9911796707
TMI Blog1933 (7) TMI 9X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... directors, was at first appointed as the liquidator. Later on, on application made to the High Court there was an order passed on July 5, 1929, for a compulsory winding-up and an official liquidator, Mr. Hazari Lal Kapoor, was appointed by the High Court. On May 28, 1930, the official liquidator filed an application under Section 235 of the Indian Companies Act against the managing agents charging them with various acts of misfeasance, misappropriation, negligence of duty and so on. The question of limitation has arisen in connection with this application. Admittedly the section which is applicable to this case is Section 235 of the Indian Companies Act. This section is a verbatim copy of the provision of Section 276 of the English Act of 1929, with this exception that there is an additional Sub section (3) in the Indian Act. So far as the main language of the section is concerned, it was copied out in the corresponding Section 214 of Act VI of 1882 from Section 165 of the English Act of 1862. At one stage there was some doubt whether there was any limitation applicable to applications made under the old section 214 of the Indian Companies Act at all. Such doubt was expressed by ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ld accrue only after the appointment of the liquidator, if not, after he discovers the Misapplication of the money. The learned Judges expressly dissented from the view expressed by the Lahore High Court in the case quoted above. The matter again arose in the case of Bhim Singh v. Official Liquidator, Union Bank of India Ltd. (I.L.R. 8 Lah. 167) which was also a case of an application under Section 235 of the Indian Companies Act in respect of an act of misfeasance complained of against a director. The learned Judges of the Lahore High Court adhered to the opinion previously expressed and held that the section merely provided a summary remedy of enforcing the existing rights which, apart from the section, might have been vindicated by means of a suit and that the Article applicable was Article 36 of the Limitation Act with the starting point from the date of the act of the misfeasance. The question also arose before the Madras High Court in -the case of Narasimha Ayyangar v. Official Assignee of Madras (I.L.R. 54 Mad. 153) which was a case of an application under Section 235 made against the directors of the Company by a liquidator seeking to recover money by way of compensation ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... it would not be a bar to a director or a contributory. Their conclusion was that Section 235 enables any of the three classes of persons mentioned therein to recover what could not be recovered under the general law. Examining the words of the section the learned Judges came to the conclusion that the right which the section gives is not given to the company but to the persons named in the section. They pointed out that under the Act the Legislature has made provisions, for instance, in Section 156 for making the ordinary law of limitation inapplicable by creating a fresh liability and they also relied on the circumstance that according to the rulings of this Court it had been held that there was a fresh start for the purposes of limitation in the case of an application under Section 186 of the Act. Dealing with the question of the applicability of the particular Article of the Limitation Act it was pointed out that Article 36 would be inapplicable because it could only apply when the misfeasance would be independent of a contract; whereas in the case of directors, who are governed by the Articles of Association it cannot be said that their misfeasance would be independent of thei ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... neys; it is not a section which purports to create a foundation upon which to base a claim for payment. It creates no new right, (3) The power of the Court to order payment is discretionary. It may refuse to act under the section, leaving the liquidator to sue in the name of the company and it will readily take that course in any case in which it is made apparent that the respondent under this procedure, if continued, would be deprived of some defence or answer open to him in a suit for the same moneys." The implications of these observations would be considered when I come to consider the provisions of Section 235. It may be pointed out at this stage that their Lordships went on to observe that the old Section 101 of the English Act of 1862 corresponding to Section 186 of the Indian Act had been judicially interpreted and administered in accordance with the views expressed in Stringer's case, namely, that the section is one which provides summary proceedings against contributories to avoid proceedings in different Courts and to permit a single proceeding in the winding-up Court-but "In those summary proceedings every objection in just as open to the person sought to be charged a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... reference to Section 215, which corresponds to Section 235 of the Indian Act, remarked: "I desire to say, though this is not the first time that this has been said, that that section deals only with procedure and does not give any new rights. It provides a summary made of enforcing existing rights." The learned Judge then pointed out that this was abundantely clear from a string of authorities in the English Courts. He also quoted the words of Lord Macnaghten in the case of Cavendish Bentinck v. Fenn (12 A.C. 652 at 669) that 'that section creates no new offence, and........it gives no new rights, but only provides a summary and efficient remedy in respect of rights which apart, from that section, might have been vindicated either at law or in equity.' He did not at all quote the remarks of Lord Herschell in the same case which were somewhat differently worded. Warrington, L.J., at page 526, observed: 'I need not read it (Section 215) again, it has been read very often, and it has already been accepted as stating, and accurately stating, what was the settled law with regard to the construction of the section corresponding to Section 115 of the present Act.' and he also quote ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nst and neither of them profess to confer a new right on the person applying. Section 235 merely says: 'The Court may, on the application of the liquidator, or of any creditor or contributory, examine into the conduct of the promotor, director, manager, liquidator or officer and compel him to pay or restore the money etc' It really gives a discretion to the Court to make the order; but the significance of the expression 'on the application of the liquidator' is to restrict the power of the Court so as to prevent it from proceeding suo motu without any application before it. Before the Court should start an investigation, there should be some person before it who would be ultimately responsible for the costs in case the application does not succeed; whereas in a proceeding under Section 186 the contributories are already on the register and it is known how much they have paid and how much they have not paid and an elaborate investigation of the kind required under Section 235 is therefore not called for. Merely because the section says 'on the application of the liquidator' I do not construe it to mean that it creates a new right in the liquidator, creditor or contributory. Even i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of Article 181 would have been equally doubtful. It has been held that in view of the fact that all the preceding Articles apply to applications made under the Code of Civil Procedure, Article 181 also applies to other applications under the same Code, i.e., the application contemplated therein is ejusdem generis with the other applications which are specially specified. In this view of the matter even Article 181 would not have been applicable. The result would have been that there would perhaps be no limitation at all. Then the observation of their Lordships that the well established practice that the court should not exercise its discretion but readily take the course of leaving the applicant to seek his remedy independently so as not to deprive the opposite party of some defence or answer open to him in a suit, would have applied with full force. The Legislature has, however, expressly added Sub-section (3) which makes the Limitation Act applicable to an application under the section as if such application were a suit. The object obviously is to preserve the right of defence under the Limitation Act and also to make it clear that the Articles of Limitation Act which apply to a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... vil or criminal he takes, he must take it in the name and on behalf of the company. No doubt the liquidator is an officer of the court having been appointed by the court, and he is under the direction and control of the court. But when a proceeding is started by him, that proceeding is not initiated in his personal capacity but in the name and on behalf of the company, and it must be deemed as if the proceeding is being continued not only in the interest of the company but actually by the company through its liquidator. The fact that the present liquidator can file an application against a past liquidator also shows that the application must be deemed to be in the interest of and on behalf of the company and not in his personal right or capacity. There is no right in a liquidator as against a previous liquidator who has retired. No doubt under Section 235 persons other than the liquidator, namely, a creditor or a contributory also can apply. But, in my opinion, similar considerations apply to these applicants as well. There is no right conferred upon them to start a fresh proceeding in their own right and to get any relief for themselves. They merely move the machinery of the cour ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tor then argued that even if in one sense no new right be held to have been created by Section 235, nevertheless the section necessarily gives a fresh start to the liquidator, creditor and contributory, because they have a right to file an application under this section and that right cannot be exercised till the liquidation proceedings have started. It seems to me that only when a new right is really created by this section, that there can be a new start for the purposes of limitation. But if no new right has been created at all, and only a summary procedure has been prescribed and a new forum has been created to which recourse may be had, then there is not necessarily a new start for purpose of limitation. If one were to concede that a new right is created resulting in a new start for purposes of limitation, the result would be that every applicant may have a fresh and a different starting point. For instance, there may be thousands of contributories in a company and if under the Articles of Association the relation of principal and agent is created between all the share-holders, on one side and the managing agents or directors on the other, the agency would continue and only ter ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s of the company. If the view advocated for by the learned counsel for the liquidator were accepted, a transaction which is many years old may be re-opened and people, who have ceased to have any connection with the company, may be brought in again and asked to explain their conduct and justify it after the lapse of a large number of years. No doubt in special cases the court has discretion to refuse to inquire into a stale claim. But if a court is determined to brush aside all considerations of limitation, there would be nothing to prevent it from calling upon such persons to vindicate their conduct in respect of matters which took place long long ago. Had the intention of the Legislature been to give a power to the court, if it so decides to re-open old questions, there would have been no necessity to add Sub-section (3) in it. It would have been quite sufficient to say that the court may, when it considers fit, investigate into the conduct of the persons complained against. It may be pointed out that if a new right were created in favour of a liquidator and if it were a personal right and the application made by the liquidator were in his own right and not on behalf of the comp ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f forthwith. If they allow the opportunity to pass away, they have themselves to thank for. Similarly in the case of past directors it is the duty of the present directors to proceed inasmuch as they represent the company. In the case of the present directors, even if they be not considered to be trustees, they may well be agents of the share-holders and time may not begin to run against them till this agency terminates or knowledge is brought home to liquidators and share-holders. I do not see that there is any particular hardship or impracticability in holding that the law of limitation has been left altogether unaltered by the provisions of Section 235. The question what should be the starting point for purpose of limitation would, of course, depend on the particular Article which applies to the facts of that case. It cannot be laid down broadly that no other special Article can ever apply and only Article 120 would apply. Creditors and contributories existed before the company came into liquidation. The liquidator is, of course, a person who came into existence after the liquidation. If a suit could have been brought by the company against the opposite party, then the Article ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e a new right to apply under Article 181, that right, of course, would not have accrued earlier than the date when the person applying could have made the application. It may also be pointed out that out of the Articles in the Limitation Act applicable to applications there is none which can apply to an application under Section 186 except Article 181; whereas there are numerous Articles prescribed for suits which may apply to a suit against directors, contributories, managers etc., contemplated by Section 235, which are other than Article 120. It, therefore, seems to me that although the recent case decided by their Lordships of the Privy Council was a case under Section 186 of the Act, the principles laid down therein are of equal application to Section 235, and, therefore, in one sense it may be said that by implication the cases of this Court have been overruled. But even assuming that those cases have not by implication been overruled, it seems to me that the principles laid down therein compel me to put a similar interpretation on Section 235 as was put by their Lordships of the Privy Council on Section 186. I must hold that this section does not create any foundation upon w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Court. But in view of a certain recent decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council to be noticed later on, a plea of limitation was taken, and the learned counsel for the appellant has been heard on that plea. In two cases decided in this Court it was held that the misfeasance application under Section 235 is governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act and the starting point of limitation is the appointment of the official liquidator. To both these decisions I happened to be a party. The earlier decision is In the matter of the Union Bank Ltd., Allahabad, and the later decision is unreported and will be found in the case of Official Liquidator of Jaunpur Sugar Factory v. Bihari and Co. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant at length and had the benefit of discussion on his part of the recent Privy Council judgment in Hansraj Gupta v. The Official Liquidators of the Dehra Dun Mussoorie Electric Tramway Company Ltd. Having regard to certain remarks to be noticed later on, contained in the judgment of the Privy Council, I shall have to modify my opinion to this extent that the starting point of limitation would be not the appointment of the receiver but the dat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... an application was a proper remedy and in deciding that it was, the following remarks were made:- 'In those summary proceedings every objection is just as open to the person sought to be charged as it would have been if a bill had been filed'. Their Lordships pointed out that if a suit had been filed on behalf of and in the name of the company by the official liquidators against Hansraj Gupta, Hansraj Gupta would have had a defence by way of limitation; and, therefore, the Judges of the High Court were not right in holding that there was no question of limitation after the winding-up order had been made provided that the claim was not barred at the date of the winding-up order. Beyond this, the decision of their Lordships' judgment does not go. It is true that in dealing with the section corresponding to Section 186 of the Indian Companies Act, their Lordships said that three things were certain, on the decisions given in England, one being that the section created only a special procedure, and it was not a section which purported to create a foundation upon which to base a claim for payment. In other words, it created no new rights. It is argued that similarly section 235 did n ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pellant, should be read as follows:- (3) The Indian Limitation Act 1908 shall apply to an application under this section as if such application were a suit and a suit in the name and on behalf of the company. I will notice his arguments in detail and try to find out whether there can be any justification for such an addition. Ordinarily I may point out, it is against all canons of interpretation to read additional words in an enactment of the Legislature. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is this. Section 235 is only a provision prescribing a procedure and is a procedure in addition to the remedy which is open to the applicant by way of suit. He argued that it was open to the liquidator to bring a suit and his remedy was not confined to an application under Section 235. This may be the case with the liquidator, but what about the "creditor" and the "contributory?" Could a creditor, independently of Section 235, bring a suit in a court of ordinary jurisdiction against the present appellant, Shiam Lal, who is alleged to have been one of the partners of the firm of managing agents who, it is said, mismanaged the company and caused a loss to it? Could, again, a s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and not the company. There is yet another answer to the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant. He says that the application is to be deemed to be a suit by or on behalf of the company. As to the liquidator, it may be suggested that he is allowed to maintain an application or a suit in the name or on behalf of the company. This is stated in Section 179, Clause (a) of the Indian Companies Act. But what about the creditor? What about the contributory? Is a creditor entitled to maintain a suit in the name and on behalf of the company? Is a contributory entitled to maintain a suit in the name and on behalf of the company? At least I have not been able to find any warrant for such a proposition and none has been placed before us. The argument is that every one of these three is maintaining the application for the benefit of the company. This is undoubtedly true. But what was the necessity of mentioning the three individuals by name if it was going to be an application on behalf of the company. The persons vitally interested are allowed to come before the court and to seek its permission to maintain the application. The maintenance of the application may involve serious lia ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... elief is not adequate, it would be open to the Legislature to step in and to give further relief. I may point out that it is open to the court to refuse to proceed where the, claim of the official liquidator or the creditor or the contributory is stale. In the instance given by Dr. Katju, namely where a promoter has left the company thirty years ago, the court will probably refuse to investigate into the actions of the promoters. When the company had been insolvent circumstances for twenty years and nobody thought it fit to proceed against the promoters, the Court would be justified in refusing an investigation. Then, Section 281 of the Indian Companies Act provides some relief in certain cases. However, we cannot interpret the statute law on grounds of mere harshness or hard cases. Then it was argued that if a contributory or a creditor or a liquidator, each comes forward with an application against, say, an ex-director, there may be different rules of limitation for different applicants, unless they are all treated as representing and applying on behalf of the company. I do not think that any such thing follows. In my own judgment in the unreported case, I have shown why the se ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... crues to the individual who is suing, but to him or to his predecessor-in-title or to any person generally who would be interested instituting a suit. A right to sue within the meaning of Section 235, Sub-section (3) of the Indian Companies Act would accrue even if there were no liquidators, no creditors and no contributories. If this argument be correct, then the date when the right to sue accrues is definitely fixed for all possible applicants. The argument would thus fail that in the case of successive liquidators the date when the right to sue accrues would be different or the date when the right to sue accrues would be different or the date when the right to sue accrues to a creditor or to a contributory may be different from the date when the right to sue accrues to a liquidator. I have already spoken at length and I do not wish to prolong my judgment. I am of opinion that the only Article applicable to an application like the one out of which the appeal before us has arisen is Article 120 of the Indian Limitation Act. See extract subjoined. (The following is the extract from the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mukerji in The Official Liquidator [of Jaunpur S ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... any officer of the company, has misapplied, retained or become liable or accountable for any money or property of the company or been guilty of any misfeasance or breach of trust in relation to the company, the court may, on the application of the liquidator or of any creditor or contributory, examine the conduct of the promoter, director, manager, liquidator or officer and compel him to pay and restore the money or property or any part thereof respectively, with interest at such rate as the court thinks fit or to contribute such sum to the assets of the company by way of compensation in respect of the misapplication, retainer, misfeasance or breach of trust as the court thinks just. 2............................................................... 3.The Indian Limitation Act, 1908 shall apply to an application under this section, as if such application were a suit. It will be noticed that in the particular cases mentioned in the section, the liquidator or creditor or a contributory has to make an application to the court for investigation into the conduct of certain persons connected with the company and the court may after such investigation as may be called for, compel the per ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the court may appoint a person or persons called an official liquidator or official liquidators. If this rule of law defines the position of an official liquidator, it is impossible to say that he is a representative of the company. Primarily, an official liquidator is an officer of the court. The object of his appointment is the conduct of the proceedings in winding-up and further doing such duties with reference to the winding up as the court may impose. Where does then the representative character of the liquidator for the company come in ? The liquidator looks after the interest of the company and it looks after the interest of the creditors of the company. Such a person can in no sense be called a representative of the company. If he might be called a representative of the company, he might with equal truth be described as a, representative of the creditors of the company. Where no liquidator is appointed (see Section 178 (2)) or during any vacancies of such appointment, all the property of the company shall be deemed to be in the custody of the court. It will be seen therefore that, primarily, it is the court in whose custody the property of the company under liquidation com ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... inted by it for the purpose of "effectually" conducting the proceedings in winding-up (Section 175, Indian Companies Act, 1913). The official liquidator has, by the very definition, to perform such duties as the court may impose and although he has been given some powers, he can exercise many important powers only with the sanction of the court and not otherwise {see Section 179, Indian Companies Act). If the official liquidator were a representative of the company, surely he would not stand in need of the court's sanction to institute suits on behalf of the company or to defend suits on behalf of the company. Thus we find that none of the three persons who has been authorised by Section 235 of the Indian Companies Act to move the court is a representative of the company. It would follow, therefore, without further reasoning, that if a suit by the company be time-barred, it should not necessarily follow that a suit by the official liquidator or a creditor or a contributory should necessarily be time-barred. The rule of limitation is a rule of procedure, a branch of the Adjective Law and does not either create or extinguish rights, except in the case of acquisition of title to imm ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nd on an examination of these cases it will be found that none of these use the words in the sense in which the learned counsel for the respondent would want them to be interpreted. The learned counsel for the respondent would read the words. "Section 235 creates no new rights" in the sense that the liquidator and others can enforce their claims under Section 235 only as a representative of the company and not by virtue of their being official liquidators or creditors or contributories. As I have said, an examination of these cases will amply show that the words have been used in the English cases only in this sense and this sense alone, namely, Section 235 (English Sections 165 of the Act of 1862 and 215 of the Act of 1908) does not enable any of the applicants (official liquidator or creditor or contributory) to recover what could not be recovered under the general law. In other words, where there is an act which creates a liability in a director or a promoter or a manager and others enumerated in Section 235, under the general rule of law, there alone can the official liquidator or a creditor or a contributory recover. For example, where an act of a director is innocent and his ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ility or any new right but only provides a summary mode of enforcing rights which must otherwise have been enforced by the ordinary procedure of the Courts.' These words, namely, "Section 165 does not create any new liability or any new right" must be read with the facts, in connection with which they have been used and it would be fraught with the greatest danger to take the words out of the context and treat them as if they are of universal application, capable of being applied to any set of facts whatsoever. As we already stated, the learned Judges of the appellate court found that the fact that the directors had not subscribed to any shares did not entail on them any liability to pay for those shares. Baggallay, L.J., at p. 672 said: The circumstances under which these gentlemen accepted office as and acted as directors did not involve them in any contract whatever to take shares. Bramwell, L.J. at p. 673 said: To my mind, the liquidator has failed to show any damage at all. This case, therefore, is no authority for the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent. The next case is Bentinck v. Thomas Fenn (L. R. 12 A. C. 652). This was a case in which, speaking br ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... spondent. On the other hand the remarks of Lord Herschell at p. 662 establish that a claim under Section 165 (English 1862) is different from a claim by the company. The last case on the point quoted to us is the case of In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. Ltd. The learned counsel for the respondent quoted the following words from p. 507 in support of his argument: I desire to say, though this is not the first time that it has been said, that that Section (215 of the English Act of 1908) deals only with procedure and does not give any new rights. As in the other two cases already discussed, the sentence relied on, if taken without regard to the facts of the case in connection with which they have been spoken, any use whatsoever might be made of them. Pollock, M. R., who used those words was considering whether one Mr. Lepine was acting honestly or was acting fraudulently. His Lordship says at p. 506: No such chart was available to Mr. Lepine, and we have to take the books singly which were before him and the books, be it remembered, of the City Equitable Company only. It is not right to treat the evidence which is now before us and its significance as being plain in the yea ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... oney in the shares of other companies. Under certain circumstances however and in good faith, the directors accepted the shares of another company in lieu of a debt owing to their own company. When the Land Allotment Co. went into liquidation, compensation was claimed from the directors who had allowed the investment. The directors pleaded the Statute of Limitation of 1888. It will be remembered that under that statute, a trustee who is not acting fraudulently is allowed to plead limitation. It was held in this case that the directors were ' trustees ' within the meaning of the statute of limitations and they would be protected by the rule of limitation if their act was not fraudulent. It was found that their act was not fraudulent and therefore they were found not to be liable for the investment. In respect however of another matter, one of the directors, Mr. Brock was held liable for a certain sum of money. It was argued that if limitation began to run only after the appointment of the official liquidator, there could be no question of limitation in the case. This argument leads us to consider the English law of limitation. The main Act of Limitation is that of 1623 and provide ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ecision went. It is, therefore, not permissible to draw an inference only from the fact that the argument was not pressed that the starting point of limitation was the appointment of the liquidator. Before we leave this point, we may mention a case decided by their Lordships of the Privy Council. This case is Ranodip Singh v. Parmeshar Prasad, (I.L.R. 47 A. 165). In this case, the father made an alienation in 1893 and the fourth" plaintiff, being the youngest son of the alien or, was not born at the date of the alienation. It was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that Article 126 of the Limitation Act was the article that applied to the case, being meant to be applied to a suit "by a Hindu governed by the law of Mitakshara to et aside his father's alienation of ancestral property". According to the 3rd column of Article 126, the time from which the period begins to run is "when the alienee takes possession of the property". This date was taken to be the date of the alienation and their Lordships of the Privy Council said at p. 178: 'The fourth plaintiff's subsequent birth on November 30, 1900, did not create a fresh cause of action or a new starting point from which l ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... my v. Streeramulu (I.L.R. 19 Mad. 149) it was held that the application was one which fell under the heading of 'applications' in Schedule 1 of the Indian Limitation Act and not under the heading of "suit". This was a Letters Patent appeal and the learned single Judge had dismissed the application on the ground that it was barred by Article 36 of the Indian Limitation Act. It was pointed out that it was an "application" that was before the court and not a suit. It was probably owing to these decisions that the legislature declared that although what the liquidator, creditor and contributory produced before the court was in the shape of an application, it was to be treated as a suit and not as an application. In our opinion the Third Sub-section of Section 235 has no significance beyond this. Before leaving this point we may point out that in the Allahabad case just quoted, viz., I.L.R. 18 All. 12, it was held that to the special proceeding provided by Section 214 of the Companies Act of 1882, Article 36 of the Indian Limitation Act was not applicable. Now, coming to consider what is the most suitable article for what may be described as the "liquidator's suit". Article 36 of Sched ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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