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TMI Blog1992 (2) TMI 322X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 14. Appellant succeeds. As repeatedly stated by Mr. Shanti Bhushan during the course of the arguments that the State is willing to provide compensation for the remaining period of the tenure, we direct the State to pay the first respondent the salary, allowances and perks for the period commencing from 13.7.90 upto 25.7.92, had he continued in office but for the impugned legislation. If any payment has been made by interim orders of the court that will go towards the deduction of this liability. - Civil Appeal No. 3062 of 1991 - - - Dated:- 20-2-1992 - Mohan, S. And Sahai, R. M. (J),JJ. JUDGMENT The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MOHAN, J. The facts relating to the Civil Appeal are as under:- The first respondent (Mr. Kailash Chand Mahajan) retired from the post of Chief Engineer from the State of Punjab. On 24.7.81, he was appointed as a member of Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board and thereafter appointed as Chairman of the said board for a period of two years. On 13.8.82, the following notification came to be issued:- No. 8-155/73-DP (Apptt. II) Dated Shimla- 2, the 13th Aug. 1982 NOTIFICATION In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 5 o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... respondent in his affidavit would aver that the third respondent (i.e.. Mr. Shanta Kumar, the Chief Minister of Himachal Pradesh) is alleged to have made speeches that should he come to power he would have the first respondent removed from the chairmanship of the Electricity Board. On 5.3.90, the third respondent became the Chief Minister. A notification dated 6.3.90, came to be issued in supersession of the notification dated 12.6.89 that the appointment of the first respondent as Chairman of the Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board is extended from 25.7.89 to 6.3.90. Another notification dated 6.3.90 was issued directing that Mr. R.S.S. Chauhan shall function as Chairman, H.P. State Electricity Board w.e.f. 7.3.90. At this stage the first respondent preferred a Writ Petition No. 123/90 challenging the validity of the notification dated 6.3.90, and prayed for certiorari to quash the same. While that writ petition was pending, on 30.3.90, another notification was issued terminating the appointment of the first respondent as Member of the State Electricity Board. On 30.3.90, the High Court while admitting the writ petition (CWP No. 123 of 1990) ordered that no appointment to the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t no person above the age of 65 years could be appointed and continued as Chairman or Member of H.P. State Electricity Board. This provision was not only to apply to future appointments, but also to the existing Chairman and Members, and where the existing incumbent's tenure is curtailed adequate compensation could be provided. No doubt, rules could be framed under Section 78 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. But those rules cannot have retrospective operations, hence the proposed ordinance. On 9.7.90, the Government of India replied pointing out the desirability of the State Government examining with reference to the relevant provisions of the Act and the constitution about the promulgating the ordinance. This State was also advised to explore the feasibility of amending the rules. On 13.7.90, the Governor of Himachal Pradesh issued an ordinance, i.e. H.P. Ordinance Rule of 2/90, amending Section 5 (6) of the Electricity (Supply) Act. The ordinance reads to the following effect :_ 934 "AUTHORITATIVE ENGLISH TEST". H.P. ORDINANCE No.........of 1990. THE ELECTRICITY (SUPPLY) (HIMACHAL PRADESH AMENDMENT) ORDINANCE, 1990 Promulgated by the Governor of Himachal Pradesh ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ated 13th July, 1990, Shri Kaialsh Chand Mahajan, Chairman, H.P. State Electricity Board, having already attained the age of more than sixty-five, years, has ceased to be Member of the H.P. State Electricity Board and consequently Chairman of the said Board. NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers vested in him under sub-section (5) of section 5 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh, is pleased to appoint Shri R.S.S. Chauhan, Member (Operation), H.P. State Electricity Board as Chairman of the HP 936 State Electricity Board with immediate effect, till further orders. By Order M.S. Mukherjee Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Himachal Pradesh. Aggrieved by the ordinance dated 13.7.90 and the above notification dated 16.7.90, the first respondent filed CWP No. 396 of 1990, praying for certiorari to quash the ordinance as well as the notifications. Inter alia, the first respondent as writ petitioner before the High Court urged that there has been a deliberate attempt on the part of the State to get rid of him through the ordinance. The same is violative of Articles 14 and 16 Constitution. In so far as he is the only person affected by the or ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ccused of having passed a law for an extraneous purpose. Therefore, no malafides could be attributed to the legislature. Dealing with the repugnancy it was held that by the impugned ordinance of the Electricity (Supply) Act, an age of superannuation has been brought in. There was no such age prescribed by the Central Act. Therefore, there was no repugnancy. By mere curtailment of the term as Chairman of the Board without any mention about his inability or professional competence, so as to affect his reputation in any manner, no injury had taken place so as to complain of violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. The plea of interference with judicial power was negatived. The plea of violation of Article 19 that the provision of compensation is illusory was negatived. On an elaborate consideration of violation of Article 14, the court after referring to the leading decisions of this court concluded that prescription of maximum age by the amending act at 65 years cannot be said to be arbitrary or irrational. Moreover public interest demands that there ought to be an age of retirement in public services. On the ancillary question whether the legislation had been enacted only wi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s amended, would disqualify all persons who are at the time of the amendment 65 years or above. The language is very wide in its comprehension. When it says "or being", this corresponds to Article 102 of the Constitution as well as Article 191, this provision being made applicable either to the Members of Parliament or to the legislative body of the State respectively. It has been held in Pasupati Nath Sukul, Election Commission of India, State of U.P. v. Nem Chand Jain and Others, [1984] 2 S.C.C., 404 that on the incurring of the qualification he ceases to be a member thereof. Therefore, there is a automatic cessation of the right to hold office,that is the purpose of "or being'. These is no necessity to remove the first respondent, by resorting to Section 10 because Section 5 (6) is self- executory. Therefore, by operation of law, the first respondent ceases to hold office on the date of coming into force of the amending Act. In Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao, [1953] S.C.R. 1144, it has been held on similar language occurring in the Constitution that it postulates both existing and supervening disqualification. If it is the avowed policy of the State to pr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ontrary to this Sub-section void. The legislature has introduced the non obstante clause to put the matter beyond doubt. This legislation is general in its terms and it application. The fact that at the relevant time of the amending Act or even the ordinance, the first respondent alone was affected is no ground to hold that it is a single person's legislation. This court, as a matter of fact, has upheld such pieces of legislation in Chiranjit Lal chowdhury v. The Union of India and Ors., [1950] S.C.R. 869, (particularly the passages occurring at pages 878-79). On the basis of its ruling it is submitted that even if it is held a single person's legislation, if he constitutes a class by himself, such a legislation would be valid. The same principle is stated in Thakur Raghubir Singh and Ors. v. The State of Ajmer (Now Rajasthan) Ors., [1959] S.C.R. 478. Again in Lachhman Das on behalf of firm Tilak Ram Ram Bux v. State of Punjab and Ors., [1963] 2 S.C.R. 353 @ 374, it has been held that a law applying to one person or one class of persons is constitutional if there is sufficient basis or reason for it. In Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. The State of Rajasthan Ors., [1964] ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hey are not impleaded no relief could be granted in favour of the writ petitioners even though on merits the petitioners could succeed. Even otherwise, today, the principle of natural justice has assumed great importance. It by reason of the decision of the court Chauhan is ultimately affected, and if that decision is rendered without hearing Chauhan, it would amount to a clear violation of the principle of natural justice. An order passed in violation of that salutory provision of natural justice would be a nullity. As a matter of fact, if Supreme Court passes an order that would amount to nullity is what this court has laid down in. In A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak Anr, [1988] Supp 1 SCR 1 @ 59. Therefore, for the failure to implead Chauhan the writ petition was liable to be dismissed. The contrary view taken by the High Court that though he is a proper party but not a necessary party, or that Chauhan came to be appointed "until further orders" and, therefore, he need not be impleaded, is wrong. Mr. Kapil Sibal took us through the background in which the impungned ordinance and th Act came to be passed. He would submit that it had a great bearing on the legal issues involved i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... w, it cannot be urged that the first respondent having attained the age of 65 ceases to be a Member or Chairman of the Electricity Board. Therefore, Section 5(6) will not help the appellant. Coming to Section 8 that deals with reappointment. Such a reappointment is governed by the terms and conditions as prescribed. The word "prescribed" means prescribed under the rules. The rule making power is contained under Section 78(2) (a). Rule 4 as originally stood governed the reappointment stating it could be under such conditions as the State Govt. may from time to time, by order, direct. There is a proposal to amend the rule. Even under those rules namely Rules 3 and 4, the reappointment is thought of. While care has been taken in this regard no amendment has been effected to Section 8 prescribing the age limit of 65. As a matter of fact, for a tenure appointment under Section 8, there never be a prescription of age of superannuation. Such an appointment is beyond the pale of Section 5. Thus, it is submitted Sections 5,8,10,78 (2) (a) provide a scheme more so when Section 10 does not prescribe the age as a disqualification. In no statute an upper age limit could ever be a disqualifica ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ially appointed cannot be compared with a reappointee. The former falling under Section 5(6) and the latter falling under Section 8. If the respondent had been appointed after the age of 65, he forms a class by himself. Therefore, the State will have to be sore what exactly is the public purpose served or a social or economic obligation. Further, as a matter of fact, this was the test applied in all single person's legislation. In all such cases whenever it was upheld either it was on the ground of mismanagement of the institution or a mill, or because it was in furtherance of a public purpose or a social or economic obligation. In fact, in Ram Prasad Narayan Sahi and another v. The State Bihar and Others, [1953] S.C.R. 1129 the mill was mismanaged. In Lalit Narayan Mishra Institute of Economic Development and Social Change, Patna etc v. State of Bihar and Others etc., [1988] 3 S.C.R 311, the institute was not only mismanaged, of course, the policy was to nationalise all the institutions. Similarly, in Shri Ram Krishana Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar Others, [1959] S.C.R. 279, and in Lachhman Das on behalf of Firm Tilak Ram Ram Bux v. State of Punjab and Others, [1963] ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... further orders." Therefore, the court could grant relief even in his absence. The cases the side has cited can have no application because they related to selection under one scheme only on the displacement of selectees. The writ petitioners could be granted relief. In fine it is submitted that where substantial justice has been done by allowing the first respondent in office until expiry of his term in July, 1992 by exercise of power under Article 136 this court will not interfere as laid down in Pritam Singh v. The State, [1950] 1 S.C.R. 453. Mr. Shanti Bhushan in his elaborate reply would state that Section 5(2) is the only source of appointment - both initial as well as reappointment. Section 8 only deals with tenure. Section 3(1) of the amending Act corresponds to Articles 101(3) or 190(3). Therefore, it brings about an automatic cessation of office. It is incorrect to contend that for a tenure post, it is not proper to prescribe an age limit. Instances are not wanting where statutory provisions have been made to such an effect. For instance, Article 224 of the Constitution in relation to the Addl. Judge. Likewise Section 8 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. Disqualificati ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ese attempts were only with the sole aim of removing the first respondent from office. the Executive having failed in its attempt resorted to legislative process. It is unethical to do so. We are afraid, we cannot decide the case on ethics. We are to judge the law and the correctness of the legal provisions as we see then. Therefore, we are to move from the ethical plane to the legal plane. In this case the State wants to introduce the age of superannuation prescribing an upper age limit of 65 for the Members and Chairman of the Electricity Board. As a matter of fact, hitherto, no such limit was found in the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Supply Act). Before the introduction of the amendment, the appellant State of Himachal Pradesh wrote on 22.6.90 to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs for procuring prior instructions from the President of India, as envisaged in clause (1) of Article 213 of the Constitution. The subject matter of the proposed ordinance falls under item 38 of List III (List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India). Item 38 deals with electricity. Where, therefore, it was proposed to amend Section 5 of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ive Tribunal, Members of Public Service Commission and other high functionaries has also been fixed. This necessitated the amendments in the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 in its application to the State of Himachal Pradesh". Therefore, what does the State desire to do? It wants to embark on a policy of retirement of the Chairman/Members of the Electricity Board after attaining the age of 65 years. This Court is least concerned with the wisdom of the policy. Certainly, no one could quarrel with the introduction of that measure as of policy. In fact this Court has repeatedly recognised such a right of the State. It is enough if we quote K.Nagaraj Anr. etc. etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh Anr. etc. A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 551. In para 7, the court had occasion to observe thus :- "Barring a few services in a few parts of the world as, for example, the American Supreme Court, the terms and conditions of every public service provide for an age of retirement. Indeed, the proposition that there ought to be an age of retirement in public services is widely accepted as reasonable and rational. The fact that the stipulation as to the age of retirement is a common feature of all of our publi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... finding out which way th balance tilts. That is an exercise which the administrator and the legislature have to undertake." For adumbrating this policy a legislation is enacted by the State. It is not for this court to find out whether there was any need for such a legislation. Of course, for lack of legislative competence or for violation of the right to equality under Article 14 etc. the validity of the legislation may be scrutinised. But, certainly, that is far from saying the court could examine the legislation from the point of view that it came to be passed with malafide intention. By long established practice, which has received approbation through authorities of this Court, it has always refrained from attributing malafides to the legislature. In fact, such a thing is unknown to law. Here again, we can usefully refer to the case K. Nagaraj Others etc. etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. etc., AIR 1985, 551. In para 36 it is stated as:- ".... The legislature, as a body, cannot be accused of having passed a law for an extraneous purpose. Its reasons for passing a law are those that are stated in the Objects and Reasons and if, none are so stated, as appear from the p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... The Chairman could be any one of the members who possesses such qualifications as prescribed under Sub- section(4). Sub-section(6) talks of disqualification - (1) member being appointed and (2) or being a member of the Board if he is a member of Parliament or of any State Legislature or any local authority. Prior to the amendment in 1960, this disqualification must have been incurred within the 12 months last preceding. What is important for our purpose is there is a disqualification for appointment in future when it says "shall be disqualified from being appointed". Equally, "or being" means ifsuch a disqualification is incurred after the appointment during the tenure of membership of the post. Therefore, the words "or being" have great significance. We will come to the effect of amendment of Section 5(6) later after dealing with the relevant sections of this Act. Section 8 reads as follow :- "Term of office and conditions for re-appointment of members of the Board - The Chairman and other members of the Board shall hold office for such period, and shall be eligible for reappointment under such conditions, as may be prescribed." A Careful reading of the Section will clearly d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r remove from office any member of the Board who- (a) is found to be a lunatic or becomes of unsound mind; or (b) is adjudged insolvent; or (c) fails to comply with the provisions of Section 9; or (d) become or seeks to become a member of Parliament or any State Legislature or any local authority; or (e) in the opinion of the State Government- (i) has refused to act; or (ii) has become incapable of acting ; or (iii) has so abused his position as to render his continuance on the Board detrimental to the interests of the general public' or (iv) is otherwise unfit to continue as a member; or (f) is convicted of an offence turpitude. (2) The State Government may suspend any member pending an inquiry against him. (3) No order of removed shall be made under this section unless the member concerned has been given an opportunity to submit his explanation to the State Government, and when such order is passed, the seat of the member removed shall become vacant and another member may be appointed under Section 5 to fill up the vacancy. (4) A member who has been removed shall not be eligible for reappointment as member or in any other capacity to the Board. (5) If the Bo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... re is no seperate power in relation to reappointment under Section 8; (3) Section 10 is only an enabling power for taking punitive action against such of those members who fall under clauses (a) to (f) of the said Section and (4) Section 78(2)(a) confers a power upon the State Government to frame rules. The effect of Amendment under Section 5(6) of the said Act With this we pass on to the amending section of 5(6), by Act 10 of 1990. The amendment was carried out to section 5(6) is as follows. This can be brought out succinctly by a tabulated statement :- STATEMENT OF PROVISIONS LIKELY TO BE AFFECTED BY THE AMENDMENT BILL Section Provisions as exist Provisions as will stand after the enactment of the Bill (1) (2) (3) 5. Constitution and Compositi- 5. Constitution and Compos- on of State Electricity Board- ition of State Electricity Board- (1) The State Govt. shall, as (1) The State Govt.shall, soon as may be after the as soon as may be after the issue of the notification issue of the notification under sub-section (4) of under sub-section (4) of sec. 1, constitute by noti- sec. 1, constitute by fication in the Official notification in the Offic- Gazette a State Electri ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... deal with the similar language employed. (Article 102 in relation to Members of Parliament). In Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao, [1953] SCR 1144 @ 1157 it was observed as under :- "The use of the word "become" in articles 190(3) and 192(1) is not inapt, in the context, to include within its Scope pre-existing disqualifications also, as becoming subject to a disqualification is predicated of "a member of a House or Legislature", and a person who, being already disqualified, gets elected, cannot inappropriately, be said to "become" subject to the disqualification as a member as soon as he is elected. The argument is more ingenious than sound. Article 191, which lays down the same set of disqualifications for election as well as for continuing as a member, and Article 193 which prescribes the penalty for sitting and voting when disqualified, are naturally phrased in terms wide enough to cover both pre-existing and supervening disqualifications; but it does not necessarily follow that articles 190(3) and 192(1) must also be taken to cover both. Their meaning must depend on the language used which, we think, is reasonably plain". In Pashupati Nath Sukul etc. v. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... han, learned counsel for the appellant. Now we shall proceed to consider as to why a corresponding amendment has not been provided by incorporating this disqualification. The argument of Mr. Kapil Sibal is that the attaining of 65 years is not to be considered as disqualification as otherwise Section 10 would provide for such a situation. It has already been seen that Section 10 merely confers an enabling power to take punitive action. It is one thing the State has power to take puritiv action, it is entirely different thing to say that in law the first respondent ceases to hold office on the incurring of the disqualification of attainment of 65 years of age. If Section 5(6) itself brings about a cessation of office, that Sub-section being self-executory in nature, there is no need to provide for the same under Section 10 once over again. Merely because the parent Act (Central Legislation) provides for a disqualification on account of becoming a Member of Parliament, State Legislature or Local Board, that does not mean there must be a corresponding provision incorporating age as well under Section 10. We are unable to agree with Mr. Kapil Sibal. Equally, the contention that Secti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r of Himachal Pradesh is pleased to extend the appointment". Therefore, where the original appointment dated 12.5.86 is extend from time to time, it is futile to contend that these are fresh appointments. While we are on this we have also get to refer to the counter affidavit of the State filed in the writ petition before the High Court. In para 12 it is stated as follows :- "The contents of para 12 of the petition, as stated, are wrong and hence denied. It is emphatically denied that the power was exercised malafide and was colourable exercise of power or was a fraud on power. The power has been exercised within the legal ambit of Section 5 read with Section 8 of the Act and the rules framed thereunder." From this we are unable to see how any help could be derived by the first respondent to base his arguments that the power of reappointment is traceable to Section 8. This aspect of the matter had already been dealt with by us. The statement of `Objects and Reasons' makes a reference to Section 8. But it does not again mean there is an independent power of appointment. What the above extract of counter affidavit and reference to Section 8 mean is denial of malafide. Besides, hi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hing to the contrary contained in any provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, rules, regulations or bye-laws made thereunder or in any judgement decree or order of the court or in any contract, any appointment made before the commencement of the Electricity (Supply) (Himachal Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1990, whereby a person has a right to continue as a member of the Board after attaining the age of 65 years, shall be void; and on such commencement he shall be deemed to have ceased to hold office of the member of the Board. (2) On ceasing to hold office of the member of the Board under sub-section (1) such member shall be entitled to compensation as may be determined by the State Government; but such compensation shall not exceed the amount equivalent to the amount of salary and allowances payable to him for his unexpired term". One thing that is significant is it contains a `non- obstante' clause. An appointment of a Member of the Board made prior to the commencement to this Act namely, 13.7.90 (giving retrospective operation) when gives a right to continue as a member after attaining the age of 65 years, that appointment is rendered void. This non-obstante clause is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... etermining the purpose of object of legislation, indeed, it is permissible to look into the circumstances which were prevalent at that time when the law was enacted and which necessitated the passing of that enactment. For the limited purpose of appreciating the background and the antecedents factual matrix leading to the legislation it is open to the court to look into the statement of `Objects and Reasons' of the Bill which accentuated to provide a remedy for the then existing malady. In the case of State of West Bengal v. Union of India, [1964] 1 SCR 371, this court ruled that the statement of `Objects and Reasons' accompanied a Bill when introduced in Parliament can be used for the limited purpose of understanding, the background and state of affairs leading up to the legislation. Therefore, we now look into the statement of `Objects and Reasons'. That clearly brings out the object of the desirability of introducing an age of superannuation as the same is entrenched in our administrative and constitutional systems. With this object in view, Section 3 intends that no one has a right to continue as a member of the Board after attaining the age of 65. Thus, the only conclusion pos ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the decision-maker will not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn. This analysis is `classical but certainly not exhaustive : R. Secretary of State for the Environment ex. P. Nottinghamshire CC (1986) AC 240 at 249 (Lord Scarman). One case which does not seem to be covered is that of a first-time applicant for a licence (below. p. 559). The courts have developed a relatively novel doctrine in public law that a duty of consultation may arise from a legitimate expectation of consultation aroused either by a promise or by an established practice of consultation". In a recent case, in dealing with legitimate expectation in R. v. Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food, ex parte Jaderow Ltd and Others, [1991] All England Law Reports 41. It has been observed at page 68 :- "Question II : Legitimate Expectation: It should be pointed out in this regard that, under the powers reserved to the member states by Art. 5(2) of Regulation 170/83, fishing activities could be made subject to the grant to licences which, by their nature, are subject to temporal limits and to various conditions. Furthermore, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on since it affects everyone. On the contrary, the argument of Kapil Sibal is that only the first respondent alone could be affected and, therefore, it is a single person's legislation being violative of Article 14 of the constitution. We will look at the relevant case law which deals with single person's legislation and how far they are violative of Article 14. In Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India and Others, [1950] 1 S.C.R. 869, the head note reads : "Held also per KANIA C.J., FAZAL ALI, and MUKHERJEA JJ.- (PATANJALI SASTRI AND DAS,JJ. dissenting) - that though the Legislature had proceeded against one company only and its shareholders inasmuch as even one corporation or a group of persons can be taken to be a class by itself for the purpose of legislation, provided there is sufficient basis or reason for it and there is a strong presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment, the burden was on the petitioner to prove that there were also other companies similarly situated and this company alone had been discriminated against, and as he had failed to discharge this burden the impugned Act cannot be held to have denied to the petitioner the right to e ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation ; and (f) that while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of a legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to he notice of the court on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation. The above principles will have to be constantly borne in mind by the court when it is called upon to adjudge the constitutionality of any particular law attacked as discriminatory and violative of the equal protection of the laws. A close persual of the decisions of this Court in which the above principles have been enunciated and applied by this Court will also show that a statute which may come up for consideration on a question of its validity under Art. 14 of the Constitution, may be placed in one or other of the following fi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... efore, on this principle Patiala State Bank was held to be a class by itself and it would be within the power of the State to enact a law with respect to it. In Tilkyat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. The State of Rajasthan and others, [1964] S.C.R. 561 @ 617-18, it is held as thus :- "That takes us to the argument that the Act is invalid because it contravenes Act. 14. In our opinion, there is no substance in this argument. We have referred to the historical background of the present legislation. At the time when Ordinance No. II of 1959 was issued, it had come to the knowledge of the Government of Rajasthan that valuables such a jewelleries, ornaments, gold and silver-ware and cash had been removed by the Tilkayat in the month of December 1957, and as the successor of the State of Mewar, the State of Rajasthan had to exercise its right of supervising the due administration of the properties of the temple. There is no doubt that the shrine at Nathdwara holds a unique position amongst the Hindu shrines in the State of Rajasthan and no temple can be regarded as comparable with it. Besides, the Tilkayat himself has entered into negotiations for the purpose of obtaining a proper scheme ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sed for the purpose of nationalisation of the Institute only. It is apparent from the provisions of the Ordinances and the Act that the private educational institutions as defined there in are to be taken over for the purpose as mentioned in the Preambles to the Ordinances and the Act in a phased manner. All the institutions which answer the description as given in Section 2(a) of the Act are to be nationalised. It is, therefore, not correct to say that the Institute has been singled out for the purpose of nationalisation. There can be no doubt that when nationalisation has to be done in a phased manner, all the institutions cannot be taken over at a time. The nationalisation in a phased manner contemplates that by and by the object of nationalisation will be taken over. Therefore, in implementing the nationalisation of private institutions in a phased manner, the Legislature has started with the Institute. Therefore, the question of singling out the Institute or treating it as a class by itself does no arise, for as the provisions of the Act the Ordinances go, all the private educational institutions, as defined in section 2(a) of the Act will be nationalised in a phased manner" ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ecame necessary because there were some other reasons namely, mismanagement requiring taking over the banks and temples etc. and therefore, the single person's legislation was upheld is not tenable. We also hold that in order to justify a legislation of this character, no extraordinary situation need be disclosed. The contention that this is not in furtherance of the legislative object, cannot also be accepted because it has already been seen that the legislative object is to introduce as age of superannuation. Beyond this nothing more need be established by the State. The possibility of this legislation applying to one or more persons exists in principle. The fact that only one individual came to be affected cannot render the legislation arbitrary as violative of Article 14. This is because Section 3 is general in terms and the incidence of its applying to one individual does not render the legislation invalid. The theory advanced by the learned counsel for the first respondent that there must be mismanagement or some extraordinary situation to warrant a legislation of its character also does not seem to be correct as seen from The Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd., Sonepat v. Their W ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... whereby he could only be removed from office by an order of the Chancellor passed on the ground of misbehaviour or incapacity after enquiry by a person who was or had been a Judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court and after the Vice Chancellor had been given an opportunity of making his representation against such removal Section 13(1) of the 1959 Act was also amended so as to reduce the term of office of the Vice Chancellor from 5 to 3 years. The 1959 Act was again amended later in 1966 by the Osmania University (Second Amendment) Act XI of 1966. Section 5 of this amending Act introduced a new s. 13A into the 1959 Act whereby it was provided that the person then holding the office of Vice chancellor was appointed; and that such new appointment must be made within 90 days of the commencement of the Act whereupon the old Vice Chancellor would cease to hold Office. The appellant filed a writ petition claiming, inter alia, that s.5 of the second amending Act introducing the new s.13A was discriminatory as against him and therefore violative of Art. 14. The High Court dismissed the petition. In the appeal to the Supreme Court, it was contended on behalf of the respondents tha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ce even after the passing of the First Amendment Act. No doubt the term of office of the Vice Chancellor was fixed at 3 years under s.13(1) of the Act. But no provisions were made in the First Amendment Act regarding the termination of the tenure of office of the Vice chancellor who was then holding that post. There can be no controversy that s.13A introduced bys.5 of the Second Amendment Act, deals only with the appellant. In fact, the stand taken on behalf of the respondents in the counter affidavit filed before the High Court, was to the effect that the Legislature had chosen to treat the Vice Chancellor holding office at the time of commencement of the Second Amendment Act, as a class by himself and with a view to enable the Chancellor to make fresh appointments, s.13A of the Act was enacted. Therefore, it is clear that s.13A applies only to the appellant. Though no doubt, it has been stated, on behalf of the respondent, that similar provisions were incorporated, at about the same time, in two other Acts, relating to two other Universities viz., the Andhra University and the Sri Venkateswara University, and though this circumstance has also been taken into account by the lear ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e Vice Chancellors has been no doubt reduced under the First Amendment Act and fixed for 3 years for all the Vice Chancellors. But, so far as the appellant is concerned, by virtue of s.13A of the Act, he can continue to hold that office only until a new Vice Chancellor is appointed by the Chancellor, and that appointment is to be made within 90 days. While all other Vice Chancellors, appointed under the Act, can continue to be in office for a period of three years, the appellant is literally forced out of his office on the expiry of 90 days from the date of commencement of the Second Amendment Act. There is also no provision in the statute providing for the termination of the services of the Vice chancellors, who are appointed under the Act, in the manner provided under s.13A of the Act. By s.13A, the appellant is even denied the benefits which may be available under the provision to sub- s.(1) of s.13 of the Act, which benefit is available to all other Vice chancellors." It will be clear from the above extract on its own terms the legislation applied only to one individual and nobody else, even in principle, to a future Vice Chancellor. There was no basis for making a distinction ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pecifically the wife's claims of succession. Lastly, we will deal with Ram Prasad Narayan Sahi and Another v. The State of Bihar and Others, [1953] S.C.R. 1129 @ 1132-33, it is held as under :- "The decision of the majority of this Court in Chiranjit Lal v. The Union of India is relied on in support of these contentions. In that case, however, the majority felt justified in upholding the legislation, though it adversely affected the rights and interest of the shareholders of a particular joint stock company, because the mismanagement of the company's affairs prejudicially affected the production of an essential commodity and caused serious unemployment amongst a section of the community. Mr. Justice Das and I took the view that legislation directed against a particular named person or corporation was obviously discriminatory and could not constitutionally be justified even if such legislation resulted in some benefit to the public. In a system of Government by political parties, I was apprehensive of the danger inherent in special enactments which deprive particular named person of their liberty or property because the Legislature thinks them guilty of misconduct, and said in may d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lly the direct recruits were not before the court, the petition is not likely to fail no that ground". What was the first respondent seeking in the writ petition? He was questioning the validity of the Ordinance and the Act whereby he had been deprived of his further continuance. What is the relief could be have asked for against Chauhan? None. The first point is Chauhan came to be appointed consequent to the suspension of the first respondent which suspension had come to be stayed by the High Court on 12.6.90. Then, again, as pointed out by the High Court it was "till further orders". Therefore, we hold the failure to implead Chauhan does not affect the maintainability of the writ petition. One postscriptum needs to be added. It was argued on the basis of Pritam Singh v. The State, [1950] S.C.R. 453 that unless the court comes to the conclusion that the High Court is palpably wrong, it should not interfere. No doubt, the same principle is stated in Union of India v. M.P. Singh, [1990] (Suppl.) S.C.C. 701 that if substantial justice is done the interference under Article 136 is not warranted. We do not think this principle will have any application. There is no denying the fa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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