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TMI Blog2004 (4) TMI 530X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rt did not keep the relevant aspects in view while reversing the judgment of the trial Court. Accordingly, we set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the first Appellate Court. The Court at Barnala shall return the plaint to the plaintiff No.1 (respondent No.1) with appropriate endorsement under its seal which shall present it within a period of four weeks from the date of such endorsement of return before the proper Court at Udaipur. If it is so done, the question of limitation shall not be raised and the suit shall be decided on its own merits in accordance with law. The appeal is allowed. - C.A. 2645 OF 2004 - - - Dated:- 23-4-2004 - DORAISWAMY RAJU AND ARIJIT PASAYAT , JJ. JUDGMENT Leave granted. In this appeal, the only question that is raised is whether the High Court s conclusion that the Civil Court at Barnala had jurisdiction to try the suit filed by respondent No.1-United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Plaintiff No.1 ) and Malwa Cotton Spinning Mills Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as plaintiff No.2 ) is correct or not. While the trial Court held that the Barnala Court had jurisdiction, the first Appellate Court held ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as the jurisdiction to try the suit. Without any plausible reason or basis the High court upset the decision of the first Appellate Court. Undisputedly, in the consignment note it was stated as follows: "The Court at Head office city shall only be the jurisdiction in respect of all claims and matters arising under the consignment at the goods entrusted for transport". Additionally, at the top of the consignment note the jurisdiction has been specified to be with Udaipur Court. With reference to the aforesaid indication in the consignment note, learned counsel for the appellant stated that there is clear exclusion of the Courts other than the chosen one and, therefore, the suit could not have been entertained at any other place. Unfortunately, the High Court did not appreciate the factual position in its proper perspective holding that the Court at Barnala would have got jurisdiction in the ordinary course. Because of the exclusion clause as embodied in the consignment note and specific indication in the consignment note that the Udaipur Court alone has jurisdiction the High Court was not justified in its conclusion. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1 (plaintiff ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office, at such place." Normally, under clauses (a) to (c) plaintiff had a choice of forum and cannot be compelled to go to the place of residence or business of the defendant and can file a suit at a place where the cause of action arises. If the defendant desires to be protected from being dragged into a litigation at some place merely because the cause of action arises there it can save itself from such a situation by an exclusion clause. The clear intendment of the Explanation, however, is that where the Corporation has a subordinate office in the place where the cause of action arises it cannot be heard to say that it cannot be sued there because it does not carry on business at that place. Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 20 inter alia refer to a Court within local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant inter alia "carries on business". Clause (c) on the other hand refers to a Court within local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action wholly or in part arises. On a plain reading of the Explanation to Section 20 CPC it is clear that Explanation consists of two parts, (i) b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d a subordinate office at another place and the cause of action arose at the place where it had its subordinate office it shall be deemed to be carrying on business at both places the language used in Explanation II would have been identical to that of Explanation I which was dealing with a case of a person having a permanent dwelling at one place and also temporary residence at another place. The above position was noted in Patel Roadways Ltd., Bombay v. Prasad Trading Company (1991 (4) SCC 270). By a long series of decisions it has been held that where two Courts or more have under the CPC jurisdiction to try a suit or proceeding an agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in any one of such Courts is not contrary to public policy and in no way contravenes Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Therefore, if on the facts of a given case more than one Court has jurisdiction, parties by their consent may limit the jurisdiction to one of the two Courts. But by an agreement parties cannot confer jurisdiction to a Court which otherwise does not have jurisdiction to deal with a matter. (See Hakam Singh v. M/s. Gammon (India) Ltd. (AIR 1971 SC ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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