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TMI Blog2003 (10) TMI 273X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... - SUPREME COURT] . Thus, it is held that section 21 of GCA would include only those orders which are in the nature of subordinate legislation and would not include other orders particularly judicial or quasijudicial orders. Consequently, the order of CIT passed u/s 12A in 1974 could not be rescinded/withdrawn by the impugned order by virtue of section 21 of GCA. Hence, the impugned order was without jurisdiction. In the course of hearing, a query was raised from the Bench as to whether the impugned order was retrospective or with prospective effect. The learned DR was unable to comment. Therefore, in the interest of justice, it would be appropriate to say few words on this aspect. In our opinion, it is only the Legislature which has power to legislate retrospectively. No other authority has such powers and, therefore, any order cannot be given effect to retrospectively. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kazi Lhendup Dorji v. CBI [ 1994 (3) TMI 381 - SUPREME COURT] has held that power u/s 21 of GCA cannot be exercised retrospectively. Hence, in any circumstances, the order of CIT u/s 12A cannot be given effect to retrospectively even assuming for the sake of argument tha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... by virtue of the provisions of section 21 of General Clauses Act, 1897 (in short GCA). It was also observed by him that the review of the activities of the institution is necessary so as to ensure that such institution does not become fraud on the law of the land and does not misuse the benevolent legislation for denying the exchequer of its due revenue. He also observed that there is no prohibition provision, he supported his action by invoking the provisions of section 21 of GCA. Since, according to the CIT, there were huge financial discrepancies and misappropriation of trust funds, he rescinded and withdrew the registration granted on6-8-1974vide his order dated27-2-2003. Aggrieved by the same, the assessee is in appeal before the Tribunal. 4. The learned counsel for the assessee has vehemently assailed the order of CIT by contending that the impugned order is without jurisdiction inasmuch as no power of review is vested with the CIT under the Act. According to him, the Income-tax Act is an independent code by itself and, therefore, the provisions of another Act cannot be looked into. Hence, provisions of section 21 of GCA cannot be invoked for justifying the exercise of power ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as granted, the CIT can always review the earlier order otherwise the very purpose of the registration would be defeated. Proceeding further, it was contended that no doubt the Income-tax Act is an independent code but there is no bar to look into the other enactments. He relied on the following judgments: 1. Madhya Pradesh Madhyam v. CIT [2002] 256 ITR 277 (MP). 2. 23 ITR 290 (Gauhati) (sic) 3. H.H. Sri Jaya Chamaraja Wadiyar, Maharaja ofMysorev.UnionofIndia[1981] 129 ITR 652 (Ker.) 4. T.S. Baliah v. T.S. Rangachari, ITO [1969] 72 ITR 787 (SC). Regarding the application of section 21 of GCA, he relied on the commentary of GCA by N.S. Bindra for the proposition that judicial orders are included within the scope of section 21 and, therefore, CIT, who granted the registration, can withdraw or cancel the registration. 6. Contentions of the rival parties have been considered carefully in the light of case law referred to. The first question to be considered is whether the CIT can review its earlier order? Normal rule is that the remedy by way of review is a creature of statute and if the statute does not contain such powers then no authority under the Act can review his own order. As a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e of the State Government. The order passed by Mr. Mankodi, in law amounted to a review of the order made by Saurashtra Government. It is well settled that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. No provision in the Act was brought to our notice from which it could be gathered that the Government had power to review its own order. If the Government had no power to review its own order, it is obvious that its delegate could not have reviewed its order." In our view, the above judgment concludes the issue. It is on the basis of this principle, it has been repeatedly held by the courts that neither the Tribunal under section 254(2) nor any other income-tax authority under section 154 can review its earlier order. It is not necessary to cite various judgments on this issue and it would be sufficient to cite the jurisdictional High Court judgment in the case of Bhawani Prasad Girdhari Lal Co. wherein it has been held that an Income-tax Officer under section 154 can only rectify the mistake but cannot review his order. In view of these binding judgments, it is held that CIT could not exercise the power of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... erein. This is the principle of Noscitur a sociis." In this case, the court was required to consider as to whether Dhoop and Agarbati could be included within the meaning of the word 'perfumery' associated with other words 'cosmetics and toilet goods'. Applying the principle of Noscitur a sociis, it was held that the word 'perfumery' was used in restricted sense and would include only those items which are used, as cosmetics and toilet goods, upon the person and consequently, would not include dhoop and agarbati. 9. If the aforesaid principle is applied to the provisions of section 21 of GCA, we are of the view that the word 'orders' would not include judicial or quasi-judicial orders. This word is associated with the words 'notification, rules and bye laws'. So the word 'order' should be construed in the context in which the associated words used. Associated words are in the nature of subordinate legislation. Therefore, the word 'order' contemplated in this section would be restricted to such orders which are issued by way of delegated/subordinate legislation. For example, orders issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes under section 119 of the Act would fall within the scope o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t be cancelled by the CIT in the absence of any specific power. 12. The case law referred to in the commentary of GCA by N.S. Bindra are with reference to notifications, rules and bye laws and, therefore, such cases do not advance the case of revenue. Even the commentary at page 396 has specifically stated that judicial and quasi-judicial orders are outside the ambit of section 21. 13. In the course of hearing, a query was raised from the Bench as to whether the impugned order was retrospective or with prospective effect. The learned DR was unable to comment. Therefore, in the interest of justice, it would be appropriate to say few words on this aspect. In our opinion, it is only the Legislature which has power to legislate retrospectively. No other authority has such powers and, therefore, any order cannot be given effect to retrospectively. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kazi Lhendup Dorji v. CBI 1994 Suppl. (2) SCC 116 has held that power under section 21 of GCA cannot be exercised retrospectively. Hence, in any circumstances, the order of CIT under section 12A cannot be given effect to retrospectively even assuming for the sake of argument that such section was applic ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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