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TMI Blog1955 (11) TMI 30X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nder the Act, was received by the applicants on the 20th August, 1951. Thereafter the applicants again sent their application for re- ference of the questions of law to the Court by post accompanied by a copy of the order that had been sent by them. This application was received by the judge (Revisions) on 25th August, 1951. At the hearing of this application, a question arose whether it was time-barred. The learned Judge (Revisions) held that the application was time-barred and, consequently, rejected it. Thereupon the applicants moved this Court under sub-section (3) of section 11 of the Act, requesting that this Court may require the Revising Authority to state the case and refer it to this Court. That application came up before a Division Bench of this Court which, in the circumstances mentioned above, referred the following question to a Full Bench for opinion: "Q. Whether, in computing the period of sixty days within which an application must be made under sub-section (1) of section 11 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act (as in force in the year 1952) an assessee is entitled to exclude the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order under sub-section (3) of section 10?" The period ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... only to be excluded when the period of limitation is being computed as prescribed for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal or an application for review of judg- ment. The application by the applicants under sub-section (1) of section 11 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act was not an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or an application for review of a judgment. On the plain language of sub-section (2) of section 12 of the Indian Limitation Act, therefore, the applicants are not entitled to exclude the period requi- site for obtaining the copy of the order of the Judge (Revisions) under sub-section (3) of section 10 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act in computing the period of 60 days prescribed under sub-section (1) of section 11 of that Act for making an application for reference to the High Court. Learned counsel for the applicants has, however, urged an argument, based on the view taken by a Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Mohan Lal Hardeo Das v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar and Orissa', that the effect of the language of section 29 of the Indian Limitation Act is that, even though sub-section (2) of section 12 of the Indian Limitation Act permits exclusion of tim ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... R. 1930 Pat. 14. entered into in a foreign country and makes the rules of limitation con- tained in the Indian Limitation Act applicable to such suit. Section 13, sub-section (1) of section 14 and section 16 permit exclusion of certain periods of time when computing the period of limitation for the suits mentioned in these sections. Section 15 deals with the computation of the period of limitation prescribed for any suit or application for the execution of a decree when the institution or execution has been stayed by injunction or order. Sections 17 and 18 deal with computation of the period of limitation in certain cases when such period has to be computed with reference to a right to institute a suit or make an appli- cation. Section 22 also lays down a rule governing the question as to when a suit is to be deemed to be instituted under certain circumstances. Sub-section (1) of section 12 deals with a special rule for computation of the period of limitation prescribed for "any suit, appeal or applica- tion". Sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 12 deal with computation of the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, application for leave to appeal or for an application for r ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ard to the provisions of the whole of the section and must apply them but only so far as they can be applied. The Court is not required or authorised to make any alterations in the provisions in order to make them applicable, if otherwise they would not be applicable, it is not required or authorised to apply only their principle or analogy. It must be borne in mind that section 29(2) makes applicable the provisions contained in several sections when the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application is to be determined. It may be that in a certain case the provisions of one of those sections cannot be applied because it does not contain the facts to which the provisions of that section can be applied or, in other words, there may be a case in which though due regard is to be had to the provisions of one of those sections, no effect can be given to its pro- visions. In such a case, it is not competent to the Court to modify the language of the section in order to give effect to its principle or to apply it by way of an analogy." The wide interpretation sought to be put by learned counsel on the provisions of section 29, if considered with reference to all the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Group (F) of the Fourth Schedule to the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, prescribes the period of limitation for execution of decrees of various types passed under that Act. In the case of an application for execution of a money decree under the U.P. Tenancy Act, the period is three years and is to be computed from the date of the final decree in the case. On the interpretation urged before us, it would have to be held that, in computing the period of limitation for an application for execution of a money decree under the U.P. Tenancy Act, the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 12 of the Indian Limitation Act would have to be applied and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the final decree will be excluded. The circum- stance that it may not be necessary to file a certified copy of the decree, when applying for execution, will be immaterial in view of the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in J. N. Surty v. T. S. Chettyar Firm(1) because a decree-holder may require a copy of the decree and judgment for purposes other than the filing of the copy at the time of making the application for execution. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held: "Section 12 makes no refe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nch of the Rangoon High Court in Rao Bahadur S. Ramanatha Reddiar v. Commissioner of Income-tax(1). In that case, the question arose whether an application for a reference to the High Court under section 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act on a question of law arising out of an order passed under section 31 of that Act was barred by time. The learned Judges held that the applicant was entitled to be furnished with a copy of the reasons for the order under section 31 of the Indian Income-tax Act (1) (1928) I.L.R. 6 Rang. 175. and the time taken by the office to furnish such copy must be excluded in computing the period of one month allowed to the assessee to apply for the reference. In arriving at this decision, the learned Judges did not, however, make a reference to any provision of the Indian Limita- tion Act under which the assessee was entitled to exclude the time taken by the office to furnish the copy of the order in computing the period of one month allowed to the assessee to apply for the reference. It was not held in so many words that this benefit was to be granted to the assessee under section 12(2) read with section 29 of the Indian Limitation Act. The learned Judges mer ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion for an application under section 21 of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act to require the Board to state a case, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order of the Board of Revenue should be excluded as provided in section 29 of the Indian Limitation Act. This decision was given solely on the basis of the decision of the Lahore High Court mentioned above and contains no reasoning at all. The most important case, on which learned counsel for the applicant has mainly placed his reliance, is the decision of the Patna High Court in Mohan Lal Hardeo Das v. Commissioner of Income- tax, Bihar and Orissa(2), which I have already mentioned earlier. In that case, reference was made to the decisions of the Rangoon and Lahore High Courts mentioned above. Thereafter the point, which has now been canvassed before us, was discussed and it was held: "It will not be straining the law to hold that the main principle laid down in section 12, namely, that the period for obtaining copies shall be excluded in computing the period of limitation in certain cases has been made applicable by section 29 in the case of a suit, appeal or an application under the special law for which a period of li ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ct to certain special proceedings only as is the case with section 12(2) of that Act, which was obviously enacted only for the purpose of an appeal, an application for leave to appeal and an appli- cation for review. A Division Bench of this Court in Amritsar Sugar Mill Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., Lucknow(1), agreed with the view taken by the Patna High Court in the case of Mohan Lal Hardeo Das v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar and Orissa(2), and grant- ed the benefit of section 12(2) of the Indian Limitation Act in respect of an application under section 11(2) of the Act to the High Court for an order calling for a statement of the case from the judge (Revisions), Sales Tax. The point also came up later before another Division Bench of this Court of which I was a member, in the case of Simbhaoli Sugar Mills Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., Lucknow(3). In the latter case, the point was not examined at all and the Bench merely followed the principle laid down in the earlier case of this Court in Amritsar Sugar Mill Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., Lucknow(1), holding that the Bench was bound by that decision. Both these decisions thus d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Limitation Act only by materially modifying the language of sec- tion 12. I am of opinion that section 29 of the Limitation Act does not apply to an application under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, and, therefore, the time of six weeks could not be extended." The learned judge agreed with the view entertained by the Lahore High Court in Nafis-uddin v. Secretary of State(2), which was also to the same effect. Amongst recent cases, I have already had occasion to refer to the views expressed by our brother, Desai, J., in the case of Ram Singh and Others v. Panchayati Adalat and Others(3). There is also a re- cent decision by a Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court in the case of Govindji Murarji v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur(4). The learned judges, referring to the decision of the Patna High Court in Mohan Lal Hardeo Das v. Commissioner of Income- tax, Bihar and Orissa(5), held: "It is not anywhere stated how an application for reference fell within the terms of section 12(2) of the Limitation Act. Their Lordships (1) (1932) I.L.R. 54 All. 282. (4) [19551 6 S.T.C. 183; A.I.R. 1955 Nag. 113. (2) (1927) I.L.R. 9 Lah. 244. (5) (1930) A.I.R. 1930 Pat. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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