9911796707
TMI Blog1971 (12) TMI 79X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1956, herein referred to as ' the 1956 Act'?" Section 171(1) of the 1956 Act reads as follows: "171. (1) A general meeting of a company may be called by giving not less than 21 days' notice in writing". Mr. S.N. Chopra, the learned counsel for the defendant, contended that the phrase " not less than 21 days' notice" has to be construed with reference to section 53(2) of the 1956 Act, which prescribes the time when the service of the notice of a meeting shall be deemed to have been effected. The relevant portion of section 53(2) of the Act reads as follows : "53. (2) Where a document is sent by post, ( a ) service thereof shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting a letter containing the documen ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... upport of his argument, Mr. Chopra relied on an English decision of the Court of Appeal in Cornfoot v. Royal Exchange Assurance Corporation [1904] 1 K.B. 40 (C.A.). That was a case on a policy of marine insurance on a ship. The insurance was expressed to be upon the ship " at and from Portland, Oregon, by any route to Algoa Bay and for 30 days in port after arrival, however employed". The expression "30 days" in the policy was held to mean thirty consecutive periods of 24 hours, the first of which began to run at 11-30 a.m. on August 2, when the ship came into Bay and anchored. The insurance was held to have come to an end before the loss occurred at 4-30 p.m. on September 1. The contention of Mr. Chopra cannot be accepted. His refere ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to commence on the next day after the day on which the ship arrived because the period of time from 11-30 a.m. on August 2, when the ship arrived, up to the beginning of August 3, could not be said to be uncovered. The risk was continuing during the voyage and continued after arrival. The said case, therefore, is of no help to Mr. Chopra's argument. The language used in section 171 of the 1956 Act is entirely different. It does not speak of 21 days after the service is effected. On the other hand, it requires 21 days' notice. The expression "not less than 21 days' notice" used in section 171 normally implies a notice of 21 whole or clear days. Part of the day, after the hour at which the notice is deemed to have been served, cannot be com ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... " so many days have always been interpreted to mean the whole days. It is not really necessary to go into these authorities in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Pioneer Motor's case ( supra ), which is binding on us. But, in order to notice the consistency in the interpretation of the aforesaid relevant words in a long catena of decisions, we may here refer to them in brief. In Chambers v. Smith 67 R.R. 231, every writ was to be made returnable on some day "not being less than 15 days" after the service thereof. It was held that the date of the issue of the writ as well as that of the service thereof were to be excluded providing an interval of clear 15 days. In In re Railway Sleepers Supply Company [1885] 29 Ch. D. 204 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ce", in section 117(2) of the English Companies Act, 1929, were construed to mean, not less than twenty-one clear days, exclusive of the day of service of the notice and exclusive of the day on which the meeting is held. Taking up the Indian case law, the expression "not less than 30 days", in section 22(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, was interpreted in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Ekbal Co . [1945] 13 I.T.R. 154 (Bom.); A.I.R. 1945 Bom. 316, to mean outside two points of time, one at which the period begins and the other at which it expires. This meant 30 clear days and was to be distinguished from the expression within 30 days, which was within two points of time. In N. V. R. Nagappa Chettiar v. Madras Race Club [1949] 19 Com ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o account in computing days, fraction of a day. A day is a unit of time and has been treated as a standard of measurement. A day is not an aggregation of hours, minutes or seconds when it is construed as a unit of time. When law refers to days, it does not take into reckoning a further sub-division of day in hours or minutes. By a day is understood a ' calendar day ' or an entire day. A 'day' is a space of time between two successive midnights and in computing day as a period of time, law does not take into consideration fractions of two days in order to make up one complete day". The contention of Mr. Chopra, that a change has been introduced in the law relating to length of notice, is not correct. We, on the other hand, find that the le ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
