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TMI Blog1980 (12) TMI 181X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 5, 1976. The application for setting aside the ex parte award was filed by respondent No. 3, acting on behalf of respondents Nos. 5 to 17 on January 19, 1977 i.e., before the expiry of 30 days of its publication and was, therefore, rightly entertained by the Tribunal. It had jurisdiction to entertain it and decide it on merits. It was, however, urged that on April 12, 1977 the date on which the impugned order was passed the Tribunal had in any event become functus officio. We cannot accede to this argument. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal had to be seen on the date of the application made to it and not the date on which it passed the impugned order. There is no finality attached to an ex parte award because it is always subject to its being set aside on sufficient cause being shown. The Tribunal had the power to deal with an application properly made before it for setting aside the ex parte award and pass suitable orders. Appeal dismissed. - Civil Appeal No. 2355 of 1979 - - - Dated:- 12-12-1980 - SEN, A.P. AND CHANDRACHUD, Y.V., JJ. For the Appellant: G.B. Pai, Mrs. Rashmi Dhariwal, Miss Bina Gupta, Mr. Praveen Kumar and J.R. Das. For the Respondent: Amlan Ghosh J ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ng aside the ex parte award but the High Court declined to interfere. Two questions arise in the appeal, namely (1) whether the Tribunal had any jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte award, particularly when it was based on evidence, and (2) whether the Tribunal became functus officio on the expiry of the 30 days from the date of publication of the ex parte award under s. 17, by reason of sub-s. (3) of s. 20 and, therefore, had no jurisdiction to set aside the award and the Central Government alone had the power under sub-s. (1) of s. 17-A to set it aside. It is contended that neither the Act nor the rules framed there under confer any powers upon the Tribunal to set aside an ex parte award. It is urged that the award although ex parte, was an adjudication on merits as it was based on the evidence led by the appellant, and, therefore, the application made by respondent No. 3 was in reality an application for review and not a mere application for setting aside an ex parte award. A distinction is sought to be drawn between an application for review and an application for setting aside an ex parte award based on evidence. The contention is that if there is no evidence led before ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r other authority may think fit' are of the widest amplitude and confer ample power upon the Tribunal and other authorities to devise such procedure as the justice of the case demands. Under cls. (a) to (c) of sub-s. (3) of s. 11, the Tribunal and other authorities have the same powers as are vested in civil courts under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, of (a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath, (b) compelling the production of documents and material objects, and (c) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses. Under cl. (d) thereof, the Tribunal or such other authorities have also the same powers as are vested in civil courts under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in respect of such other matters as may be prescribed. Although the Tribunal or other authorities specified in s. 11 are not courts but they have the trappings of a court and they exercise quasi-judicial functions. The object of giving such wide powers is to mitigate the rigour of the technicalities of the law, for achieving the object of effective investigation and settlement of industrial disputes, and thus assuring industrial peace and harmony. The discretion thus conferred ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ing due to a sufficient cause, and is faced with an ex parte award, it is as if the party is visited with an award without a notice of the proceedings. It is needless to stress that where the Tribunal proceeds to make an award without notice to a party, the award is nothing but a nullity. In such circumstances, the Tribunal has not only the power but also the duty to set aside the ex parte award and to direct the matter to be heard afresh. The language of r. 22 unequivocally makes the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to render an ex parte award conditional upon the fulfilment of its requirements. If there is no sufficient cause for the absence of a party, the Tribunal undoubtedly has jurisdiction to proceed ex parte. But if there was sufficient cause shown which prevented a party from appearing, then under the terms of r. 22, the Tribunal will have had no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set aside the ex parte award. In other words, there is power to proceed ex parte, but this power is subject to the fulfilment of the condition laid down in r. 22. The power to proceed ex parte under r. 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... It is in the latter sense that the Court in Narshi Thakershi's case held that no review lies on merits unless a status specifically provides for it. Obviously when a review is sought due to a procedural defect, the inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal must be corrected ex debito justitiae to prevent the abuse of its process, and such power inheres in every court or Tribunal. The contention that the Tribunal had become functus officio and therefore, had no jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte award and that the Central Government alone could set it aside, does not commend to us. Sub-section (3) of s. 20 of the Act provides that the proceedings before the Tribunal would be deemed to continue till the date on which the award becomes enforceable under s. 17A. Under s. 17A of the Act, an award becomes enforceable on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication under s. 17. The proceedings with regard to a reference under s. 10 of the Act are, therefore, not deemed to be concluded until the expiry of 30 days from the publication of the award. Till then the Tribunal retains jurisdiction over the dispute referred to it for adjudication and upto that date it has the power ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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