|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 181 to 200 of 984 Records
-
2009 (7) TMI 1220
Issues Involved:1. Validity of disciplinary proceedings based on a pseudonymous complaint. 2. Whether the actions of the respondent constituted "misconduct" warranting disciplinary action. Summary:Issue 1: Validity of Disciplinary Proceedings Based on Pseudonymous ComplaintThe respondent, a Commissioner in Customs and Excise, was issued a charge memo based on a pseudonymous complaint alleging irregularities in claiming transfer allowance and transportation advance. The Tribunal set aside the charge memo, citing CVC instructions that generally prohibit action on pseudonymous complaints unless they contain verifiable details. The Tribunal noted that the complaint was received when the respondent was due for promotion, which raised suspicion of mala fide intent. The High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, emphasizing that the complaint did not justify disciplinary action and appeared to be a tactic to delay the respondent's promotion. Issue 2: Whether the Actions of the Respondent Constituted "Misconduct"Article of Charge No. 1: The respondent had received an advance of Rs. 38,425/- for transporting household goods but returned the amount voluntarily before any action was initiated on the complaint. The High Court found that the respondent's actions did not constitute misconduct, as the advance was returned promptly and voluntarily, and there was no evidence of ill motive or financial loss to the government. Article of Charge No. 2: The respondent delayed adjusting a TA advance of Rs. 16,000/- but eventually did so voluntarily. The High Court concluded that the delay did not amount to misconduct warranting disciplinary action, especially since the adjustment was made before the issuance of the charge memo. The High Court noted that the charge sheet was issued after the respondent had been cleared for promotion, suggesting an ulterior motive to deny the promotion. The cumulative effect of the circumstances indicated that the disciplinary action was not bona fide. The writ petition was dismissed, affirming the Tribunal's decision to quash the charge memo.
-
2009 (7) TMI 1219
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the arbitration award.
2. Claim for increase in rates during the contractual period.
3. Claim for increase in rates during the extended period.
4. Payment of interest on the claims.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Arbitration Award:
The Union of India challenged the arbitration award dated September 9, 2000, which favored the respondent. The Calcutta High Court's Single Judge upheld the challenge substantially, setting aside the award on two out of three issues. The Division Bench of the High Court, however, restored the arbitrator's award entirely. The Supreme Court was approached to resolve this conflict.
2. Claim for Increase in Rates During the Contractual Period:
The respondent claimed an increase in rates from August 3, 1991, to December 31, 1992, due to revised wages for casual laborers. The Railway authorities rejected this claim, citing the contract as a "fixed price contract" without an escalation clause. The Supreme Court referenced the decision in *Tarapore & Co. vs. State of M.P.*, which supported the contractor's right to reimbursement for increased wages, implying that the authorities must have visualized the necessity of paying fair wages without reducing the contractor's profit. The Court also cited *Food Corporation of India vs. M/s. A. M. Ahmed & Co.*, which reiterated the reasonableness of allowing escalation due to statutory wage revisions.
3. Claim for Increase in Rates During the Extended Period:
The respondent continued work under protest from January 1, 1993, to August 31, 1994, after the contract was terminated, based on the appellant's request. The arbitrator awarded the respondent a sum for this period, which the High Court's Division Bench upheld. The Supreme Court found no infirmity in this award, as the work was carried out beyond the contractual period, making the bar of clause 31 inapplicable.
4. Payment of Interest on the Claims:
The arbitrator awarded interest on the claims for both pre-reference and pendente lite periods. The appellant contested this, citing clause 31 of the agreement, which barred interest for delay in payment. The Supreme Court differentiated between the two periods:
- Contractual Period (Item No.3): The Court ruled that clause 31 barred pre-reference and pendente lite interest for this period, making the arbitrator's award unsustainable.
- Extended Period (Item No.4): Since this period was beyond the contract's termination, clause 31 did not apply. The Court upheld the award of pre-reference and pendente lite interest for this period.
The Supreme Court directed that the respondent is entitled to interest on the amount determined under Item No.4 at 16% per annum from November 1, 1994, to September 9, 2000, with post-award interest at 18% per annum until payment.
Conclusion:
The appeal was partially allowed. The respondent's entitlement to interest was limited to the extended period, with the final award recalculated accordingly. No costs were ordered.
-
2009 (7) TMI 1218
Appeal/Reference to High Court - Question of fact - the decision in the case of COMMISSIONER OF C. EX., CHANDIGARH Versus NIRMAL KUMAR AGGARWAL [2008 (7) TMI 409 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT] contested - Held that: - delay dismissed.
-
2009 (7) TMI 1217
Issues: Interpretation of Rule 2(l)(1) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 and Section 4(3)(c) of Central Excise Act regarding input service and place of removal.
The judgment by the Madras High Court involved the interpretation of Rule 2(l)(1) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 and Section 4(3)(c) of the Central Excise Act, defining input service and place of removal. The court examined the definition of input service as any service used by a provider of taxable service for providing an output service or by a manufacturer directly or indirectly in relation to the manufacture of final products and clearance from the place of removal. The definition encompassed various services like setting up, modernization, renovation, repairs, advertisement, market research, storage, procurement of inputs, business activities, transportation, and other related services.
Regarding the definition of "place of removal" under Section 4(3)(c), the court noted it includes a factory, warehouse, depot, premises of a consignment agent, or any other place from where excisable goods are to be sold after clearance from the factory. The court, prima facie, concluded that based on the above provisions, the petitioner was not entitled to any interim order. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition, indicating that the petitioner's claim did not align with the interpretation of the relevant rules and acts provided in the judgment.
-
2009 (7) TMI 1216
Issues involved: Appeal against rejection of renewal of recognition u/s. 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Summary:
Issue 1: Rejection of renewal of recognition u/s. 80G
The appeal was filed against the order rejecting renewal of recognition u/s. 80G. The appellant raised grounds questioning the Director of Income-tax(E)'s decision, emphasizing the charitable nature of the institution and compliance with conditions u/s. 80G. The Director observed missing vouchers for certain expenditures, leading to the rejection based on non-compliance with conditions u/s. 80G(5)(i) to (iv) and relevant case laws.
Issue 2: Compliance with conditions for 80G benefits
The appellant trust, engaged in educational activities, applied for renewal of recognition u/s. 80G. The trust's main objects were related to education and public welfare. The trust claimed compliance with all conditions for 80G benefits, disputing the rejection based on missing vouchers for specific expenditures, arguing that it did not violate section 80G(i) to (v) of the Act.
Issue 3: Violation of accounting provisions
The Revenue contended that the trust failed to produce proper vouchers for certain expenditures, indicating potential misapplication of funds and violation of section 80G(5)(iv) requiring maintenance of regular accounts. The trust's compliance with accounting provisions was questioned, leading to the denial of recognition u/s. 80G(5)(vi) of the Act.
Judgment:
After considering submissions and evidence, the Tribunal found that the trust had minor irregularities in voucher production but had not deviated from its charitable objects. The trust's financial records showed no income generation, reliance on loans, and absence of malafide intentions. The trust maintained proper accounts, as evidenced by audit reports and financial statements. Having enjoyed recognition u/s. 80G previously, the Tribunal concluded that the trust deserved renewal of recognition u/s. 80G(5) of the Act, ruling in favor of the appellant.
This summary encapsulates the issues, arguments, and the Tribunal's decision regarding the rejection of renewal of recognition u/s. 80G in the legal judgment.
-
2009 (7) TMI 1215
The Bombay High Court dismissed the appeals as the issue was covered by a previous judgment. No substantial question of law arose in the case. The appeals were dismissed with no order as to costs.
-
2009 (7) TMI 1214
Issues Involved:
1. Rejection of Books of Accounts.
2. Addition for closing stock of work-in-progress.
3. Valuation of work-in-progress on an estimated basis.
4. Consideration of opening stock of work-in-progress.
Summary:
1. Rejection of Books of Accounts:
The CIT(A) upheld the rejection of the Books of Accounts, despite the appellant company consistently following the same method of accounting and stock valuation in past assessments u/s 143(3).
2. Addition for Closing Stock of Work-in-Progress:
The CIT(A) upheld the addition of Rs. 5,38,976/- for Assessment Year 2004-05 and Rs. 6,29,355/- for Assessment Year 2005-06 made by the Assessing Officer for the closing stock of work-in-progress. The Assessing Officer found that the assessee did not show any work-in-progress in the closing stock, which led to incorrect profit as per accounting principles and the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in British Paints India Ltd. (188-ITR-44).
3. Valuation of Work-in-Progress on an Estimated Basis:
The Assessing Officer estimated the work-in-progress based on a five-day cycle of dyeing and printing work, taking 312 working days in a year and computing the average processing of cloth per day. The cost of work-in-progress was calculated at 50% of the average processing charges per meter. This resulted in additions of Rs. 5,38,976/- for Assessment Year 2004-05 and Rs. 6,29,355/- for Assessment Year 2005-06.
4. Consideration of Opening Stock of Work-in-Progress:
The assessee argued that if work-in-progress is added to the closing stock, it should also be considered in the opening stock. The CIT(A) confirmed the addition but allowed the benefit of this addition in the next year as opening stock.
Tribunal's Decision:
The Tribunal found that the assessee consistently followed a method of not including the value of chemicals and colors consumed in the work-in-progress, which was accepted by the Department in the past. The Tribunal referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in CIT vs. EMA India Ltd. (2008) 296 ITR 510 (All.), which supported the assessee's method of valuation. The Tribunal concluded that the consistent method adopted by the assessee should not be disturbed without good reasons. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the orders of the lower authorities and deleted the additions of Rs. 5,38,976/- for Assessment Year 2004-05 and Rs. 90,379/- for Assessment Year 2005-06. The appeals of the assessee were allowed.
Order signed, dated, and pronounced in the Court on 24/07/2009.
-
2009 (7) TMI 1213
Whether a valid marriage had taken place between the deceased Subramanya and the first respondent?
Whether the first respondent was married to the deceased or not?
Whether the appellant was one of the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased Subramanya, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that she had been rightly held to be entitled to 1/4th share in the estate of the deceased Subramanya?
-
2009 (7) TMI 1212
Issues involved: Appeal against refund claim allowed based on Supreme Court decisions, challenge to assessment order for refund claim, maintainability of refund without challenging assessment order.
Summary:
Issue 1: Appeal against refund claim allowed based on Supreme Court decisions
The Revenue filed an Appeal against the impugned order where the refund claim of the Appellant was allowed based on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs. The Revenue contended that in another case, Priya Blue Industries v. Commissioner of Customs, the Supreme Court held that without challenging the assessment, the refund is not maintainable. The Revenue cited various decisions including those of the Tribunal and the Hon'ble Bombay High Court to support their argument that in the absence of challenging the assessment order, the refund is not sustainable.
Issue 2: Challenge to assessment order for refund claim
The Respondent argued that the refund claim was filed because the finished goods were not assessed as per the law. The Commissioner (Appeals) had allowed the claim of the Respondents. However, it was found that the bill of entry was assessed by the proper officer and the duty was paid accordingly, without any challenge to the assessment order by the Respondents.
Issue 3: Maintainability of refund without challenging assessment order
After considering the decisions cited by the Revenue, it was held that in the absence of challenging the assessment order, the refund is not maintainable. The Hon'ble Bombay High Court's decision in the case of Karan Associates highlighted that in a situation where the assessment order is not challenged, the refund cannot be granted. Therefore, the impugned order was set aside, and the Appeal was allowed based on the merit in the Revenue's contention.
*(Pronounced and dictated in the open court)*
-
2009 (7) TMI 1211
Whether assuming that constructions of permanent structures would attract the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 26, the same deserves strict construction and as permission had been granted by the State, the constructions made by way of arches cannot be construed to be an encroachment within the meaning of the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001 (Tamil Nadu Act 34 of 2002 )?
Whether if a literal meaning to sub-section (1) of Section 26 is assigned, no over-bridge can also be constructed for the pedestrians nor any signboard can be put up for the benefit of the public. The constructions having been made far away from the tar road, the impugned judgment should be upheld?
-
2009 (7) TMI 1210
Disallowances on bad debts - claims of the assessee relating to non-rural branches - without appreciating the provisions of s. 36(1)(viia) in its proper perspective - Whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the diminution in the value of securities held by the bank should be allowed as deduction disregarding the method prescribed in the RBI circular as per which "permanent" investments had to be valued only at cost and only 'current' investments were to be valued at market price at the close of the accounting year ? HELD THAT:- The very same issue came up for consideration before this Court in the decision reported in CIT vs. Karur Vysya Bank Ltd.[2004 (7) TMI 52 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] which was rendered by relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in United Commercial Bank vs. CIT[1999 (9) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT]. In that case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court categorically formulated the principles.
Following the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, this Court has clearly held that the assessee is entitled to change the method of valuation of Government securities to market value from cost and claim depreciation on the difference in the diminution of value. The Tribunal also rightly pointed out the above ruling and held that the securities are trading assets of the bank and the loss arising on its sale is an allowable deduction. The loss on sale of securities is a revenue loss considering that the securities are trading assets and not investments. Hence, this question of law is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
Whether the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the interest paid on charge of investment is allowable as revenue expenditure disregarding the principle that the interest paid on charge of investments categorized as 'permanent' are to be treated as capital expenditure and not as revenue expenditure - HELD THAT:- Whatever expenses incurred or interest paid therein on such shares was only revenue expenditure and not a capital expenditure in nature and the Tribunal by following the decision of this Court in [2004 (7) TMI 52 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] and by following the Hon'ble Supreme Court decision [1999 (9) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT] has arrived at the conclusion that the interest paid will not be a capital expenditure and only a revenue expenditure. Hence, we hold that the Tribunal's finding is legal, valid and correct. Therefore, this question is also answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee following the above decisions of this Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
Whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the loss on sale of security incurred by the assessee bank was allowable as revenue loss ignoring the fact that loss on sale of securities categorised as 'permanent assets' 'cannot be treated as business loss - HELD THAT:- Once the Government securities have already been held as stock-in-trade, any further subsequent sale by the bank to either third party and any loss on such transfer will also be treated only as a revenue expenditure and cannot be of a permanent nature treating the security as a capital expenditure. Since the main question has already been decided following the Hon'ble Supreme Court decision that such securities are stock-in-trade and loss of Government security transfer would only amount to revenue expenditure and the Tribunal was right in holding the same following the decision of this Court. Hence this question of law is also answered against the Revenue.
Whether the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the payment of subscription fees paid to Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) to carry on business of merchant banking by the assessee bank was allowable as revenue expenditure - HELD THAT:- Following the decision rendered in Bikaner Gypsums Ltd. vs. CIT [1990 (10) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT] the Tribunal has rightly held that the bank which was carrying out its merchant banking business hitherto, having been required by the subsequent operation of law to pay authorisation fee to SEBI has paid the same and hence, the expenses have to be viewed only as having been incurred to facilitate the carrying on of an existing business and it is in the nature of revenue expenditure.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case Bikaner Gypsums Ltd. vs. CIT (supra) had categorically held that where the assessee has an existing right to carry on a business, any expenditure made by it during the course of business for the purpose of removal of any restriction or obstruction or disability would be on revenue account, provided the expenditure does not acquire any capital asset. Payments made for removal of restriction, obstruction or disability may result in acquiring benefits to the business, but that by itself would not acquire any capital asset. Hence, the finding of the Tribunal is correct in law.
We do not find any other reason to interfere with the order passed by the Tribunal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
-
2009 (7) TMI 1209
Capital gain on sale of land - conversion of capital asset into stock-in-trade - development agreement was entered into by the assessee with the developer - the assessee provided his land measuring 44,000 sq. ft. - The assessee handed over the possession of the property to the developer for construction purpose - AO treated the transaction of handing over of the possession of the land and building to the developer as transfer u/s. 2(47) - assessment of income from the first transaction - According to assessee, income from this transaction arises only in the year in which the builder sells each flat from the portion allotted to the builder to the ultimate customers.
HELD THAT:- We may point out here that from the record it is apparent that apart from the development agreement and supplementary development agreement, there is no other document executed by the assessee. In our view, the lower authorities have not taken a correct view by analyzing the transaction by applying the provisions of s. 2(47) which is applicable only in case of capital asset. As per s. 2(14), capital asset does not include stock-in-trade. Therefore, once the capital asset is converted into stock-in-trade, the provision of s. 2(47) becomes irrelevant and does not apply.
Delivery of possession of immovable property cannot by itself be treated as equivalent to conveyance of immovable property as held by the Hon'ble apex Court in the case of Alapati Venkataramiah [1965 (3) TMI 21 - SUPREME COURT] Until and unless the title of the property is passed on to the purchaser, there cannot be a sale or transfer of immovable property, since in the present case the question is whether the handing over of the possession under the development agreement of the property which is stock-in-trade of the assessee can be treated as a transfer by applying the definition of transfer in s. 2(47) of the IT Act, 1961. As we have already stated earlier that in the case of stock-in-trade, the definition of transfer under s. 2(47) of the IT Act, 1961 is not applicable, therefore, the contextual or the ordinary meaning of the word transfer is applicable in the present case.
The assessee has executed all the sale deeds for transfer of the constructed apartments in favour of the end-user/purchaser, therefore the transfer of the proportionate land took place only when the assessee transferred the construction property by way of sale deeds and offered the business income which was accepted by the Department. In any case, when the assessee has retained the portion of the land being proportionate to the constructed area to be retained by the assessee, then there is no question of transfer of the entire land to the developer.
In view of the discussion, we hold that the orders of the lower authorities, qua this issue are not sustainable on the facts as well as on law. We set aside the orders of the lower authorities, qua this issue and direct the AO to tax the capital gain arising from the conversion of the land and building into stock-in-trade proportionately into the previous years in which the constructed property was sold by the assessee or retained for self-use and corresponding business income was offered.
Fair market value of the property - assessee adopted the fair market value as on 1st April, 1981 @ ₹ 40,000 per cent - AO adopted the fair market value at ₹ 10,000 per cent - HELD THAT:- This is not a case that the assessee has transferred the building separately but the building was to be demolished for development of the property. The AO has adopted the fair market value without any verification or taking into consideration the incidence of sale, etc. Since the estimation made by the AO is without any-basis or supporting material, then the substitution of the fair market value by the AO without any substantial material is not justified. On the other hand, the fair market value adopted by the assessee is duly confirmed by the sub-Registrar.
Accordingly, the orders of the lower authorities, qua this issue are not sustainable and are set aside and the AO is directed to accept the fair market value as on 1st April, 1981 @ ₹ 14,000 per cent as adopted by the assessee.
Deduction u/s. 54F - AO rejected the claim of the assessee on the ground that the assessee has neither purchased nor constructed a residential building as it was built by the developer under the agreement and also that the capital gain if any, assessable has been considered in the AY 2004-05 and not in the AY 2005-06 - CIT(A) has rejected the claim of the assessee on the ground that when the assessee has not admitted the capital gain on self-occupied portion in the asst. yr. 2004-05 of the property, there is no question of deduction under s. 54F - HELD THAT:- Since, we have decided the issue of chargeability of the capital gain in favour of the assessee, then consequently the claim of exemption u/s. 54F is also allowable as per law. It is clear from the record that, the development of the property was for residential purpose and therefore when the property was constructed as a residential building. Accordingly, we allow the claim.
Sale value of the built-up area - the assessee has sold 7,860 sq, ft. of built-up area with the land - adopted the sale value @ ₹ 2,079 per sq. ft. in the return of income - The AO found that as certified by the engineers, M/s Britto, Ilango & Associates, the value of the built-up, area and the land was ₹ 2,200 per sq. ft. The AO accordingly adopted the sale value at ₹ 2,200 per sq. ft. On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the rate adopted by the AO - HELD THAT:- When there is no dispute regarding the sale consideration adopted by the assessee as mentioned in the sale document, then the slight variation in the estimation made by the experts and the actual realization cannot be ruled out. In the case in hand, the variation is only ₹ 121 which is about 5 per cent of the estimated rates. we are of the considered opinion that no estimate can be taken as perfect and therefore the rate adopted by the assessee on the basis of consideration recorded in the sale deeds is just and proper. Accordingly, we set aside the orders of the lower authorities, qua this issue.
Long-term capital loss on sale of shares - The assessee claimed the cost of acquisition of the shares at ₹ 380 per share and ₹ 3,500 per share for respective lots. The AO estimated the cost of acquisition at face value of ₹ 100 for one lot and at ₹ 150 per share for another - HELD THAT:- It is an admitted fact that when the shares belong to a closely held company and the transactions of sale and purchase are out of stock exchange, then there could not be any either evidence except the transaction recorded in the books of account between the parties. Therefore, we hold that the rejection of the assessee's claim of the cost of acquisition is not justified. Accordingly, we set aside the orders of the lower authorities and allow the claim of the assessee.
-
2009 (7) TMI 1208
The Bombay High Court ruled that transfer fees received by assessee societies from outgoing or incoming members are not liable to tax due to the principle of mutuality. The judgment was based on previous rulings and government circulars.
-
2009 (7) TMI 1207
Issues Involved: Common issue of penalties imposed for issuing invoices without supplying material.
Summary:
The appellants, registered dealers, faced penalties for issuing invoices without supplying material. The Advocate argued that relevant records proved goods were supplied with invoices, citing a Tribunal decision. The Revenue contended that invoices mentioned two-wheeler vehicle numbers and lacked evidence of material supply, referring to another Tribunal decision. The Commissioner (Appeals) initially set aside penalties based on news reports but later reversed due to ongoing malpractice. The Tribunal emphasized that penalties cannot rely solely on news reports and noted the need for examining evidence. Following a previous decision, the Tribunal shifted the burden to the appellants to prove receipt and use of duty-paid goods. Consequently, the impugned orders were set aside, and matters remanded for fresh adjudication based on the Tribunal's decision.
Separate Judgment: None.
-
2009 (7) TMI 1206
Credit denied on ground that activity does not amounts to manufacture - decision in the case of COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EX. & CUS., SURAT-III Versus CREATIVE ENTERPRISES [2008 (7) TMI 311 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] contested, where it was held that if the activity of the assessee does not amount to manufacture there can be no question of levy of duty, and if duty is levied, Modvat credit can’t be denied by holding that there is no manufacture - Held that: - the decision in the above case upheld - appeal dismissed - decided against Revenue.
-
2009 (7) TMI 1205
Whether the Appellate Tribunal is right in law and on facts in allowing the claim of the assessee for amounts incurred for the issue of convertible debenture?
Held that:- Facts of the case clearly indicate that portion of the convertible debenture was converted into equity shares and assessee company had got enduring benefits and therefore, the expenditure incurred by the assessee on conversion of convertible debentures into equity shares has to be treated as capital expenditure. It may be noted that the Assessing Authority disallowed expenditure only to the extent pertaining to the convertible portion of the expenditure which formed part of the capital. As such disallowance made by the Income Tax Officer, which was confirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals) has to be sustained. The question of law raised by the Revenue, though not happily framed, is accordingly answered in the negative in favour of the Revenue and against the Assessee. Consequently, appeals are allowed and the order of the Tribunal is set aside.
-
2009 (7) TMI 1204
Intent to evade duty - Held that: - Once the dealer-respondent is a government organisation like Markfed it is not easy to infer any evasion of duty much less its intention to do so. There is thus no merit in the appeal as no question of law warranting its admission would arise - appeal dismissed.
-
2009 (7) TMI 1203
The Delhi High Court, in a judgment by Mr. Manmohan, J., granted prayer (a) of the application and directed the registry to carry out the correction in the order. The application stands disposed of. (Citation: 2009 (7) TMI 1203 - Delhi High Court)
-
2009 (7) TMI 1202
Sales tax on the sale of "Halls" - writ of prohibition, prohibiting the respondents from assessing or levying or collecting more than four per cent.
Held that:- When the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Chennai, has issued the clarification Nos. 3 and 106 of 2004, dated January 2, 2004 and April 16, 2004, respectively and revised the assessment on earlier occasion and concluded the penalty for excess collection of tax over and above four per cent, treating "Halls" as ayurvedic medicine, another assessing authority, by mere change of opinion, cannot propose to revise the assessment treating the said product as confectionary. Therefore, when the show-cause notice issued by the assessing authority is inconsistent with the circulars in force, the same can be challenged by way of a writ petition. Though the general principle of law is that the writ against show cause is not maintainable, yet if the authority acts contrary to the clarificatory circulars and if it lacks jurisdiction, it can be subjected to judicial review in writ jurisdiction
In view of the binding precedents of the circulars issued by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, in favour of the assessee this court is of the view that the impugned showcause notice issued contrary to the circulars, is without jurisdiction and it is liable to be set aside and accordingly, set aside and consequently, the petitioner is entitled to the relief sought for in the writ petition.
-
2009 (7) TMI 1201
Notificatio being dated May 6, 1986, issued by the State of Rajasthan in exercise of powers conferred by section 8(5) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 challenged
Held that:- The "relevant industry", therefore, has to be construed to mean, as would be understood and generally treated by the people in the trade and commerce, conversant with the subject, and comes to be known in the common parlance.
The mere omission of the word "of goods" in clause (2) of annexure 1, which words have been considered by learned single judge has no adverse effect on the aspect, as to from which industry the relevant inputs are to be obtained for the accounting year 1984-85, for the purpose of computing the extent of eligibility of the assessee to claim partial exemption of tax under the notification.
Whether the assessee could claim partial exemption on the basis of the input figures of other cement industry, which might have existed in the accounting year 1984-85, and in our view, the answer to this also has to be in the negative, inasmuch as, in that event, the assessee would not have been entitled to claim partial exemption under this notification, for want of existence of other manufacturer in the State, in the "relevant industry" during the accounting year 1984-85.
............
|
9911796707
