TMI Blog1986 (8) TMI 242X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... application for condonation of delay in filing it. On the Registry taking exception to one consolidated appeal, three Supplementary Appeals have been filed on 12th May, 1986 along with the three other applications for condonation of delay 3. The dates relevant for a consideration of the Application for condonation of delay in the original appeal itself (Appeal No. E/1044/86-A) as furnished in the Application are as follows:- (a) 14-10-85 - The order of the Collector (Appeals) was attested and put in a course of transmission to the appellant amongst others; (b) 18-10-85 - The aforesaid order was received in the office of the Applicant. It is on 31-3-1986 that the instant appeal was received in the Registry of the Tribun ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and rather leisurely. 6. For the Applicant it was urged that public interest has to be taken into consideration in condoning the delay since it may be that a departmental authority may delay filing the appeal for oblique motives and the public interest should not be allowed to suffer on that account, as it would, if the appeal is thrown out merely on the ground of some delay which is also explainable. [Reliance on 1983 ECR 1556 (SC) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bahadur Singh and Ors.]. Our attention was also invited to 1985 (21) E.L.T. 529, wherein the Tribunal had, following the ratio of the aforesaid decision of the Hon ble Supreme Court held inter alia that although the law of limitation applies equally for or against a private individua ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rder sought to be appealed against was communicated to the Collector was prescribed and the Tribunal was competent under sub-section (5) of the said Section to admit the Appeal after the expiry of the aforesaid period, if satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period ; (b) substantially identical words occur in S.5 of the Limitation Acts of 1908 and 1963 and the expression sufficient cause had come up for interpretation in a host of cases; (c) suffice it to note, however, that - (i) the right to plead the bar of limitation is a valuable right and once it had accrued, it cannot be lightly divested by condonation of the delay beyond the expiry of the period prescribed, unless, in terms ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to supra]; (v) it is not possible to lay down precisely as to what facts or matters would constitute sufficient cause under S. 5 of the Limitation Act. But those words should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or any inaction or want of bonafides is imputable to a party, i.e. the delay in filing an appeal should not have been for reasons which indicate the party s negligence in not taking necessary steps which he would have or should have taken. What would be such necessary steps will again depend upon the circumstances of a particular case [AIR 1978 S.C. 537 (542) Mrs. Sandhy Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi]; (vi) it is true that, the expression sufficient cause cannot be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... l period of limitation of 90 days, notwithstanding that no period of limitation at all was prescribed. It was in that context that the Hon ble Court observed that (i) the only known principle - a rule of judicial circumspection - is that the Court may not examine stale causes as the Court helps the vigilant and not the indolent; (ii) the explanation for the delay was convincing and acceptable; (iii) a decision in that case had to be taken whether the case was one required to be taken to a higher Court; (iv) even though, the. authorities charged with a duty to implement the law should be vigilant, it cannot be overlooked, that a departmental- authority may cause delay for oblique motives and in consequence public int ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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