9911796707
TMI Blog1965 (8) TMI 74X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the question formulated by the Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax, U.P., on 30th August, 1965, and said that the reasons for the answer would be given later. We now proceed to give the reasons. The material facts, as stated in the statement, are as follows: For the assessment year 1952-53 an assessment order under the U.P. Sales Tax Act was passed on 13th October, 1953, assessing the assessee [at whose instance the Judge (Revisions) has submitted this statement, on a turnover of Rs. 14,000]. A copy of the order was despatched on 26th December, 1953, and it was received by the assessee in the first week of January, 1954. (Why the assessing officer took more than two months to despatch the copy and why it took so many days for service are not known). The assessee filed no appeal from the assessment order; instead on 12th September, 1955, it applied to the Judge (Revisions) to revise it. Previously no period of limitation was prescribed for an application for revision but the Act was amended with effect from 1st April, 1954, and now the period of limitation prescribed for an application for revision is one year from the date of service of the order complained of and the Judge (Revisions) ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... affects a present right by going behind it and giving efficacy to anterior circumstances to defeat it, which they had not when the right accrued, or which relates back to and gives to a previous transaction some different legal effect from that which it had under the law when it occurred................... However, a statute is not regarded as operating retroactively because of the mere fact that it relates to antecedent events, or draws upon antecedent facts for its operation. A prohibition of the doing of business after a statute goes into effect is not retroactive with regard to that business, even though the business be done in pursuance of an earlier contract." (50 Am. Jur., 492-493). As we shall show subsequently there is no vested right to apply for revision of an assessment order under the Sales Tax Act. Further even if it were a vested right it cannot be said to be in respect of a transaction or consideration anterior to 1st April, 1954. The making of an assessment order is not a transaction or consideration giving rise to a right. Assessing a dealer to sales tax does not confer any right upon him; on the contrary it imposes an obligation or duty (to pay a certain sum of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ated to or drawn upon. Even if it be said that applying the Amendment Act in the instant case amounts to giving retrospective effect to it we have no hesitation in holding that it has retrospective operation. Every procedural law is retrospective in operation: see Interpretation of Statutes by Maxwell, 10th Edition, p. 225, 36 H.L. 426, 50 Am. Jur. 506, Gardner v. Lucas (1878) 3 App. Cas. 582. (per Lord Hatherley at p. 598 and per Lord Blackburn at p. 603), The Attorney-General v. Sillem and Others(1864) 10 H.L.C. 704; 11 E.R. 1200. (per Lord Westbury, L.C., at p. 727 and per Lord Cranworth at p. 738), Turnbull v. Forman(1885) 15 Q.B.D. 234., Anant Gopal Sheorey v. State of Bombay A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 915. (Kapur, J., at p. 917), The King v. Chandra Dharma[1905] 2 K.B. 335., Abdul Karim v. Deputy Custodian-GeneralA.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1256. (Wanchoo, J., at p. 1258) and Shahid Ganj Mosque v. Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak CommitteeA.I.R. 1940 P.C. 116. (per Sir George Rankin at p. 121). The reasons are that the general rule that a statute is prima facie prospective and that no retrospective effect is to be given to it unless by express words or necessary implication it appears that this was ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of this Court said in Bankey Lal v. BabuA.I.R. 1953 All. 747. that rules of limitation are rules of procedure and do not create any right in favour of any person, nor define or create causes of action but merely prescribe the period within which the remedy can be exercised. The Privy Council held in Shahid Ganj Mosque v. Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak CommitteeA.I.R. 1940 P.C. 116. that the limitation for a suit is governed not by the law existing when the cause of action accrued but by the law existing at the time of the institution of the suit because limitation is "a matter of procedure" (per Sir George Rankin at p. 121). It is stated in 36 H.L. 426 that provisions relating to the time for the bringing of proceedings are regarded as procedural rules. In Ruckmaboye v. Lulloobhoy Mottichund(1852-54) 8 Moore P.C. 4 at p. 36. it was said: "Considered in their true light, Statutes of Limitation......are ordinarily simple regulations of suits and not of rights. They regulate the times in which rights may be asserted in Courts of Justice, and do not purport to act upon those rights." Khondkar Mahomed Saleh v. Chandra Kumar MukerjiA.I.R. 1930 Cal. 34., Baijnath v. Doolarey HajjamA.I ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or contract the remedy alone is gone by lapse of time and not the obligation; so in the case of a debt or contract there is no question of any right being affected by the law of limitation. There is no vested right in a remedy: see Brainard v. Hubbard20 L.E. 272., Mallett v. State of North Carolina45 L.E. 1015 at p. 1018., and Gibbes v. Zimmeran78 L.E. 342. In the case of Brainard(8), Clifford, J., observed at page 277 that, "a party cannot have any vested right in a remedy conferred by an Act of Congress to prevent Congress from modifying it or adding new conditions to its exercise." In Gibbes's case78 L.E. 342 at p. 347., Roberts, J., said: "........although a vested cause of action is property......the appellant has no property, in the constitutional sense, in any particular form of remedy." The propositions that procedural law is retrospective and that law of limitation is procedural law give rise to the proposition that law of limitation starts applying at once in the absence of words to the contrary and a proceeding is governed by the law of limitation in force at the time of its institution and not by the previous law of limitation that might have existed at the time o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... whether the amendment extends the period of limitation (barring the case of extinction of the cause of action before the Amending Act comes into force) or shortens it. The effect of a law of limitation enacted for the first time prescribing a period of limitation is the same as that of an amendment in an existing law of limitation shortening the period of limitation. The question of the effect of the shortening of the period of limitation arises in two cases, (1) when the shortening is done before the expiry of the shortened period for the cause of action and (2) when it is done after the expiry. In the instant case we are concerned with the effect of the shortening of the period of limitation before the expiry of the shortened period; actually the Amendment Act was passed so much before the expiry of one year from the date of service of the order upon the assessee that it could hardly make a grievance of the shortening of the period and contend that it was not left with sufficient time for applying for revision. We are not concerned with the effect of shortening the period of limitation after the expiry of the shortened period so that a party is left with no right to file a suit, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... provisions or postpones its coming into effect so as to give an opportunity for commencing an action before it becomes time-barred under its provisions, it is held to indicate legislative intention that it is to be given retrospective effect: see Queen v. Leeds and Bradford Railway Co.(1852) 18 Q.B. 343., Ram Karan v. Ram Das(7) (per King, J., at p. 647) and Jethmal v. Ambsingh(8) (per Modi, J., at p. 99 and Wanchoo, C.J., at p. 106). But it does not follow that it is not to be given retrospective effect in other circumstances. Soni Ram v. Kanhaiya Lal(1913) I.L.R. 35 All. 227., The State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Kamla Prasad[1957] 8 S.T.C. 440., Ram Karan v. Ram DasA.I.R. 1931 All. 635. (per Sulaiman, C.J., at p. 640), Sohn v. Waterson21 L.E. 737., Cornill v. Hudson(1), Jethmal v. AmbsinghA.I.R. 1955 Raj. 97. and Ramayya v. LakshmayyaA.I.R. 1942 P.C. 54., all lay down that limitation for a proceeding is governed by the law of limitation in force when it is commenced and not by the earlier law in force at the time of the accrual of the cause of action. The contrary view expressed in United States v. St. Louis, S.F. T.R. Co.70 L.E. 435. is not applied here in India. The decision ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g in revision. Revisional jurisdiction is notoriously discretionary; there is no right to get an order revised as there is a right to get an order corrected on appeal. Instituting a suit and instituting an appeal are matters of right but not applying for revision. Provisions regarding revision including section 10 of the Sales Tax Act merely confer power upon superior authorities to revise inferior authorities' orders and do not confer any right upon parties aggrieved by the inferior authorities' orders to apply for revision. In the Commissioner of Income-tax v. Tribune Trust, Lahore[1948] 16 I.T.R. 214. , the Privy Council stated that section 33 of the Indian Income-tax Act does not create any right in the aggrieved person; the so-called right of revision is not strictly speaking a right at all. The Privy Council pointed out that the only specific right is that of an appeal. In Hari Shanker v. Girdhari LalA.I.R. 1963 S.C. 698., the Supreme Court distinguished between a right of appeal and a right of revision. In S.S. Khanna v. F.J. Dillon1963 A.L.J. 1068., the Supreme Court observed that the power conferred by section 115, Civil Procedure Code, is discretionary. If a revision cann ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
