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TMI Blog1943 (11) TMI 11X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ssly makes any statement which is false in a material particular, he shall be guilty of an offence against that regulation". The respondents were charged with producing a return false in a material particular with intent to deceive and, secondly, with making a statement which they knew to be false in a material particular. I should add this, that Mr. James Henry Orpin was charged with analogous offences or an offence at any rate connected with the offences said to have been committed by the first-named respondents, the Kent and Sussex Contractors, Ltd. When, the information came to be heard certain evidence was given, and as found by the special case the respondent company sent in certain returns made for the purposes of the Motor Fuel Rationing Order signed by Mr. M.G. Knowler, the transport manager of the respondent company, in respect of a vehicle which was in fact controlled by the respondent company. That return was false in material particulars and it was known by him to be false in material particulars. It was contended on that evidence by the appellant that the offences charged were proved to have been committed, but the respondents met that contention, according to the s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e judgment in R. v. Cory Brothers Co, (96 L.J.K.B., at p. 764; [1927] 1 KB., at. p. 816), In that judgment there is a citation from the judgment of Pattern, J., in R. v Birmingham and Gloucester Railway (11 L.J.M.C, at p. 136); 3QB ,at p. 232) as follows (it begins with a note by Holt, C.J.: "'A corporation is not indictable but the particular members of it are' "): "'What the nature of the offence was to which the observation was intended to apply does not appear; and as a general proposition it is opposed to a number of cases, which show that a corporation may be indicted for breach of a duty imposed upon it by law, though not for a felony, or for crimes involving personal violence, as for riots or assaults."' Under the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939, it is very common for offences to be created in which certain ingredients are required to be found and this particular case seems to me very clearly to be one of such cases. They are offences in which it. is not material to consider whether there is or is not mens rea, which I understand to mean criminal intention, but they are cases which state the ingredients, as, for instance, in this case where one of the necess ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... l case in that case. "The magistrate, although upon the facts as above stated he would have convicted if the respondents' servants had been principal in the matter, was yet of opinion that, as the exempting clause of the section implied that only such a person could commit the offence as was capable of believing, and as a corporation having no mind could not exercise that faculty, the respondents 'being a corporation, were not liable under the section." Lord Alverstone stated the facts and then said (80 L.J.K.B., at p. 1324; [1911] 2 K.B., at p. 836): "The magistrate has held that, inasmuch as 'the person' who gives a false warranty is made liable unless he proves that when he gave the warranty 'he had reason to believe' that the statements or descriptions contained therein were true, therefore 'the person' cannot be construed as including a corporation, hut must be limited to natural persons capable of belief. In my view that is too narrow a construction. Where a person is capable of giving a warranty that person is liable to a fine. There is no reason why a warranty should not be given by a corporation. It can give a warranty through its agents, and through its agents it can beli ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e Legislature has thought it so important to prevent the particular act from being committed that it absolutely forbids it to be done; and if it is done the offender is liable to a penalty whether he had any mens rea or not, and whether or not he intended to commit a breach of the law". Again he elaborates those propositions. Then he passes from Section 6 to the section which requires intent to be proved. "As to Section 3 there is a slight difference, because, reading Section 3 and Section 5 together, it seems that mens rea is involved in the offence, though it need not be proved by the prosecution, as it must in ordinary criminal cases. It is. however, so far an element in the offence that if the defendant succeeds in proving that he had no mens rea he is to be acquitted, the burden of proof thus being shifted from the prosecution to the defence. A provision of that kind is enacted where the Legislature desires to prevent the act from being done, though it is recognised that there may be cases in which the act is done innocently, and in which the person ought, therefore, not to be convicted. In those cases the defendant can prove his innocence; but, as it would be difficult ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ticular Act of Parliament has that effect or not, regard must be had to the object of the statute, the words used, the nature of the duty laid down, the person upon whom it is imposed, the person by whom it would in ordinary circumstances be performed, and the person upon whom the penalty is imposed". Then at the end of his judgment he says this (87 L.J.K.B., at p. 89; [1917] 2 KB., at p. 846): "I see no difficulty in the fact that an intent to avoid payment is necessary to constitute the offence. That is an intent which the servant might well have, inasmuch as he is the person who has to deal with the particular matter. The penalty is imposed upon the owner for the act of the servant" of course, the result could only be reached where any person is given express or implied authority or is estopped from saying that he had not. "Once it is decided that this is one of those cases where a principal may be held liable criminally for the act of his servant, there is no difficulty in holding that a corporation may be the principal. No mens rea being necessary to make the principal liable, a corporation is in exactly the same position as a principal who is not a corporation." It is neces ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on accused did the forbidden act intentionally and that it is not necessary to go further and prove what is commonly known as mens rea or any intention other than to do the thing forbidden". In the case with which we are dealing the first charge was one of doing something with intent to deceive. The second charge was that of making a statement which the company knew to be false in a material particular. Once the ingredients are stated in that way it seems to me quite unnecessary to inquire whether it is necessary to prove that you have acted on behalf of the company. In argument counsel for the respondents on behalf of the respondents has stoutly maintained the position that a company is incapable of having mens rea and that mens rea cannot be imputed to it even if and when its agents could be held to have mens rea. Here the question raised as to mens rea seems to me to be quite irrelevant because the regulation says that if a person with intent to deceive does certain things he shall be guilty of an offence or if he makes a return knowing it to be false in a material particular. There was ample evidence on the facts appearing in the special case to show that this company ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ledge of the agent must be imputed to the body corporate and the intention of the agent must likewise be imputed to the body corporate. Counsel for the respondents says that although a body corporate may be incapable of having an intention or of having knowledge in the eyes of the law it is capable, and the statute has so expressly provided. He says it is not capable of having what he called a criminal intention a mens rea. I asked him for a translation of the words "mens rea", but I do not think I got one other than that criminal intention is intention to commit a crime. In this particular case the intention was the intention to deceive. It the responsible agents of a body corporate do an act making a document or putting forward a document that has been made by some body else knowing it to be false and intending that it should deceive, I apprehend, according to the authorities that my Lord has cited, that knowledge must be imputed to the company of the intention to deceive and the knowledge of the agents of the company must also be imputed to the body corporate. In my opinion the submission that was made to the magistrates that the company could not in law be capable of a crim ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Interpretation Act, 1889, are made applicable, and by Section 2 (1) of the Interpretation Act? 1889, it is provided that: "In the construction of every enactment relating to an offence punishable on indictment or on summary conviction, whether contained in an Act passed before or after the commencement of this Act, the expression 'person' shall, unless the contrary intention appears, include a body corporate". Therefore, looking back at regulation 82, under which these respondents are charged, the words "any person" prima facie includes a limited liability company, such as the respondents. The argument for the respondents is that the contrary intention appears, that the offence cannot have been committed by the respondents because the respondents, an incorporated company, cannot have been guilty of intent to deceive. It is obvious that as a corporation which is a fictitious person is not capable of acting in its own person but can act only through its agent or servant, its wrongful acts must be in fact the acts of its agents or servants although imputed in law to the corporation itself The liability of a body corporate is, therefore, in all cases a vicarious liability for the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... howing that they are a corporation". That seems to me to be good sense and good law. Here, as I have already pointed out, if a corporation, a fictitious person, desires to obtain coupons for petrol it must furnish the information required by the appropriate authority, and if the information required by the appropriate authority is falsely given with intention to deceive, then a real person is liable for the penalties. I think it follows from the words of Bowen, L.J., that there are good reasons why, if the person who requires coupons can only apply for them through other persons or agents and commits an offence in the case of a natural person, he is still guilty notwithstanding that that person is merely fictitious. Then there was the case of Pearks, Gunstcn Tee, Ltd. v. Ward. [1902] 71 LJKB 656; [1902] 2 KB 1. Then in 1917 comes the case of Mousell v. London and North Western Railway. [1917] 87 LJKB 82; [1917] 2 KB 836. There there were two sections dealt with. The first was Section 98 of the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, which says: "Every person being the owner or having the care of any carriage or goods passing or being upon the railway shall, on dem ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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