9911796707
TMI Blog2011 (6) TMI 391X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... later, requesting for refund of money, can be relied upon by the revenue to deny the exemption under section 11 for assessment year 2001-02. Exemption u/s 11 - Held that:- while section 10(22) had an express condition that the institution should exist "not for purposes of profit" section 11 does not impose any such condition. - the incidence of surplus during the course of activity of running the educational institution would not be a ground to state that the assessee is carrying on a business activity so as to forfeit exemption under section 11. Education versus Charitable - section 2(15) - Held that:- 'education' per se is a 'charitable purpose' under section 2(15). - the revenue's attempt to categorize the educational institution as a business has to be rejected. Regarding donation - Held that:- the donations received by the assessee towards 'corpus fund' cannot be treated as 'capitation fees'. - Further, even if the corpus donations received are in deed capitation fees, as more than 75 per cent of that amount has also been applied for charitable purposes, the said donations would still be exempt under section 11 (1)(a). Power of AO to decide the nature of trust in assessme ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tated that after the enquiries and investigations by the aforesaid various authorities stretching over a period from 1994 to 2007, all the authorities had granted exemption to the Trust under section 10(22)/section 11 and also renewed the approval under section 80G to the Trust. 5. However, subsequent to a search under section 132 on 6-6-2007, the revenue, apparently has altered its earlier conclusion about the assessee's eligibility for exemption under section 11 and invoked section 147 to deny the exemption originally granted to the assessee resulting in the present appeal and cross objections. 6. For assessment year 2001-02, the Trust earned a surplus of Rs. 6,80,23,196 and had received corpus donations of Rs. 1,26,50,000, both of which, it claimed, were exempt under section 11. Apparently, no assessment was made either under section 143(1) or (3) and it is the grievance of the Trust that even the refund of TDS of Rs. 10150 claimed by its return was not issued. vide order under section 143(3) rule with section 147 dated 30-12-2008, the Assessing Officer has brought the aforesaid surplus of Rs. 6,80,23,196 and corpus donations of Rs. 1,26,50,000 to tax by denying the exemptio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... either donations nor voluntary contributions as these payments were forcibly extracted from the parents/guardians at the time of admission of their children into the appellant's institution. 9. In its decisions the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has made it clear that education cannot be run as a business and that the concept of teaching shops is contrary to the constitutional scheme and is wholly abhorrent to the Indian culture and heritage. When the appellant runs an educational institution by collecting capitation fees the same cannot therefore be held to be a charitable institution under section 2(15) of the Income-tax Act and the appellant is not eligible for exemption under section 11. 10. The appellant has to prove that corpus donations were not received from any relatives of the students admitted in the college and donors are totally strangers to the parties to the transactions motivated purely by philanthropic instinct. The list of donors was submitted by the appellant at the fag end of the proceedings and enquiries made with respect to local parties reveal that there were no such persons at the given addresses. The response of persons who were issued questionnai ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 11. 1b. The learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) has erred in holding that no evidence has been shown to support that the assessee is engaged in the activity of education as a business without considering the actual evidence available on record viz. Show cause notice issued by the Commissioner of Income-tax Central Range - I proposing to cancel the registration under section 12AA(3), statements recorded during the course of search from Sri V. Sankar son of the managing trustee and Sri R. Vijayakumar, Secretary to the other Pro-Chancellor, letters from parents and refund files of donations, the details of all of which have been clearly mentioned in the assessment order. 1c. The learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) has erred in holding that the assessee has discharged its burden regarding proving the claim under section 11 without considering that the assessee has delayed furnishing the list of donors for the relevant year especially when the Assessing Officer has proved the facts for the later assessment years. 1d. The learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) has erred in holding that "the details of admission procedures given by the appellant clearl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ellore Engineering College functioned; iv. Actual selection and allotment of the candidates for admission in to engineering by the Madras University through the single window system; and v. The fees to be charged. 11. In support of the above submissions, copies of approvals from the University of Madras prescribing the courses and the number of students that can be admitted for each course during the year have been filed in pages 39 to 41 of "statement of facts". Copies of the Admissions Regulations of AICTE and DOTE are placed at pages 22 to 33 of "statement of facts" which substantiate the assessee's submission that it had very little discretion in the matter of admissions which are: (1) 5 per cent of sanctioned seats as NRI quota and (2) "lapsed seat" - seats that remain unfilled after the last date fixed for allotment by the competent authority (regulation No. 10 in page No. 25 of AICTE admission regulations) placed at page 36 of "statement of facts". He referred to the Notification by the Tamil Nadu Government fixing the fees to substantiate that the trust's revenue was also regulated by the Government. Finally, he referred to pages No. 69 to 71 of "statement of fac ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d to above clearly establish that both the number of students and the fees chargeable from them are regulated and controlled by AICTE/DOTE through the University of Madras. Hence, the assessee could not have engaged in 'profiteering' as alleged by the revenue by increasing the students strength nor could it have charged a higher fee. We find from page 36 of statement of facts that the Government Notification prescribing fees for unaided self financing engineering colleges prescribes 3 different scales of fees with the nomenclatures of (a) Free seat category (b) Payment seat category (c) Non resident Indian students We find that there is a significant difference in the scale of fees for each category of students. Obviously, this is because the Government, in its wisdom, recognizes that unaided self financing educational institutions cannot be run by charging the lower fees charged by aided financial institutions. Therefore, the Government has permitted them to charge higher fees for the different categories. We find from the admission regulations and other documents submitted that 5 per cent of the seats sanctioned by the University of Madras can be given to NRI studen ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... " by the affluent students to the needy students, as the State, which was traditionally/constitutionally bound to provide these services, could not do so. Hence, the charging of higher fees from a certain percentage of students will not be detrimental to the "Charitable" nature of the institutions as this charging of higher fees from the affluent students is done only to subsidise the cost of education of the needy students especially when this scheme of "Public private partnership" is an instrument of State policy. We find support for our above view from CIT v. Pulikkal Medical Foundation (P.) Ltd. [1994] 210 ITR 299/73 Taxman 402 (Ker.) and Breach Candy Hospital Trust v. Chief CIT [2010] 322 ITR 246/192 Taxman 98 (Bom.). A careful appreciation of the aforesaid macro view can only lead to the irresistible conclusion that charging of higher fees from affluent students or raising funds for the laudable object of education, which is traditionally a State function, through donations, by an unaided self financing educational institutions cannot deter the "charitable" nature of the activity and in any view make such activity "Commercial" in nature. 15. There is one more angle from whi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is unable to get students to fill up even the sanctioned strength, we fail to understand as to how it would be in a position to demand and get donations at the time of admission. 17. For the reasons aforesaid, we have no reservations in holding that the assessee had very little discretion in the matter of admission or charging of fees during the year and therefore, have no hesitation in holding that the corpus donations received cannot be treated as capitation fees and that the surplus earned by the assessee cannot be on account of "profiteering" warranting the assessment of assessee's surplus as 'income from business' and therefore, we dismiss Ground Nos. 1.d and 1.e raised by the revenue. 18. As regards Ground No. 1.c that, the assessee had delayed furnishing the list of donors and therefore the ld. CIT(A) erred in holding that the assessee had discharged his burden, we find, as pointed out by the ld.AR that this ground clearly contradicts para 14, page 8, of the assessment order, which affirms that the list of dates, names, full addresses and donations received were obtained and verified with the account books and records. Further, there is much force in the assessee's subm ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... be acted upon without supporting evidence. 21. After considering the rival submissions, we are inclined to accept the aforesaid submissions of the assessee. It is a well established principle that, Income-tax, being an annual tax, the proceedings and assessment of each year is self contained and will be based only on the facts, circumstances and the law prevailing during that year and cannot be influenced by facts and circumstances of even the same assessee in another year. Although this principle is so well established that it needs no precedence to be relied on, we may quote the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Aditanar Educational Institution v. Addl. CIT [1997] 224 ITR 310/90 Taxman 528 where, in page 318, it was held as under: "Income-tax is an annual tax and therefore, the liability for taxation must be determined with reference to each year" " the availability of the exemption should be evaluated each year to find out whether the institution existed during the relevant year solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit." 22. We, therefore, hold that the contents of the show cause notice under section 12AA(3) proposing to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n will be subject to tax. However, there may be cases where the educational institutions may be owned by the trusts of societies to whom the provisions of section 11 may be applicable. Where all the objects of these trusts are educational, and the surplus, if any, from running the educational institution is used for educational purposes only, it can be held that the institution is existing for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit." 24. The aforesaid propositions were again buttressed by the ld.AR by a line of cases as under: Aditanar Educational Institution's case (supra) " running, managing or assisting schools and colleges - is an educational institution entitled to exemption available each year on surplus over expenditure, if the institution existed solely for educational purposes - overall view to be taken - Income-tax Act " " availability of the exemption should be evaluated each year to find out whether the institution existed during the relevant year solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit. After meeting the expenditure, if any surplus results incidentally " " it will not cease to be one existing solely for educational purposes ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nds of the educational institution that would not ipso facto lead to an inevitable conclusion that such an educational institution exists for making profits and not solely for educational purposes " " Accordingly, it had to be ascertained whether the educational institution had been applying its profit wholly and exclusively to the object for which the institution was established. Merely because an institution had earned profit that would not be the deciding factor to conclude that the educational institution existed for profit " Vanita Vishram Trust v. CIT [2010] 327 ITR 121/192 Taxman 389 (Bom.) " the fact that a surplus may incidentally arise from the activities of the trust, after meeting the expenditure incurred for conducting educational activities would not disentitle the trust of the benefit of the provisions of section 10(23C) " Maa Saraswari Educational Trust v. Union of India [2010] 194 Taxman 84 (HP). " Therefore, it is not as if the educational institution cannot generate any surplus. Generating surplus and accumulation of income will not disqualify an institution for the benefits of section 10(23). Surplus is to be understood in contradistinction to gener ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... bmitted that, section 2(15) providing an inclusive definition of charitable purpose, enumerates the following: u Relief of the poor; u Education; u Medical relief and u Advancement of any other object of general public utility, not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit. 26. It was also submitted that there are no conditions for treating 'education' as charitable purpose under section 2(15) - unlike under section 10(22) and that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Surat Art Silk Manufacturers Association, (supra), has held that the phrase "not involving the carrying on any activity for profit" would govern only the last limb of section 2(15) and not the earlier 3 limbs, which includes 'education'. Further, CBDT Circular No. 11 of 2008 dated 19-12-2008 also clearly endorses this view and puts the matter to rest. Para 2.1 and 2.2 of the said circular reads as under: 2.1 "newly inserted proviso to section 2(15) will not apply in respect of the first three limbs of section 2(15) i.e. education. Consequently, where the purpose of a trust or institution is relief of the poor, education, it will constitute 'charitable purpose' even if it inciden ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cial Welfare Society [2007] 107 ITD 403 (Delhi) " Whether relief of poor, education and medical relief are charitable activities per se and if any institution is carrying out any of these objects, then such an institution would be pursuing a charitable purpose - Held, yes " " Whether since running schools in a systematic manner was incidental to attainment of one of objects of society, assessee's case was covered under section 11(4A) and, therefore, expenditure incurred in commercial activity was not entitled to exemption under section 11(1)(a) " Dy. DIT v. Shanti Devi Progressive Education Society [2011] 9 Taxmann.com 240 (Delhi) O.P. Jindal Global University v. CIT [2010] 127 ITD 164 (Delhi) 28. We have no difficulty in subscribing to this submission of the assessee, as the language of the statute is crystal clear and requires no interpretation, whatsoever, to hold that 'education' per se is a 'charitable purpose' under section 2(15). We are surprised by the number of cases on this issue and amazed at the propensity of the revenue to litigate on what is perhaps one of the simplest definitions under the Income-tax Act. Be that as it may, our task in subscribing to this ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... at " . following income shall not be included in the total income .. u income derived from u property held under trust wholly for charitable or religious purposes to the extent it is applied for such purposes ." 33. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gangabai Charities v. CIT [1992] 197 ITR 416/63 Taxman 501 has upheld the aforesaid interpretation as under: "in page 419 - " in order to claim the benefit of section 11(1)(a) of the Act: 1. the income is derived from property held under the trust. 2. the trust is wholly for charitable or religious purposes. 3. the exemption is permissible to the extent to which to such income is applied to such purposes in India" Again, in page 421 the Apex Court went on to hold that: "the crux of statutory exemption under section 11(1)(a) of the Act is not the income earned from property held under trust, but the actual application of the said income for religious and charitable purposes". 34. While interpreting 'not involving any activity for profit' governing the 4th limb of section 2(15), the Supreme Court in Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association case (supra) has held that "so long as the purpose does ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Thanthi Trust [2001] 247 ITR 785/115 Taxman 126 (SC) " Further change of law - requirement that business should be incidental to attainment of objectives of trust - satisfied - Income-tax Act, 1961, sections 11(4A) (before and after amendment in 1992), 13(1)(bb) " " Interpretation of taxing statutes - ambiguity - provision to be construed in manner that benefits " " The scope of sub-section (4A) of section 11, as amended in 1992, is more beneficial to a trust or institution than the scope of the sub-section before the amendment. As it stands amended in 1992, all that is required for the business income of a trust or institution to be exempt from tax is that the business should be incidental to the attainment of the objectives of the trust or institution. A business whose income is utilized by the trust or the institution for the purposes of achieving the objectives of the trust or the institution is a institution " DIT(Exemptions) v. Willington Charitable Trust [2011] 330 ITR 24/195 Taxman 232 (Mad.) " Charitable purpose - exemption - business income if utilized towards achievement of object of assessee - trust it would be incidental to achievement of object - Assess ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... titled to exemption - Income-tax Act, 1961, section 11 - Thanthi Trust (2001) 247 ITR 785 (SC) applied " CIT v. Bimetal Bearing Ltd. [1985] 152 ITR 85 (Mad.) ITO v. Rao Bahadur AKD Dharmaraj Education Charity Trust [2005] 273 ITR 256/147 Taxman 350 (Mad.) " assessment year 1992-93, the respondent/assessee claimed exemption under sections 10(22) and 11 of the Income-tax Act " " Even though the - alleged to have been involved in carrying on business during the assessment year 1992-93, nowhere in the order, have the authorities concerned stated that the nature of business said to have carried on by the respondent/assessee (trust) is in violation to the provision of section 11(4A) of the act - concededly, the object of the respondent/assessee (trust) is to establish, run, manage and assist colleges, schools and other educational institution solely for educational purpose and in that regard to raise or collect funds, donations, gifts - 10(22) " CIT v. Nahata Charitable Trust [2000] 246 ITR 450/[2002] 125 Taxman 190 (Mad.) " Charitable purposes - charitable trust - exemption - exemption cannot be denied solely on ground that trust carries on business - Income-tax Act, 1 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t in shape of excess of income over expenditure by and large was for purpose of education - held, yes " " The institution might have had profit which was in the shape of excess of income over expenditure. If such excess called profit was distributed to the persons without any consideration then under those circumstances, it would be held that the institution was for the purpose of profit. If the excess over expenditure of income was subsequently spent within the institution directly and indirectly was for the development of various fields and branches closely linked with the system of imparting education, then under such circumstances, it could not be held that the institution was run for the purpose of profit. The basic test for determining whether the institution for profit is the application for profit " " The institution may have profit which is in the shape of excess of income over expenditure. If such excess called profit is distributed to the persons without any consideration then under those circumstances, it will be held that the institution is for the purpose of profit. If the excess over expenditure of income is subsequently spent within the institution directly a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ; CIT v. Bal Utkarsh Society [1979] 119 ITR 137 (Guj.) He further submitted that a donation may be identified as a corpus donation - u from the intention of the donor expressed in writing or implication u from its treatment in the accounts of the donee and u manner of utilization by the donee 42. It is claimed that corpus fund donations have a specific written direction to treat them as such by the donors, in support of which a copy of such donation receipt has been filed in page No. 48 of the "statement of facts". The assessee is authorized to accept such corpus donations by clauses 3 and 5(p) of its trust deed filed in pages No. 6 to 17 of the "statement of facts". Further, the assessee has credited the entire corpus donation of Rs. 1,26,50,000 to the corpus fund account. The ld. AR contends, in our opinion rightly, that the revenue has no basis whatsoever to rechristen the 'corpus donation' as 'capitation fee' except on his presumptions and assertions in the assessment order and on account of statements by Sri V. Sankar and Sri R. Vijayakumar. 43. The ld. AR has furnished a list of trustees during the year relevant to assessment year 2001-02, in whic ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ogressive Education Society's case (supra) " Exemption was denied for assessment year 1993-94 on ground that it was collecting admission fee, donation and loans and thus had been a society for profit and not solely for educational purpose - whether since assessee had been doing these activities right from beginning and same was within powers given in memorandum, there was no reason to object to such collections - since revenue could not point out any case where any part of profit/income was diverted for purpose other than for educational purposes, exemption under section 10(22) could not be denied to assessee - held, yes " Agarwal Shiksha Samiti Trust v. CIT [1987] 168 ITR 751/[1988] 36 Taxman 165 (Raj.) 46. We are inclined to follow the aforesaid line of decisions and hold that for all the above reasons and following the above judgments, the donations received by the assessee towards 'corpus fund' cannot be treated as 'capitation fees'. We may add that, independent of the aforesaid decisions, another bench of this Tribunal, of which one of us was a member, has in the case of Balaji Educational Charitable Public Trust (supra) held that "in the absence of proper enquiries ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... al institutions have proliferated in the past 2 decades on account of the Government's initiative to rope in the private sector to perform its constitutional obligation of providing education to its citizens. Hence, a student or his parents have the right of choosing the educational institution and can never be compelled to choose a particular institution or pay donation for securing admission into such institution. Hence, if a student or his parents are so particular to gain admission into an institution and for that purpose are willing to donate money for the improvement of the institution, then it appears to us to be a 'voluntary' act and therefore, even if the donations were paid at the time of or to secure admission into the institution, it will not cease to be 'voluntary' so as to fall outside the ambit of section 11(1)(d) or 12(1). We may add that if such donations were collected from students/parents after the admission, then the revenue's case may be on a better footing, as then, it could be said that such donations were not 'voluntary', but under compulsion, as the student was at the mercy of the institution. However, we fail to see how the assessee could have compelled a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... On reading the above two terms, it appears to us that - 1. Contribution' is a term of wider import than 'donation' and it includes 'donation'. 2. While 'contribution' may have quid pro quo, a donation does not have quid pro quo. 3. 'Contribution' may be either 'voluntary' or under a legal or contractual obligation, but a 'donation' can only be 'voluntary'. 51. We then have to ascertain the meaning of 'voluntary', which has been defined as: u "voluntary adj. u Done or undertaken of one's own free will: a voluntary decision to leave the job. u Normally controlled by or subject to individual volition: u voluntary muscle contractions. u Capable of making choices; having the faculty of will. u Supported by contributions or charitable donations rather than by Government appropriations: voluntary hospitals. Law (a) Without legal obligation or consideration: a voluntary conveyance of property. (b) Done deliberately; intentional: voluntary manslaughter. [Middle English, from Latin voluntarius, from voluntas, choice, from velle, vol-, to wish; see wel in Indo-European roots.] Synonyms: voluntary, intentional, deliberate, wilful, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nt charges for a souvenir are 'voluntary contributions' under section 12(1). 53. In the case of CIT v. Shri Billeswara Charitable Trust [1984] 145 ITR 29/16 Taxman 259 (Mad.) it has been held in page 29 - " .. When Parliament speaks of income derived from voluntary contributions, which voluntary contributions are ordinarily windfalls, the legitimate implication to be read into the statute is that voluntary contributions per se are not regarded as income at all. On a proper construction of section 12(1) and section 12(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, voluntary contributions directed to be held as part of the corpus of the donee cannot be held to be income for the purpose of applying section 12(2) " . In page 32-33 - " The matter may be looked at from the point of view of the charity as well. It may be that a charity lives on voluntary contributions and public donations. In most cases, the charities may have to wait too long to obtain the donations or voluntary contributions. The charity may also have to look everywhere, even heavenward, for contributions and donations of money and windfalls. There is no exercise of control over windfalls in the sense that one cannot say that som ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion, but a donation may be for a consideration; and a Gift must be entirely executed, while a Donation need not be. The term Donation is more aptly used to describe that which is given to a public cause or charity than to indicate a bounty to an individual (Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 38, Page 783). 56. Viewed in this perspective, we have no doubt in our mind that the 'corpus donations' received by the assessee pursuant to specific written direction from the donor to that effect as per a sample copy of the receipt filed before us that these 'corpus donations' are only 'voluntary contributions' envisage by sections 2(24)(iia), 11(1)(d) and 12(1) and therefore, we hold that these corpus donations are exempt under section 11(1)(d). 57. The ld.AR further advanced another attractive argument by relying on CIT v. Tollygunge Club Ltd. [1977] 107 ITR 776 (SC) to submit that the corpus donation, even assuming, without admitting, was collected at the time of admission, it will not form part of 'income' of the trust but would only be a capital receipt. In that case, a surcharge was levied on the admission of members into a club for the purpose of charity and the surcharge was claimed to b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... section 12A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, once done is a fait accompli and the Assessing Officer cannot thereafter make further probe into the objects of the trust " Hiralal Bhagwati v. CIT [2000] 246 ITR 188 (Guj.) " Once the registration under section 12A(a) of the Act was granted, the Income-tax Officer was not justified in refusing the benefits on the ground that it was not for the benefit of the public at large " Asstt. DIT (Exemption) v. Rajastani Siksha Samithi [2008] 23 SOT 124 (Hyd.) (SMC) " Charitable trust - exemption under section 11 - role of Assessing Officer after registration under section 12AA - after registration under section 12AA, the role of Assessing Officer is limited to denying exemption under section 11 qua income not found applied for charitable purposes and does not extend to holding that trust or institution is not established for charitable purpose hence not eligible for exemption under section 11 " " The role of the Assessing Officer in such cases stops here. But he cannot go further overruling a superior authority to hold that the trust or institution is not established for charitable purpose. Therefore, the Assessing Officer has excee ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ty Gymkhana's case (supra), apart from the other decisions on this issue cited above, we respectfully follow the decision of the Apex Court and hold that the Assessing Officer has no power to determine whether the activity of the assessee was charitable in nature and therefore, even on this score the denial of exemption under section 11 by holding that the activity of the trust was not charitable deserves to be rejected. 62. For all the reasons aforesaid, we uphold the order of the ld. CIT(A) in holding that the trust is eligible for exemption under section 11 in respect of its surplus from education activities and corpus donations received and dismiss the revenue's appeal. 63. In the result, the appeal filed by the revenue stands dismissed. 64. The grounds raised in the cross objection regarding levy of tax at maximum marginal rates will be of academic interest in view of our above finding. The levy of surcharge and interest under section 234A and 234B, being now mandatory, would have a consequential effect. As we have upheld the order of the ld. CIT(A) and no tax liability would arise, the cross objection on levy of tax at maximum margin rate, levy of surcharge and levy of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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