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TMI Blog2002 (3) TMI 909X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... respondents notwithstanding the reversal of the judgment of the High Court in Venkatgiri.s case by the Supreme Court? Whether the High Court would be justified in issuing a mandamus in the changed circumstances, namely, Supreme Court reversing the judgment of the High Court in Venkatgiri's case inasmuch as for issuance of a mandamus one of the condition precedent, which is required to be established is that the right subsisted on the date of the petition? Whether the judgment of this Court in Shenoy's case [1985 (4) TMI 66 - SUPREME Court] requires any re-consideration? Held that:- Our answer to the first question is that the decision of this Court dated 6.2.1986 must be held to be a 'law declared' within the ambit of Article 141 of the Constitution and the constitutional validity of the Amendment Act 1971 is not open to be re-agitated and that the judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court holding the Amendment Act to be constitutionally invalid had been set aside by this Court. No indefeasible right on the respondents could be said to have accrued on account of the earlier Judgment in their favour notwithstanding the reversal of the Judgment of the High court in Venkatagir ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tate Government issued an administrative instruction in G.O.Ms. No. 645 dated 28.5.66, indicating the procedure for determining the final compensation. Section 39 of the Act indicates the manner in which the compensation is to be determined. The scheme of the aforesaid provision is that the Director shall determine the compensation under sub-section (1) of Section 39 and a person aggrieved could put-forth his grievances to the Director, in the matter of proposed determination of the basic annual sum and also the total compensation payable. The Director is required to determine the compensation payable under sub-section (1) of Section 39, after giving the applicant an opportunity of making his representation, either in writing or orally. The order passed under sub-section (1) of Section 39 on being communicated to the concerned land- holder as well as to any other applicant, the person aggrieved within three months could approach the Board of Revenue by filing an appeal, as provided under sub-section (5) of Section 39. Sub-section (6) of Section 39 confers suo motu powers on the Board, who in its discretion at any time call for and examine the record of any order passed by the Direc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nts herein in accordance with law laid down in Venkatagiri's case. Against this direction of the learned Single Judge, the State Government filed an application for leave to appeal under Article 133(a) (b) of the Constitution, but the same on being dismissed, the State Government did not approach the Supreme Court and allowed the matter to rest therein. Notwithstanding the finality attached to the order of the learned Single Judge in favour of the respondents, the same not being complied with, a fresh writ petition was filed, which was registered as Writ Petition No. 730 of 1978, praying therein that the earlier order be commanded to be implemented by a writ of mandamus. That application was disposed of on 28.3.1978 and the Court issued the direction to implement the earlier order dated 7.6.1977 within one month from the date of the order. The Judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Venkatagiri's case had been assailed in the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 398 and 1385 of 1972. Those two appeals were disposed of by order dated 6.2.1986. In this Court the counsel appearing for the respondents, who were the original writ petitioners before the High Court consented ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... having been allowed, the present appeal has been preferred by the State Government by grant of special leave. When this appeal had been listed before a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court on 7.2.2002, the Court felt that the decision of this Court in the case of M/s Shenoy Co. Ors vs. Commercial Tax Officer Circle II, Bangalore Ors., on which the counsel for the State relied upon and the decision of this Court in the case of Authorised Officer (Land Reforms) vs. M.M. Krishnamurthy Chetty, 1998(9) SCC 138, on which Mr. Rao for the respondents relied upon, perhaps run counter to each other and as such to resolve the said conflict, the appeal should be decided by a Bench of three learned Judges, and that is how the appeal has been placed before us. Mr. Guntur Prabhakar, the learned counsel appearing for the State, contended that the law declared by the Supreme Court in the appeal in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh Ors. vs. Venkatagiri Ors. is the law of the land and binding on all persons throughout the country in view of Article 141 of the Constitution. By the said Judgment, this Court having held that the amendment of 1971 Act is valid and it having furthe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d the High Court, therefore, committed serious error in not examining the effect of Article 141 of the Constitution in its true perspective. Mr. Prabhakar also relied upon the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in E.S.P. Rajaram and ors. vs. Union of India and Ors., 2001(2) S.C.C. 186, and contended that the very approach adopted by this Court in the aforesaid case to have a uniformity of law in respect of all concern leads to the only conclusion that the High Court was not justified in issuing a mandamus on the ground of finality to the earlier Judgment in favour of the respondents, as that would go against the provisions of Article 141 of the Constitution. Mr. P.P. Rao, the learned senior counsel, appearing for the respondents on the other hand contended that the judgment of this Court in C.A. Nos. 398 1385 of 1972 (State of Andhra Pradesh Ors. vs. Venkatagiri) proceeded on the basis of a concession of the counsel appearing for said Venkatagiri. Neither the Court examined the different contentions or adjudicated upon the same and as such, it cannot be held to be a law declared within the ambit of Article 141 of the Constitution. According to Mr. Rao, the so called o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hts accrued to the respondents in terms of the earlier judgment are not affected by the order and judgment of the Supreme Court dated 6.2.1986 in Venkatgiri's case and as such, the Division Bench of the High Court was fully justified in issuing the impugned order and direction. In view of the rival submissions following questions arise for our consideration: (a) Can the decision of this Court dated 6th February, 1986, upholding the constitutional validity of the Amendment Act of 1971 reversing the judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in C.A. Nos. 398 and 1385 of 1972 (State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Venkatagiri and batch), and further indicating that the period during which interim payments are payable under the Act ends with the date of the original determination made by the Director under Section 39(1) of the Act, be held to be a law declared by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution, or it can be said to be per incurium, as contended by Mr. Rao, learned counsel appearing for the respondents? (b) The judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in favour of the respondents passed in Writ Petition Nos. 3293 and 3294 of 1975 not being challenged by way of ap ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ints raised and decided by the Court in a given case. So far as constitutional matters are concerned, it is a practice of the Court not to make any pronouncement on points not directly raised for its decision. The decision in a judgment of the Supreme Court cannot be assailed on the ground that certain aspects were not considered or the relevant provisions were not brought to the notice of the Court (see AIR 1970 SC 1002 and AIR 1973 SC 794). When Supreme Court decides a principle it would be the duty of the High Court or a subordinate Court to follow the decision of the Supreme Court. A judgment of the High Court which refuses to follow the decision and directions of the Supreme Court or seeks to revive a decision of the High Court which had been set aside by the Supreme Court is a nullity. (See 1984(2) SCC 402 and 1984 (2) SCC 324). We have to answer the first question bearing in mind the aforesaid guiding principles. We may refer to some of the decisions cited by Mr. Rao in elaborating his arguments contending that the judgment of this Court dated 6th February, 1986 cannot be held to be a law declared by the Court within the ambit of Article 141 of the Constitution. Mr. Rao reli ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t and, as such, the observation of the Court in Nakara may be a moral obligation of the State but cannot be construed a ratio decidendi for being enforceable and applicable in all cases. It is in this context, it was observed in Krishena Kumar that the enunciation of the reason or principle upon which a question before a Court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent, and the ratio decidendi is the underlying principle, namely, the general reasons or the general grounds upon which the decision is based on the test or abstract the specific pecularities of the particular case which gives rise to the decision. Having examined Nakara's case it was stated in Krishena Kumar that it was never required to be decided that all the retirees formed a class and no further classification was permissible. At the same time it was never held in Nakaras' case that both the Pension retirees and Provident Fund retirees formed a homogeneous class and that any further classification among them could be violative of Article 14. We fail to understand as to how the aforesaid observations made in Krishena Kumar can have any application to the case in hand where directly the issue was whether ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... en placed reliance on yet another decision of this Court in the case of A-One Granites vs. State of U.P. and Others (2001) 2 Supreme Court Cases 537, to which one of us (Pattanaik, J.) was a party. In that particular case the applicability of Rule 72 of the U.P. Minor Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963 was one of the bone of the contention before this Court, and when the earlier decision of the Court in Prem Nath Sharma vs. State of U.P. (1997) 4 Supreme Court Cases 552, was pressed into service, it was found out that in Prem Nath Sharma's case the applicability of Rule 72 had never been canvassed and the only question that had been canvassed was the violation of the said Rules. It is in this context, it was held by this Court in Granite's case as the question regarding applicability of Rule 72 of the Rules having not been even referred to, much less considered by Supreme Court in the earlier appeals, it cannot be said that the point is concluded by the same and no longer res integra . This dictum will have no application to the case in hand on the question whether the judgment of this Court in Civil Appeal No. 398 of 1972 can be held to be a law declared under Article 141. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... for consideration inasmuch as the decision as to the constitutionality of the Amendment Act of 1971 is neither a general observation nor can it be held to be an observation without application of mind. The only other case which may be noticed in this connection, is the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Gurnam Kaur (1989) 1 Supreme Court Cases 101. In the aforesaid case the Court examined the provisions of Article 141, elaborated the meaning of the expression 'obiter dicta, per incuriam and sub silentio decisions and ultimately held that the orders made with the consent of the parties and with the reservation that the same should not be treated as precedent, cannot have a binding effect as law declared. We are unable to persuade ourselves with the contention of Mr. Rao that a judgment of this Court in Civil Appeal No. 398 of 1972 is merely a judgment on concession and not a decision on merits. Consequently, this decision also will be of no application. Bearing in mind the host of decisions cited by Mr. Rao and on examining the judgment of this Court dated 6.2.1986 in Civil Appeal No. 398 of 1972 we have no doubt in our mind that the conclusion of the Court that the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ated 22.9.71. Notwithstanding the aforesaid direction in favour of the respondents in writ petition Nos. 3293 and 3294 of 1975, interim payments not having been made, the respondents approached the High Court again, by filing a fresh writ petition, which was registered as writ petition No. 730 of 1978. The High Court disposed of the matter on 28.3.78, directing the State to implement the earlier order dated 7.6.77 within a month from the date of the said order. Yet, no interim payments had been made and in the meantime, Supreme Court reversed the Judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Venkatagiri's case in C.A. Nos. 398 and 1385 of 1972 by Judgment dated 6.2.1986. While reversing the Judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Venkatagiri's case, independent of the concession made by the counsel for the said Venkatagiri, the Court also held that the amended provision is constitutionally valid and further directed that interim payments would be payable only till the date of the original determination made by the Director under Section 39(1) of the Act and on the deposit of the amount by the State, so determined. The original mandamus in favour of the respondents havin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... de the Judgment of the High Court, the Court also observed that those who have not prosecuted their appeals, they would also have the benefit of the Judgment and this the Supreme Court could do in exercise of its power under Article 142 of the Constitution. We really fail to understand as to how the aforesaid decision is of any application. According to Mr. Rao, since in Venkatagiri's case there has been no such observation notwithstanding the reversing the Judgment of the High Court, those of the persons against whom, the State did not come up in appeal, their rights are concluded by the earlier judgment of the High Court and that must be allowed to operate. It is however difficult for us to accept this contention in the facts of the present case, particularly in the context of the issuance of mandamus by the Court. Mr. Rao also strongly relied upon the Judgment of this Court in the case of Authorised Officer (Land Reforms) vs. M.M. Krishnamurthy Chetty, 1998(9) SCC 138. In this case, this Court held that the order of the High Court, directing the Authorised Officer to examine the dispute in the light of the Judgment of the High Court in the case of Naganatha Ayyar vs. Authori ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, 1999(3) S.C.C. 30, which was a case arising from an assessment made under the Income-tax Act . Having examined the aforesaid decision at length, we do not find anything stated therein which will be of any assistance to the respondents in the present case. Mr. Rao, no doubt submitted with force that in Shenoy's case, the Court never focussed its attention as to the finality of the earlier Judgment and the principle of res judicata and accordingly, the said decision require a consideration by a larger Bench. But we are not persuaded to accept this submission inasmuch as when the Court is examining the question of any right having emanated from a Judgment of the High Court and the said Judgment squarely having emanated, on following an earlier Judgment of the said Court, without any further reasoning advanced and no question of facts involved but purely a question of constitutionality of an Act, the moment the earlier Judgment of the High Court is reversed by the Supreme Court, that becomes the law of the land, binding on all parties. In other words, the Judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Venkatagiri's case, holding the amendment Act t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... l as non-fundamental or ordinary legal rights, which may come within the expression 'for any other purpose'. The powers of the High Courts under Article 226 though are discretionary and no limits can be placed upon their discretion, it must be exercised along recognised lines and subject to certain self-imposed limitations. The expression 'for any other purpose' in Article 226, makes the jurisdiction of the High Courts more extensive but yet the Court must exercise the same with certain restraints and within some parameters. One of the conditions for exercising power under Article 226 for issuance of a mandamus is that the Court must come to the conclusion that the aggrieved person has a legal right, which entitles him to any of the rights and that such right has been infringed. In other words, existence of a legal right of a citizen and performance of any corresponding legal duty by the State or any public authority, could be enforced by issuance of a writ of mandamus. Mandamus means a command. It differs from the writs of prohibition or certiorari in its demand for some activity on the part of the body or person to whom it is addressed. Mandamus is a command iss ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... case. In our view, therefore, the said conclusion of the High Court must be held to be erroneous. Coming to the last question, Mr. Rao vehemently urged that the Shenoy's case requires reconsideration inasmuch it had not taken into account the various principles including the principle of res judicata. But on examining the Judgment of this Court, more particularly, the conclusion in relation to the provisions of Article 141 of the Constitution, and applying the same to the facts and circumstances to the present case, we do not think that a case has been made out for referring the Shenoy's case to a larger Bench for reconsideration. On the other hand, we respectfully agree with the conclusion arrived at by the three Judge Bench of this Court in Shenoy's case. In Shenoy the Court was considering the applicability of Article 141 of the Constitution and its effect on cases, against which no appeals had been filed. A law of the land would govern everybody, and the non-consideration of the principle of res judicata will not be a ground to reconsider the said judgment. In the aforesaid premises, the judgment of the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court is set aside ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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