TMI Blog1967 (8) TMI 119X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed the Bihar State Universities (University of Bihar, Bhagalpur and, Ranchi) (Amendment) Act, No. 13 of 1962 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) which came into force on April 21, 1962. Section 4 thereof was in the following terms:- Certain appointments, etc., of teachers of non Government affiliated colleges to be subject to Chancellor's orders-Notwithstanding anything contained in the said Act or the Magadh University Act, 1961 (Bihar Act IV of 1962) or the statutes made thereunder, or the Bihar State Universities (University of Bihar, Bhagalpur and Ranchi) Ordinance, 1962, (Bihar Ordinance No. 1 of 1962) every appointment, dismissal, removal, termination of service or reduction in rank of any teacher of a college, not belonging to the State Government, affiliated to the University established under the said Act or the Magadh University Act, 1961 (Bihar Act IV of 1962) made on or after the twenty-seventh day of November, 1961 and before the first day of March, 1962, shall be subject to such order as the Chancellor of the University may, on the recommendation of the University Service Commission established under section 48A of the said Act, pass with respect thereto. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... her in question had not been heard before the order was made and therefore the order was bad as it violated the principles of natural justice. That case was decided by the High Court on April 23, 1963 and the order in question was struck down on the ground that it violated principles of natural justice. Further in that case the validity of s. 4 of the Act was also challenged but that question was not decided. (See Ram Kripalu Mishra v. University of Patna)(1). It seems that it was realised sometime in October or Novem- ber, 1962 that the order of August 18, 1962 in the case of the appellant might be similarly challenged; so on November 8, 1962 the Commission gave notice to the appellant to show cause why the Commission should not recommend to the Chancellor that there was no adequate justification or reason for the Chancellor to modify the order already passed on August 18, 1962. This was a composite notice to the appellant and several other teachers with whose cases we are not concerned. The body of the notice shows various grounds on which the notice was issued, but it did not (1) A.I.R. 1964 Patna, 41. indicate which particular ground applied to the appellant. e must say that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sed in the High Court have been urged before us in support of the appellant's contention that the two orders dated August 18, 1962 and February 18, 1963 are liable to be quashed. We shall first consider whether s. 4 is ultra vires Art. 14 of the Constitution. The first ground in that behalf is that the dates mentioned in s. 4 were completely arbitrary and therefore there was no valid classification to uphold the validity of the section. There is no doubt that if the dates are arbitrary, s. 4 would be violative of Art. 14, for then there would be no justification for singling out a class of teachers who were appointed or dismissed etc. between these dates and applying s. 4 to them while the rest would be out of the purview of that section. But we are of opinion that the dates in s. 4 cannot be said to be arbitrary. We have already referred to the statement of objects and reasons which gives the reasons for the enactment of s. 4. We are entitled to look into those reasons to see what was the state of affairs when s. 4. came to be passed and whether that state of affairs would justify making a special provision for teachers appointed, dismissed etc. between the two dates specified ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the matter of qualifications, and in the matter of procedure prescribed for these purposes. We do not think that the legislature intended more than that when it gave power to the Chancellor to scrutinise the appointments, dismissals, etc. made between these two dates. We have therefore no hesitation in reading down the section and hold that it only authorises the Chancellor to scrutinise appointments, dismissals etc. made between these two dates for the purpose of satisfying himself that these appointments, dismissals etc., were in accordance with the University Act and the Statutes, Ordinances, Regulations or Rules made thereunder, both as to the substantive and procedural aspects thereof. If the appointments etc. were in accordance with the University Act etc., the Chancellor would uphold them, and if they were not, the Chancellor would pass such orders as he deemed fit. Read down this way, s. 4 does not confer uncanalised power on the Chancellor; as such it is not liable to be struck down as discriminatory under Art. 14. It is then urged that no provision was made in s. 4 for hearing of the teacher before passing an order thereunder. Now s. 4 provides that the Chancellor will ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ned in this case was that at some stage it was realised that the appellant should be given a hearing before an order was passed against him under S. 4. Therefore the appellant was given a hearing by the Commission on a notice issued on November 8, 1962 to show cause. It is true that the subsequent proceedings were in form as if they were for the review or modification of the order of August 18, 1962 and it is doubtful whether S. 4 provides for review of an order once passed. It seems to us that in substance what happened was that the order of August 18, 1962 was not given effect to when it was realised that it might be illegal and thereafter action was taken to give notice to the appellant and a hearing before passing an order under S. 4. Here again the order of February 18, 1963 is in form an order modifying the order of August 18, 1962, but in substance it should be taken as a fresh, order under S. 4 after giving opportunity to the appellant to represent his case before the Commission. The order made on February 18, 1963 therefore cannot be said to suffer from the defect that it was passed without observing the principles of na- tural justice. As for the order of August 18, 1962, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ould only mean this that the appellant had a second class Master's degree for the purpose of the post of a lecturer in Ramakrishna College and that sub-rule could not mean that for the purpose of appointment as a Principal of the Pandaul College, the appellant would be deemed to have a second class Master's degree. The High Court therefore held that as the appellant did not fulfil the minimum qualification for the post of a Principal, his appointment was irregular under the Statutes and the Chancellor would have the power to pass such order as he thought fit under s. 4. We are unable to accept this construction of sub-r. (6). Rule (1) of chapter 16 of the Statutes provides for the grades, pay scales and qualifications of teachers. This sub-rule is prospective in operation meaning thereby that the minimum qualifications thereunder would be required for future appointments. Further nothing has been brought to our notice in the Statutes to show that teachers appointed before July 1, 1952 would be liable to removal on the ground that they did not possess the minimum qualifications. This means that sub-r. (6) was not necessary in order that teachers appointed and confirmed be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s post i.e., a second class Master's degree. Therefore, it must be held that from the date the sub-rule came into force, the appellant, though he actually had a third class Master's degree, must be deemed to have a second class Master's degree, which was the minimum qualification for the lecturer's grade. Nothing has been pointed out to us in the Statutes which would take away this deemed qualification thereafter. We cannot therefore agree with the High Court that when sub-r. (6) says that a teacher appointed and confirmed before July 1, 1952 would be deemed to have the minimum qualification-though in fact he does not have it-it only provides for this deeming so long as he held the particular post he was holding on the date the Statutes came into force. That in our opinion is not the effect of the words the post he holds , for these words are only descriptive and have to be there because the provision in r. (1) (1) referred to three categories, namely, lecturers, professors and principals. 'We may in this connection refer to sub-r. (5) which shows that even if in future candidates with minimum qualification are not available, the A Syndicate can relax the minim ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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