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TMI Blog1992 (7) TMI 297X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tion to the notice submitted by Lajwanti was not found satisfactory and she was issued another notice under section 7 of the SAFEMA. The appellant's house was purchased for Rs. 46,000 in the name of Lajwanti, appellant, vide sale deed dated July 20, 1974, registered on August 1, 1974. According to Lajwanti, the customs authorities had seized Rs. 10,389 from the possession of her husband, Pala Singh, which amount had been given to him by one Gura Singh for purchase of a truck. Gura Singh is dead. The customs authorities refunded that amount to Pala Singh some time in 1970. She had Rs. 8,000 as "stridhan" which had been given to her from time to time by her father and other family members. She gave this amount to her husband, Pala Singh, who purchased half portion of a house in Kailash Nagar in the area of Gandhi Nagar, Delhi, jointly with one V. K. Agarwal. Pala Singh sold his share in the Kailash Nagar house for Rs. 53,000 and out of the same, he paid Rs. 46,000 for the purchase of house No. 496/25-A2, Gandhi Nagar, Delhi, in her name. The competent authority, after investigation and trial, came to the conclusion that the story of Pala Singh having purchased a house in Kailash Naga ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and no order in the eyes of law, the declaration made against him under section 12A shall be treated as dead declaration and cannot be invoked against him. In the absence of a valid detention order under section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA against Pala Singh, the proceedings initiated by the competent authority against his wife with respect to the house in dispute cannot be sustained because Lajwanti cannot be treated an affected person in terms of section 2(2)(c) of the SAFEMA. We are not impressed with the contention. Whether the authorities constituted under the SAFEMA are competent to look into the legality of a detention order under section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA against Pala Singh is the main point which requires consideration. In other words, are the authorities constituted under the SAFEMA competent to set aside the detention order made under the COFEPOSA or hold it legally bad. In our opinion, the authorities under the SAFEMA have no competency to do so. The SAFEMA applies to a person against whom an order of detention has been made under the COFEPOSA and it is so provided in section 2(2)(b) of the SAFEMA. There are four provisos to this sub-section and proviso No. (iv) read : ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... his omission is hardly relevant for the purposes of these proceedings. The Legislature has provided that the competent authority shall record "reasons to believe" in terms of section 6(1) of the SAFEMA before initiating proceedings. It has been made obligatory on the part of the competent authority to consider the value of the property held by a person to whom the SAFEMA applies and also his known sources of income, etc., before issuing notice to a person under section 6. The provision contained in section 6 of the Act ensures application of mind on the part of the competent authority before issuing a notice. The implications of such notice are serious inasmuch as the burden of proof in terms of section 6 of the SAFEMA stands transferred to the notices as a consequence thereof. At the same time, the "reasons to believe" recorded under section 6 are not meant to be an encyclopaedia. It cannot be held that whatever is not included in the "reasons to believe" cannot be invoked against the appellant. We, therefore, hold that irrespective of the fact that no mention was made by the competent authority of the declaration under section 12A of the COFEPOSA in the "reasons to believe", the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rst review in terms of proviso (iii) to section 2(2)(b) of the SAFEMA shall stand extended to actual review which in the instant case had not been made till the date the detention order was revoked. The text and tenor of proviso (iii) of section 2(2)(b) of the SAFEMA read with section 12A(3) of the COFEPOSA does not admit of such interpretation. We, therefore, hold that the period laid down for the purpose of revocation in terms of proviso (iii) to section 2(2)(b) of the SAFEMA is four months from the date the declaration under section 12A of the COFEPOSA is made and not beyond. In the instant case, the revocation of detention of Pala Singh having been made on March 21, 1977, was not within a period of four months from the date of detention under section 12A of the COFEPOSA which was made on December 18, 1975. Another contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that the declaration under section 12A of the COFEPOSA made against Pala Singh was not reconsidered in terms of sub-section (3) thereof and as such it stands rendered infructuous on the expiry of four months from December 18, 1975. There was, therefore, no subsisting declaration against Pala Singh on March 21, 1977, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ale deed or a copy thereof. Many adjournments were obtained for this purpose. An affidavit of one Shri Ajay Kumar Sharma, claiming to be the attorney of Kirpal Singh, vendee, was placed on the file wherein an averment made was that Kirpal Singh had gone to Nairobi and the registered sale deed was with him. He stated that the house in Kailash Nagar had been purchased by Kirpal Singh. To the same effect is an affidavit of Pala Singh himself. The competent authority has observed in the impugned order that a reference was made to the SubRegistrar regarding the registration of the sale deed by Pala Singh in favour of Kirpal Singh of the house in Kailash Nagar. The Sub-Registrar replied in the negative. Ultimately, an affidavit of Kirpal Singh attested on March 9, 1992, was placed on file wherein he stated that he had purchased the house from Pala Singh on June 6, 1973, on the basis of a general power of attorney. This affidavit completely punctured the story of the appellant regarding the sale of the house in Kailash Nagar by Pala Singh in favour of Kirpal Singh through a registered sale deed. No copy of the registered general power of attorney allegedly executed in favour of Kirpal Sin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... isions of the SAFEMA shall not apply to them as provided in section 2(2)(c) thereof. The contention is without force. The condition precedent for application of section 2(2)(c) is that there is a valid sale (transfer). In case there is no valid sale, it is irrelevant whether the alleged transfer is in good faith for adequate consideration or otherwise. We have held above that Jaswant Singh from whom Rama Devi and Pawan Kumari allegedly purchased the house was not its owner at any time. The transaction regarding the house in dispute between Jaswant Singh on the one side and Rama Devi and Pawan Kumari on the other cannot be treated as a valid sale. Learned counsel for the appellant, therefore, cannot invoke section 2(2)(c) of the SAFEMA to the benefit of the appellant. Section 11 of the SAFEMA reads : "11. Certain transfers to be null and void._Where, after the issue of a notice under section 6 or under section 10, any property referred to in the said notice is transferred by any mode whatsoever such transfer shall, for the purposes of the proceedings under this Act, be ignored and if such property is subsequently forfeited to the Central Government under section 7, then, the tra ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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