TMI Blog1972 (3) TMI 88X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pplied to the Labour Court at Delhi under s. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act) for computing the benefits and amount he was entitled to receive alleging that the appellant had not paid to him such amounts and benefits. The appellant contested the respondent s claim on various grounds. The, Labour Court framed the following four issues : 1. Whether the application is not legally maintainable ? 2. Whether this court has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition ? 3. Whether the petitioner has been dismissed with effect from 19-9-1967, if so its effect ? 4. Whether the applicant is entitled to. any of the benefits claimed ? and decided all of them in favour of the respondent who was held entitled to ₹ 5,195/- as balance of salary at the rate of ₹ 1501p.m. for the period of suspension and also other allowances, the total amount computed being ₹ 10,259.98. Before us the appellant only questioned the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the respondent s application under s. 33C(2) of the Act because, according to the submission, the respondent, having already been dismissed, had ceased to be a workman on t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n the police, service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding five hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature. It is noteworthy that s. 2 by its opening words expressly includes the operation of this section in case of repugnancy in the subject or context.- Section 33C provides for recovery of money due from ail employer and sub-s. (2) of this section reads as under:--- (2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government. According to the appellants submission, under S. 33C(2) the applicant cannot ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 3C of the Act. The decision in the Central Bank of India v. Rajagopalan (supra) also in our opinion, does not assist us in deciding the question requiring determination because the respondent before us claims relief with respect to the period of suspension prior to his dismissal and the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is not questioned by the appellant on the ground that the only relief available to the respondent is to raise an industrial dispute with regard to his dismissal. The respondent in the present case is not seeking relief against his dismissal as indeed consistently with the order of dismissal his claim is confined to the benefits and amount which. he was entitled to receive for the period prior to his dismissal. However, the decision in Central Bank of India v. Rajagopalan (supra) does trace the legislative history of Chapter VA and s. 33C of the Act and after doing, so. the Court observed In our opinion, on a fair and reasonable construction of sub-s. (2) it is clear that if a workman s right to receive the benefit is dispute, that may have to be determined by the Labour Court. Before proceeding to compute the benefit in terms of money the Labour Court inevitably ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... oyers such disputes must be adjudicated upon in the manner prescribed by the Act, as for instance under s. 10(1). But having regard to the legislative policy to provide a speedy remedy to individual workmen for enforcing their existing rights, it would not be reasonable to exclude their existing rights sought to be implemented by individual workmen. Therefore though in determining the scope of s. 33C care should be taken not to exclude cases which legitimately fall within its purview, cases which fall, for instance, under s. 10(1), cannot be brought under s. 33C; (3) Section 33C which is in terms similar to those in s. 20 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) ,Act, 1950 is a provision in the nature of an executing provision; (4) Section 33C(1) applies to cases where money is due to a workman under an award or settlement or under Chapter VA of the Act already calculated and ascertained and therefore there is no dispute about its computation. But sub-section 2 applies both to non-monetary as well as monetary benefits. In the case of monetary benefit it applies where such benefit though due is not calculated and there is a dispute about its calculation; (5) Section ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s. 33C observing that such jurisdiction could not be ousted by a mere plea denying the workman s claim to computation of the benefit in terms of money, adding that the Labour Court had to go into the question and determine whether on the facts it had jurisdiction to make the computation. We now turn to some decisions of the High Courts which directly deal with this point. In Tiruchi-Srirangam Transport Co., (P) Ltd. v. Labour Court, Madurai(1) Ramachandra Ayyar J., repelled a similar contention as was raised before us by Shri Malhotra on behalf of the appellant. In the case. cited one Iswaran was employed as a traffic supervisor in Tiruchi-Srirangam Transport Co., (P) Ltd. His services were terminated in December, 1956 under a scheme of retrenchment. Later, disputes were raised between the management and other workers regarding bonus for the years 1955-56 and 1956-57 and a settlement was reached in April, 1958 pursuant to which the management declared additional bonus and one month s wage for each of the two years. Iswaran having not been paid anything by way of bonus though he had worked during those two years applied to the Labour Court for necessary relief under s. 33C(2) of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... appellant s submission these decisions have ignored the vital point that the definition of workman specifically includes within its fold, only for the purpose of a proceeding under the Act in relation to an industrial dispute, persons who have, been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with or as a consequence of that, dispute or, whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute. Since certain categories of persons are also expressly stated not to be included in this definition the Legislature must, according to the argument, be considered to have intended to define this word with exactitude and precision and its scope, therefore, cannot be extended to the dismissed, discharged or retrenched persons except strictly for the purposes of the proceedings expressly mentioned in the inclusive clause. The fact that the definition also specifically excludes from its purview four categories of persons employed in an industry who would have otherwise been within the periphery of the definition shows that the legislature intended to be meticulously precise leaving no scope for any intendment extending the literal meaning of the language used to dismissed em ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nition is to apply to, the word workman as used in the particular clause of the Act which is under consideration, for this word may both be restricted or expanded by its subject matter. The. context and the subject matter in connection with which the word workman is used are accordingly important factors having a bearing on the question. The propriety or necessity of thus construing the word workman is obvious because all parts of the Act have to be in harmony with the statutory intent. Keeping this in mind we may turn to the purpose and object of s. 33C of the Act. This section was enacted for the purpose of enabling individual workmen to implement, enforce or execute their existing individual rights against their employers without being compelled to have recourse to s. 10 by raising disputes:and securing a reference which is obviously a lengthy process. Section 33C of the Act has accordingly been described as a provision which clothes the Labour Court with the powers similar to those of an executing court so that the workman concerned receives speedy relief in respect of his existing individual rights. The primary purpose of the section being to provide the aggrieved workma ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ore us and, therefore, we should not be deemed to express any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of either view. We are referring to this aspect only to make it clear that our decision must be) confined to the construction of the provisions of the Act and we must not be understood to have expressed any opinion on the construction of the Minimum Wages Act. In the Madras High Court two single Judges have taken divergent views and tile Kerala High Court agreed with the view that the employees under the Minimum Wages Act need not be, in the employment at the time of their applications under s. 20 of the Minimum Wages Act whereas the Punjab High Court on the other hand agreed with the contrary view of the Madras High Court. The language of s. 20 of the Minimum Wages Act is not completely identical with that of s. 33C(2)of the Act and the relevant clauses of the definition sections in the two statutes are also somewhat differently worded. Without any further discussion on this aspect we are content to observe that this judgment should not be considered as an expression of opinion on the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Minimum Wages Act. As a result of the foregoi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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