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TMI Blog2004 (10) TMI 577X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uits had been filed by the appellants' companies and other appellants in 1989 which were decreed by order dated 24.10.1997. In all these cases complainant- Fazru was defendant no.1. In 1992 the complainant filed a Civil Suit No. 90 of 1992 in the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Nuh. The same was dismissed for default on 7.10.1997. Complainant filed the complaint which forms subject matter of present appeal on 25.11.1997. According to the appellants process was directed to be issued by the learned Magistrate on 9.1.1999. Such action was assailed by filing a revision. By judgment dated 9.7.1999, learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gurgaon, allowed the revision and dismissed the complaint. It was, inter alia, held that protection under Section 300 of the Code was not available to the complainant. Aggrieved by said order, the complainant filed a revision petition no. 552 of 2000 before the High Court. By the impugned order the High Court allowed the revision. Learned Judge held that if the present appellants had any grievance they could seek review of the summoning order with a view to get discharged in view of the provision of Section 245 of the Code. In support of the appeal, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... erests of justice that after a decision has been given against the complainant upon a full consideration of his case, he or any other person should be given another opportunity to have his complaint enquired into Allah Ditta v. Karam Baksh (AIR 1930 Lahore 879); Ram Narain Chaubey v. Panachand Jain ((AIR 1949 Pat 256); Hansabai Sayaji Payagude v. Ananda Ganuji Payagude (AIR 1949 Bom 384); Doraisami Aiyar v. Subramania Aiya (AIR 1918 Mad 484). In regard to the adducing of new facts for the bringing of a fresh complaint the Special Bench in the judgment under appeal did not accept the view of the Bombay High Court or the Patna High Court in cases above-quoted and adopted the opinion of Maclean, C.J. in Queen Empress v. Dolegobind Dass (ILR (1901) 28 Cal 211), affirmed by a Full Bench in Dwarka Nath Mondul v. Beni Madhab Banerjee (ILR (1901) 28 Cal 652). It held, therefore, that a fresh complaint can be entertained where there is manifest error, or manifest miscarriage of justice in the previous order or when fresh evidence is forthcoming." S.K. Das, J. delivering the minority judgment also observed: (AIR p.887, para 21) "The question was then considered by a Full Bench of the Calcu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to bar the entertainment of a second complaint on the same facts, exceptional circumstances must exist for entertainment of a second complaint when on the same allegations a previous complaint had been dismissed ......I accept the view expressed by the High Courts that there is nothing in law which prohibits the entertainment of a second complaint on the same allegations when a previous complaint had been dismissed under Section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. I also accept the view that as a rule of necessary caution and of proper exercise of the discretion given to a Magistrate under S. 204(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, exceptional circumstances must exist for the entertainment of a second complaint on the same allegations; in other words, there must be good reasons why the Magistrate thinks that there is "sufficient ground for proceeding" with the second complaint, when a previous complaint on the same allegations was dismissed under Section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure." The learned Judge posed the question as to what would be those exceptional circumstances. Noticing the decisions in Queen Empress v. Dolegobind Dass, ((1901) ILR 28 Cal 211), In re : K ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n a misunderstanding of the nature of complaint or it was manifestly absurd, unjust or where new facts which could not, with reasonable diligence, have been brought on record in the previous proceedings have been adduced. The second complaint could be dismissed after a decision has been given against the complainant in previous matter upon a full consideration of his case. Further second complaint on the same facts would be entertained only in exceptional circumstances, namely, where previous order was passed on an incomplete record or on misunderstanding of the complaint or it was manifestly absurd or unjust. At this juncture, it will be also necessary to take note of what this Court has said in Subramanium Sethuraman v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (2004 (6) Supreme 662). It was laid down in the said decision that it is impermissible for the Magistrate to re-consider his decision to issue process in the absence of any specific provision to recall such order. In Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal and Ors. (2004 (7) SCALE 137), this Court considered the view of the Court in K.M. Mathew v. State of Kerala and Anr. (1992 (1) SCC 217) and held that the issuance of process under Sectio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ial Statute governing that case, as noted above, has been clearly indicated. It was inter alia, observed as follows: "To sum up, the essential attribute of an interlocutory order is that it merely decides some point or matter essential to the progress of the suit or collateral to the issues sought but not a final decision or judgment on the matter in issue. An intermediate order is one which is made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment. Untwalia, J in the case of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (1978(1) SCR 749) clearly meant to convey that an order framing charge is not an interlocutory order but is an intermediate order as defined in the passage, extracted above, in Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol.60. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the observations made in Corpus Juris Secundum. It is obvious that an order framing of the charge being an intermediate order falls squarely within the ordinary and natural meaning of the term 'interlocutory order' as used in Section 11(1) of the Act. Wharton's Law Lexicon (14th Edn. P.529) defines interlocutory order thus: "an interlocutory order or judgment is one made or given during the progress of an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nd (2) that the test for determining the finality of an order is whether the judgment or order finally disposed of the rights of the parties. Thus, summing up the entire position the inescapable conclusion that we reach is that giving the expression "interlocutory order" its natural meaning according to the tests laid down, as discussed above, particularly in Kuppuswami's case (supra) and applying the non obstante clause, we are satisfied that so far as the expression 'interlocutory order' appearing in Section 11(1) of the Act is concerned, it has been used in the natural sense and not in a special or a wider sense as used by the Code in Section 397(2). The view taken by us appears to be in complete consonance with the avowed object of the Act to provide for a most expeditious trial and quick dispatch of the case tried by the Special Court, which appears to be the paramount intention in passing the Act." As the High Court has not considered the legality of the order directing issuance of process keeping in view the law laid down by this Court, we feel it would be proper to remit the matter to the High Court to record positive findings on the relevant issues. The appeal is dispo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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