TMI Blog1974 (8) TMI 109X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... p at Gorakhpur. On April 2, 1968 he was found in possession of a steel rod and two pieces of moulded brass shells belonging to the Railway. After the preparation of a recovery memo the respondent was forwarded to the Railway Protection Force Post where a case was registered against him under section 3(a) of the Act. Gajai Singh, Sub-inspector, Railway Protection Force inquired into the case under section 8(1) of the Act, during the course of which he recorded the statements of three persons: Rakshak Indra Deo Yadav, Rakshak Jagannath Pandey and R. K. Nandi. The statements were read over to these persons and their signatures were obtained thereon. Two others, G. S. Tripathi and Kamla Kant Yadav wrote out their statements in their own hand and handed over the same to Gajai Singh. The respondent pleaded not guilty but the learned Special Railway Magistrate, First Class, Gorakhpur convicted him under section 3(a) of the Act and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for fifteen months. That judgment was confirmed in appeal by the learned Civil and Sessions Judge, Gorakhpur. The respondent filed a revision application in the High Court of Allahabad which set aside the judg ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... entral Government as a superior officer of the Force. Section 5 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Cr. Pr. an offence under this Act shall not be cognizable. By section 6 of the Act power is given to the concerned officers to arrest without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant any person who has been concerned in an offence punishable under the Act or against whom a reasonable suspicion exists of his having been so concerned. Section 7 requires that every person arrested for an offence punishable under the Act must be forwarded without delay to the nearest officer of the Force. Section 9(1) of the Act empowers an officer of the Force to summon any person whose attendance he considers necessary either to give evidence or to produce a document . By sub- section (3) of section 9 persons so summoned are bound to attend either in person or by an authorized agent and they are bound to state the truth upon any subject respecting which they are examined or make statements . By section 9(4) every such inquiry is deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Penal Code. Section 11 provides that all searches ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... under any law other than the Penal Code shall be investigated according to the provisions of the Code, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner of investigating such offences. Provisions governing inquiries under section 8(1) of the Act are either expressly or by necessary implication inconsistent with some of the outstanding provisions of the Cede governing investigations under Chapter XIV, called Information to the Police and their Powers to investigate . Whereas section 8(1) Speaks of inquiry by an officer of the Force, sections 155 and 156 of the code speak of the power to investigate into non-cognizable and cognizable cases respectively. Labels, of course, are not decisive of the content of a phrase but the difference in terminology is purposeful. Section 9(1) of the Act confers on officers of the Force the power to summon any person whose attendance is necessary either to give evidence or to produce a document. Section 160 of the Code empowers a police officer making an investigation to require by a written order the attendance of a person who appears to be acquainted with the circus,stances of the case. By section 9(3) of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hin the meaning of section 193 of the Penal Code. The obligation to state the truth, attracting for its breach a penal consequence, must necessarily imply in the officer conducting the inquiry the power to obtain the signature of the person on the statement made by him; or else, in a prosecution under section 193, Penal Code, it would be an easy defence to deny the very making of the statement and thereby to escape the punishment. in order that the prosecution under section 193 may not be rendered illusory and the duty to state the truth should have a real and practical sanction for its enforcement, the officer conducting the inquiry must have the right to obtain the signature of the person making the statement. That creates an inconsistency between the Act and the Code for,whereas an officer conducting an inquiry tinder the Act may and indeed ought to obtain the signature of witnesses on their statements, section 162(1) of the Code provides: No statement made by any person to a police-officer in the course of an investigation under this Chapter shall, if reduced into writing, be signed by the person making it . In view of the provisions contained in section 14 of the Act, the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... two Provisos to section 8(2) of the Act. Under Proviso (a), if the officer of the Force is of the opinion that there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion against the accused, he shall either admit the accused to bail to appear before a Magistrate having jurisdiction in the case or forward him in custody to such Magistrate. Under Proviso (b), if it appears to the officer that there is no sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion against the accused, he shall release him on a bond to appear before the Magistrate having jurisdiction and shall make a full report of all the particulars of the case to his superior officer. The duty cast by Proviso (b) on an officer of the Force to make a full report to his official superior stands in sharp contrast with the duly cast by section 173(1) (a) of the Code on the officer-in-charge of a police station to submit a report to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. On the conclusion of an enquiry under section 8(1), therefore, if the officer of the Force is of the opinion that there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion against the accused, he must file a complaint under sectio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t object and are limited by it. It is significant that the Act of 1957, by section 14, makes a distinction between a member of the Force and a police officer properly so called. Reference may now be made to a few decisions of this Court. In State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram([1962] (3) S.C.R. 338.), the question which fell for consideration was whether a Customs Officer either under the Land Customs Act, 1924 or the Sea Customs Act, 1878 is a police officer within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act. The majority took the view that though the expression police-officer occurring in section 25 had to be construed in a wide and popular sense, Central Excise Officers are not police officers and therefore confessions made to them are not hit by section 25. In Badku Joti Savant v. State of Mysore([1966] (3) S.C.R. 698.), a similar question arose before a Bench of five Judges of this Court with reference to the provisions of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1 of 1944. Sections 21(1) and (2) of that Act are in material respects identical with the provisions of sections 8(1) and (2) of the Act. A unaminous court held that though under Section 21(2) the Central Excise Officer has t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|