9911796707
TMI Blog2015 (3) TMI 197X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the interlocutory stage. The issue as to whether two reports prepared by the Director General, namely, Case No.29/2010 and RTPE 52/2006 are practically identical, would be examined by the COMPAT at the final hearing stage. This Court is also in agreement with the prima facie conclusions arrived at by COMPAT in its impugned order. Moreover, this Court is of the view that COMPAT has also passed similar orders requiring other cement manufacturers to pre-deposit ten per cent of the penalty imposed on them by CCI. In the light of said orders, this Court is of the view that the impugned order is fair and reasonable and requires no interference at this interlocutory stage in writ proceedings. - Decided against the appellant. - W.P. (C) NO. 3008 OF 2014 CM APPL. NOS. 6274 -6275 OF 2014 - - - Dated:- 27-5-2014 - MANMOHAN, J. Parag P. Tripathi, Ramesh Singh, Kunal Bahri and Ms. Ishita Chakrabarti for the Petitioner. Vaibhav Gaggar, Ms. Reena Kumari, Abhimanyu Chopra and Dr. Vijay Kumar Singh for the Respondent. JUDGMENT 1. By the present writ petition, petitioner challenges the interlocutory order dated 29/04/2014 passed by Competition Appellate Tribunal (hereinaf ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... was of no value. If that is so then the application made for the settlement under Section 245-C was still pending before the Commission when the amendment made by Finance Act of 1979 came into effect and the said amendment being procedural, it would govern the pending proceedings and the Commission would have the power to overrule the objections of the Commissioner. Dr. V. Gauri Shankar, appearing for the revenue, did not seriously contest that position. He accepted the position that the law as it is, after the amendment authorises the Commission to consider and overrule the Commissioner's objection. He also very fairly, in our opinion and [Vide Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed. B.J./61 dated 21-8-1989] rightly accepted the position that the appellant was entitled to be heard on the Commissioner's objections. It appears to us, therefore, if that is the position then, in our opinion, the appellant was entitled to be heard on the objections of the Commissioner. As mentioned hereinbefore, the only short ground which was sought to be canvassed before us was whether after the amended Act the order had been rightly set aside and whether the appellant had a right to be heard on the objectio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 3rd respondent, which fact has not been disputed before us, we consider that insisting upon the payment of the duty determined, cannot be upheld.... 5. On the other hand, Mr. Vaibhav Gaggar, learned counsel for respondent submits that the present writ petition is not maintainable as the petitioner has an alternative effective remedy by way of an appeal. Learned counsel for respondent refers to Section 53T of the Act, 2002 which provides an alternative efficacious remedy to the petitioner. It reads as under:- 53T. Appeal to Supreme Court - The Central Government or any State Government or the Commission or any statutory authority or any local authority or any enterprise or any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the Supreme Court within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal to them. 6. He states that in G.K. Granites v. Tata Hitachi Construction Machinery Co. Ltd. [2013] 205 DLT 355 a Coordinate Bench of this Court has held as under:- 6. A careful perusal of Section 53T of the Competition Act would show that an appeal to the Supreme Court is provided against ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... instituted, the Apex Court, considering that the order impugned before it had been passed after coming into force of the Constitution, upheld the right of appeal conferred under Article 133 of the Constitution. In the case before this Court also the impugned orders came to be passed by the Competition Appellate Tribunal much after the MRTP Act had been repealed and the Competition Act had been notified. Therefore, despite the fact that the original application was filed under the provisions of Section 12B of the MRTP Act and in view of the provisions contained in Section 66 of the Competition Act as also Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, the said petitions had to be decided in terms of the provisions of the MRTP Act, an appeal against the order passed by the Competition Appellate Tribunal, after coming into force of the Competition Act would be maintainable. 8. The appeal under Section 53T of the Competition Act is provided against any decision or order of the Competition Appellate Tribunal irrespective of whether such decision or order be interlocutory, intermediate or final though the orders impugned in their petitions are final orders. Therefore, the appropriate remedy ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... In that event there will be no 'case'. 13. In the considered view of this Court, as far as the present Petitioners are concerned, the investigations against them by the DG(I R) remained incomplete and the matter did not crystallize into a 'case' before the MRTP Commission, which could be stated to be pending as on the date of the CAA. Consequently there is no merit in the contention that as far as the Petitioners are concerned, it was incumbent on the DG(I R) of the CCI to transfer the cases straight to the CAT and not to the CCI. 14. A comparison of Section 66(3) CA with Section 66 (6) CA shows the contrast between the kinds of matters before the MRTP Commission and the DG(I R). While Section 66(3) CA talks of 'cases' pending before the MRTP Commission, Section 66(6) CA talks of 'all investigations or proceedings' pending before the DG(I R). The expression all investigations or proceedings is meant to encompass even investigations and proceedings before the DG(I R) which remained incomplete as of the date of the CAA 1999. 9. He also urges that as the two reports pertaining to Case No. 29/2010 and RTPE 52/2006 are practically identical, n ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of this Court. If that is successfully done then the provisions for other remedies do not stand in the way. We accordingly allowed the petitioner to raise the point of jurisdiction before us. 12. They further submit that this Court has the power to grant unconditional stay. In support of their submission, they place reliance upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Asstt. Collector of Central Excise v. Dunlop India Ltd. [1985] 1 SCC 260 wherein it has been held as under:- All this is not to say that interim orders may never be made against public authorities. There are, of course, cases which demand that interim orders should be made in the interests of justice. Where gross violations of the law and injustices are perpetrated or are about to be perpetrated, it is the bounden duty of the court to intervene and give appropriate interim relief. In cases where denial of interim relief may lead to public mischief, grave irreparable private injury or shake a citizen's faith in the impartiality of public administration, a court may well be justified in granting interim relief against public authority. 13. Upon a perusal of the papers, this Court finds that COMPAT in the imp ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... igation and indeed, one of its duty is to see that competition law is not breached, which is clear from the language of section 18 of the Competition Act. Under the circumstances, it has to be held that the inquiry ordered by the CCI was not pertaining to the pre Act period, but it pertained to the period when the Act and more particularly sections 3 and 4 were invoked. In that view, we do not find any jurisdictional error by the CCI in ordering the inquiry. 7. The learned counsel then went on to suggest that there was a separate report produced by the DG in respect of Case No.29 of 2010 and the DG still produced a different report in RTPE 52 of 2006. The learned counsel was at pains to point out that in the order in that case the CCI extensively relied on the report of DG produced in Case No. 29 of 2010. He further urged that inspite of relying on report of DG in Case No. 29 of 2010, that report was not supplied to the Appellant while deciding RTPE 52 of 2006. The learned counsel went one step ahead and contended that inspite of the fact that report was demanded by the Appellant by a separate application, that application was specifically rejected by the CCI on the ground that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the Writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged..... Consequently, a writ petition challenging an order of COMPAT is maintainable on limited grounds. 16. However, this Court is of the opinion that the petitioner's argument of lack of jurisdiction is misplaced as neither CCI nor COMPAT lack inherent jurisdiction to decide the petitioner's first submission as to whether Act, 2002 applies to the proceedings or not. This Court is of the view that issues of applicability of Act, 2002 or Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 and levy of penalty are not equivalent to lack of inherent jurisdiction to decide the case. Consequently, in the opinion of this Court, it is only the CCI and COMPAT which have the jurisdiction to decide the issue of applicability of Act, 2002 as well as the issue of levy of penalty thereunder. 17. This Co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
