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TMI Blog1988 (10) TMI 175X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ents of the prescribed value on or before the prescribed dates which fell on the 7th, 10th and 14th May 1984. Since the petitioners were not successful in effecting the exports within the stipulated dates, it is the case of the petitioners that they, of the 9th of May 1984 applied to the Bombay office of the respondent No. 4 for extension of the period up to 31st May 1984. According to the petitioners, this extension was granted and they effected the exports within the extended period. 3. On the 5th of January 1985 the petitioners learnt from a press report appearing in the Economic Times that their registration had been suspended by the respondent No. 4 pending investigation into the alleged forgery of rubber stamps of the respondent No. 4 Council while procuring the order of extension. The petitioners filed in this Court Writ Petition No. 28 of 1985. By an order, dated the 11th January 1985 this writ petition Writ Petition No. 28 of 1985. By an order, dated the 11th January 1985 this writ petition was dismissed. The petitioners carried an appeal being Appeal No. 24 of 1985 and the same was dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court on the 22nd January 1985. 4. On the 14th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... December 1984 to 30th December 1985. On the 24th August 1987 the petitioners approached the Chief Controller of Imports Exports, the respondent No. 2 seeking to invoke his general power of review and set aside the impugned order of 27th July 1987. Since the petitioners received no response, they filed the present petition. 5. Mr. Raval, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 4 raised a preliminary objection in regard to the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. According to him, the impugned order was passed by the respondent No. 1 after the petitioners have been heard in Delhi. The entire cause of action arose in Delhi. Merely because the said order was received by the petitioners in Bombay, that would not afford jurisdiction on this Court for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He placed reliance on the case of Motipur Sugar Factory v. Jt Secy; Government of India M.O.I., reported in AIR 1984 Calcutta page 240 wherein it was observed: .........that the registered office of the petitioner company is in Bihar and the said Motipur Sugar Factory is in Bihar. By the impugned order, the management of the said ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . page 1124 wherein it was held that .......once an order of an original authority is taken in appeal to the appellate authority which is located beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, it is the order of the latter authority which is the operative order after the appeal is disposed of, and as the High Court cannot issue a writ against the appellate authority for want of territorial jurisdiction it would not be open to it to issue a writ to the original authority which may be within its territorial jurisdiction once the appeal is disposed of... When an appeal is made, the appellate authority can do one of three things, namely, (i) it may reverse the order under appeal, (ii) it may modify that order, and (iii) it may merely dismiss the appeal and thus confirm the order without any modification. In all these three cases after the appellate authority has disposed of the appeal, the operative order is the order of the appellate authority whether it has reversed the original order or modified it or confirmed it. In law, the appellate order of confirmation is quite as efficacious as an operative order as an appellate order of reversal or modification. Therefore, if ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Court would not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 merely on the ground that the notices of acquisition had been served on the owners in West Bengal. In regard to the third case viz. East India Commercial Company, supra, it is enough to observe that the same related to a point of time prior to the 15th and 42nd Constitutional amendments whereby Clauses 1A and 2 respectively were introduced. The observations contained in this case will, therefore, have no application to the facts of the present case. 8. In the present case, it will have to be noticed that the petitioners are carrying on business in Bombay. Under the relevant Export Policy, the petitioners were engaged in the Business of exporting readymade garments to U.S.A. This business of export was being carried on in Bombay. In view of the provisions of Article 226(2), the short question that will have to be decided is whether the cause of action to file the present petition either wholly or in part arises within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. It is true that the impugned order .has been passed by the respondent No.1 in Delhi. However, all the consequences that flow from that order are visited upon the p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... was non-est. Mr. Chagla further submitted that the general power of review as contained in Para 156 was similar to the power of review contained in Para 155(2). In other words, the power of review under Para 156 is circumscribed by power under Para 155(2). This power of review under Para 156 cannot be invoked at the instance of the respondent No. 4. It could be exercised only for granting relief to a person aggrieved of the type contemplated in Para 155(2). Reliance was placed on the decision of R. v. London Sessions Appeal Committee reported in (1951) 1 All England Law Reports Page 1032 wherein it was observed : By s. 25(1) of the London Country Council (General Powers) Act, 1947, it is provided: Any person aggrieved by the refusal of a borough council to register him as a registered street trader or to grant or renew an annual licence or by the cancellation by a borough council of his registration as a registered street trader or by the revocation or variation by a borough council of an annual licence or by any prescription made by a borough council under s. 21(5) (annual licences) of this Act may appeal to a petty sessional court and on any such appeal the court may confi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... court held that he was not and had no right of appeal under s. 105 of that Act. It was put that he might be annoyed at finding what he thought was a breach of the law was not a breach, but, LORD COLEBRIDGE, C.J., said (25 Q.B.D. 361): The section does not give an appeal to anybody but a person who is by the direct act of the magistrate aggrieved - that is, who has had something done or determined against him by the magistrate. Under the statute we are now considering the court of summary jurisdiction has to take into account the same matters as the borough council, and, if the court thinks the cancellation of the licence is not justified, it can restore the licence to the street trader. If the court refuses to grant a licence, the street trader is a person aggrieved, because his livelihood is affected, and an order is made directly affecting him. In my opinion, the order did not directly affect the council in such a way as to make it a person aggrieved within the meaning of the section. For these reasons, I think London Sessions were right in holding there was not appeal given to the council, and, therefore, this application for an order of mandamus should be refused." 1 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y the Chief Controller of Imports Exports. The impugned order, however, was passed by respondent No. 1, the Additional Chief Controller of Imports Exports. According to Mr. Chagla, this power of review can be exercised by the Chief Controller himself and by none at all. He pointed out that Para 155(1) provided an appeal to an exporter who is not satisfied with a decision of the registering authority either refusing to register him or deregistering him. Such an appeal lies to the Chief Controller of Imports Exports or to an officer authorised by him in this behalf. The power of review contained in Clause 155(2) is provided only to the Chief Controller of Imports Exports and not to an officer authorised by him as provided in Para 155(1). Similarly, the power of review contained in Para 156 is exercisable by only the Chief Controller of Imports Exports and not by an officer authorised by the Chief Controller. According to Mr. Chagla, the power of review was a discretionary power and hence was personal to him i.e. to the Chief Controller of Imports Exports. This power was not capable of being delegated. The impugned order not having been passed by the Chief Controller of Im ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... able to be set aside. 14. Mr. Chagla next contended that the respondent No. 1 has clearly exceeded his jurisdiction in exercising the powers of review contained in Para 156. The powers of review, according to Mr. Chagla can be exercised only in cases contemplated under Order 47 Rule 1 or under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The respondent No. 1, however, had virtually exercised appellate powers. He had reappreciated the facts and the evidence and had interfered even on findings which were essentially discretionary in nature. Placing reliance on the judgment and order, dated the 25th November, 1986 passed by the respondent No. 3, Mr. Chagla pointed out that the appellate authority had found on a careful perusal of the record, that there was no conclusive evidence to establish the guilt of the exporter. The appellate authority had found that the request of the exporter though received in the Apparel Exports Promotion Council was not officially processed but this did not establish that the guilt lay at the door of the exporter. The possibility of an irregularity on the part of an employee of the Apparel Export Promotion Council cannot be entirely ruled out. Since no col ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the decree or when there is any fresh or new matter discovered after the passing of the decree. The scope of the power of review in English Courts has been discussed in Charles Bright Co. v. Sellar , (1904) 1 KB 6(B), where the history of procedure in England has been explained. It is manifest, therefore, that the expression review has a well known legal significance, and S. 26(2), Administration of Evacuee Property Act must be construed in the context and background of the Code of Civil Procedure where the same expression has been used. It is a familiar rule of construction that when the legislature has deliberately used a term which has a known legal significance in law,, it must be taken that the legislature has attached to that term that known legal significance [see- L.P.E. Pugh v. Ashutosh Sen , AIR 1929 PC 69(C)]. In our opinion the expression review used in S. 26(2), Administration of Evacuee Property Act must be construed not in a grammatical sense but it must be construed to have the same legal meaning as in 0.47, R.1, Civil P.C. If this view is right, it follows that Mr. R.P. Singh had no jurisdiction to review the order of his predecessor, Mr. S.N. Ray, in a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ccept payment of a sum in consideration for the grant of any exclusive privilege under s. 22 either by calling tenders or by auction or otherwise as it may by general or special order direct. The powers conferred on the State Government by s. 22 and s. 29 are absolute powers. As seen earlier, the validity of those provisions has not been challenged before us. Under s. 29(2) the Government had power to dispose of any of the exclusive privileges mentioned in s. 22 either by calling for tenders or by auction or otherwise as it may be general or special order direct. That being the amplitude of the power of the Government, we fail to see how the Government can be said to have conferred on itself arbitrary power under Clause (6) of its order made on January 6,1971, when it provided that: No sale shall be deemed to be final unless confirmed by the State Government who shall be at liberty to accept or reject any bid without assigning any reason therefor. The power that the government reserved for itself under that clause is nothing more than what was conferred on it by the legislature under s. 22 and s. 29 of the Act. It is not possible to challenge the validity of the order made wi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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