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2024 (3) TMI 974
Principles of Estoppel against law - Classification of goods - handmade branded unmanufactured tobacco under the brand name of ‘Rajhans’ - classifiable under CETH 24039910 or not - demand confirmed on the ground that appellant had agreed to classification of the said products as manufactured product - purchase of certain perfumeries etc. for mixing the same - HELD THAT:- The finding of the Commissioner (Appeals) to the effect that appellant has admitted the product as manufactured tobacco cannot be the reason for holding against them. It is settled in law that there cannot be any estoppel against the law in the matter of classification.
Reliance placed in the case of ELSON MACHINES PVT. LTD. VERSUS COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE [1988 (11) TMI 107 - SUPREME COURT] where it was held that Plainly there can be no estoppel against the law. The claim raised before us is a claim based on the legal effect of a provision of law and, therefore, this contention must be rejected.
No evidence has been brought on record either in the impugned order or in the Order-in-Original to show that the goods cleared by the appellant were classifiable under CETH 2403. What operation was undertaken, what was the nature of the products has not been examined and recorded. Nothing is available on record as to what made the finished goods cleared by the appellant during this period different from what was being cleared by them in past and post the brief period of February 2012 to August 2012. The impugned order itself hold that the products produced and cleared by the appellant during the entire period of demand was unmanufactured tobacco.
In the case of YOGESH ASSOCIATES VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, SURAT-II [2005 (9) TMI 173 - CESTAT, MUMBAI] Bombay Bench has held The explanatory notes to HSN especially when pari materia are binding to arrive at the classification and the law on this issue is well settled. We, therefore have no reason to take out the product impugned in these appeals, from the Heading 2401.10 as arrived by us and place it elsewhere under Chapter 24.
There are no merits in the impugned order to this extent - appeal allowed.
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2024 (3) TMI 973
Reduction of turnover - cement imported from outside the State of U.P. - Rule 9 of the Value Added Tax Rules - HELD THAT:- Upon perusal of the order of Tribunal it is patently clear that the goods were imported from outside the State of U.P. and were used in one project in the State of U.P. There does not appear to be any perversity in the finding of the Tribunal with regard to the above factum. Such being the case, Rule 9 (1)(e) of the Rules would definitely apply and the petitioner would be entitled to the benefit thereunder.
The general rule of law in taxing statutes is that in case of any doubt the benefit should be given to the assessee. However, in case of exemption and deduction to be given, a stricter approach may be followed, as per catena of judgments of the Supreme Court, to examine whether the assessee is eligible for such benefit. In the present case, there is no factual dispute of goods having been imported from outside the State of U.P. and, therefore, the assessee clearly qualifies for the said benefit.
The question of law is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Department - Application dismissed.
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2024 (3) TMI 972
Violation of principles of natural justice - impugned order does not take into consideration the reply submitted by the petitioner and is a cryptic order - HELD THAT:- The observation in the impugned order dated 23.12.2023 is not sustainable for the reasons that the reply filed by the petitioner is a detailed reply. Proper Officer had to at least consider the reply on merits and then form an opinion whether the reply is not clear and unsatisfactory. He merely held that the reply is not clear and satisfactory which ex-facie shows that the Proper Officer has not applied his mind to the reply submitted by the petitioner.
Further, if the Proper Officer was of the view that reply was unsatisfactory and further details were required, the same could have been specifically sought from the petitioner. However, the record does not reflect that any such opportunity was given to the petitioner to clarify its reply or furnish further documents/details.
The order cannot be sustained, and the matter is liable to be remitted to the Proper Officer for re-adjudication. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 23.12.2023 is set aside. The matter is remitted to the Proper Officer for re-adjudication - the impugned order records that petitioner’s reply is not satisfactory. The Proper Officer is directed to intimate to the petitioner details/documents, as maybe required to be furnished by the petitioner.
Petition disposed off.
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2024 (3) TMI 971
Dishonour of Cheque - vicarious liability of director - petitioner argues that he had resigned and had ceased to be a Director of the accused company w.e.f. 10.08.2017 and thereafter, he had no concern with the day-to-day affairs and decisions of the company qua its business transactions - HELD THAT:- In the present case, one handwritten line has been added in the complaint i.e. “accused no. 2 to 4 are responsible of day to day affairs of accused no. 1”, and even the complete language of Section 141 of NI Act has not been reproduced, let alone any specific detail about any role played by either of the petitioner in issuance or dishonour of cheque in question or as to how were they-in-charge of or responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the accused company when the cheque in question had been issued or dishonoured. Even before the learned Trial Court, the complainant had submitted the copies of Articles of Association and Memorandum of Association of the accused company, in which the details of Directors, as they were at the time of formation of company in the year 2015, were mentioned, and the updated data of the company available in the records of Registrar of Companies or Ministry of Corporate Affairs website was not placed before the learned Trial Court.
The petitioners had resigned much prior to the issuance of cheque and the complainant has not disputed the factum of their resignations. The Director who had signed the cheque in question i.e. Nikhil Mehta (accused no. 3) continues to be the Director of the accused company till date, whereas the records show that the present petitioners had resigned in the year 2017 itself. Thus, the petitioners cannot be made liable under Section 138/141 of NI Act, in such facts and circumstances.
Petition allowed.
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2024 (3) TMI 970
Denial of benefit of the N/N. 52/2003-customs to input/raw material imported by EOU used - denial on the ground that appellant had consumed inputs and generated wastage beyond the norms fixed by norms committee - HELD THAT:- In the instant case for material consumed over and above the SION notification issued by the DGFT, Department views that duty or at least penalty is liable to be charged in case excess wastage comes into play. However, it is found that Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the matter of COMMISSIONER, CUSTOMS (PREVENTIVE) VERSUS MONARCH OVERSEAS [2019 (1) TMI 1513 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT], while dealing with scope of Notification No. 52/2003–Cus. Dated 03.01.2003 31.03.2003 particularly clause (3) construed the non-obstante clause by interpreting that once the material procured are used for the purpose of manufacture of finished goods or services then even if, waste and scrap arises in course of production and manufacture over the norm then same is also exempt from the duty of custom leviable or the additional duty.
Appeal allowed.
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2024 (3) TMI 969
Determination of tax u/s 73(9) of the CGST/SGST Act - petitioner submits that the order is passed merely on the representation of the petitioner without giving any opportunity of oral hearing to the petitioner - violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- The petitioner is entitled for an opportunity of hearing before determination of any tax even under Section 73(9) of the CGST/SGST Act.
The impugned order dated 29.12.2023, is hereby set aside. The matter is remanded back to the appropriate authority to pass a fresh order after giving opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner - Petition allowed by way of remand.
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2024 (3) TMI 968
Seeking grant of bail - fraudulent availment and passing of input tax credit of G.S.T, by preparing fake invoices without any actual supply of goods by several firms created, managed and run by the applicant - creation of a number of bogus firms for the purpose of issuing fake invoices - HELD THAT:- Perusal of the provisions contained under Section 73 and 74 of the CGST Act would reveal that a mechanism has been provided therein with regard to the determination of tax not paid or short paid or erroneously refunded or input tax credit wrongly availed or utilized by reason of fraud or any wilfull mis-statement or suppression of facts. Section 74 of the CGST Act provides for assessment of tax by the proper officer by issuing a notice to the assesee, however, sub-section 11 of Section 74 of the CGST Act would suggest that if the tax, which has been calculated along with the interest payable or the penalty is deposited, all proceedings in respect of the said notice shall be deemed to be concluded - it may be inferred that even if all the tax liability including penalty, etc. has been deposited, it would be only the 'notice' which would be discharged and the proceedings with regard to Section 132 of the CGST Act shall remain alive. Thus, there seems force in the submissions made by learned counsel for the Department that the process of prosecution and assessment may go on simultaneously.
The arrest of the applicant has not been done for his non cooperation in the investigation or for further investigation. Nowhere it is stated that the applicant while at liberty may hinder the smooth progress of investigation and in this order it has also not been mentioned as to why the applicant is being arrested, which was required to be stated.
The requirement under sub-section (1) of section 69 of CGST Act is reasons to believe that not only a person has committed any offence as specified but also as to why such person needs to be arrested. From a perusal of the reasons recorded by the Principal Additional Director General, it is reflected that no incident has been mentioned therein recording any act of the applicant or his conduct of threatening any witness or even of not co-operating with the investigation or of fleeing from investigation. It is true that economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be visited with a different approach in the matter of bail, because such offences pose serious threat to the financial health of the country, but there has to be a sound reason or belief for curtailing the liberty of a person, specially in the offences punishable with up to seven years of imprisonment.
Keeping in view the fact that applicant has appeared before the department on 30, 31 January 2024 and on 01st February and his statements have been recorded on these days and he was arrested on 2nd February, 2024 and produced before the magistrate and no custody remand was sought by the department and it was after many days i.e. on 26.02.2024 the department has taken the permission from the Court concerned for interrogation of the applicant in jail and also that applicant has retracted his confessional statements and in the orders of arrest no reason has been mentioned as to why after recording of the statements of the applicant for many days his arrest is required and also keeping view that applicant is in jail in this case since 02.02.2024 and investigation appears to have reached an advanced statge and nothing has been shown before this Court which may justify the further detention of the applicant in prison and also considering that the alleged offence is punishable with up to 5 years maximum punishment and still no formal accusation in the form of FIR or complaint has been filed by the department and also keeping in view that in such circumstances continuing the detention of the petitioner may not at all be justified and it appears justified for this court to strike a fine balance between the need for further detention of the applicant when even custodial interrogation has not been claimed at all by the Department and considering the right of an accused to personal liberty, applicant may be released on bail, however subject to certain conditions.
Let the accused/applicant- Deepanshu Srivastava involved in above-mentioned case, be released on bail on his furnishing a personal bond with two sureties in the like amount to the satisfaction of the court concerned subject to fulfilment of conditions imposed - bail application allowed.
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2024 (3) TMI 967
Reversal of ITC - wrongful availment of Input Tax Credit (ITC) on purchase of Car - impugned order was issued in view of the respondent not being aware of the reversal in the GSTR 3B return - HELD THAT:- The petitioner has placed on record the GSTR 3B return for the month of April in the assessment year 2023-2024. Such return indicates the reversal of ITC to the extent of Rs. 73,690/- each towards CGST and SGST. On examining the impugned order, it is evident that such impugned order proceeds on the basis that ITC of Rs. 73,690/- each towards CGST and SGST was wrongly availed of. In other words, the said order proceeds on the basis that ITC was not reversed. In light of documents placed on record by the petitioner, the said order requires reconsideration.
The impugned order dated 11.07.2023 is quashed and the matter is remanded for reconsideration. The petitioner is permitted to file a reply to the show cause notice dated 19.04.2023 and to submit all relevant documents along with such reply.
Petition disposed off by way of remand.
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2024 (3) TMI 966
Validity of assessment order - fraudulent availment of Input Tax Credit (ITC) - documents produced by the petitioner were disregarded - issuance of fake invoices - HELD THAT:- The documents produced by the petitioner along with the reply to intimation and reply to show cause notice were disregarded and the assessing officer reproduced the statements from the show cause notice. Since there was no application of mind, the impugned assessment order is not sustainable.
The impugned assessment order dated 23.08.2023 is quashed and the matter is remanded for re-consideration. After providing a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner, including a personal hearing, the assessing officer is directed to issue a fresh assessment order within two months. The petitioner is granted leave to submit additional documents to establish that the availment of ITC was in order.
Petition disposed off.
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2024 (3) TMI 965
Violation of principles of natural justice - impugned order passed without taking into consideration the reply submitted by the petitioner and is a cryptic order - ex-parte demand - HELD THAT:- The observation in the impugned order is not sustainable for the reasons that the reply filed by the petitioner is a detailed reply, however the impugned order records that “neither filed any reply nor appeared in person”. Proper Officer had to at least consider the reply submitted by the Petitioner on merits and then form an opinion. He merely held that the no reply has been filed which ex-facie shows that Proper Officer has not applied his mind to the reply submitted by the petitioner.
The order cannot be sustained, and the matter is liable to be remitted to the Proper Officer for re-adjudication. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 29.11.2023 is set aside. The matter is remitted to the Proper Officer for re-adjudication.
Petition disposed of by way of remand.
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2024 (3) TMI 964
Violation of principles of natural justice - impugned order does not take into consideration the reply submitted by the petitioner and is a cryptic order - demand alongwith penalty - HELD THAT:- Perusal of the Show Cause Notice shows that the Department has given separate headings under declaration of output tax, excess claim Input Tax Credit, ITC to be reversed on non-business transactions & exempt supplies and under declaration of ineligible ITC. To the said Show Cause Notice, a detailed reply was furnished by the petitioner giving full disclosures under each of the heads - The observation in the impugned order dated 23.12.2023 is not sustainable for the reasons that the reply filed by the petitioner is a detailed reply. Proper Officer had to at least consider the reply on merits and then form an opinion whether the reply was unsatisfactory, incomplete and not duly supported by adequate documents. He merely held that the reply is not clear and unsatisfactory which ex-facie shows that Proper Officer has not applied his mind to the reply submitted by the petitioner.
Further, if the Proper Officer was of the view that the reply is unsatisfactory and if any further details were required, the same could have been specifically sought from the petitioner. However, the record does not reflect that any such opportunity was given to the petitioner to clarify its reply or furnish further documents/details.
The matter is liable to be remitted to the Proper Officer for re-adjudication. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 23.12.2023 is set aside. The matter is remitted to the Proper Officer for re-adjudication - Proper Officer is directed to intimate to the petitioner details/documents, as maybe required to be furnished by the petitioner. Pursuant to the intimation being given, petitioner shall furnish the requisite explanation and documents. Thereafter, the Proper Officer shall re-adjudicate the show cause notice after giving an opportunity of personal hearing and shall pass a fresh speaking order in accordance with law within the period prescribed under Section 75(3) of the Act.
Petition disposed off.
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2024 (3) TMI 963
Retrospective cancellation of GST registration of petitioner - SCN does not specify any cogent reason - violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- In terms of Section 29(2) of the Act, the proper officer may cancel the GST registration of a person from such date including any retrospective date, as he may deem fit if the circumstances set out in the said sub-section are satisfied. Registration cannot be cancelled with retrospective effect mechanically. It can be cancelled only if the proper officer deems it fit to do so. Such satisfaction cannot be subjective but must be based on some objective criteria.
It is important to note that, according to the respondent, one of the consequences for cancelling a taxpayer’s registration with retrospective effect is that the taxpayer’s customers are denied the input tax credit availed in respect of the supplies made by the taxpayer during such period. Although, it is not considered apposite to examine this aspect but assuming that the respondent’s contention in required to consider this aspect while passing any order for cancellation of GST registration with retrospective effect. Thus, a taxpayer's registration can be cancelled with retrospective effect only where such consequences are intended and are warranted.
In view of the fact that Petitioner does not seek to carry on business or continue the registration, the impugned order dated 07.07.2023 is modified to the limited extent that registration shall now be treated as cancelled with effect from 26.07.2022 i.e., the date when the Petitioner closed down his business activities. Petitioner shall make the necessary compliances as required by Section 29 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
Petition disposed off.
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2024 (3) TMI 962
Retrospective cancellation of GST registration of petitioner - petitioner could not respond to the SCN as the petitioner could not access the GST portal - HELD THAT:- The impugned order dated 11.12.2023 has been passed merely on the ground that no reply has been received from the taxpayer - It is not in dispute that once the registration is cancelled retrospectively, the taxpayer is not in a position to access the portal; become aware of any notice or respond thereto.
In the instant case, since the GST portal shows that the registration of the petitioner has been cancelled retrospectively with effect from 01.07.2017, petitioner would not have been able to receive the show cause notice or access the portal to become aware of any show cause notice or respond thereto.
Since both the petitioner as well as respondent want the registration to be cancelled, though for different reasons, the interest of justice requires that the registration of the petitioner be deemed to be cancelled with effect from 01.01.2018 i.e., the date of the application filed by the Petitioner seeking cancellation of the GST registration - the impugned order dated 11.12.2023 is not sustainable - petition disposed off.
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2024 (3) TMI 961
Validity of assessment order - alleged discrepancies in returns filed by the petitioner - difference between the amounts indicated in the notice in Form ASMT-10 and the amounts specified in the show cause notice - HELD THAT:- On examining the notice in Form ASMT-10, the said notice pertains to financial year 2017-2018. The abstract of demand proposed therein is for an aggregate sum of Rs. 1,37,33,386.62 comprising a demand of Rs. 71,59,663.28 towards IGST, a sum of Rs. 32,86,861.67 towards SGST and a sum of Rs. 32,86,861.67 towards CGST. Upon receipt of the petitioner's reply dated 22.09.2023, by order in Form ASMT-12 dated 27.09.2023, the respondents concluded that the reply was satisfactory and no further action is required.
In these circumstances, it is necessary to examine the impugned assessment order to verify whether the same demand was resurrected. On examining the impugned assessment order, it is found that the confirmation of demand relates to the same assessment period and the same amounts towards SGST, CGST and IGST. The only difference is that interest and penalty has been imposed thereon to arrive at the aggregate sum indicated therein. Upon issuance of an order in Form ASMT-12 recording that no further action is required, the continuation of proceedings culminating in the impugned assessment order is undoubtedly unsustainable.
The impugned assessment order is quashed - Petition closed.
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2024 (3) TMI 960
Denial of Input Tax Credit - Disallowance on the ground that the details submitted in the petitioner's return did not tally with that in the GSTR-2A return - HELD THAT:- The documents on record, such as invoice dated 20.09.2017 and the GSTR return of Kirthi Enterprises, prima facie indicate that the GSTIN of Premier Corporation was wrongly mentioned by Kirthi Enterprises in the return. If that is indeed the case, the petitioner would be unjustly deprived of ITC. In order to provide the petitioner with an opportunity to redress this grievance, interference with the impugned order is called for.
The impugned order dated 25.08.2023 is quashed and the matter is remanded to the assessing officer. The assessing officer is directed to provide a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner, including a personal hearing, and thereafter issue a fresh assessment order within a period of two months thereafter. It is also open to the petitioner to file an appropriate petition, if necessary, to set right the error complained of by the petitioner.
Petition disposed off.
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2024 (3) TMI 959
Validity of Revision u/s 263 - Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue - loan transactions advanced to the assessee by entry operators - disallowance u/s 14A of the Act read with Rule 8D(2)(iii) - PCIT, while exercising the revisional powers, recorded that M/s. Sarvottam Securities Ltd. and M/s. Upaj Leasing & Finance Pvt. Ltd. are the shell companies of Mr. Himanshu Verma, an entry operator and the assessee was the beneficiary of the unsecured loans received through the entry operator and AO ought to have done further inquiry to ascertain the genuineness and creditworthiness of the loan transactions - HELD THAT:- As in light of the findings which are unravelled from the DDIT investigation report and assessment proceedings of M/s. Upaj Leasing & Finance Pvt. Ltd. that the entities M/s. Sarvottam Securities Ltd. and M/s. Upaj Leasing & Finance Pvt. Ltd. are the shell companies of an entry operator, the relevance of ascertaining the genuineness and creditworthiness of the transactions cannot be undermined. Additionally, the genuineness and creditworthiness of the transactions may not be satisfactorily determined solely on the basis of the ledger accounts or the ITR of the entities, especially when the identities of such entities are not bona fide.
As observed in N.R. Portfolio [2013 (11) TMI 1381 - DELHI HIGH COURT] the task of unveiling the mischief of the human minds working behind the corporate veil in such cases requires a deeper scrutiny, which goes beyond the periphery of documents ordinarily submitted for the purpose of assessment. An inquiry for ascertaining the creditworthiness and genuineness of financial transactions necessarily requires unknotting of the transactions, by going beyond what is conspicuously available.
Unfortunately, the assessment order nowhere reflects any element of inquiry or verification. The discussion about the loan transactions in question is altogether missing. Furthermore, the assessment record would also reflect that the AO has not taken any concrete steps to ascertain the genuineness and creditworthiness of the transactions, which merits consideration in the light of the findings that emerged from the DDIT investigation report and assessment proceedings of M/s. Upaj Leasing & Finance Pvt. Ltd. It emerges that the present is a case where the AO failed not only to spell out any finding about the DDIT investigation report and assessment proceedings of M/s. Upaj Leasing & Finance Pvt. Ltd. but also to scrutinize the highlighted aspects in the said report qua the genuineness and creditworthiness of aforenoted loan transactions. Therefore, this is the minimum inquiry which atleast was expected to have been made by the AO.
It is apposite to point out that clause (a) of Explanation 2 of Section 263 of the Act introduces a deeming fiction to the effect that the order passed by the AO shall be considered erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, if the order is passed without making inquiries or verification, which should have been made. Henceforth, since neither there is any facet of discussion about the aforenoted aspects in the assessment order nor the assessment record duly reflects that the AO has done inquiry in the light of the findings of the investigation report. We find that the present is a fit case to invoke the revisional powers under Section 263 of the Act.
So far as question (a) is concerned, we hold that the ITAT was incorrect in holding that the AO had duly made the inquiry in the instant case and considered the material produced before it. Furthermore, the ITAT also erred in holding that the PCIT has wrongly assumed the jurisdiction under Section 263 of the Act as the assessment order is not only prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue but also erroneous in nature.
So far as question (b) is concerned, it is crystal clear that Explanation 2 to Section 263 of the Act will be applicable in the instant case as the said explanation was inserted vide Finance Act, 2015 with effect from 01 June 2015 and the case of the assessee belongs to AY 2016-17.
Thus, questions of law need to be answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
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2024 (3) TMI 958
Validity of reopening of assessment - An order u/s 245D(4) already been passed by the Income Tax Settlement Commission (ITSC) - Scope of harmonious construction - whether the order of the ITSC is final in all respects for the concerned AY? - HELD THAT:- As seen that the order of the ITSC is deemed to be conclusive for all the matters pertaining the concerned AY for which the settlement application has been accepted and processed by the ITSC. In case, the Income Tax Department is not satisfied with the computation of income by the ITSC for the relevant AY, the same could only be assailed in accordance with the provisions contemplated under Section 245D(6) read with Section 245D(7) of the Act. The legislative scheme envisaged for ITSC is self-contained in nature and the intent appears to be to facilitate a mutually satisfactory arrangement which could not be reopened, unless explicitly covered under the textual exceptions of fraud or misrepresentation.
In the instant case, the application of the petitioner was accepted and the proceedings were initiated therein by the ITSC after the second search and seizure operation was conducted by the respondent on 05.03.2013. Thus, undoubtedly, since the ITSC was already held up with the concerned AY, including the aspects raised by the respondent in the present petition, the AO cannot be allowed to exercise jurisdiction to reopen the proceedings under the guise of Section 147/148 of the Act for the relevant AY in consideration.
As already settled allowing the AO to proceed with the impugned notices and order for reopening assessment for the concerned AY would create a situation of downright chaos and vagueness. Put otherwise, it would tantamount to simultaneous existence of two concomitant and materially different assessment orders for the same AY, which is completely impermissible as per the provisions of the Act.
The issue regarding the impermissibility of two assessment orders for a particular AY was also highlighted in the case of Abhisar Buildwell Pvt. [2023 (4) TMI 1056 - SUPREME COURT]
Therefore, if the respondent was apprehensive of the fact that the petitioner had suppressed its income before the ITSC, it ought to have resorted to the remedy contained in Chapter XIX-A of the Act itself on the grounds of fraud or misrepresentation. The concept of fraud has been jurisprudentially recognized as a concept of wide import, and thus, availability of a challenge on the ground of fraud could have provided an effective remedy to the respondent, if so justified. Evidently, the respondent has failed to seek recourse to such a remedy and rather, preferred an appeal before this Court on altogether different aspects as compared to the ones raised in the present petition. In any case, the same was also dismissed vide order dated 05.09.2017 [2017 (9) TMI 1721 - DELHI HIGH COURT]
So far as the decision relied upon by the respondent in the case of Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd. [2023 (5) TMI 587 - SUPREME COURT] is concerned, in the given facts and circumstances, the same cannot be construed to be an authority to override the mandate of Section 245-I of the Act. Sections 150 and 245-I of the Act are provisions of equal standing and a conflict between the two must be resolved by resorting to the principle of harmonious construction. One of the foremost considerations of harmonious construction is to preserve the essence and meaning of both the provisions, and to not let either provision fall at the expense of the other. If the settlement arrived at by ITSC is allowed to be reopened on grounds, other than those expressly provided for, it would effectively render the entire mandate of the ITSC as vulnerable and the commitment of the finality of a settlement would stand compromised. It is this legislative sanctity of ITSC that provides it a special status under the Act.
Since the decision of the ITSC qua the issues in the present petition has already attained finality, therefore, taking a cue from the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Brij Lal [2010 (10) TMI 8 - SUPREME COURT] the reliance placed by the respondent on Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd. [2023 (5) TMI 587 - SUPREME COURT] to proceed with the reassessment proceedings, is completely unjustifiable and unsustainable, in the given factual matrix of the petition.
In view of the aforesaid, we quash the impugned notice alongwith corrigendum and the impugned order of even date.
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2024 (3) TMI 957
Application u/s 119(2)(b) for condoning delay, if any, in filing Form 10-ID to avail the beneficial rate of tax of 15% u/s 115BAB - Validity of order of CBDT rejecting the application u/s 119(2)(b) - FDI investment approval from China - as submitted Petitioner had not entered into any transaction for FY 2019-20 as need to take approvals and the COVID-19 pandemic which lasted in China for a longer period - For AY 2020-21 and 2021-22, Petitioner had not exercised the option to be governed by Section 115BAB of the Act, which Petitioner thought of exercising for AY 2022-23. - As argued order has not been passed or signed by the Member who gave a personal hearing and secondly, in the order reliance has been placed on the report of the Field Authorities, which Petitioner on instructions, states, has not been provided - principles of natural justice denied - HELD THAT:- As Petitioner stated that such a report was received by CBDT and considered itself came to light only when Petitioner received the impugned order. He also states that Petitioner’s officers were called by the ‘Field Authorities’. Their explanations were sought after which nothing was received by the Assessee from the Field Authorities.
In our view, principles of natural justice would require that Respondent No. 1 should have made a copy of the report received by them from the Field Authorities to Petitioner and given an opportunity to Petitioner to explain or show cause. We understand that even during the personal hearing, it was not informed to Petitioner that there was such a report.
Moreover, the order says, “This issues with the approval of Member (IT&R), Central Board of Direct Taxes” and is signed by one Virender Singh, Additional Commissioner of Income Tax (ITA Cell), CBDT, New Delhi. If a personal hearing has been granted by the Member (IT&R), the order should have been passed by him. Mr. Sharma states there could be file notings. If that is so, that has not been made available to Petitioner.
In the circumstances, on these two grounds alone, we quash and set aside the impugned order dated 5th December 2023 and remand the matter to CBDT. The Member/Members shall within three weeks from the date this order is uploaded make available to Petitioner all Field Reports/documents/instructions received by the CBDT from the Field Authorities and within two weeks of receiving the same, Petitioner shall file, if advised, further submissions in support of their application for condonation of delay.
Thereafter, an order shall be written, passed and that order shall be authored and signed by the Member of CBDT, who has given a personal hearing and when we say this, it is not the Member holding the same designation.
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2024 (3) TMI 956
Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - reasons to believe - cash deposits in bank account as alleged unexplained - nformation received from the Investigation Officer, Kolhapur that Petitioner made some cash deposit by assessee-trust - HELD THAT:- The reasons recorded clearly indicate that notice has been issued and the reopening has been initiated on a mere change of opinion. In the earlier scrutiny assessment, Respondent No. 1 had the opportunity to specifically scrutinize the cash deposits made by Petitioner. A specific query was also raised by the IO, Kolhapur regarding the cash deposits under Section 133(6) of the Act, to which Petitioner had replied stating that the said issue was being examined in the scrutiny assessment. The reason recorded and the impugned order are based on issues which have already been examined and verified during the original scrutiny assessment and the same cannot, in law, be a valid ground to reopen Petitioner’s assessment for AY 2016-17 as the same would amount to a ‘review’.
The same facts and materials on record cannot be re-examined for change of opinion under the garb or reassessment proceedings. It has been held in a catena of judgments that reassessment proceedings cannot be initiated by the AO when he has accepted the matter in an original assessment and the same would amount to a mere change of opinion and would not give rise to ‘reasons to believe’.
Also further noticed from the documents on record that there was no reason nor any justification given in the notice to even arrive at prima facie finding that the cash deposits led to escapement of income. There was no response to Petitioner’s requests for information regarding alleged undisclosed income pertaining to cash deposits over and above the deposits in the bank account. The impugned order does not even controvert the objection raised by Petitioner that the cash collected was not only deposited in its bank account but was also duly offered to tax.
It is settled law that a reason to suspect is not the same as reason to believe. There has to be a rational connection and the live link between the material coming to the notice of the AO and the formation of belief regarding escapement of income. See Sheo Nath Sing case [1971 (8) TMI 6 - SUPREME COURT]
The reasons to believe in the present matter merely adverts to information from the Investigation Officer, Kolhapur that Petitioner made some cash deposits. But it is an admitted fact that Petitioner, a charitable trust registered under Section 12A of the Act, eligible to avail exemption under Section 11 of the Act has deposited the donations received in cash in its bank account and thereby disclosed ‘Nil’ total income for the relevant assessment year. Moreover, the accounts of Petitioner are recorded, accounted and audited and hence, undoubtedly, there is no undisclosed cash over and above the deposits in its regular bank accounts which were offered for taxation. Thus, there is no material or fact which has been stated in the reasons for reopening assessment in the present case on which any belief can be founded of the nature contemplated by law. Decided in favour of assessee.
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2024 (3) TMI 955
Validity of assessment u/s 153C - Period of limitation - Assessment of income of any other person - recording of satisfaction about seven years after search - HELD THAT:- The question as to whether these proceedings are barred by limitation should be addressed with reference to the judgment in Jasjit Singh [2023 (10) TMI 572 - SUPREME COURT] Effectively, the Supreme Court held that the person, other than the searched person, would be gravely prejudiced if the papers were to be handed over to the jurisdictional assessing officer of such person after about four years.
In the case at hand, the search in the premises of Mr. Thirumalaivasan was carried out on 11.10.2012, whereas the satisfaction note was recorded only on 27.03.2019. It is also significant to notice that the assessing officer of the searched person and the petitioner were the same and the recording of satisfaction about seven years after search is unjustified. If the limitation period of six years is reckoned from the date on which satisfaction was recorded, which falls within financial year 2018-2019 or assessment year 2019-2020, the respondent could only have reached back up to assessment year 2013-2014. Therefore, the proceedings in respect of both these assessment years are undoubtedly barred by limitation. It should also be noticed that the periods specified in Section 153B for completion of assessment had also lapsed.
The impugned assessment orders are quashed as being barred by limitation. Decided in favour of assessee.
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