9911796707
TMI Blog1966 (9) TMI 136X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ter of his second wife named Supputhayee. In February 1949 Lakshmiammal gave birth to a son. There is dispute as to the question whether Lakshmiammal had left her husband about 1945 or so because of frequent quarrels between the two. Anyhow the fourth wife had also no children. In June 1953 Rangaswami Chettiar fell ill. He was first treated as an out-patient in Batlagundu hospital and later admitted as an in-patient. On June 16, 1953 he executed a registered deed of gift in favour of his second wife Ammathayee of certain immovable joint family property. Lakshmiammal when she came to know of this gift published a notice in a newspaper accusing the second and fourth wife of trying to deprive her and her minor son of their due share in the joint family property by having the gift deed executed and claimed that the gift deed was not valid. On September 4, 1953, Rangaswami Chettiar sent a notice in reply to the notice published by Lakshmiammal. Ili that notice Rangaswami Chettiar accused Lakshmiammal of having left Wm a year and a half after the marriage after quarrelling with him. He also accused her of living a life of promiscuity thereafter. Finally he said in the notice that the son ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... who disputed the paternity of the plaintiff-respondent in view of s. 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, No. 1 of 1872, had not been discharged in this case and it had not been proved that Rangaswami Chettiar had no access to Lakshmiammal on or about the time when the plaintiff-respondent could have been conceived. On the question of the gift deed, the High Court held that Hindu law did not permit a husband to gift joint family immovable property to his wife in the circumstances in which the gift was made in this case. The High Court therefore dismissed the appeal so far as the stepmothers of the plaintiff-respondent were concerned. The High Court however allowed the appeal of defendants Nos. 4 and 5 who were the brothers of the two step-mothers of the plaintiffrespondent and set aside the decree of the trial court with respect to them by which they were made accountable. There was also a crossobjection before the High Court with respect to certain properties which were in the possession of the sixth defendant. That crossobjection was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff-respondent had failed to prove that those properties were joint family properties left by Rangaswami Chett ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ame jealous after the birth of the plaintiffrespondent to her and that is why they influenced Rangaswami Chettiar against her. This evidence was relied upon by the trial court and the High Court has not disbelieved it. It is also in evidence that Lakshmiammal was living in her father s house in the same village as Rangaswami Chettiar, even according to the appellants witnesses and that Lakshmiammal s father s house was only a furlong away from Rangaswami Chettiar s house. It was in these circumstances that the High Court had to consider the question whether the heavy burden which lies on a person denying the paternity of a child born during wedlock had been discharged. It is true that Rangaswami Chettiar had given the notice to Lakshmiammal in which he denied the paternity of the plaintiff-respondent; but that notice stands in no better position than would have been the statement of Rangaswami Chettiar even if he was alive when this suit was fought out in the trial court. Section 112 is in these terms- The fact that any person was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and any man, or within two hundred and eighty days after its dissolution, the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f this immovable property was about one-tenth of the entire property left by Rangaswami Chettiar. The argument on behalf of the donee-appellant is that the gift was valid as it was of a reasonable portion of the immovable property, firstly because it was made by a husband in favour of a wife out of love and affection, and secondly because it was made by her husband to carry out the pious obligation that lay on him to fulfil the wishes of his father to make some provision for Ammathayee, which his father had indicated at the time of her marriage. Hindu law on the question of gifts of ancestral property is well-settled. So far as movable ancestral property is concerned, a gift out of affection may be made to a wife, to a daughter and even to a son, provided the gift is within reasonable limits. A gift for example of the whole or almost the whole of the ancestral movable property cannot be upheld as a gift through affection: (see Mulla s Hindu Law, 13th Edn. p. 252, para 225). But so far as immovable ancestral property is concerned the power of gift is much more circumscribed than in the case of movable ancestral property. A Hindu father or any other managing member has power to make ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on that no gift of ancestral immovable property can be made on such a ground. Even the father-in-law, if he had desired to make a gift at the time of the marriage of his daughter-in-law, would not be competent to do so insofar as immovable ancestral property is concerned. No case in support of the proposition that a father-in-law can make a gift of ancestral immovable property in favour of his daughter-inlaw at the time of her marriage has been cited. There is in our opinion no authority to support such a proposition in Hindu law. As already observed, a Hindu father or any other managing member has power to make a gift within reasonable limits of ancestral immovable property for pious purposes, and we cannot see how a gift by the father-in-law to the daughter-in-law at the time of marriage can by any stretch of reasoning be called a pious purpose, whatever may be the position of a gift by the father or his representative to a daughter at the time of her marriage. One can understand such a gift being made to a daughter when she is leaving the family of her father. As it is the duty of the father or his representative to marry the daughter, such a gift may be and has been held by thi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ft cannot be upheld on the ground that Rangaswami Chettiar had merely carried out the wishes of his father indicated on the occasion of the marriage of Ammathayee. The appeal therefore fails and is hereby dismissed with costs to to the plaintiff-respondent. Before we part with this appeal, we should like to refer briefly to the case of Natarajan Chettiar who was defendant No. 6 in the trial court and is respondent No. 3 before us. He was made a party with respect to certain properties in schedule D to the plaint. His case was that the properties in schedule D were not liable to be partitioned. This contention of his was upheld by the trial court. That is why the decree does not provide for partition of D schedule properties. It was therefore unnecessary for the appellants to make him a party to the present appeal unless the appellants claimed some relief against him. Learned counsel for the appellants has stated that no relief is being claimed against Natarajan Chettiar respondent No. 3. The appeal therefore must fail as against Natarajan Chettiar who will get his costs from the appellants but no hearing fee. Further among the properties to be divided where a gold chain (i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
