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TMI Blog1975 (10) TMI 102X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... petitioner in Special Leave Petition No. 918 of 1975, hereinafter referred to as Mangu Ram, was at all material times a partner in the firm of M/s Ram Pershad Gondamal, which is the petitioner in Special Leave Petition No. 919 of 1975. The firm of M/s Ram Pershad Gondamal owned a shop in Kharibaoli, Delhi where it sold inter alia Phool Gulab. On 8th August, 1969, the Food Inspector of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi purchased two samples of Phool Gulab from the shop of the firm of M/s Ram Pershad Gondamal for analysis after complying with the procedure prescribed by law and each sample was divided into three parts, out of which one part was sent to the Public Analyst for analysis, the other was retained by the Food Inspector and the third was handed over to Mangu Ram who sold the samples on behalf of the firm of M/s Ram Pershad Gondamal. The first sample was marked O. P. K. 169 and the second was marked O. P. K. 170. It was found from the report of the analysis made by the By the Public Analyst that both samples O. P. K. 169 and O. P. K. 170 were adulterated and hence the Municipal Corporation Delhi filed two complaints, one in respect of each sample, against Mangu Ram and the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1971, but it came to be filed two days late, namely, on 27th August, 1971. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi therefore, made an application for condonation of delay by invoking s. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and pleaded that there was sufficient cause which prevented it from making the application for special leave within time. The High Court, by an order dated 3rd November, 1971, condoned the delay as there was in its opinion sufficient cause for not making the application for special leave within the time prescribed by sub-s. (4) of s. 417 and, taking the view that this was a fit case which deserved the exercise of discretion under sub-s. (3) of s. 417, the High Court granted special leave to the Municipal Corporation of Delhi to appeal against the order of acquittal. The appeal was thereafter heard by a Division Bench of the High Court. The High Court took the view that there was no evidence on record to show that M/s Venkateshwara Co. from whom Phool Gulab was purchased by the firm of M/s Ram Pershad Gondamal was a licensed manufacturer, nor was there any written warranty in the prescribed form obtained by the firm of M/s Ram Pershad Gondamal from M/s Venkateshwara Co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... te of the order of acquittal and it had no jurisdiction to extend this time limit of sixty days by resort to s. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. This contention was sought to be supported before by reference to a decision of this Court in Kaushalya Rani's v. Gopal Singh(1), Now, prima facie, it might seem at first blush that the decision in Kaushalya Rani's case(1) is directly applicable in the present case and clinches the decision of the issue in favour of Mangu Ram and the firm of M/s Ram Pershad Gondamal. But a closer scrutiny will reveal that it is not so. The decision in Kaushalya Rani's case (1) is clearly distinguishable from the present case. The question which arose for consideration in Kaushalya Rani's case(1) was apparently the same as in the present case, namely, whether the time limit of sixty days prescribed in sub-s. (4) of s. 417 for making an application for special leave under sub-s. (3) of that . section could be extended by invoking s. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. This Court held that sub-s. (4) of s. 417 laid down a special period of limitation for an application by a complainant for special leave to appeal against an order of acquitt ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Limitation Act, 1963 enacts in so many terms that for the purpose of determining the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law the provisions contained in ss. 4 to 24, which would include s. 5, shall apply in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. Section 29, sub-s. (2), cl. (b) of the Indian Limitation Act. 1908 specifically excluded the applicability of s. 5, while s. 29, sub-s. (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 in clear and unambiguous terms provides for the applicability of s. 5 and the ratio of the decision in Kaushalya Rani's case(1) can, therefore, have no application in cases governed by the Limitation' Act, 1963, since that decision proceeded on the hypothesis that the applicability of s. 5 was excluded by reason of s. 29(2) (b) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. Since under the Limitation Act, 1963 s. 5 is specifically made applicable by s. 29. sub-s. (2), it can be availed of for the purpose of extending the period of limitation prescribed by a special or local law if the applicant can show that he had sufficient cause for not prese ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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