9911796707
TMI Blog1961 (12) TMI 82X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tuitously in that behalf and the appellant had enjoyed the benefit thereof. The respondent's case was that on February 8, 1944, it offered to put up certain temporary storage godowns at Arambagh in the District of Hooghly for the use of the Civil Supplies Department of the State of Bengal and that the said offer was accepted by the said department by a letter dated February 12, 1944. Accordingly the respondent complete the said construction and its bill for ₹ 39,476/- was duly paid in July 1944. Meanwhile, on April 7, 1944, the respondent was requested by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Arambagh, to submit its estimate for the construction of a kutcha road, guard room, office, kitchen and room for clerks at Arambagh for the Department of Civil Supplies. The respondent alleged that the Additional Deputy Director of Civil Supplies visited Arambagh on April 20, 1944, and instructed the respondent to proceed with the construction in accordance with the estimates submitted by it. Accordingly the respondent completed the said constructions and a bill for ₹ 2,322/8 was submitted in that behalf to the Assistant Director of Civil Supplies on April 27, 1944. Thereafter the Sub-Divis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s in favour of the appellant. The result was that the respondent's claim was upheld under s. 70 of the Contract Act and a decree for the amount claimed by it was accordingly passed in its favour. The appellant disputed the correctness and validity of the said decree by preferring an appeal to the Calcutta High Court in its civil appellate jurisdiction. The said appeal was heard by S.R. Das Gupta and Bachawat, JJ. The two learned Judges who heard the said appeal delivered separate though concurring judgments and substantially confirmed the material finding recorded by the trial court. In the result the appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed. The appellant then applied for a certificate to come to this Court but the High Court rejected its application. Thereupon the appellant moved this Court for a special certificate and on obtaining it has come to this Court; and the principal point which has been urged before us by Mr. Sen on behalf of the appellant is that s. 70 of the Contract Act does not apply to the present case. Before dealing wit this point it is necessary to refer briefly to the finding recorded by the Courts below that the contract on which the respondent relie ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he case of Bhikraj Jaipuria(1) so in the present case too Mr. Chatterjee has attempted to argue that the conclusion about the obligatory character of the provisions of s. 175(3) is inconsistent with the decision of this Court in Chatturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani v. Moreshwar Parashram (2) In that case a contract for the supply of goods had been entered into with the Central Government by the firm Moolji Scika and Company of which the candidate Chatturbhuj was a partner. The contract in question had not complied with the mandatory provisions of Art. 299(1) of the Constitution (which corresponds snbstantially to s. 175(3) of the Act) and the question which this Court had to consider was whether in view of the fact that the contract in question had contravened the provisions of Art. 299(1) the candidate Chatturbhuj could be said to be disqualified for being chosen as a member of Parliament by virtue of the disqualification set out in s. 7(d) of the Representation of the People Act 43 of 1951. In dealing with this question Bose, J., who spoke for the Court, observed that "s. 7(d) of the Representation of the People Act does not require that the contracts at which it strikes should be e ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... we do not think that Mr. Chatterjee can successfully challenge the finding of the Courts below that the contracts in question were invalid. It is on this basis that we have to consider the main question about the applicability of s. 70 to the facts of the present case. Mr. Sen argues that in dealing with the question about the scope and effect of s. 70 it would be material to remember the background of this section. He suggests that the rule laid down in the section is based on the notes in Smith's Leading Cases to Lampleigh v. Brathwaite (2), and so he argues that in construing the said section it would be relevant to refer to the English decisions bearing on the point. The first decision on which Mr. Sen very strongly relies is the case of H. Young & Co. v. The Mayor and Corporation of Royal Leamington Spa (1). In that case, the House of Lords had to consider the effect of the provisions of s. 174(1) of the Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict c. 55). The said section enacts that "every contract made by an urban authority whereby the value or amount exceeds $50 shall be in writing and sealed with the common seal of such authority". It was held that "the provision ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a representative body, by requiring the observance of certain solemnities and formalities which involve deliberation and reflection. That is the importance of the seal. It is idle to say that there is no magio in a water". Mr. Sen argues that the decision in the case of H. Young & Co.(1). offers us material assistance in dealing with the question about the effect of noncompliance of s. 175(3) of the Act and the applicability of s. 70 of the Indian Contract Act. Incidentally it may be pointed out that in England the decision in Young's case (1) has now become obsolete because the relevant provisions of the Public Health Act, 1875, were repealed in 1933 by the Local Government Act, 1933. Section 266 of the said Act authorises the local authority to enter into contract necessary for the discharge of their functions and provides that all contracts made by a local authority or by a committee thereof shall be made in accordance with the standing orders of the local authority, and in the case of contracts for the supply of goods or materials, or for the execution of works, the standing orders shall (a) require that, except as otherwise provided by or under the standing orders, notice ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d be in writing and sealed with the common seal of the authority in question renders the contract void and as such exempts the corporation from any liability to pay compensation for the performance of the contract even where the corporation may have had the full benefit and enjoyment of the said contract. On the other hand, where the requirement as to writing and seal is based not on statutory provision but on principles of common law, failure to comply with the said requirement would not afford a valid defence to the corporation to resist a claim made by a contractor for compensation for a work done by him if it is shown that the corporation had the benefit and enjoyment of the said work. This latter principle has been laid down by the Court of Appeal in Lawford v. The Billericay Rural District Council (2). In that case it was held that '"where the purposes for which a corporation is created render it necessary that work should be done or goods supplied to carry those purposes into effect and orders are given by the corporation in relation to work to be done or goods to be supplied to carry into effect those purposes, if the work done or goods supplied are accepted by the cor ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to ascertain its proper meaning uninfluenced by any consideration derived from the previous state of the law or of the English law upon which it may be founded". If the words used in the Indian statute are obscure or ambiguous perhaps it may be permissible in interpreting them to examine the background of the law or to derive assistance from English decisions bearing on the point; but where the words are clear and unambiguous it would be unreasonable to interpret them in the light of the alleged background of the statute and to attempt to see that their interpretation conforms to the said background. That is why, in dealing with the point raised before us we must primarily look to the law as embodied in s. 70 and seek to put upon it a fair and reasonable construction. Section 70 reads thus: "Where a person lawfully does anything for another person, or delivers anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously, and such other person enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore, the thing so done or delivered." It is plain that three conditions must be satisfied before this section can be invoked. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the construction took the risk of the rejection of the work by the appellant. Therefore, in cases falling under s. 70 the person doing something for another or delivering something to another cannot sue for the specific performance of the contract nor ask for damages for the breach of the contract for the simple reason that there is no contract between him and the other person for whom he does something or to whom he delivers something. All that s. 70 provides is that if the goods delivered are accepted or the work done is voluntarily enjoyed then the liability to pay compensation for the enjoyment of the said goods or the acceptance of the said work arises. Thus, where a claim for compensation is made by one person against another under s. 70, it is not on the basis of any subsisting contract between the parties, it is on the basis of the fact that something was done by the party for another and the said work so done has been voluntarily accepted by the other party. That broadly stated is the effect of the conditions prescribed by s. 70. It is, however, urged by Mr. Sen that the recognition of the respondent's claim for compensation virtually permits the circumvention of the man ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a claim for compensation can be made by A against the State Government, and in entertaining the said claim the Court could not be upholding the contravention of s. 175(3) at all either directly or indirectly. Once it is realised that the cause of action for a claim for compensation under s. 70 is based not upon the delivery of the goods or the doing of any work as such but upon the acceptance and enjoyment of the said goods or the said work it would not be difficult to hold that s. 70 does not treat as valid the contravention of s. 175(3) of the Act. That being so, the principal argument urged by Mr. Sen that the respondent's construction of s.70 nullifies the effect of s. 175(3) of the Act cannot be accepted. It is true that s. 70 requires that a person should lawfully do something or lawfully deliver something to another. The word "lawfully" is not a surplusage and must be treated as an essential part of the requirement of s. 70. What then does the word "lawfully" in s. 70 denote ? Mr. Sen contends that the word "lawfully" in s. 70 must be read in the light of s. 23 of the said Act; and he argues that a thing cannot be said to have been done lawful ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... p as therein contemplated to receive compensation from the other s. 70 would be hardly necessary. Therefore, in our opinion, all that the word "lawfully" in the context indicates is that after something is delivered or something is done by one person for another and that thing is accepted and enjoyed by the latter, a lawful relationship is born between the two which under the provisions of s. 70 gives rise to a claim for compensation. There is no doubt that the thing delivered or done must not be delivered or done fraudulently or dishonestly nor must it be delivered or done gratuitously. Section 70 is not intended to entertain claims for compensation made by persons who officiously interfere with the affairs of another or who impose on others services not desired by them. Section 70 deals with cases where a person does a thing for another not intending to act gratuitously and the other enjoys it. It is thus clear that when a thing is delivered or done by one person it must be open to the other person to reject it. Therefore, the acceptance and enjoyment of the thing delivered or done which is the basis for the claim for compensation under s. 70 must be voluntary. It woul ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mages for breach of contract if a contract was subsisting between the parties. Thus considered it would, we think, not be reasonable to suggest that in recognining the claim for compensation under s.70 we are either directly or indirectly nullifying the effect of s. 175 (3) of the Act or treating as valid a contract which is invalid. The fields covered by the two provisions are separate and distinct, s. 175 (3) deals with contracts and provides how they should be made. Section 70 deals with cases where there is no valid contract and provides for compensation to be paid in a case where the three requisite conditions prescribed by it are satisfied. We are therefore, satisfied that there is no conflict between the two provisions. It is well-known that in the functioning of the vast organisation represented by a modern State Government officers have invariably to enter into a variety of contracts which are often of a petty nature. Sometimes they may have to act in emergency, and on many occasions, in the pursuit of the welfare policy of the State Government officers may have to enter into contract orally or through correspondence without strictly complying with the provisions of s. 17 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... result of a 175(3) of the Act is to make the appellant incompetent to enter into a contract unless the contract is made as required by s. 175(3). In our opinion, this argument is not well founded. Section 175(1) provides for and recognises the power of the Province to purchase or acquire property for the purposes there specified and to make contracts. No doubt s. 175(3) provides for the making of contracts in the specified manner. We are not satisfied that on reading s. 175 as a whole is would be possible to entertain the argument that the appellant is in the position of a minor for the purpose of s. 70 of the Contract Act. Incidentally, the minor is excluded from the operation of s. 70 for the reason that his case has been specifically provided for by s. 68. What s. 70 prevents is unjust enrichment and it applies as much to individuals as to corporations and Government. Therefore, we do not think it would be possible to accept the very broad argument that the State Government is outside the purview of s. 70. Besides, in the case of a minor, even the voluntary acceptance of the benefit of work done or thing delivered which is the foundation of the claim under s. 70 would not be pr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... have expressly pointed out that the appellant did not contest this part of the respondent's case. "I should mention", says S. R. Das Gupta, J., "that the appellant did not contest before us the quantum decreed in favour of the plaintiff"; and Bachawat, J., has observed that "the materials from the record also show that the Government urgently needed the work which was done by the respondent and that the Government accepted it as soon as it was done and used it for its benefit". In fact the learned judge adds that "the learned Advocate-General frankly confessed that this is a case where the Province of Bengal was under a moral obligation to pay the respondent", and has further added his comment that "an obligation of this kind which is apart from the provisions of s. 70 of Indian Contract Act a moral and natural obligation is by the provision of that section convertd into a legal obligation". Therefore once we reach the conclusion that s. 70 can be invoked by the respondent against the appellant on the findings there is no doubt that the requisite conditions of the said section have been satisfied. That being so, the Courts below we ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he section and the view of the High Court that the necessary requisites exist in the present case. In this Court the case was argued on behalf of the appellant on the basis that the High Court was in error in holding that, relief under s. 70 can be granted where the Government has the benefit of work done under a contract with it which was not made in terms of s. 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, and was, therefore, invalid. Various authorities, both English and Indian, were cited in support of this argument. We think it unnecessary to discuss them as the basis on which the present contention is advanced does not exist in this case. Nor do we think that the High Court decided the case on that basis. It is clear from the findings of the High Court, to which we shall presently refer, that there was in fact no agreement, valid or invalid, between the respondent and the Government. It follows that the work had not been done under any agreement with the Government. No question, therefore arises as to the validity or invalidity of an agreement with the Government because of a failure to comply with the terms of s. 175 (3) of the Government of India Act nor as to the applicab ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... th certain cases dealing with the question of work done under an invalid contract but that was because those cases had been cited at the bar. We are not, therefore, called upon in the present case to pronounce upon the question whether compensation under s. 70 of the Contract Act can be awarded where goods are delivered to, or work done for, the Government under a contract with it which is invalid for the reason that it had not been made in the terms prescribed by s. 175(3) of the Government of India Act and we do not do so. Now, if the work was done at the request of the officers of Government who had no authority to make the request for Government and the respondent was aware of this, it would follow that the work had been done at the request made by the officers in their personal capacity. In such a case it seems to us that if the request resulted in a contract between the officer and the respondent under which the officers were personally bound to pay the respondent reasonable remuneration for the work, then it would be a very debatable question whether the respondent would have any claim against the Government under s. 70. We say debatable because we have grave doubts if the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ersonally for the work done. As the High Court pointed out, the officers made it clear, of which indeed the respondent itself was fully aware, that the payment would be by the Government, and, therefore, that they themselves would have no liability. They said the respondent's "estimates have been submitted to the Deputy Director for formal sanction which when received will be communicated to them. Meanwhile they must not delay the work." The Deputy Director presumably was the not officer authorised to grant the sanction. He however was not one of the officers who had made the request for the work. The respondent was fully aware that the work was needed for the Government and the officers had no personal interest in it. And what is most important is that the respondent never itself thought that the officers had made any personal promise to pay. Throughout, the respondent had been requesting the Government to sanction the orders placed by the officers, submitting estimates for the work to the Government and requesting the latter for payment; not once did it look to the officers for any liability in respect of the work done under their orders. The respondent had on previous ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... equisites of s. 70, as very correctly formulated by G. K. Mitter, J., satisfied ? We think they are. There is no dispute that Government had taken the benefit of the work. We also feel no doubt that the respondent did not intend to do the work gratuitously. It submitted its estimate for the work and was very prompt in submitting its bill after the work was done. It had earlier in similar circumstances without proper contract with the Government done work for it at the request of its officers and received payment from the Government. It was a firm of contractors whose trade it was to carry out works of construction for payment and the Government was aware of this. There is no reason to think that in the present case it did the work gratuitously. On its part the Government never thought that the work had been done gratuitously for it raised objections to the bill submitted by the respondent on grounds of bad quality of the work and that it had been done without proper sanction. The Government urgently needed the work and no sooner was it completed, it promptly put it to its use. It was plainly fully aware that the work was done for it by a party whose trade was to work for remunerati ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ne lawfully. It was contended that the obligation under s. 70 of the Contract Act arises only in circumstances in which English law would have created an obligation on the basis of an implied contract or a quasi-contract and that there could be no implied contract or quasi-contract with the Government because a contract could be made with it only in accordance with s. 175(3) of the Government of India Act. Now it has been repeatedly held that a resort to English law is not justified for deciding a question arising on our statute unless the statute is such that it cannot be reasonably understood without the assistance of English law, indeed, there is good authority for saying that s. 70 was framed in the form in which it appears with a view to avoid the niceties of English law on the subject, arising largely from historical reasons and to make the position simple and free from fictions of law and consequent complications: see Pollock on Contracts (13th ed.) p. 10. Furthermore, we do not see that s. 175(3) in any way prevents a contract with the Government being implied or a Government from incurring an obligation under a quasi-contract. A contract implied in law or a quasi-contract ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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