service tax liability can be levied on the aforesaid amount/expenses/charges under GTA services.
Interest and penalties - invocation of extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- The respondent followed a reasonable and correct interpretation of law. Therefore, the respondent cannot be alleged to have suppressed fact with the malafide intention - subsequent SCN for the same period could not be issued invoking extended period of limitation. In this regard, reliance is place on J.K. Enterprises Vs. Principal Commissioner of Central Excise, Alwar [2023 (1) TMI 936 - CESTAT NEW DELHI]. Resultantly, no interest is recoverable and no penalties are imposable.
Conclusion - i) IIM, CEAI, and DDA are not commercial concerns, and their construction services are not taxable. ii) Single residential unit constructions are not taxable under the relevant service categories. iii) FOC materials are not includible in the taxable value for service tax. iv) Advances related to non-taxable activities and miscellaneous income not linked to taxable services are not subject to service tax. v) There are no suppression of facts or intent of tax evasion by the respondent. Interest, penalt and extended period cannot be invoked.
Appeal of Revenue dismissed.
-
2025 (3) TMI 198
Adjournments beyond the statutory limit of three times as per Section 35C(1A) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 - non prosecution od appeal in terms of Rule 20 of CESTAT Procedure Rules, 1982 - HELD THAT:- In case of Ishwar lal Mali Rathod [2021 (9) TMI 1301 - SUPREME COURT] condemning the practice of adjournments sought mechanically and allowed by the Courts/Tribunal’s Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed 'Considering the fact that in the present case ten times adjournments were given between 2015 to 2019 and twice the orders were passed granting time for cross examination as a last chance and that too at one point of time even a cost was also imposed and even thereafter also when lastly the High Court passed an order with extending the time it was specifically mentioned that no further time shall be extended and/or granted still the petitioner – defendant never availed of the liberty and the grace shown.'
Conclusion - There are no justification for adjourning the matter beyond three times which is the maximum number statutorily provided.
The Appeal is dismissed for non prosecution in terms of Rule 20 of CESTAT Procedure Rules, 1982.
-
2025 (3) TMI 197
Levy of penalty - whether penalty has been properly imposed or the matter should have been remanded on this aspect also for penalty under Section 78 required to be imposed? - HELD THAT:- The period involved in this case is January- 2014 to March-2015. It is found that the order setting aside penalty under Section 78, imposed penalty under Section 76 and remanded matter on various points. Same has been correctly passed by the learned Commissioner (Appeals).The fact is also noted that there was an earlier show cause notice issued to the party and that was done after thorough scrutiny of its functioning. Therefore, the matter was well within the knowledge of the department. Any provision relating to non-filing of return or not paying tax dues does not bring the concept of ‘intent to evade payment of Tax’ as the same could be outcome of contentious issues on taxability, at times. As found by the Learned Commissioner (Appeals), only quantum of service tax was disputed and not the liability itself. In view of various payments made by the appellant as mentioned above, the order taking note has set aside the penalty under Section 78 of Finance Act, 1994.
Conclusion - There is no error in the impugned order which set aside penalty under Section 78. Even otherwise imposition of simultaneous penalties under Section 76 and Section 78 is debatable in various High Courts.
Appeal of the department is therefore liable to be rejected.
-
2025 (3) TMI 196
Recovery of service tax with interest and penalty - benefit of threshold exemption and cum tax benefit - branded service to the subscribers or not - extended period of limitation - Admissibility of Cenvat credit.
Recovery of service tax with interest and penalty - benefit of threshold exemption and cum tax benefit - extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- It is settled principal in law that a subsequent judgment cannot be a basis for making the demand by invoking extended period. In this decision Tribunal has concluded that extended period of limitation would not be available for making this demand. Accordingly, the extended period of limitation would not be available for making this demand and the demand should be restricted to normal period of limitation.
Admissibility of Cenvat credit - HELD THAT:- There are no reason to disagree with the findings recorded in the impugned order. The credit have to be allowed strictly as per the provisions of the Cenvat Credit Rules and appellant should have taken the credit within one year from the date of submission of document against which credit has been taken. In the case of Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. [2000 (7) TMI 108 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI] referred by Authorised Representative appearing for revenue, Tribunal have upheld the denial of credit taken beyond the period prescribed by Central Excise Rules, 1944 - it is not inclined to allow the benefit of Cenvat credit availed in respect of the documents which admissibly are more than one year beyond one year from the date of issuance of show cause notice which goes contrary to Rule 4 of Cenvat Credit Rules.
Extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- The extended period of limitation could not have been invoked in this matter, therefore, penalties imposed under Section 78 is also set aside.
Conclusion - i) The appellants are not providing any branded service to the subscribers and are entitled to avail the benefit of exemption Notification No. 33/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012. ii) Extended period of limitation could not have been invoked in this matter, therefore, penalties imposed under Section 78 are also set aside. iii) The appellants are entitled to avail Cenvat credit of the service tax paid by the MSO, subject to compliance with the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004. iv) The demand should be restricted to the normal period of limitation.
Matters are remanded back to the Original Authority for re-quantification - Appeals are partly allowed and matter remanded to original authority for re-quantification of demand.
-
2025 (3) TMI 195
Lapse of cenvat credit under Rule 11(3) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 - rebate claim of duty paid on exported goods - HELD THAT:- Sub-clause (i) of sub-rule 3 of Rule 11 will have to be treated as distinct and separate from sub-clause (ii). Sub-clause (ii) alone provides for lapse of cenvat credit. Sub-clause (i) does not provide for lapse. The appellants have conceded that the case on hand falls only sub-clause (i) of sub-rule 3 of Rule 11 of CCR, 2004. The logical consequence is that the subject cenvat credit cannot be treated as having lapsed. The argument of the learned standing counsel that sub-clause (ii) should be read integrally with sub-clause (i) stands rejected. The provision for lapse set out in sub-clause (ii) cannot be applied in respect of the situation covered by sub-clause(i).
Whether these writ appeals are competent? - HELD THAT:- The latest Instruction dated 06.08.2024 reads that appeal shall not be filed in the CESTAT, High Court and Supreme Court if the case fell within the prescribed monetary limits. Exceptions have also been carved out. It is noticed that the direction is “appeal shall not be filed”. If in contravention of the instruction, an appeal is filed, the assessee can bring it to the notice of the concerned authority and seek withdrawal of the appeal. It may not be open to the tribunal or the High Court to dismiss the appeal filed by the revenue by citing the said Instruction. Once the appeal has been filed, it is required to necessarily deal with the issue on merits.
Conclusion - i) The cenvat credit of the company did not lapse under Rule 11(3)(i). ii) Once an appeal is filed, it must be heard on its merits, even if it falls within the prescribed monetary limits set by the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs.
Appeal dismissed.
-
2025 (3) TMI 194
Rrefund of the duty paid in cash - appellants have procured capital goods under EPCG Scheme and have not availed CENVAT credit of the same - HELD THAT:- In the instant case, the procurement of capital goods being from a domestic manufacturer, wherein policy provides that such domestic manufacturer can avail the refund of excise duty paid by them under the condition that the recipient, the appellant in this case, does not avail CENVAT credit.
In the instant case, the appellants are in a better position inasmuch as CENVAT credit was not available to them in case the supplier availed the refund. In fact, the condition in Para 8.5 of the Exim Policy needs to be looked at from the supplier’s angle and not from the recipient’s angle, in this case, the appellant’s angle. As long as the appellant has not availed the credit, the appellant has not violated any condition of the Notification regarding the exhaustion of the available credit. As submitted by the appellants, exhausting the credit necessarily means the credit they have taken and not certainly the credit which they have not taken. If the appellant had more credit, they would have paid less in cash and if the credit was on the lower side, they would have paid more in cash. The appellants contend that either way, the situation is revenue neutral or the credit available at the hands of the buyers will not be altered by the manner in which the appellants pay duty on the products they cleared.
Conclusion - The condition in the Exim Policy regarding the exhaustion of available credit should be viewed from the supplier's perspective, not the recipient's. The appellants had not violated any conditions by not availing CENVAT credit.
The impugned order set aside - appeal allowed.
-
2025 (3) TMI 193
CENVAT Credit - input service of transportation of goods upto the place of removal - extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- The issue to determine is the admissibility of Cenvat credit in respect of outward transportation whether the supply of goods on FOR basis or at the factory gate. If Board has clarified through the circular on FOR basis the credit should have been admissible in the present case, it is found from the purchase order reproduced bellow that the supply of total cost basis at the premises of the appellant and in case of any defect entire sale was to be rejected.
From the perusal of the above purchase order the condition, it is found that the entire supply is made on total cost basis, and could have been rejected by the buyer for any defects noticed subsequent to delivery. The above condition of purchase order is enough to hold that transit risk was with the appellant and supply was made on FOR basis. That being so, on the basis of Board Circular the credit could not have been denied.
Extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- The Board has specifically directed against invocation of extended period of limitation, as the issue involved is interpretational in nature. The demand made by invoking extended period of limitation goes contrary to the spirit of the circular. Thus there are no merits in the same and also the penalties imposed under Rule 15 read with section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944.
There are no merits in the impugned order and the same is set aside - appeal allowed.
-
2025 (3) TMI 192
Valuation of goods manufactured by the appellant during the period from 28.08.1986 to 31.03.1989 - HELD THAT:- It is an admitted fact that the dispute pertains to the period from 28.08.1986 to 31.03.1989 and the issue is coming up for hearing for the third time. The appellant was following the procedure laid down in Rule 173C (11) of Central Excise Rules, 1944 and duty payment was based on value shown in the SDAs. It was further sold by the sister concern of the appellant at higher rate by adding additional items as optional items, including battery etc., which are manufactured by other manufactures. Even as per the statement of the Senior Manager dated 30.10.1990, the purchase order was received from sister concern M/s. Keltron controls and transactions were regulated through Sectional Debit Advices (SDAs). He also stated that the appellant was not aware of the original orders of M/s. Keltron controls and has also not verified the invoices of M/s. Keltron controls regarding sale of UPS system including optional items and the excise duty remittance was not based on the realization of the amount by their sister concern M/s. Keltron controls.
The original Adjudicating Authority, only after considering the above facts, held that since the appellant had filed SDAs along with RT-12 Returns and when it is made available to the concerned officer, there is a failure on the part of department to probe the matter further and due to that reason, the demand invoking the extended period of limitation and penalty proposed in the show cause notice were dropped.
Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the case, invoking extended period of limitation is unsustainable. Considering the above, demand, if any for the normal period is confirmed in accordance with law. The demand by invoking the extended period of limitation and penalty imposed as per the impugned order on the appellant are set aside.
Conclusion - The penalty imposed were not justified due to the lack of evidence of undervaluation or suppression of facts by the appellant.
Appeal allowed in part.
-
2025 (3) TMI 191
Classification of goods manufactured by the appellant - classifiable under Tariff Item 84369100 of CETA, 1985 or under 73.14 - HELD THAT:- The Division Bench of this Tribunal in the appellant’s own case [2016 (9) TMI 572 - CESTAT CHANDIGARH] where the identical issue was in dispute, has held that Welded Wire Mesh is classifiable under Tariff Item 84369100 of CETA, 1985. The said decision of the Tribunal was appealed against by the Revenue before the Hon’ble Apex Court but the Hon’ble Apex Court vide its order dated 20.09.2024 has dismissed the same on monetary ground.
Conclusion - The goods are classified under Tariff Item 84369100.
The impugned order set aside - appeal allowed.
-
2025 (3) TMI 190
CENVAT Credit - input services - outdoor catering services - period post amendment w.e.f. 01.04.2011 - interest - penalty - HELD THAT:- The issue of availment of Cenvat credit of service tax paid on 'outdoor catering services', it is no more res integra and it is decided by the Larger Bench in Wipro Limited, [2018 (4) TMI 149 - CESTAT BANGALORE - LB] that cenvat Credit of service tax paid on 'outdoor catering services' cannot be availed, post 01.04.2011 in view of the exclusion clause C(ii) to the definition of input service 2(l) of Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004. Therefore, service tax paid on 'outdoor catering services' is not eligible for availment of Cenvat credit.
Demand of interest - HELD THAT:- The confirmation of demand of interest on the cenvat credit demand is not sustainable following the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in case of M/s. Bill Forge.
Penalty - HELD THAT:- It is found for the earlier period this Tribunal has set aside the penalty proceedings under Rule 15(1) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 and also in the adjudications for the subsequent periods the penalty has been dropped by the adjudicating authority, hence, it is found that penalty imposed in this appeal is unsustainable. Consequently, the confirmation of demand of interest and the imposition of penalty in the impugned order is unsustainable and needs to be set aside.
Conclusion - The appellant was not entitled to avail Cenvat credit on 'outdoor catering services' post the amendment. However, the demand of interest and penalty imposed on the appellant set aside, deeming them unsustainable based on legal precedents and the specific circumstances of the case.
Appeal allowed in part.
-
2025 (3) TMI 189
Benefit of N/N. 63/1995-CE dated 16.03.1995 to the vendors, who supply goods to the enlisted companies/organisations in the Notification - HELD THAT:- The Tribunal in the case of Vulcan Gears Vs. Commissioner of C. Ex. [2010 (5) TMI 781 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD] held that 'the Tribunal while deciding in favour of the appellant, took note of the Circular issued by the Board in respect of Notification No. 184/86, which is the precedent Notification to Notification No. 63/95-CE. In Circular vide F. No. 213/18/91-C.Ex.6, Circular No. 5/92, dated 19-5-1992 and another letter from Ministry of Finance F. No. IV/16/4/2003, dated 7-11-2003, it has been clarified that the exemption will be extended to all job workers and vendors supplying inputs required by BEML for manufacture of finished goods supplied to Ministry of Defence.'
The appellant has relied on the case laws mentioned, wherein it is held that the beneficial Notification should be given effect retrospectively and oppressing Notification should be given effect, prospectively. The appellant has paid duty on the goods supplied to BEML from November 2009, after the issue of clarification by the Board Vide Circular F. No. 110/32/2009-CX-32 dated 27.10.2009. The appellant contended that the period involved in this case is from June 2009 to October, 2009 i.e., before the issue of the clarification by the Board, hence they have contended that they are eligible for the benefit of Notification No. 63/1995-CE, in view of their above submissions and the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court and the Tribunals.
Appeal allowed.
-
2025 (3) TMI 188
CENVAT Credit - input invoices which were received more than 6 months before availing credit in the factory - Civil charges - Electrical License - Pest Control - Testing charges for Civil works - RCM-Repairs - contravention of Rule 2(l) of CCR, 2004 - cenvat credit on input service invoices issued prior to 01.09.2014 and credit availed in October 2014 - applicability of 6 months pursuant to issuance of Notification No. 21/2014-CE (NT) dated 11.07.2014 which has been brought into effect from 01.09.2014 for invoices issued prior to 01.09.2014 - HELD THAT:- The issue is no more res integra and covered by the judgment of this Tribunal in the case of Roquette Riddhi Siddhi Pvt. Ltd. V. CCE, Customs and Service Tax, Belgaum [2024 (1) TMI 1210 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD], wherein it is held that 'appellants have correctly taken the cenvat credit on 18/09/2014 for the invoices issued prior to 01/09/2014.'
The confirmation of demand of cenvat credit of Rs. 1,04,80,736/- on this count is unsustainable in law, accordingly, set aside. Since the appellant had submitted not to pursue the confirmation of cenvat credit of Rs. 1,75,320/- as they have already reversed a major portion of Rs. 1,11,999/- and the balance amount is negligible, the order confirming the demand on this count is upheld. However, the imposition of penalty for availing the said credit being interpretation of law cannot be sustained, accordingly set aside.
Appeal is partly allowed.
-
2025 (3) TMI 187
Reduction of penalty under Section 11AC of CEA - duty and interest not paid within 30 days from the date of communication of the order of the Central Excise officer - interest under Section 35FF of the Act for delayed refund of the amount deposited - HELD THAT:- The proviso to Section 11AC of the Act is clear. The reduction of penalty to 25% will apply only in those cases where the amount of duty determined by the Central Excise officer along with interest is deposited within 30 days from the date of communication of the order of the Central Excise officer. There is no reference to order of an appellate authority such as Commissioner (Appeals), Tribunal or High Court or Supreme Court. As the appellant had not fulfilled the conditions of this proviso, he was not entitled to the benefit of reduced penalty. Therefore, the Assistant Commissioner was correct in calculating the penalty as equal to 100% of the duty under Section 11AC of the Act and consequently, reducing the amount of refund.
Interest as applicable under Section 35FF of the Act - HELD THAT:- It is clear from section 35FF that where an amount of duty deposited by the appellant under section 35F is required to be refunded consequent upon the order of the appellate authority or tribunal and such amount is not refunded within three months from the date of communication of such order, interest has to be paid. In this case, the order of the Tribunal is dated 29.01.2019 but the appellant had communicated the copy of this order to the officer and sought refund only on 01.07.2022. There is nothing on record to show that the Final Order of this Tribunal was communicated to the Assistant Commissioner through any other means. The Assistant Commissioner passed the order on 05.08.2022 i.e., within less than two months of the application.
Conclusion - i) Assistant Commissioner was correct in calculating the penalty as equal to 100% of the duty under Section 11AC of the Act. ii) The appellant was not entitled to interest under Section 35FF due to the delay in seeking the refund.
The appeal is rejected and the impugned order is upheld.
-
2025 (3) TMI 186
Challenge to appellate order by which assessment order was confirmed - whether the petitioner was right in his contention that the output tax demand for the period during which the eligibility certificate was not renewed or rejected, namely, 4.3.2015 to 31.3.2015 could be adjusted with the forwarded accumulated input tax credit? - HELD THAT:- The learned tribunal had rightly took into consideration the provisions of the West Bengal Value Added Tax Act and found that the rejection of the renewal of the eligibility certificate will render the petitioner/dealer ineligibility for output tax for discharging the liability the dealer will have to pay the taxes.
However, the claim of the petitioner/dealer to adjust the carry forward input tax which was carried forward to the subsequent quarter is not feasible as there is no such provision under the Act.
Conclusion - The learned tribunal was perfectly right in holding that the output liability for the rejected period, namely, from 4.3.2015 to 31.3.2015 was to be paid by the writ petitioner within 30 days of such rejection in terms of Rule 180 of the said Rules and having not done so, the authorities were justified in demanding the same by passing the impugned order.
The petitioner has not made out any case for interference with the order passed by the learned tribunal - Petition dismissed.
-
2025 (3) TMI 185
Rejection of application filed by the appellant herein, seeking leave to appeal against the judgment and order - acquittal of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act - issuance of statutory notice - HELD THAT:- It is inclined to remand the matter to the High Court, it is not proposed to say anything further. However, all that we want to say at this stage is that the High Court while declining to grant leave, should have kept in mind Section 139 of the NI Act as well as Section 118 of the NI Act. The High Court should have tried to consider the case of the complainant applying the two provisions to the facts of the case, more particularly, having regard to the evidence on record oral as well as documentary. This aspect has not been touched even by the Trial Court and therefore, it was necessary for the High Court to look into it closely.
The impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside - Appeal disposed off.
............
|
9911796707
