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TMI Blog1994 (12) TMI 219X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Shri Rawal pleaded that first the application for condonation of delay in filing the Reference application may be taken up. Shri K.K. Jha, ld. SDR has got no objection. Accordingly, we proceeded to hear the application for condonation of delay. Shri Rawal pleaded that the appellant is prevented by sufficient cause in the late filing of the application for reference. He pleaded that bonafidely the appellant had challenged the order passed by the Tribunal before the Delhi High Court and the Hon ble Delhi High Court was pleased to pass an order for approaching the Tribunal for the disposal of the Reference application and also a direction was given to file an application for condonation of delay. He pleaded that a copy of the order passed by the Hon ble High Court appears at page, 34-35 of the paper book. He pleaded that since the present Reference application is in view of the directions of the Hon ble Delhi High Court and as such the Tribunal should consider the limitation liberally and further on the merits, bona fides of the appellant cannot be doubted. In support of his argument he cited the decision in the case of Metro Exporters Ltd. v. CEGAT reported in 1991 (51) E.L.T. 316. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sition that the impugned order was received on 17-1-1994 and as such the last date for filing of the reference application was 18-3-1994 whereas the reference application was filed on 28-9-1994. Thus, there is a delay of 194 days. In the month of May, 1994 the appellant had filed a writ petition before the Hon ble Delhi High Court challenging the order passed by the Tribunal and the Hon ble Delhi High Court vide Order dated 14-9-1994 in Civil Writ Petition No. 3859/94 had passed the following order :- This petition has been filed against the order dated 22nd November, 1993 of the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal passed under Section 125-B of the Customs Act, 1962. Mr. Rawal, counsel for the petitioners has raised various points. He states that the order dated 16-4-1990 passed by the Collector of Customs against which the appeal was filed before the Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction in the matter. This argument is based on the fact that though the order of the Collector is dated 16-4-1990, notification conferring jurisdiction on him dated 6-4-1990 was made available to public sometime in June, 1990. He says that the jurisdiction of the Collector would be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e the application is made by the other party, by a fee of two hundred rupees, require the Appellate Tribunal to refer to the High Court any question of law arising out of such order and, subject to the other provisions contained in this section, the Appellate Tribunal shall, within one hundred and twenty days of the receipt of such application, draw up a statement of the case and refer it to the High Court. Para materia similar are the provisions under the Income Tax Act, 1961. Section 256(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 is reproduced below:- 256(1). The assessee or the Commissioner may, within sixty days of the date upon which he is served with notice of an order under Section 254, by application in the prescribed form, accompanied, where the application is made by the assessee, by a fee of two hundred rupees, require the Appellate Tribunal to refer to the High Court any question of law arising out of such order and subject to the other provisions contained in this section, the Appellate Tribunal shall, within one hundred and twenty days of the receipt of such application, draw up a statement of the case and refer it to the High Court." A perusal of both the Sections under t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d to. The authorities functioning under the Act are bound by the provisions of the Act. If the proceedings are taken under the Act by the department, the provisions of limitation prescribed in the Act will prevail. It may, however, be open to the deptt. to initiate proceedings in the Civil Court for recovery of the amount due to the deptt. in case when such a remedy is open on the ground that the money received by the assessee was not in the nature of refund. Hon ble Madras High Court in the case of K. Muthuswamy Pillai v. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal reported in 174 ITR 636 had held as under : In order to appreciate this controversy, let me extract Section 256(1) of the Act, which is challenged before me. It reads as under :- Statement of case to the High Court. - (1) The assessee or the Commissioner may, within sixty days of the date upon which he is served with notice of an order under Section 254, by application in the prescribed form, accompanied, where the application is made by the assessee, by a fee of two hundred rupees, require the Appellate Tribunal to refer to the High Court any question of law arising out of such order and, subject to the other provisions con ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... maximum, only up to a specified time-limit and no further, then the Tribunal concerned has no jurisdiction to treat as within limitation, an application filed before it beyond such maximum time limit specified in the statute by excluding the time spent in prosecuting in good faith and due diligence any prior proceeding on the analogy of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act. We have said enough and we may say it again that where the Legilsature clearly declares its intent in the scheme and language of a statute, it is the duty of the court to give full effect to the same without scanning its wisdom or policy, and without engrafting, adding or implying anything which is not congenial to or consistent with such expressed intent of the law giver; more so if the statute is a taxing statute. We will close the discussion by recalling what Lord Hailsham has said recently in regard to importation of the principles of natural justice into a statute, which is a clear and complete code by itself : It is true of course that the courts will lean heavily against any construction of a statute which would be manifestly fair. But they have no power to amend or supplement the language of a statut ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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