9911796707
TMI Blog1997 (7) TMI 548X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... be admitted and advertised. In response to this notice, the appellant company appeared and filed objections questioning the maintainability of the company petition and prayed for dismissal of the same. After exchange of affidavits, the objections raised by the appellant were rejected on December 6, 1996. Against the aforesaid order the present appeal was filed by the appellant on March 28, 1997. We have heard Shri Janardan Sahai for the appellant and Shri K.L. Grover for the respondent. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the notification dated July 15, 1949, excluding jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench in respect of company cases was issued by the Chief Justice in exercise of his power under the second proviso to para. 14 of the United Provinces High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as "the Amalgamation Order"). The notification is not under the first proviso which deals with the territorial jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench in respect of districts falling in the Oudh area. It has been submitted that the second proviso confers power on the Chief Justice to order that any case or class of cases arising in the said areas, shall be heard at ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... med to be a good law as the Bench could not consider the observations of the Supreme Court in Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, AIR 1976 SC 331, in para. 37 in which the expression "heard" has been considered and interpreted and distinguished from the expression "institution". It has been further submitted that under section 10 of the Companies Act, 1956, also the company petition for winding up of the appellant company could be filed at Lucknow and not at Allahabad. The jurisdiction at Allahabad could not be created for filing the company petition on the ground that the official liquidator has his office at Allahabad. The official liquidator is appointed for the High Court and not in respect of any Bench of the High Court. It has also been submitted that the question of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage. In the present case, objection was raised at the earliest opportunity even before filing of the counter-affidavit. In the counter-affidavit filed in the company petition also the question of jurisdiction was raised in para. 22. Even after exchange of counter and rejoinder affidavits, the winding up proceedings are at the initial stage. It has also been su ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e High Court at Allahabad has jurisdiction to hear company petitions filed under the Companies Act. The High Court is the new High Court created under para. 3 of the Amalgamation Order. From a combined reading of para. 3 and para. 18 of the Amalgamation Order and section 10 of the Companies Act, the only conclusion which can be drawn is that the company judge who sits at Allahabad alone has jurisdiction to entertain company petitions. For this purpose, reliance has also been placed on Chapter V, rule 1 of the Rules of the Court, 1952, which provides that judges shall sit alone or in such Division Courts as may be constituted from time to time and do such work as may be allotted to them by order of the Chief Justice or in accordance with his discretion. As the company judge has been appointed at Allahabad alone, allotting to him all the cases pertaining to company matters, there is no illegality involved in entertainment of winding up petitions at Allahabad in relation to a company which has its registered office within the territories of the State of Uttar Pradesh. It has also been submitted that the judgments of the apex court in Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... heard at Allahabad." Under para. 14, the Chief Justice passed Order No. 6103, dated July 26, 1948, in the following terms: "In exercise of the powers conferred by article 14 of the United Provinces High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948, the Chief Justice of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad is pleased to direct that as from the July 26, 1948, until further order, the Bench of the High Court at Lucknow shall exercise the jurisdiction and power vested under the said Order in the High Court in respect of cases arising in the whole of Oudh." On July 15, 1949, the Chief Justice passed Order No. 8427 to the following effect: "In exercise of the power conferred by article 14 of the United Provinces High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948, and in partial modification of the Court's Notification No. 6103, dated July 26, 1948, as amended up to date, the Chief Justice of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad is pleased to direct that with effect from July 25, 1949, the Lucknow Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad shall not exercise jurisdiction and power in respect of cases under the following Acts arising within its existing territorial jurisdiction: 1.Th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ses could be heard at Allahabad without causing any kind of increase or decrease of the territorial jurisdiction of the judges sitting at Lucknow. The order dated July 15, 1949, thus does not affect the territorial jurisdiction defined by order dated July 26, 1948, for exercise of jurisdiction and power by the judges sitting at Lucknow. By subsequent order, only the exercise of jurisdiction and power in respect of certain cases of particular nature under specified Acts was excluded. Thus, the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the order dated July 15, 1949, is invalid and bad for want of authority cannot be accepted. The ratio in Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, AIR 1976 SC 331, and Ram Lakhan Saran v. Sunni Central Board of Waqfs, AIR 1976 All 532, is in respect of the subsequent order of the Chief Justice affecting the territorial jurisdiction and in that context it was held that once the power defining the territorial jurisdiction was exercised by the Chief Justice, it stood exhausted and could not be exercised again. In Ram Lakhan Saran v. Sunni Central Board of Waqf, AIR 1976 All 532, the notification dated December 14, 1948, by w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... submission reliance has been placed in para. 37 of the judgment in Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, AIR 1976 SC 331, which is being reproduced below: "To sum up, our conclusions are follows. First, there is no permanent seat of the High Court at Allahabad. The seats at Allahabad and Lucknow may be changed in accordance with the provisions of the Order. Second, the Chief Justice of the High Court has no power to increase or decrease the areas in Oudh from time to time. The areas in Oudh have been determined once by the Chief Justice and, therefore, there is no scope for changing the areas. Third, the Chief Justice has power under the second proviso to paragraph 14 of the Order to direct in his discretion that any case or class of cases arising in Oudh areas shall be heard at Allahabad. Any case or class of cases are those which are instituted at Lucknow. The interpretation given by the High Court that the word 'heard' confers power on the Chief Justice to order that any case or class of cases arising in Oudh areas shall be instituted or filed at Allahabad instead of at Lucknow is wrong. The word 'heard' means that cases which have already been instituted or fi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , 1949, the Lucknow Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad shall not exercise jurisdiction and power in respect of cases under the following Acts arising within its existing territorial jurisdiction. The phraseology used in the order dated July 15, 1949, is wide enough and excludes even the institution of the cases under the Companies Act at Lucknow. The expression used in the order is "exercise of jurisdiction and power" which is much wider than the expression "heard", to include the institution of cases also. Thus, in terms of the order dated July 15, 1949, all company cases could be filed and heard at Allahabad. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench in the case of Jugul Kishore v. Official Liquidator, Special Appeals Nos. 7 and 8 of 1979 dated September 24, 1982. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the contention of learned counsel for the appellant is correct, as learned counsel does not dispute that the case can be lawfully heard at Allahabad, it shall be only a technical breach if the petition is instituted at Allahabad instead of Lucknow as it has to be ultimately heard at Allahabad and for this technical defect or r ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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