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TMI Blog1978 (12) TMI 168X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... gainst form 14. The Sales Tax Officer, therefore, issued a notice of reassessment in form 28. Although the date does not appear on the record it is common ground that this notice was issued on 4th March, 1970. On 20th October, 1970, the Sales Tax Officer passed an order of reassessment under section 35 of the said Act and imposed on the assessee a penalty of Rs. 5,000 under section 36(2)(c) of the said Act. The assessee preferred an appeal against the said order, but the same was dismissed by the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax. The assessee then went by way of second appeal to the Sales Tax Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the said appeal holding that the penalty of Rs. 5,000 imposed by the Sales Tax Officer and confirmed by the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax was bad in law and the Tribunal set aside the imposition of the said penalty. It is from this decision of the Tribunal that the aforesaid question has been referred to us. In order to appreciate the controversy raised before us, it is necessary to bear in mind the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 36 of the said Act, as it stood at the relevant time. The period under assessment was from 1st August, 1964, to 31 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d include within its ambit the process of reassessment under section 35 of the said Act. It was further submitted by him that the explanation to section 36(2) of the said Act, which has been introduced by the said Maharashtra Act 29 of 1965, indicates that a wide meaning has to be given to the said expression "assessing" so as to include therein the process of reassessment under section 35 of the said Act. It was urged by him that unless this is done, the expression "or reassessed under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 35" used in the explanation would be rendered redundant, because in spite of the same, the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 36 of the said Act would not come into play at all in a case of reassessment under section 35 of the said Act. We find it difficult to accept these submissions of Mr. Dada. If the word "assessing" had stood by itself in the opening part of sub-section (2) of section 36 of the said Act, it might have been possible to urge with some justification that the said word should be given a wide import so as to include the process of reassessment within its ambit, although we express no opinion as to whether such a contention would be ulti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ht to bring to tax, on the basis of section 3-D and the notification, the first purchases of processed or split foodgrains including dal on the ground that they constituted a separate item quite independent of the unprocessed or unsplit foodgrains. The Allahabad High Court, in Tilok Chand Prasan Kumar v. Sales Tax Officer, Hathras, District Aligarh[1970] 25 S.T.C. 118., held that such a levy was invalid. After that decision, the U.P. Sales Tax (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1970, replacing an Ordinance, was passed, and explanation 11 was added to section 3-D(1) providing that "split or processed foodgrains .....shall be deemed to be different from unsplit or unprocessed foodgrains" and that nothing in sub-section (1) "shall be construed to prevent the imposition, levy or collection of the tax in respect of the first purchases of split or processed foodgrains merely because tax had been imposed, levied or collected earlier in respect of the first purchases of those foodgrains in their unsplit or unprocessed form". Section 7 of the amending Act also validated earlier levies and declared notifications issued under section 3-D to be deemed to have been issued under the Act as so amend ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mmissioner in that case as per the direction of the Appellate Tribunal. It has been held in that case that the true meaning of any passage in a statute is that which best harmonises with the object and each passage of the statute, and the court should ordinarily and as far as possible see that the interpretation it puts on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. Where the main object and intention is clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftsman's unskilfulness. The court will read not only the particular provision but also allied and cognate provisions as forming a connected scheme and not treat them as detached provisions. This does not militate in any way against the well-established canon of construction that a fiscal enactment should be construed strictly and in favour of the subject. Even this case is not helpful in the decision of the case before us, because it is based on the interpretation of a different provision which came up for consideration in that case, viz., section 33B(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. In order to appreciate the ratio of that case, it is necessary to bear in mind the following observations in the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ally drafted cannot be a ground to treat any part of a provision as otiose, for so long as the intention of the legislature is clear and beyond doubt, the courts have to carry out that intention. This decision also is not of any assistance to Mr. Dada. The question in that case was not that any word should be read into section 21(2) of the Wealth-tax Act, but whether it was open to the legislature when enacting that section to have proceeded on the basis that for the purpose of the Wealth-tax Act the trustee is holding the trust property on behalf of the beneficiaries. This, it is clear, the legislature could undoubtedly do. The Supreme Court in that case was not called upon to read any words into a section as is required of us by Mr. Dada in the present case. As against the aforesaid decisions relied on by Mr. Dada, reference can also be made to some decisions which support the view that it is not open to the court to read words into a statute which the legislature has omitted to put save and except in very exceptional cases. James, L.J., in delivering the opinion of the Judicial Committee in Dyke v. ElliottLaw Rep. 4 P.C. 184 at 191., has observed as follows: ".....No doubt a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g cannot be given to the word "assessing" used in sub-section (2) of section 36 of the said Act as suggested by Mr. Dada because that would really involve adding of words in this sub-section. Moreover, if Mr. Dada's submission in this regard were correct, it would imply that at the time the explanation was enacted the legislative intent was to enlarge the scope of sub-section (2) of section 36. If this was so, one fails to see why the main portion of subsection (2) of section 36 was not suitably amended. It may be pointed out that prior to the amendment of section 35 of the said Act by Maharashtra Act 32 of 1972 it was required that before any proceedings under that section were initiated a notice containing all or any of the requisitions which may be included in a notice under sub-section (3) of section 33 of the said Act was required to be served on a dealer. It could, therefore, have been said that there was some similarity regarding the process of assessment under section 33 and the process of reassessment under section 35 of the said Act. However, by the said Maharashtra Act 32 of 1972 the provisions of section 35 of the said Act have been amended retrospectively and it is n ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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