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TMI Blog2006 (12) TMI 479X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ther. Life will become impossible. Hence, the meaning of the literal rule of interpretation is simply that we mean what we say and we say what we mean. In the present case, we are clearly of the opinion that the literal rule applies, and the other rules have no application to interpreting Section 31, since the language of Section 31 is plain and clear, and cannot be said to be ambiguous or resulting in some absurdity. In view of the above, we are clearly of the opinion that the recovery in question is time-barred and it is hereby quashed. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The appeals are accordingly allowed. - C.A. 5634 OF 2006 - - - Dated:- 6-12-2006 - S. B. Sinha and Markandey Katju, JJ. JUDGMENT Leave granted. This appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment and order dated 26.5.2005 of the Punjab Haryana High Court in Execution Petition No. 1-L of 1999 by which the execution proceeding was transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh (hereinafter referred to as the 'Tribunal'), for being disposed of in accordance with law. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The facts of the case ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... .1.1999. In the present case, the Bank filed three Execution Petitions. The first one, being Execution Petition No. 14-L of 1987, was dismissed on 8.11.1990 by the following order: No list of the property sought to be attached has been filed. This application is dismissed. The petitioner may, however, file a fresh execution application in accordance with law. It appears that a second Execution Petition thereafter was filed in 1994 being Execution Petition No. 3-L of 1994 by which the decree holder bank sought attachment and sale of properties which did not belong to the judgment debtors. After contest by the objectors, this second Execution Petition was dismissed by a Learned Single Judge of the High Court on 18.8.1994 holding that the decree passed against the Company cannot be satisfied by attachment and sale of properties belonging to other Companies, as these other Companies are different and distinct juristic personalities with different set of shareholders. Thereafter on 4.9.1998, the respondent-bank filed another Company Petition No. 236 of 1998 under Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956 read with Rule 117 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 seeking leave of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r transfer of execution proceedings as mentioned in the RDB Act is applicable only with regard to proceedings pending on the relevant dated i.e. 24.6.1993 and there is no provision for transfer of application filed after the said date. There is, however, order dated 18.12.1998 on record whereby the parties consented that the petitioner may be allowed to file execution petition in this Court. In view of judgment of the Apex Court in Allahabad Bank (supra), this Court has no jurisdiction to deal with the application for execution. The question is whether in exercise of inherent jurisdiction of this Court, execution petition could be transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh, as prayed for by the decree-holder. Inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred. The same can be exercised for advancing ends of justice, subject to the condition that exercise of such powers is not in conflict with express provisions of the statute. Learned counsel for the judgment-debtor is unable to show any decision or principle as to why inherent power cannot be invoked in the present case, to achieve the ends of justice. There is no express or implied pro ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... may be after such transfer, forward the records of such suit or other proceeding to the Tribunal; and (b) the Tribunal may, on receipt of such records, proceed to deal with such suit or other proceeding, so far as may be, in the same manner as in the case of an application made under section 19 from the stage which was reached before such transfer or from any earlier stage or de novo as the Tribunal may deem fit. Admittedly, the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh was established in 1993 and hence after 1993 the exclusive jurisdiction regarding recovery of debts pertaining to which the RDB Act applies is with the Tribunal. In our opinion, the impugned order of the High Court dated 26.5.2005, transferring the Execution Petition pending before it to the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh was clearly beyond the scope of Section 31 of the RDB Act because Section 31 states that only suits or other proceeding pending before the Court immediately before the establishment of the Tribunal under the Act, stand transferred to the Tribunal. Since, admittedly the Tribunal in the present case, had been established in 1993, and no proceeding was pending before it on the date when it was ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that consent cannot confer jurisdiction. In Allahabad Bank vs. Canara Bank Anr.(supra) (vide para 23) this Court observed : In our opinion, the prescription of an exclusive Tribunal both for adjudication and execution is a procedure clearly inconsistent with realization of these debts in any other manner. Since Section 24 of the RDB Act applies the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, to applications filed before the Tribunal, and since Article 136 of the Limitation Act provides a period of limitation of 12 years for filing an Execution Petition, hence now no such application can be filed since that period of 12 years expired on 15.1.1999. Hence, in our opinion the debt became time barred after 15.1.1999. Learned counsel for the respondent-Bank relied on Section 446(1) of the Companies Act which states that when a winding-up order is passed or the official liquidator is appointed as a provisional liquidator, no suit or other legal proceeding shall be commenced, or if pending at the date of the winding-up order, shall be proceeded with against the company, except by leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court may impose. Learned counsel for respon ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... law which has to prevail, in accordance with the Latin maxim 'dura lex sed lex', which means 'the law is hard, but it is the law'. Equity can only supplement the law, but it cannot supplant or override it. Thus, in Madamanchi Ramappa Anr. vs. Muthaluru Bojjappa AIR 1963 SC 1633 (vide para 12) this Court observed : what is administered in Courts is justice according to law, and considerations of fair play and equity however important they may be, must yield to clear and express provisions of the law. .. In Council for Indian School Certificate Examination vs. Isha Mittal Anr. 2000(7) SCC 521 (vide para 4) this Court observed : Considerations of equity cannot prevail and do not permit a High Court to pass an order contrary to the law. Similarly in P.M. Latha Anr. vs. State of Kerala Ors. 2003(3) SCC 541 (vide para 13) this Court observed : Equity and law are twin brothers and law should be applied and interpreted equitably, but equity cannot override written or settled law. .. In Laxminarayan R. Bhattad Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra Anr. 2003(5) SCC 413 (vide para 73) this Court observed : It is now well settled that when ther ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ention. In fact, in Allahabad Bank vs. Canara Bank (supra), the argument that a purposive interpretation should be put on the provisions of the RDB Act has been specifically rejected (vide para 34). In M/s. Hiralal Ratanlal vs. STO, AIR 1973 SC 1034, this Court observed: In construing a statutory provision the first and foremost rule of construction is the literary construction. All that the Court has to see at the very outset is what does the provision say. If the provision is unambiguous and if from the provision the legislative intent is clear, the Court need not call into aid the other rules of construction of statutes. The other rules of construction are called into aid only when the legislative intent is not clear. (emphasis supplied) It may be mentioned in this connection that the first and foremost principle of interpretation of a statute in every system of interpretation is the literal rule of interpretation. The other rules of interpretation e.g. the mischief rule, purposive interpretation etc. can only be resorted to when the plain words of a statute are ambiguous or lead to no intelligible results or if read literally would nullify the very object of the s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a sea of difficulties which it is not easy to fathom. In other words, once we depart from the literal rule, then any number of interpretations can be put to a statutory provision, each Judge having a free play to put his own interpretation as he likes. This would be destructive of judicial discipline, and also the basic principle in a democracy that it is not for the Judge to legislate as that is the task of the elected representatives of the people. Even if the literal interpretation results in hardship or inconvenience, it has to be followed (see G.P. Singh's Principles of Statutory Interpretations, 9th Edn. pp 45-49). Hence departure from the literal rule should only be done in very rare cases, and ordinarily there should be judicial restraint in this connection. As the Privy Council observed (per Viscount Simonds, L.C.): Again and again, this Board has insisted that in construing enacted words we are not concerned with the policy involved or with the results, injurious or otherwise, which may follow from giving effect to the language used. (see Emperor v. Benoarilal Sarma, AIR 1945 PC 48, pg. 53). As observed by this Court in CIT vs. Keshab Chandra Mandal, AIR ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ere pending on the date when the Tribunal was established. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that we have to see the legislative intent when we interpret Section 31. In our opinion, resort can be had to the legislative intent for the purpose of interpreting a provision of law when the language employed by the legislature is doubtful or ambiguous or leads to some absurdity. However, when the language is plain and explicit and does not admit of any doubt, the Court cannot by reference to an assumed legislative intent expand or alter the plain meaning of an expression employed by the legislature vide Ombalika Das vs. Hulisa Shaw, 2002 (4) SCC 539. Where the language is clear, the intention of the legislature has to be gathered from the language used vide Grasim Industries Limited vs. Collector of Customs 2002 (4) SCC 297 and Union of India vs. Hamsoli Devi 2002 (7) SCC 273. In Union of India and another vs. Hansoli Devi and others 2002(7) SCC (vide para 9), this Court observed : It is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, then the court must give effect to the words used in the stat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that the object is a pencil, he means that it is a horse, donkey or an elephant. In other words, the literal rule of interpretation simply means that we mean what we say and we say what we mean. If we do not follow the literal rule of interpretation, social life will become impossible, and we will not understand each other. If we say that a certain object is a book, then we mean it is a book. If we say it is a book, but we mean it is a horse, table or an elephant, then we will not be able to communicate with each other. Life will become impossible. Hence, the meaning of the literal rule of interpretation is simply that we mean what we say and we say what we mean. In the present case, we are clearly of the opinion that the literal rule applies, and the other rules have no application to interpreting Section 31, since the language of Section 31 is plain and clear, and cannot be said to be ambiguous or resulting in some absurdity. In view of the above, we are clearly of the opinion that the recovery in question is time-barred and it is hereby quashed. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The appeals are accordingly allowed. No costs. - - TaxTMI - TMITax - Corp ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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