9911796707
TMI Blog1950 (11) TMI 16X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e. According to the petitioner the order sought to be revised was received by him only on 24th February, 1948. He has filed this application for the issue of a writ of mandamus to the Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras, directing him to entertain his application and to dispose of it in accordance with law, because according to him the application was within time as it was filed within one year from the date of the receipt of the assessment order by him. The only question on the merits which falls for decision is whether the one year has to be computed from the date when the order was signed by the Income-tax Officer, or the date when it was communicated to the petitioner, or the date, if there be any, on which the petitioner had the oppo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... le rule applying to the provisions relating to appeals and revisions made in every enactment, and that each such provision in a particular enactment should be construed having regard to the general scheme of that enactment and taking into account the history of legislation in respect of the subject-matter of that enactment. He placed strong reliance on the fact that there had been amendments of the Income-tax Act and with regard to certain rights of appeal the amendments had specifically provided that time should be computed from the date of the receipt of the order sought to be appealed against, but there was no such amendment introduced in Section 33A. It is not for us to consider why the language of Section 33A(2) was not altered. The on ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he revisional powers by the Commissioner and therefore time must be computed from the date when the order was actually passed. Plausible though this argument may be, so far as sub-section (1) of Section 33A is concerned, we are of opinion that it is not sound so far as the right given to the party aggrieved under sub-section (2) is concerned. In a case falling under sub-section (1) the Commissioner acts of his own motion. There is no question of the aggrieved party invoking his jurisdiction. There can therefore be no occasion to apply the rule enunciated in Secretary of State for India in Council v. Gopi Setty Narayanaswamy Nayudu Garu[1911] 34 Mad. 151. It may be said that the Commissioner's power to call for the record ceases with ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dispose of the application according to law. This relief the petitioner cannot obtain under any of the provisions of the Income-tax Act. We therefore see no substance in this objection. The other objection is based on the long delay in making the application. The order of the Commissioner rejecting the petitioner's application for revision was made on 5th April, 1949, while the application for the issue of a writ of certiorari was made about a year after that date. We have held that though there is no period of limitation as such prescribed for applications for the issue of prerogative writs, long delay can be one of the grounds for refusing to grant an application for the issue of such writs. In this case, however, we think there a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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