2025 (1) TMI 944 - HC - Money Laundering

Money Laundering - Provisional Attachment Order - condonation of delay of 132 days in approaching this Court after the Appellant withdrew its Appeal from the Gujarat High Court - Section 42 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002 - HELD THAT - Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal on any question of law or fact arising out of such order. The proviso to Section 42 and which is important for our purposes stipulates that the High Court may if it is satisfied that the Appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the initial period of sixty days may allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. What can be discerned from these provisions is that an appeal has to be filed within sixty days the initial period and if not done so then on sufficient cause being shown the High Court can condone the delay up to a further period of sixty days. The question that arises in the present case is whether by virtue of the said proviso the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 is excluded. This Court in the case of MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER MUMBAI VERSUS ANUSAYA SITARAM DEVRUKHKAR ORS. 2025 (1) TMI 783 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT after reviewing the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. Popular Construction Company 2001 (10) TMI 1044 - SUPREME COURT Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board Vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and others 2010 (4) TMI 1031 - SUPREME COURT Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. Vs. Gujrat Energy Transmission Corporation Ltd. and others 2017 (3) TMI 1628 - SUPREME COURT and Bengal Chemist and Druggists Association Vs. Kalyan Chowdhary 2018 (2) TMI 487 - SUPREME COURT came to the conclusion that beyond the stipulated period of 120 days this Court would have no power to condone the delay. The decision rendered by this Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai would apply with full force to the facts of the present case. There are no hesitation in holding that after the total period of 120 days as stipulated in Section 42 of the PMLA 2002 read with its proviso the High Court would have no power to condone the delay in preferring the Appeal. There are no hesitation in holding that beyond the total period of 120 days as stipulated in Section 42 read with its proviso of the PMLA 2002 this Court has no power to condone the delay. Since admittedly in the facts of the present case the application seeking a condonation of delay is beyond the total period of 120 days. Application seeking condonation of delay is hereby dismissed.

Summary

1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED

The core legal question in this judgment is whether the High Court has the power to condone a delay in filing an appeal beyond the maximum period of 120 days as stipulated under Section 42 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA, 2002).

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents

Section 42 of the PMLA, 2002 provides a 60-day period to file an appeal against an Appellate Tribunal's decision, with a possible extension of an additional 60 days if sufficient cause is shown. The question is whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which allows for further extension of time, applies to appeals under Section 42 of the PMLA.

Court's Interpretation and Reasoning

The court examined the language of Section 42, emphasizing the proviso, which permits an extension of the appeal period by no more than 60 days. The court reasoned that the explicit wording of the proviso-"not exceeding sixty days"-indicates a legislative intent to exclude the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Key Evidence and Findings

The court considered the statutory language of Section 42 and related provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963. It also reviewed previous judgments, including those interpreting similar statutory provisions, to determine legislative intent regarding the exclusion of Section 5.

Application of Law to Facts

The appellant filed the appeal beyond the 120-day limit (60 days plus a 60-day extension), arguing that Section 5 of the Limitation Act should apply. However, the court found that the statutory language of Section 42 clearly excluded further extensions beyond 120 days.

Treatment of Competing Arguments

The appellant argued that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not explicitly excluded by Section 42 of the PMLA, and cited a similar case under the NIA Act where the court allowed an extension. The court distinguished the NIA Act case, noting that it involved fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution, which were not at issue here.

Conclusions

The court concluded that it lacked the authority to condone a delay beyond the 120-day period stipulated in Section 42 of the PMLA, 2002, thereby dismissing the application for condonation of delay and the appeal itself.

3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

Preserve Verbatim Quotes of Crucial Legal Reasoning

"The words used in the proviso to Section 42 'within a further period not exceeding sixty days' clearly therefore exclude the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963."

Core Principles Established

The court established that when a statute provides a specific time frame with a limited extension period, the applicability of general provisions for extension under the Limitation Act is excluded unless explicitly stated otherwise.

Final Determinations on Each Issue

The court determined that the appeal was filed beyond the permissible period under Section 42 of the PMLA, 2002, and that it did not have the power to condone the delay. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay and the appeal were dismissed.