2006 (12) TMI 548 - SC - Indian Laws

Offences punishable u/s 8 and 9 of the Act - Political opponent lodged the complaint - Public servant - Chief Minister of the State of Punjab - Sanction in terms of Section 197 of the CrPC - Validity of proceedings initiated under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ('Act') and/or the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (the 'IPC') - whether sanction is necessary or not ? - registration of a cognizable offence - HELD THAT - Mere non-description of the offences in detail is really not material. At the stage of framing charge it can be urged that no offence is made out. With reference to the absence of allegations under Sections 8 and 9 of the Act, it is submitted whether the charge sheet has reference to any particular material referred to in it and the relevance of it is to be considered at the time when the charge is framed. It would not be desirable to analyse minutely the materials as at that stage the Court is primarily concerned with the question as to whether charge is to be framed in respect of any offence and whether there prima facie appears existence of any material and not the sufficiency of the materials. Therefore, the appellants' stand that the charge sheet does not refer to any particular material cannot be accepted, more particularly, in view of the specific materials referred to by Learned Counsel for the respondent-State. It would not be permissible to contend that a public servant would be covered by Section 13(1)(d) (similar to Section 5(1)(d) of Old Act) and therefore the public servant would not be covered by Sections 8 and 9 of the Act. The offences under Section 13(1)(d) and the offences under Sections 8 and 9 of Act are different and separate. Assuming, Section 13(1)(d)(i) covers public servants who obtain for 'himself or for any other person' any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage by corrupt or illegal means, that would not mean that he would not fall within the scope of Sections 8 and 9. The ingredients are different. If a public servant accepts gratification for inducing any public servant to do or to forbear to do any official act, etc. then he would fall in the net of Sections 8 and 9. In Section 13(1)(d) it is not necessary to prove that any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage has been obtained for inducing any public servant. Great emphasis has been led by the appellants on some factual scenario to show that the complainant was close to incumbent Chief Minister and he has been rewarded subsequently for making the complaint. In essence, the plea is that mala fides are involved. This allegation of mala fides is also linked with the so called conferment of power with the particular police station at Mohali and conferment of jurisdiction on a particular Special Judge by Notification dated 17.11.2003. A plea of mala fides has not only to be clearly pleaded but specifically proved by adducing cogent evidence. Mere allegation and suspicions would not be sufficient. The person against whom mala fides conduct is attributed is interestingly not a party in the proceedings. So far as the allegation that political opponent had lodged the complaint is concerned, that itself is not sufficient for the Court to interfere. When the allegation is made, investigation is undertaken to find out whether there is any substance in the allegation. Merely because the political opponent was the complainant that does not per se lead to an inference that the complaint has to be thrown out or that no notice should be taken thereof. Whether the submissions ought to prevail, the legal principles governing the registration of a cognizable offence - It is manifestly clear that if any information disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before an officer incharge of a police station satisfying the requirements of Section 154(1) of the Code, the said police officer has no other option except to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say, to register a case on the basis of such information. In this connection, it may be noted that though a police officer cannot investigate a non-cognizable offence on his own as in the case of cognizable offence, he can investigate a non- cognizable offence under the order of a Magistrate having power to try such non-cognizable case or commit the same for trial within the terms under Section 155(2) of the Code but subject to Section 155(3) of the Code. Further, under Sub-section (4) to Section 155, where a case relates to two offences to which at least one is cognizable, the case shall be deemed to be a cognizable case notwithstanding that the other offences are non-cognizable and, therefore, under such circumstances the police officer can investigate such offences with the same powers as he has while investigating a cognizable offence. Whether the registration of a criminal case u/s 154(1) of the Code ipso facto warrants the setting in motion of an investigation under Chapter XII of the Code - The controversy revolves around the Notification dated 19.10.2002 regarding P.S., Mohali with Statewide jurisdiction. According to Learned Counsel for the respondent-State it represents a continuity and there was no new creation. So far as the Notification dated 17.11.2003 is concerned, undisputedly, the expression used is appoint . It was clarified that though the said expression has been used, it did not actually mean appointment of a Sessions Judge and First Additional Sessions Judge, Ropar as Special Judges. They were already appointed and designated as stated in the Notification itself. What was intended related to allocation of cases registered at P.S., Mohali to the existing Courts of Special Judges, Ropar. There is also no dispute that P.S., Mohali falls within the area of district Ropar over which Special Judges, Ropar had jurisdiction as approved by the High Court. It is to be noted that Learned Counsel for the State submitted that to avoid any fear of forum shopping, the State is even willing to abide by the decision of this Court if the trial takes place in Chandigarh or wherever this Court directs, and to show that the State has no intention to the trial being conducted at a particular place and to prove its transparency the stand is taken. We do not think it necessary to so direct, because the expression notwithstanding the jurisdiction of other Special Judges in the State of Punjab has already been stated to be unnecessary and would be of no consequence. That being so, the plea in that regard as raised by the appellants also fails. Since all the challenges have been held to be without substance, the inevitable result is that the appeals deserve to be dismissed which we direct.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Validity of proceedings initiated under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and/or the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
2. Lack of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
3. Allegations of mala fide and political vendetta.
4. Legality of jurisdiction and establishment of a special court.
5. Sufficiency and clarity of the charge sheets.
6. Applicability of Sections 8 and 9 of the Prevention of Corruption Act to public servants.
7. Validity of the sanction order and its application.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity of Proceedings Initiated under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and/or the Indian Penal Code, 1860:
The appellants challenged the Punjab and Haryana High Court's dismissal of their petitions questioning the validity of proceedings initiated under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (the 'Act') and the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (the 'IPC'). The appellants argued that the proceedings were based on mala fide complaints and political vendetta, with vague allegations that did not indicate any offense. The High Court relied on the Constitution Bench decision in R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, which was rendered in the context of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (the 'Old Act'). The appellants contended that the decision did not consider the effect of Section 6(2) of the Old Act, corresponding to Section 19(2) of the Act.

2. Lack of Sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:
The appellants argued that the offenses alleged under the IPC had a close nexus with their official duties, necessitating sanction under Section 197 of the Code. The respondents countered that the decision in R.S. Nayak correctly laid down the position that no sanction is necessary if the accused is no longer a public servant at the time of taking cognizance. The Court emphasized that the requirement of sanction is time and offense-related, and the absence of sanction does not vitiate the proceedings unless it results in a failure of justice.

3. Allegations of Mala Fide and Political Vendetta:
The appellants claimed that the cases were registered at Mohali Police Station with mala fide intentions and a new court was established without consulting the High Court. The respondents refuted these claims, stating that no new court was established and the Special Judge was designated to hear the cases for convenience. The Court held that mere allegations and suspicions of mala fide intentions are insufficient without cogent evidence. The political opponent's involvement in lodging the complaint does not invalidate the investigation.

4. Legality of Jurisdiction and Establishment of a Special Court:
The appellants challenged the jurisdiction conferred on a particular Special Judge and the establishment of a special court. The respondents clarified that the Special Judge was appointed in consultation with the High Court, and the notification regarding the police station's jurisdiction was issued by the then Government of Chandigarh. The Court found no substance in the allegations of choosing a Special Judge with oblique motives.

5. Sufficiency and Clarity of the Charge Sheets:
The appellants argued that the charge sheets were vague and lacked definite material to substantiate the allegations. The respondents provided specific references to materials indicating the commission of offenses, including evidence of recycling money, amassing benami property, and disproportionate assets. The Court held that the charge sheets contained sufficient details and materials, and the issue of sufficiency should be addressed at the stage of framing charges.

6. Applicability of Sections 8 and 9 of the Prevention of Corruption Act to Public Servants:
The appellants contended that Sections 8 and 9 of the Act apply only to private persons and not to public servants. The Court analyzed the provisions and concluded that the term "whoever" in Sections 8 and 9 is wide enough to include public servants. The offenses under Sections 8 and 9 are distinct from those under Section 13(1)(d) of the Act, and public servants can be prosecuted under these sections.

7. Validity of the Sanction Order and Its Application:
The appellants argued that the sanction order was invalid due to non-application of mind and lack of specific reference to the alleged infractions. The Court held that the sanctioning authority is not required to specify each offense separately and that the materials placed before the authority were sufficient. The distinction between the absence of sanction and alleged invalidity due to non-application of mind was emphasized, with the latter being a matter to be raised during the trial.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the challenges raised by the appellants were without substance. The Court affirmed the validity of the proceedings, the sufficiency of the charge sheets, the applicability of Sections 8 and 9 of the Act to public servants, and the legality of the jurisdiction and establishment of the special court. The allegations of mala fide and political vendetta were found to be unsubstantiated.