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TMI Blog1975 (1) TMI 90X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e Governments to pass orders of detention for the reasons therein mentioned. I Section 3 (2) confers power on District Magistrates, speciually empowered Additional District Magistrates and Commissioners of Police to pass orders of detention for reasons specified there- in. If an order of detention is passed by any of these officers, "he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Governmment to which be is subordinate together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particula rs as in his opinion have a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof unless in the meantime it has been approved by the State Government :" That is the clear mandate of section 3(3). The District Magistrate, in the instant case, made the detention order on June 13, 1972 and on the 15th he reported the fact of making the order to the State Government. The question for consideration, which has been argued with some favour by the learned counsel appearing wnicus curiae for the petitioner, is whether the District Magistrate can be said to have reported the making of the order "forthwith" as required by secti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... it has a distinct and important purpose to serve. The 12 days' period which the Act in normal circumstances allows to the State Government for approving the detention order is evidently thought to be reasonably necessary for enabling the Government to consider the pros and cons of the order. Delay on the part of the District Magistrate or the other officers in reporting to the State Government the fact of making the detention order would inevitably curtail the period available to the State Government for approving the detention order. The period of 12 or 22 days, as the case may be, which is referred to in section 3 (3) runs from the date on which the order of detention is made and not from the date on which the fact of making the order is reported to the State Government. Such a delay may conceivably lead to a hurried and cursory consideration of the propriety or justification of the order and thereby impair a valuable safeguard avail-able to the detenu. A liberal construction of the requirement that the officer making the order of detention shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government is therefore out of place. Contending for the acceptance of the literal me ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... erty must be construed strictly. The rule of strict construction is no justification for holding that the act to be performed 'forthwith' must be performed the very instant afterwards without any intervening interval of time or that it should be performed simultaneously with the other act. Citing Sameen v. Abeyewickrema ([1963] A.C. 597),Maxwell says that where something is to be done forthwith, a Court will not require instantaneous compliance with the statutory requirements ("The Interpretation of Statutes"12th Ed., pp. 101-102). in Keshav Nilkanath Joglekar v. The Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay ([1956] S.C.R. 653) -a Constitution Bench of this Court had to deal with a similar contention founded on section 3(3) of the Preventive Detention Act IV of 1950, which was in-terms identical with section 3(3) of the Act under consideration. Ile order of detention was passed in that case on January 13, 1956 but the report to the State Government was made on January 21. Accepting the explanation offered by the detaining authority in his affidavit as to why he could not make the report earlier, the Court held that the question to consider under section 3(3) was whether the re ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ernment insufficient time to consider whether the order of detention should be approved. The order was in fact approved on June 21, much before the expiry of the statutory period of 12 days. The District Magistrate, it must be stated, has not explained in his affidavit why he did not report the fact of detention to the State Government promptly. The order is dated June 13 and if not on the 13th itself, he should have in normal circumstances made his report on the 14th. Such remissness on the part of detaining authorities is not to be encouraged but it ought to be stated that counsel for the State Government had asked for an adjournment to enable the District Magistrate to file a supplementary affidavit for explaining the delay. We did not grant the adjournment as we were inclined to the view that the interval between the date of the order and the date of the report is not so long as to require an explanation on oath. The date on which the order was passed may, even according to the petitioner's counsel be left out of the reckoning. That accounts for the 13th. The report was made on the 15th and there is some authority for the proposition that an act may be taken as done "at th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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