Natural Justice - Indian Laws - General

Term Natural Justice Principles of natural justice trace their ancestry to ancient civilizations and centuries long past. Until about two centuries ago the term natural justice was often used interchangeably with natural law and at times it is still so used. The expression natural law has been variously defined. In Jowitt s Dictionary of English Law (Second Edition, page 1221) it is defined as- rules derived from God, reason or nature, as distinct from man-made law. Black s Law Dictionary (Fifth Edition, page 925) states : This expression, natural law , or jus natural , was largely used in the philosophical speculations of the Roman jurists of the Antonine age, and was intended to denote a system of rules and principles for the guidance of human conduct which, independently of enacted law or of the systems peculiar to any one people, might be discovered by the rational intelligence of man, and would be found to grow out of an conform to his nature, meaning by that word his whole mental, moral, and physical constitution. The point of departure for this conception was the stoic doctrine of a life ordered according to nature , which in its turn rested upon the purely supposititious existence, in primitive times, of a state of nature ; that is, a condition of society in which men universally were governed solely by a rational and consistent obedience to the needs, impulses, and promptings of their true nature, such nature being as yet underacted by dishonesty, falsehood, or indulgence of the baser passions. In ethics it consists in practical universal judgments which man himself elicits. These express necessary and obligatory rules of human conduct which have been established by the author or human nature as essential to the divine purposes in the universe and have been promulgated by God solely through human reason . UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER VERSUS TULSIRAM PATEL AND OTHERS- 1985 (7) TMI 371 - SUPREME COURT The basic principles on which the entire system of justice is based upon have been enshrined in jurisprudence as principles of natural justice rest. There are mainly two Principles of Natural Justice , which are stated as follow: Nemo judex in causa sua .- No one should be made a judge in his own cause and the rule against bias. Audi alteram partem means to hear the other party or no one should be condemned unheard. M/S SHAKUMBHARI CASTING ENGINEERS AND SHRI SUNIL KUMAR - 2025 (1) TMI 527 - CESTAT ALLAHABAD The duty to act fairly is the theme of the principles of natural justice. The Rule generally applies with full force to conduct leading directly to a final act of decision. In Halsbury s Laws of England , Vol. l(i), 4th Edition it is stated: 85...Thus a presumption that natural justice must be observed will arise more readily where there is an express duty to decide only after conducting a hearing or inquiry or where the decision is one entailing the determination of disputed questions of law and fact. Prime facie, moreover, a duty to act in accordance with natural justice will arise in the exercise of a power to deprive a person of his livelihood or of his legal status where that status is not merely terminable at pleasure, or to deprive a person of liberty or property rights or another legitimate interest or expectation, or to impose a penalty on him; though the conferment of a wide discretionary power exercisable in the public interest may be indicative of the absence of an obligation so to act. Where a discretionary power to encroach upon individual rights is exercised, factors to be taken into account in deciding what fairness requires in the exercise of the power include the nature of the interests to be affected, the circumstances in which the power falls to be exercised and the nature of the sanctions, if any involved. The content of duty to act fairly will normally be very limited where the authority is in the course of exercising a function not culminating in a binding decision, but that may not be the case if the wording of the grant of powers or the context indicates that a fair hearing ought to be extended to persons likely to be prejudicially affected by an investigation or recommendation. Law in this regard has expanded to a great extent. In J.F. Garner s Administrative Law , it is stated: The natural justice bias rule looks to external appearances rather than to proof of actual improper exercise of power. If the reasonable observer would have the requisite degree of suspicion of bias in the decision-maker then that decision can be challenged. It is a matter of the courts ensuring that justice is seen to be done . Since successful challenge is based on appearances, it is natural that the types of matter to which the rule applies is somewhat confined. As we shall see it clearly applies to judicial and disciplinary functions but not generally more widely to administrative decision-making and actions. In Metropolitan Properties Co.(FGC) Ltd. v. Lannon reported in 1968 3 All ER 304, Lord Denning MR observed: In considering whether there was a real likelihood of bias; the court does not look at the mind of the justice himself or at the mind of the Chairman of the Tribunal, or whoever it may be, who sits in a judicial capacity. It does not look to see if there was a real likelihood that he would, or did, in fact favour one side at the expense of the other. The court looks at the impression which would be given to other people. Even if he was as impartial as could be, nevertheless if right-minded persons would think that in the circumstances, there was a real likelihood of bias on his part, then he should not sit. And if he does it, his decision cannot stand; see R. v. Huggins (8), Sunderland justices (9), per Vaughan Williams, L.J. Nevertheless, there must appear to be a real likelihood of bias. Surmise or conjecture is not enough; see R. v. Camborne Justices, ex parte Pearce (10); R. v. Nailsworth Justices, ex parte Bird (11). There must be circumstances from which a reasonable man would think it likely or probable that the justice, or Chairman, as the case may be, would, or did, favour one side unfairly at the expenses of the other. The court will not enquire whether he did, in fact, favour one side unfairly. Suffice it that reasonable people might think he did. The reason is plain enough Justice must be rooted in confidence and confidence is destroyed when right minded people go away thinking; The Judge was biased. Danckwerts, L.J. observed : Of course, I am not saying that the mere fact that a solicitor had acted for or advised tenants should disqualify, him from sitting. But the facts of this case display some lack of appreciation of the rules of conduct by Mr. Lannon, and my conclusion is that it was not wise of Mr. Lannon to act as Chairman of the Committee in the circumstances. De Smith in his Administrative and Constitutional Law observed: If the main functions of a tribunal are to determine disputed questions of law and fact, and to exercise discretionary powers by reference to standards that are not self-created but explicitly prescribed by statutory or other rules, on the basis of evidence openly tendered, and if, moreover, the abdicators can normally be expected to preserve a detached attitude towards the parties and issues before them, then a departure from the standard of even-handed justice which the law requires from those who occupy judicial office, or those who are commonly regarded as holding a quasi-judicial office, such as an arbitrator ought not be and will not be countenanced. In Manak Lal v. Prem Chand - 1957 (2) TMI 63 - SUPREME COURT , this Court observed: ....But where pecuniary interest is not attributed but instead a bias is suggested, it often becomes necessary to consider whether there is a reasonable ground for assuming the possibility of a bias and whether it is likely to produce in the minds of the litigant or the public at large a reasonable doubt about the fairness of the administration of justice. It would always be question of fact to be decided in each case. The principle , says Halsbury, nemo debt esse judex in causa propria sua precludes a justice, who is interested in the subject-matter of a dispute, from acting as a justice there in [Halsburys Laws of England Vol. XXI, p.535, para 952]. In our opinion, there is and can be no doubt about the validity of this principle and we are prepared to assume that this principle applies not only to the justices as mentioned by Halsbury but to all tribunals and bodies which are given jurisdiction to determine judicially the rights of parties. In Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, Hyderabad v. Sri Stayanarayana Transports (P) Ltd., Guntur - 1964 (10) TMI 99 - SUPREME COURT , this Court held that the elementary rule of natural justice that person trying a cause, though in a quasi-judicial proceeding, should not suffer from personal bias. This Court stated the law thus: We ought, however, to add that in the light of the general considerations which we have set out, it is of utmost importance that in appreciating evidence, the Court ought to adopt a very cautious, circumspect, and careful approach. If the evidence led by the parties in such a case is tested by cross-examination, it would be easier to determine where truth lies. But in the absence of cross-examination, appreciating the effect of competing affidavits is not an easy matter. In such a case, the Court must always enquire on which side the probabilities lie and must scrutinize the affidavits very critically to determine which of them deserves to be believed. Naturally, in dealing with such a question of fact in appeal, we are normally inclined to attach importance to the findings of fact recorded by the High Court itself. . B. N. Jha - 2003 (3) TMI 784 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA