2020 (2) TMI 1243 - HC - Indian Laws

Dishonor of Cheque - applicability of time limitation in making complaint as per Section 142(b) of Act, 1881 - date of 'cause of action' - dishonoured cheques were returned to complainant on 24.08.2000, notice was issued on 06.09.2000 which was received back unclaimed on 14.09.2000 but complaint was filed on 31.10.2000 - HELD THAT - Section 138, proviso, Clause (a) of Act, 1881 is apparently satisfied. Cheques were presented to Union Bank within valid period for its collection. Notice required to be issued for demand vide proviso Clause (b) of Section 138 of Act, 1881 within 15 days of receipt of information from Bank regarding return of cheques as unpaid was also given. The date of notice is 06.09.2000. Thus, aforesaid requirement is also satisfied and notice was issued within the period prescribed in Clause (b), proviso to Section 138 of Act, 1881. Now, Clause (c) proviso to Section 138 of Act, 1881 gives 15 days' time from the date of receipt of notice by addressee to make payment - In the present case, notice returned unclaimed and received by complainant on 14.09.2000. If this date is taken to be due service of notice by accused-applicant then 15 days' time would expire on 29.09.2000. In K. Bhaskaran Vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and Others 1999 (9) TMI 941 - SUPREME COURT , it was held that if a notice is returned by sender as unclaimed, such date would be commencing date in reckoning the period of 15 days contemplated in Clause (c) to proviso of Section 138 of Act, 1881 - In the present case, since payment could have been made upto 29.09.2000 but when it is not made, cause of action arose on 30.09.2000. Since complaint in the present case, was filed within one month i.e. October, 2000, after excluding 30.09.2000, the day when cause of action arose, it cannot be said that complaint is exfacie barred by time provided in Section 142(b) of Act, 1881 - Applications dismissed.

Issues:
1. Application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash summoning order.
2. Objection raised against the summoning order.
3. Applicability of Section 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
4. Calculation of the period of limitation under Section 142(b) of the Act.
5. Interpretation of the term "month" as per the General Clauses Act, 1897.
6. Relevance of Supreme Court judgments in determining the correct law.

Analysis:
1. The judgment involved an application filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking to quash summoning orders dated 21.11.2000 and 15.11.2004. The accused-applicant objected to the summoning order, claiming no association with the firm involved in the loan transaction and disputing the validity of the complaint filed by the Cooperative Bank.

2. The objection raised by the accused-applicant against the summoning order was based on various grounds, including the lack of association with the firm, the alleged forgery by another individual, and the procedural irregularities in the complaint filed by the Assistant Manager of the Cooperative Bank. The objection was rejected by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, leading to the application under Section 482.

3. The judgment extensively analyzed the provisions of Sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, to determine the applicability of the time limit for filing complaints in cases of dishonored cheques. The court examined the sequence of events, including the presentation of cheques, issuance of notices, and the filing of complaints, to ascertain compliance with the statutory requirements.

4. The court delved into the calculation of the period of limitation under Section 142(b) of the Act, focusing on the date of the cause of action and the exclusion of the said date while computing the one-month period for filing complaints. The judgment referenced relevant case laws to establish the correct interpretation of the law regarding the exclusion of the date of the cause of action in determining the period of limitation.

5. The interpretation of the term "month" as per the General Clauses Act, 1897 was crucial in determining the timeline for filing complaints under Section 142(b) of the Act. The court examined whether the calculation should be based on the number of days or the corresponding month, emphasizing the importance of excluding the date of the cause of action in the computation.

6. The judgment highlighted the relevance of Supreme Court judgments in establishing the correct legal position, emphasizing that reliance on overruled judgments could mislead the court. The court rejected the application, concluding that the complaint was not time-barred under Section 142(b) of the Act, as it was filed within one month after excluding the date of the cause of action.

Conclusion:
The judgment provided a detailed analysis of the issues raised in the application, focusing on the objection to the summoning order, the interpretation of statutory provisions, and the calculation of the period of limitation. By referencing relevant legal principles and case laws, the court concluded that the complaint was not barred by time and rejected the applications filed by the accused-applicant.

← Previous Next →