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TMI Blog1967 (8) TMI 77X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he petitioner a driver-cum-mechanic, was suspended by the administrative officer of respondent No. 1 by the order, annexure "B" to the petition. In this order, it was alleged that the petitioner was guilty of "insubordination and disobedience" to orders issued by his superior authority and was accordingly considered "undesirable" to be retained in the service of the company. On December 2, 1965, the administrative authority served the charge-sheet, annexure "C" to the petition and asked the petitioner to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him on the charge of misconduct, comprising of-- (i)wilful insubordination or disobedience to superior order, (ii)negligence of work, (iii) habitual indiscipline and misbehav ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t be said that it is a department of the Central Government, whatever may be the share, ownership or management of the company. Hence, the employees of this company cannot claim the protection of article 311 of the Constitution. In view of the above finding, it has been urged on behalf of the respondent that relief under article 226 of the Constitution is not available against a company registered under the Companies Act. The answer to this question, however, is not simple and would depend upon some other considerations. The first question to be determined is the legal character of the standing orders made under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. The question appears to have been settled by the Supreme Court, in the ca ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... te of U.P. [1965-66] 29 FJR 76 ; 12 FLR 290, 300 ; AIR 1966 SC 1471 the Supreme Court has even upheld the validity of a State law which provided that standing orders would, in specified cases, prevail over the contrary provisions in a Central Act. They are also subject to the doctrine of ultra vires, like other subordinate legislation or statutory instruments (vide the case last cited). There is thus no doubt that the standing orders after they are duly certified and provided they are intra vires have the force of law like any other statutory instruments. In view of the number of Supreme Court decisions just cited, it is not possible, with respect, to agree with Sen J. in Malik Ram's case (supra) that dismissal in violation of the requirem ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , was not and could not have been placed before the court inasmuch as that case came up from the decision of the Nagpur High Court on September, 26, 1956. The introduction of section 13A, by section 32 of the Amendment Act 36 of 1956 has changed the situation altogether. Section 13A provides: " If any question arises as to the application or interpretation of a standing order certified under this Act, any employer or workman may refer the question to any one of the Labour Courts constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), and specified for the disposal of such proceeding by the appropriate Government by notification in the official Gazette, and the Labour Court to which the question is so referred shall, after giving ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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