TMI Blog1966 (2) TMI 66X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mitation." The circumstances giving rise to this reference are that Chiranji Lal and Brothers (hereafter referred to as the assessee) filed a revision petition before the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, on 5th February, 1958, against an order of the Sales Tax Commissioner dated 21st November, 1957. The Chief Commissioner by his order dated 18th July, 1958, held that the revision was barred by time, having been filed after the expiry of sixty days, the period prescribed for filing revision petitions. The Chief Commissioner has not given detailed reasons in the judgment and has only relied on two earlier orders passed by him in D.C.M. v. The Sales Tax Commissioner and Fauja Singh and Others v. The Sales Tax Commissioner. We have had no access to those decisions of the Chief Commissioner, but from the nature of the questions referred to us it appears that the Chief Commissioner took the view that though the rules framed under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, as extended to the Union territory of Delhi (hereafter referred to as the said Act), required a certified copy of the order of the Sales Tax Commissioner to accompany the revision petition, but still the time requisite for o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... P.A.I.R. 1929 Lah. 170., a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court decided that in computing the period of limitation for an application under section 66(3) of the Income-tax Act, for requiring the Commissioner of Income-tax to refer certain questions of law to the High Court, the time requisite for obtaining certain copies was to be excluded by virtue of section 29 of the Limitation Act. This principle was applied by the Calcutta High Court to an application under section 21 of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, requiring the Board to state a case to the High Court in India Ice and Cold Storage Co., Limited v. The Member, Board of Revenue, West Bengal[1948] 1 S.T.C. 191; 53 C.W.N. 191. In coming to this conclusion, the Bench of the Calcutta High Court followed the Lahore High Court decision in Muhammad Hayat Haji Muhammad Sardar's case(1). In Mohan Lal v. Commissioner of Income-taxA.I.R. 1930 Pat. 14., the Patna High Court held, following the above-mentioned Lahore decision, that in computing the period of limitation for an application for reference by an assessee under section 66(3) of the Income-tax Act the time requisite for obtaining copies was to be excluded on general ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of judgment". The decision of the Lahore High Court in Muhammad Hayat Haji Muhammad Sardar's caseA.I.R. 1929 Lah. 170. was not considered to be an authority relevant to the controversy on the ground that the limitations expressed in section 12(2) were not considered by that High Court. It would be pertinent to point out here that the arguments in this reference have proceeded before us on the assumption that section 29, though applicable, does not extend the scope of section 12(2) beyond "an appeal, or application for leave to appeal and an application for a review of judgment", and the words: "any suit, appeal or application" in section 29 are not meant for the purpose of enlarging the scope of sub-section (2) of section 12 of the Limitation Act, but merely for the purpose of describing the nature of the proceedings to which sections 4, 9 to 18 and 22 are to be applied. In Hari Krishan v. State of PepsuA.I.R. 1958 Punj. 490., a Division Bench of this Court held that section 12(4) of the Limitation Act does not apply to an application under section 18 of the Land acquisition Act, and consequently, the applicant is not entitled to exclude the time taken in obtaining a copy of the aw ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fy the decision of an inferior court. What then can be a justification for saying that "revision" in the said Act is used in its narrow technical sense as comprehending something other than "appeal"? I think, the answer must be in the negative. In Subramania Pillai v. Seethai Ammal and Another(1911) I2 Ind. Cas. 38., a Division Bench of the Madras High Court, while discussing the nature of the order passed under section 622, corresponding to section 39 of the Letters Patent said: "when a question was raised whether an order passed under section 622, corresponding to section 15 of the present Civil Procedure Code, was passed in the exercise of the High Court's original or appellate jurisdiction it involved no straining of language to decide that the word 'appeal' used in sections 15 and 39 was used in a comprehensive sense so as to include both what is described technically as an appeal as also the common law writs of error." Again in Secretary of State v. British India Steam Navigation Co.(1911) 9 Ind. Cas. 183., a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court declined to accept the contention that a narrow interpretation should be placed on the expression "made on appeal" in section 3 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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