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TMI Blog1960 (3) TMI 46X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d before proceeding to discuss the questions that arise. We are concerned only with Chapters IV and IVA of the Act. Chapter IV comprises ss. 42 to 68 and Chapter IVA, which was in its entirety introduced by the amending Act, consists of ss. 68A to 681. Taking Chapter IV first, we find that s. 42(1) provides that no owner of a transport vehicle shall use or permit the use of the vehicle in any public place save in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted under the Act. A transport vehicle is defined in s. 2(33) as a public service vehicle or a goods vehicle. Clause (a) of sub-sec. (3) of s. 42 as it originally stood provided that sub-sec. (1) of that section would not apply to any transport vehicle owned by or on behalf of the Central Government or a State Government other than a vehicle used in connection with the business of a railway. So under it the Government could ply stage carriages on. the public highways without having to obtain permits in respect of them. The amending Act of 1956 substituted a, new clause (a) in s. 42(3) for the old clause. The new cl. (a) provides that sub-sec. (1) shall not apply to any transport vehicle owned by the Central Government o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed scheme, any State transport undertaking applies in the manner specified in Chapter IV for a stage carriage permit or a public carrier's permit or a contract carriage permit in respect of a notified area or notified route, the Regional Transport Authority shall issue such permit to the State transport under. taking, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in Chapter IV. The respondents to this petition are (1) The Regional Transport Authority, Aurangabad, (2) The State Transport Authority, Bombay, (3) The Divisional Controller of State Transport, Marathwada and (4) The State. of Bombay. Aurangabad and Maratliwada are both in the State of Bombay. The first and second respondents are the authorities set up under s. 44 of the Act by the Government of Bombay. It is the duty of the first respondent to consider applications for and to grant, permits for stage carriages to be plied in Aurangabad region and the second respondent hears appeals from the decisions of the first respondent. The third respondent is the head of a department of the Government of the State of Bombay and is in charge of public transport work in Marathwada. It appears that the petitioner had pe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... art. 32 of the Constitution for' appropriate writs quashing the order of respondent No. 1 dated July 18, 1959, restraining the State of Bombay from applying for permits save under the provisions of Chapter IVA and respondent No. 1 from entertaining any application by the State of Bombay under Chapter IV and directing respondent No. 1 to hear the petitioner's applications for permits according to law. Various grounds have been advanced in support of the petition and these will now be discussed. The petitioner first contends that in view of chapter IV-A the State of Bombay bad no right to apply for permits under Chapter IV of the Act as it had done. It says that the order of the first respondent granting permits to the State of Bombay Under chapter IV was therefore illegal and affected its fundamental rights under art. 19(1) (g). The first question then is whether the State of Bombay was entitled to apply for permits under Chapter IV. The petitioner says that special provisions having been made in Chapter IVA to enable the Government to run its buses the Government's right to run buses was restricted to those provisions and the Government was not entitled to resort to th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ts, to secure permits to be able, to run its buses. The powers under the two Chapters are therefore difference To such a case the principle of Nazir Ahmad's case ([1936] L.R. 63 I.A. 372, 381) cannot be applied. The learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to the maxim expression units est exclusio alterius and contended that since the Act by Chapter IVA provided that the Government would be entitled to run buses under a scheme it impliedly prohibited the running of buses by the Government otherwise. It does not seem to us that this maxim carries the matter further. It is a maxim for ascertaining the intention of the legislature. Where the statutory language is plain and the meaning clear, there is no scope for applying the rule. Section 42(3) (a) appears to us to be perfectly plain in its terms. It contemplates that the Government has to apply for permits under s. 42(1) to run buses as a commercial enterprise. That being so, the maxim cannot, be resorted to for/ ascertaining the intention of the legislature and implying a prohibition against the Government applying for permits under Chapter IV. The learned counsel then referred to the case of Viscounts Rhondda' ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... State transport undertaking has been defined as an undertaking providing road transport service carried on by a state Government. Such an undertaking is really a department of a Government and in order to be able ,to provide transport service, it must be able to own transport vehicles. In fact s. 68F(1) requires the State transport undertaking to apply for permits under Chapter IV and therefore contemplates it as an owner of a transport vehicle for the purposes of s. 42 which is contained in that Chapter. The learned counsel then referred to the concluding portion of s. 47(1) which makes it incumbent on the authority considering applications for permits to take into consideration the representations made by the persons therein mentioned. He said that the persons there mentioned did not include the Government and therefore the intention is clear that applications for permits by the Government were not intended to be considered under s. 47 and if Government could not come under s 47, it could not come under Chapter IV at all. But assume that representations by the Government are not contemplated by s. 47. That does not show that applications for permits by the Government are als ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... emplate the Government as an applicant for permit. If Government is not an individual owner: then all that will happen in view of the proviso to s. 47(1) will be that a co-operative society will not be able to claim any preference over the Government. All that the proviso does is to give a co-operative society a preference over individual owners. It is not concerned with stating who can apply for permits. It seems to us therefore that the petitioner's contention that the Government cannot apply for a permit under Chapter IV of the Act is unsustainable. The petitioner cannot complain of the Government having applied under that Chapter. We are not called upon, therefore, to discuss the further question, whether any fundamental right of the petitioner under art. 19(1)(g) would have been affected by the Government having applied for and obtained permits under Chapter IV without having the right to do so. This disposes of the contentions concerning the infringement of the petitioner's fundamental rights under art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. We will now consider the question of the violation of art. 14 of the Constitution. The first contention in this regard was based on ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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