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TMI Blog1983 (1) TMI 278X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion 27 of the Customs Act should not apply and that the time-limit of 3 years under the general law of limitation should apply instead. In general, the firm maintains that assessments made in excess of jurisdiction should not be hit by the time-bar of the Customs Act. 2. We are unable to accept this claim. The operation of the time-bar has been held to be operable in a judgment of the Supreme Court in AIR 1976 SC 638 M/s. Madras Rubber Factory v. Union of India and others. Madras Rubber Factory had imported Pyratex Vinyl Pyridine Latex for the manufacture of rubber tyres and tubes. Customs duty on the latex was assessed and levied under Item 67 of the Indian Tariff Act, 1934. The importers claim that duty should have been charged under Item 39 of the Tariff. After the importation, Madras Rubber Factory filed an application under Section 27 of the Customs Act to the Assistant Collector of Customs and claimed refund of duty charged in excess. These refund claims were late and were barred by limitation prescribed by this section. The Supreme Court ruled that the rejection by the Customs authorities of the claims of refund as time-bar were not incorrect and therefore dismissed the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... efund of any sums of money paid as duty by an importer. It is noteworthy that sub-section (4) specifically prohibits entertainment of any claim of refund except in accordance with the provision of this section (except to the extent provided in Section 26 which deals with refund of export duty in certain cases). It is not clear to us why the duty paid to have been paid as a result of an exercise of power in excess of jurisdiction by an officer should enjoy a status different from other wrong assessments and recoveries of duty. If there is such a distinction we are unable to see it. All moneys paid as duty whether in exercise of jurisdiction or not are governed by the same limitation of law. The appellants grounds for claiming that this was an exercise of power in excess of jurisdiction by the assessing officer is because the goods imported by them i.e. Oleyl Cetyl Alcohol was totally exempted by notification 45-Cus., dated 1-3-79 and that therefore no additional duty under Item 68, Central Excise Tariff would be leviable and in case an officer of customs levies such countervailing duty, he would be conferring on himself a jurisdiction which he did not have. But the same thing can ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ned by the general law of limitation, nothing prevented them from making a provision to such effect. If they did not do so but kept a time-limit in the customs statute itself, then we are satisfied that is the limit they want to be observed. We see no reason why the time-limit of Section 27 of the Customs Act should yield to the time-limit of some other Act. 4. We, therefore, have no hesitation in rejecting the appeal. 5. We should like to dwell briefly on the Appellate Collector s discussion of the case when the matter came before him. In his order dated 30-8-1980, he came to the conclusion that excess of jurisdiction can be canvassed in a case like this only when the subject goods were not assessable to Central Excise duties when produced in India, because in such a case the law would not confer any liability of such goods to excise duties and correspondingly there can be no levy of countervailing duty under the Customs Tariff Act of 1975. The case of the appellant was that similar goods produced in India would have been assessable to excise duty but that when such goods are imported from abroad, the countervailing customs duty was exempted on such imported goods. The App ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on of the principles of natural justice. It is not as if a quasi-judicial authority exceeds its jurisdiction by deciding in good faith and in conformity with the principles of natural justice an issue that it is empowered to determine. 10. In A.V. Narasimhalu s case. [ECR(C) 328 S.C. =(1969)2 SCWR 446], the Supreme Court had occasion to reiterate these and other propositions defining the limits of the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in cases where the jurisdiction is absent ab-initio or where the action of the quasi-judicial authority is in excess of jurisdiction. It was held, inter alia, that- (a) where the act is a complete code dealing with liability to pay duty and for obtaining relief against excessive or erroneous levy and other related matters, the jurisdiction of a civil court to entertain a suit on the ground that the duty was improperly or illegally levied is excluded ; (b) it would not be open in all situations where a party who had right to appeal to refuse to resort to the procedure prescribed by the statute and to file a suit; (c) civil courts have, however, jurisdiction examine to only cases in which - (i) the provisions of the statute had not been compl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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