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TMI Blog2015 (8) TMI 1165X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... delay (45 days under RDB Act) stands extended to disposal of appeal under the SARFAESI Act (to the extent that condonation is of delay beyond 30 days). There is no reason to exclude the proviso to Section 20(3) in dealing with an appeal under the SARFAESI Act. Taking such a view will be nullifying Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act. Even if power of condonation of delay by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act were held not to be applicable, the proviso to Section 20(3) of the RDB Act is applicable by virtue of Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act. This interpretation is clearly borne out from the provisions of the two statutes and also advances the cause of justice. Unless the scheme of the statute expressly excludes the power of condonation, there is no reason to deny such power to a Appellate Tribunal when the statutory scheme so warrants - no hesitation in holding that the Appellate Tribunal under the SARFAESI Act has the power to condone the delay in filing an appeal before it by virtue of Section 18(2) SARFAESI Act and proviso to Section 20(3) of the RDB Act. - delay in filing an appeal under Section 18 (1) of the SARFAESI Act can be condoned by the Appellate Tribuna ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, and time can be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act wherever applicable; and (iii) Section 24 of the RDB Act makes the Limitation Act applicable to an application made to a Tribunal. Section 36 of the SARFAESI Act makes period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act applicable to measures taken under Section 13(4). Thus, there is be no exclusion of the Limitation Act. 5. On the other hand, the Banks would contend that: (i) Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act cannot be read as extending provisions of proviso to Section 20(3) of the RDB Act to an appeal filed under Section 18(1) of the SARFAESI Act; (ii) Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is not attracted to proceedings before a Tribunal as the period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act is applicable only to proceedings before a Court and not before a Tribunal; and (iii) Provisions of Limitation Act can stand excluded not only by an express provision of a local or special law but also by necessary implication from the scheme of such local or special law. The scheme of the SARFAESI Act by making the Limitation Act expressly applicabl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963). Sections 20 and 24 of the RDB Act : Section 20 Appeal to the Appellate Tribunal (1) Save as provided in subsection (2), any person aggrieved by an order made, or deemed to have been made, by a Tribunal under this Act, may prefer an appeal to an Appellate Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter. (2) No appeal shall lie to the Appellate Tribunal from an order made by a Tribunal with the consent of the parties. (3) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within a period of forty-five days from the date on which a copy of the order made, or deemed to have been made, by the Tribunal is received by him and it shall be in such form and be accompanied by such fee as may be prescribed: Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of forty-five days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period. (4) On receipt of an appeal under sub-section (1), the Appellate Tribunal may, after giving the parties to the appeal, an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit, confirming, m ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... there is sufficient cause for not filing such appeal within that period. Even if power of condonation of delay by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act were held not to be applicable, the proviso to Section 20(3) of the RDB Act is applicable by virtue of Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act. This interpretation is clearly borne out from the provisions of the two statutes and also advances the cause of justice. Unless the scheme of the statute expressly excludes the power of condonation, there is no reason to deny such power to a Appellate Tribunal when the statutory scheme so warrants. Principle of legislation by incorporation is well known and has been applied inter alia in Ram Kirpal Bhagat vs. The State of Bihar (1969) 3 SCC 471, Bolani Ores Ltd. vs. State of Orissa (1974) 2 SCC 777, Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. vs. Union of India (1979) 2 SCC 529 and Onkarlal Nandlal vs. State of Rajasthan (1985) 4 SCC 404 relied upon on behalf of the appellants. We have thus no hesitation in holding that the Appellate Tribunal under the SARFAESI Act has the power to condone the delay in filing an appeal before it by virtue of Section 18(2) SARFAESI Act and proviso to Section 20(3) of the R ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... xtent that condonation is of delay beyond 30 days). There is no reason to exclude the proviso to Section 20(3) in dealing with an appeal under the SARFAESI Act. Taking such a view will be nullifying Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act. We are thus, unable to uphold the view taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court. 12. We approve the view taken by the Madras, Andhra Pradesh and Bombay High Courts, but for different reasons. The view taken by Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sajida Begum vs. State Bank of India AIR 2013 AP 24 is based on applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. In our view, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act has no absolute application, as the statute in question impliedly excludes applicability of provisions of Limitation Act to the extent a different scheme is adopted. If no provision of Limitation Act was expressly adopted, it may have been possible to hold that by virtue of Section 29(2) power of condonation of delay was available. It is well settled that exclusion of power of condonation of delay can be implied as laid down in Union of India vs. Popular Construction Co. (1995) 5 SCC 5, Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board vs. Central Electricity Regula ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ineering Enterprises vs. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department (2008) 7 SCC 169 and M.P. Steel Corporation vs. Commissioner of Central Excise (2015) 5 SCALE 505. 15. As a result of the above discussion, the question is answered in the affirmative by holding that delay in filing an appeal under Section 18 (1) of the SARFAESI Act can be condoned by the Appellate Tribunal under proviso to Section 20 (3) of the RDB Act read with Section 18 (2) of the SARFAESI Act. The contrary view taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Seth Banshidhar Media Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd. case is overruled. 16. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the Bank against the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court is dismissed and the appeals filed by the borrowers are allowed. The impugned orders passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh (in appeals arising out of SLP (C) No.27674 of 2011 and SLP (C) No.36316 of 2011) are set aside and the matters are remanded to the High Court for being dealt with afresh in accordance with law. The appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.38436 of 2012 has been preferred directly from the order of the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Delhi passed by the said tribunal relying up ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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