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2003 (1) TMI 674

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..... disposed of. The following is the order passed by this Court on March 30, 1998: "The joint Commissioner, Commercial Taxes (Administration) Dhanbad, by order dated February 26, 1998 issued notice under section 46(4) of the Bihar Fiance Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') calling upon the petitioner to show cause as to why orders granting exemption from payment of tax under the Act be not re-called. Earlier an order dated February 25, 1998, directing the Steel Authority, Bokaro, not to supply the tax free raw materials to the petitioners was issued. Being aggrieved by the said orders, the petitioner has filed this writ petition. By order dated February 26, 1998 the Joint Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, decided to exercise revisional power suo motu and accordingly issued notice to the petitioner fixing March 10, 1998 to appear and show cause. Mrs. I. Sen Choudhary, learned Senior Counsel I, has stated that the petitioner did appear on March 10, 1998 and had taken time up to April 2, 1998 for filing show cause and the case is now fixed on April 2, 1998. As the matter has not been decided so far and has been fixed on April 2, 1998 before the Joint Commissioner, Comm .....

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..... for manufacture of finished products by way of conversion or transformation of distinct commercial commodity." 3.. Aggrieved by the passing of the aforesaid order by the Joint Commissioner even though the Deputy Commissioner had not started proceedings afresh on remand, the petitioner filed yet another writ petition in this Court being C.W.J.C. No. 1887 of 1998(R) and a division Bench of this Court vide judgment dated August 19, 1998 while dismissing the writ petition clearly held that the petitioner was Reported in [2000] 117 STC 91 (Steel India v. State of Bihar). not engaged in any manufacturing process and that the petitioner was only engaged in the process of cutting and rolling, etc., of the same product. While dismissing the writ petition of the petitioner the Division Bench took into account the definition of the term "manufacture" as occurring in section 2(n) of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 and taking into consideration the operational aspects of the manufacturing process carried on by the petitioner disagreed with the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner and held that in view of the definition of the term "manufacture" the petitioner could not be held entitled .....

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..... ecord, I am of the opinion that (a) the merit of the case regarding eligibility of the petitioner for tax incentive under the scheme was examined by the honourable High Court while disposing the writ petition C.W.J.C. 1897 of 1998(R) and the petitioner's case was rejected by the honourable the High Court and later by the honourable Supreme Court of India, on merit, (b) the petitioner has failed to prove that a different commodity is being manufactured from the raw materials. Therefore, it will not be proper to allow the claim of the tax exemption, as prayed by the petitioner. The revision petition, is accordingly dismissed." 6.. We have heard Mr. Poddar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. Jhunjhunwala, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. The only issue involved in this case is as to whether the petitioner is engaged in any manufacturing process as is covered by section 2(n) of Bihar Finance Act, 1981. Actually, Mr. Jhunjhunwala submitted that the Notification No. S.O. 95 dated April 4, 1994 defined and prescribed the extent of the exemption parameter in clause 2 of the said Notification to convey that the exemption is available only with resp .....

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..... ds brought as raw materials continue to be same goods such as M.S. Slab. Prime steel ingot, H.R. Sheet, Plate, coils, mixed steel scrap which was commercially known as such before that process.The dealer is neither registered in Central Excise Act nor paying excise duty on processed material. The argument of the learned counsel of the dealer was also considered pointing out distinction in Orissa case cited above. It has been urged that use of power is not required in the definition of "Manufacture" in Orissa Sales Tax Act and as such ratio of Supreme Court judgment, is not applicable. The argument of the dealer as to use of power is not relevant as the ratio of the Supreme Court judgment in the aforesaid case is emergence of different goods, as result of application of process. This position has also been explained by the honourable Supreme Court in Union of India v. Delhi Cloth General Mills AIR 1963 SC 791. 19.. In view of above facts and circumstances it is fully established beyond doubt that cutting and processing of iron and steel materials adopted by the dealer do not result into emergence of a new or distinct commercial commodity other than the raw material purchased. Th .....

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..... we cannot reopen these issues. Mr. Poddar relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ashirwad Ispat Udyog v. State Level Committee reported in [1999] 112 STC 207; (1998) 8 SCC 85 to contend that the scope of the expression "manufacture" has been expanded by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment. He particularly relied upon para 8 of the aforesaid judgment (para 9 in STC) which reads thus: Steel India v. State of Bihar [2000] 117 STC 91 (Pat). Steel India v. State of Bihar [1999] 2 BLJR 942. "8. Decisions construing the meaning of the word 'manufacture' as used in other statutes do not apply unless the definition of that word in the particular statute under consideration is similar to that construed in the decisions. The plain construction of the special definition of the word in a particular Act must prevail. In the special definition given in section 2(j) of the said Act 'manufacture' has been defined as including a process or manner of producing, collecting, extracting preparing or making any goods. There can be no doubt whatsoever that 'collecting' goods does not result in the production of a new article. There is, therefore, inherent evidence in the .....

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