TMI Blog1963 (11) TMI 64X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nclude all kinds of fabrics woven out of cotton yarn and, therefore, the aforesaid carpet should not be considered as an article made from cloth but "handloom cloth" covered by entry 29. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal, confirming the view of the Deputy Commissioner. At the instance of the petitioners, the Tribunal referred the following question to us: "Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case sales of shetranjis woven on handloom out of cotton yarn are covered by entry 29 of Schedule A to the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959?" Schedule A contains entries in respect of goods, the sale or purchase of which is free from all taxes. Entry 29 in that Schedule, with which we are for the moment concerned in this reference, provides as follows: "Handloom cloth of all varieties excluding pure silk cloth." Mr. Nanavaty for the petitioners argued that since the carpet in question was admittedly made of cotton yarn and further that it was manufactured on handloom, the view taken by the Deputy Commissioner and confirmed by the Tribunal that it did not fall within entry 29 was erroneous and that the Deputy Commissioner and the Tribunal ought to have held that a carpet of the kind we have ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... st be regarded as cloth. He also relied upon the Bombay Sales Tax Laws (Special Exemptions) Act, 1957, an Act exempting sales and purchases of certain goods which became assessable to additional duty of excise and of certain handloom textiles and other goods from the sales tax laws in force in the State of Bombay. Particular reliance was placed on the Preamble of that Act where it is stated that the Act was passed in view of the Central Government proposing to levy an additional duty of excise on certain goods and that, therefore, it was expedient to exempt the sales and purchases of those goods and of certain handloom textiles, and other goods from the sales tax laws in force in the State of Bombay. Section 3 of that Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the relevant sales tax law or any rules made thereunder etc., no tax shall be payable under the relevant sales tax law on the sale or purchase of designated goods effected on or after the appointed day, subject to the conditions or exceptions, if any, set out in the corresponding entry in column II of Schedule II. Section 4 of that Act then provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the relevant sales ta ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... word "vegetables" used in item 6 of Schedule II of the C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, rather than its dictionary meaning. Item 6 in that Schedule related to "vegetables" and item 36 in that Schedule related to betel leaves. Item 36 however was deleted by the Amendment Act 16 of 1948, but it was contended that in spite of that deletion, betel leaves must be held to be exempted as according to the dictionary meaning, they were vegetables. The Supreme Court rejected this contention on two grounds, (1) that the fact that there were two distinct entries, entry 6 for vegetables and entry 36 for betel leaves, indicated the legislative intent that betel leaves were not vegetables, and (2) that apart from that fact, the word "vegetables" in a taxing statute must be understood and was held in several decided cases, as having that meaning attached to it in common parlance. Dealing with the latter aspect, the Supreme Court has observed at page 288 of the report as follows: "But it was submitted that betel leaves are vegetables and therefore they would be exempt from sales tax under item 6. Reliance was placed on the dictionary meaning of the word 'vegetables' as given in Shorter Oxford D ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on behalf of the petitioner that the object underlying the exemption, namely, to encourage production of handwoven cloth or to help weavers whose livelihood depended upon that industry, applied as much to nawar tape as to cloth, for both were woven on handloom with mill yarn and by the same class of persons for whom the protection was designed. Dealing with this contention, the learned Judges observed that the word "cloth" was not a word of art and in common parlance it designated fabrics used for garment, covering and such other purposes. They further observed that it was impossible to conceive that the Legislature, which presumably knew the popular meaning of that word, would have used it in so comprehensive a sense as to take in nawar tape and that the simple test was, would any person go to a bazar and ask for cloth when he wanted nawar tape. Though the process of manufacture for both may be the same, the two words had acquired secondary meaning and, therefore, if the Legislature intended to exempt nawar tape, they would have used that word specifically, as the Government had done in a subsequent notification dated 18th November, 1954. After examining the various dictionary me ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , the Andhra High Court laid down that the words "cotton cloth" were used in the aforesaid provisions to denote every fabric used for any purpose including the use as a wearing apparel and that cloth did not cease to be cloth merely because it was used as a dhoti or a sari. But in laying down that proposition, the Andhra High Court was replying to the contention urged before it that saris and dhotis would not fall within the meaning of cloth and it was while negativing that contention that the High Court observed that the expression "cotton cloth" need not be given that narrow meaning contended for by the dealer there. It is clear from the judgment that this decision did not dissent from the earlier decision of that High Court and in fact, it relied upon it, for, at page 563 of the report, the learned Judges adopted the meaning of cloth as understood in common parlance as was done in the earlier case by Subba Rao, C.J., and Viswanatha Sastry, J., by observing that "in common parlance, the word 'cloth' is used to denote every fabric used for any purpose including the use as a wearing apparel." Mr. Nanavaty therefore was not right in arguing that the Andhra High Court had laid down s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... h of fowl, though the flesh of fowl may not be included in the meaning of the word "meat" as given in the dictionaries or the meaning attached to that expression in common parlance. What the learned Judges therefore in reality held was that where the context in which a particular expression was used, required a wider connotation to be given to the expression in question, such context for the purpose of construction would be an overriding consideration. The decision, therefore, is not really one which would throw light upon the question of construction before us, it being a decision solely dependent upon the context in which the expression "meat" was used in entry No. 4 of the Second Schedule of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946. Mr. Nanavaty has not been able to point out any such context in entry No. 29 governing its construction which can be considered to be an overriding factor, as was the case in the Bombay decision. The expression "cloth" has acquired a secondary meaning, that is to say, a meaning attached to that expression in common parlance by those dealing in and conversant with handloom cloth, and the carpet of the type we have before us would not, in our view, be included i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|