1961 (5) TMI 54 - SC - Indian Laws

Indian Limitation Act for condonation of one day s delay in filing an appeal, the question arose whether the appellant had to explain his con- duct during the whole period prescribed for filing the appeal or he has to explain the delay between the last day for filing the appeal and the date on which the appeal was actually filed. Section 5 of the Limitation Act lays down that an appeal may be admitted after the period of limitation if the appellant shows sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period . - Held, that it would be irrelevant to invoke general considerations such as diligence of the appellant in construing the words of s.5. The expression within such period does not mean during such period and the failure of the appellant to account for his non-diligence during the whole period of limitation does not disqualify him from praying for condonation of delay.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Construction of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.
2. Sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing an appeal.
3. Judicial discretion in excusing delay.
4. Interpretation of the phrase "within such period" in Section 5.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Construction of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908:
The primary issue in this appeal revolves around the interpretation of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. The appellant argued that the Judicial Commissioner erred in his construction of the phrase "within such period" in Section 5, which pertains to the extension of the period of limitation for filing an appeal if sufficient cause is shown.

2. Sufficient Cause for Condonation of Delay in Filing an Appeal:
The appellant firm failed to file the appeal within the prescribed period due to the illness of one of its partners, Ramlal, on the last day for filing the appeal. The Judicial Commissioner accepted the illness as a valid reason for the one-day delay but dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the appellant did not show diligence during the entire period of limitation. The Supreme Court emphasized that the explanation for delay should focus on the period between the last day of filing and the actual filing date, rather than the entire limitation period.

3. Judicial Discretion in Excusing Delay:
The Supreme Court highlighted two key considerations in construing Section 5:
- The expiration of the limitation period gives the decree-holder a legal right to treat the decree as binding.
- If sufficient cause is shown, the court has the discretion to condone the delay to advance substantial justice. The court emphasized that the discretion should be exercised to promote justice, provided there is no negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fides on the appellant's part.

4. Interpretation of the Phrase "Within Such Period" in Section 5:
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Judicial Commissioner's interpretation that "within such period" required the appellant to explain its conduct throughout the entire limitation period. Instead, the Court held that the phrase should be interpreted to mean the period ending on the last day of the prescribed limitation. Therefore, the appellant only needed to explain the delay from the last day of filing until the actual filing date. The Court concluded that the illness of Ramlal on the last day constituted a sufficient cause for the one-day delay.

Conflict in Judicial Opinions:
The Supreme Court acknowledged conflicting High Court decisions on this issue. For instance, the Calcutta High Court in Karalicharan Sarma v. Apurbakrishna Bajpeyi supported the view that explaining the delay on the last day was sufficient, aligning with the Supreme Court's interpretation. Conversely, decisions from Nagpur and Patna High Courts required appellants to explain their conduct during the entire limitation period, which the Supreme Court found unreasonable.

Discretionary Jurisdiction and Bona Fides:
The Court reiterated that proving sufficient cause is a prerequisite for the court's discretionary jurisdiction under Section 5. If sufficient cause is shown, the court must then decide whether to condone the delay, considering the appellant's diligence and bona fides. The Court clarified that considerations relevant to Section 14 of the Limitation Act, which deals with bona fide prosecuting in the wrong forum, should not be conflated with applications under Section 5.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, condoned the one-day delay, and remanded the case to the Judicial Commissioner for disposal on merits. The appellant was directed to pay the respondent's costs incurred in the Supreme Court, while costs in the Judicial Commissioner's court would be determined in the appeal.

Appeal Allowed.